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‘In an orgy of virtue, we seem to lose our grip on decency’ 
Bayliss Manning, quoted by John Rohr (1998) in: 
Public Service, Ethics, and Constitutional Practice 
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ABSTRACT 
Within the last couple of decades, a range of new concepts that all propose that 
science should be done ‘more responsibly’ has emerged within science 
governance literature as well as in science government in both the USA and 
across Europe. Terms such as ‘Responsible Innovation’ (Owen et al. 2013) and 
‘socially robust science’ (Nowotny, Scott, and Gibbons 2001) have gained 
momentum within science governance. Generally speaking, the calls share the 
view that there is a need for more external governing of science as a vital 
supplement to the internal professional ethics that also guide scientific conduct 
(Braun et al. 2010; Jasanoff 2011). Moreover, they agree that there is a need to 
enhance scientists’ abilities to reflect upon the ‘outcomes’ of their inventions – 
that is, the social, environmental and ethical consequences of introducing new 
scientific knowledge and technologies into society.  Though the calls for 
‘Responsible Science’ are plentiful, few have actually studied how ‘Responsible 
Science’ is done in practice and how the demands affect the scientific work, i.e. 
the organisation of science, the scientists’ professional identities and their well-
being at work. This dissertation examines how public scientists relate to current 
demands for ‘Responsible Science’. Based on a Foucauldian-inspired document 
study of scientific journal papers as well as an STS-inspired ethnographic study 
of two laboratories, it answers the research questions: 
 
How is ‘Responsible Science’ conducted and justified by public scientists – and 
what are the consequences of these responsibilities in their daily work? 
 
Based on the document study, a typology of ‘political rationalities’ of 
‘Responsible Science’ is constructed. Four political rationalities are identified: 
The Demarcation Rationality, which aims to exclude the social from the 
scientific production in order to make it objective and thereby responsible; the 
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Reflexivity Rationality, which considers it science’s responsibility to choose 
research areas based on problems in society; the Contribution Rationality, which 
insists that responsible science should live up to public demands for innovation 
and democracy; and the Integration Rationality, which advocates that science 
should be co-constructed with societal actors. The four rationalities describe 
idealised versions of what being a ‘responsible scientist’ entails. Each rationality 
is distinct, but it is argued that all of them address the issue of a boundary (or 
integration) between science and society. The political question is how this 
relationship is to be defined and regulated.  
 
Based on the ethnographic laboratory studies, three ‘modes of responsibility’ 
(Law 1994) are identified: Vocation, Oikos and Citizenship. The three modes of 
responsibility illustrate the responsibilities that the scientists have to live up to in 
their daily work and it is described how they attempt to do so. It is also shown 
that each mode entails a specific idea about what the scientists have a 
responsibility for: namely, the ‘truth’, the ‘business’ and the ‘public’. Each 
mode also entails specific ideas about science’s role in society and the scientists’ 
professional roles. While the scientists do find each responsibility more or less 
reasonable, the study also shows how they find it frustrating and confusing to 
navigate between all of them in their daily work. Not only are they at times in 
doubt about the evaluation criteria associated with what they are doing, but they 
also have to work hard to live up to all three responsibilities. At the same time, 
they feel that their professional autonomy is threatened. Based on these findings, 
this study concludes by asking how ‘Responsible Science’ can be developed in 
ways that make it more meaningful and less frustrating for the scientists to relate 
to in their daily work.  
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DANISH ABSTRACT 
I løbet af de sidste årtier er der opstået en række krav om, at offentlig forskning 
skal være ‘social ansvarlig’. Disse krav ses både i science governance-
litteraturen og er også reflekteret i forskningspolitik både I USA og Europa. 
Termer som ‘Responsible Innovation’ (Owen et. al. 2013) og ‘socially robust 
science’ (Nowotny, Scott & Gibbons 2001) har vundet indpas i 
forskningspolitikken. Overordnet set deler de forskellige krav det syn, at der er 
brug for mere ekstern styring af forskningen som et vitalt supplement til de 
interne etikker der allerede guider det videnskabelige arbejde (Braun et al 2010; 
Jasanoff 2011). Der ud over ser der ud til at være enighed om, at der er brug for 
at hæve forskeres generelle færdigheder udi at reflektere over de bredere 
konsekvenser af deres forskning – det vil sige de miljømæssige, sociale og 
etiske implikationer af at introducere ny videnskabelig viden og nye teknologier 
i samfundet. Selvom disse krav vinder indpas i forskningspolitikken 
internationalt set, er der indtil nu kun meget få studier af, hvordan ‘ansvarlig 
forskning’ bliver gjort i praksis og hvordan det påvirker det videnskabelige 
arbejde, dvs. organiseringen af det videnskabelige arbejde, den videnskabelige 
profession og forskernes generelle tilfredshed med deres arbejde. Dette 
forskningsprojekt undersøger, hvordan offentlige forskere forholder sig til disse 
krav om ‘ansvarlighed’. Baseret op Foucault-inspireret dokumentstudie af 
videnskabelige artikler og et STS-inspireret etnografisk studie af to laboratorier, 
svarer det på forskningsspørgsmålene: 
 
Hvordan bliver ‘ansvarlig forskning’ foretaget og retfærdiggjort af offentlige 
forskere og hvad er konsekvenserne af at skulle leve op til bestemte former for 
ansvar i forskernes daglige arbejde? 
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Projektet udvikler, baseret på en dokumentstudie, en typologi over ‘politiske 
rationaliteter’ om ansvarlig forskning. Fire politiske rationaliteter identificeres. 
‘Afgrænsningsrationaliteten’, som søger at ekskludere det ’sociale’ fra den 
‘videnskabelige’ produktion for at gøre forskningen objektiv og dermed 
ansvarlig. ‘Refleksivitetsrationaliteten’, som ser det som videnskabens ansvar at 
lade sig guide af problemer i samfundet i sit valg af forskningsområde. 
‘Bidragsrationaliteten’, som anser det for vitalt, at forskningen lever op til 
samfundets krav om demokrati og innovation og til sidst 
‘Integrationsrationaliteten’, som advokerer for, at forskningen skal skabes i tæt 
samarbejde med samfundets andre aktører. De fire rationaliteter beskriver hver 
især idealer for, hvad det vil sige at være en ‘ansvarlig forsker’. Hver rationalitet 
er distinkt, men der argumenteres for, at de alle adresserer en problematik om en 
‘grænse’ mellem forskning og samfund. Det politiske spørgsmål bliver i 
forlængelse heraf, hvordan denne grænse skal defineres og reguleres.  
 
Baseret på et etnografisk laboratoriestudie bliver tre ‘modes of responsibility’ 
(Law 1994) identificeret. De får navnene ‘Kald’, ‘Oikos’ og ‘Medborgerskab’. 
De tre ‘modes’ illustrerer de former for ansvar, som forskerne har i deres daglige 
arbejde og det er beskrevet, hvordan de forsøger at leve op til dem. Det bliver 
også vist, at hvert ‘mode’ indeholder en distinkt, abstrakt ide om, hvad man har 
ansvar for, nemlig ‘sandheden’, ‘organisationen’ og ‘offentligheden’. Hvert 
‘mode’ indeholder også en forestilling om forskningens rolle i samfundet og 
forskerens professionelle rolle. Selvom forskerne finder hver form for ansvar 
nogenlunde fornuftigt, viser studiet også, at de finder det frustrerende og 
forvirrende at navigere imellem dem alle tre i deres daglige arbejde. Samtidig 
føler de, at deres professionelle autonomi er truet. Baseret på disse resultater 
bliver afhandlingen konkluderet med at spørge, hvordan der kan arbejdes med 
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‘ansvarlig forskning’ på en måde, som forskerne finder mere meningsfuld og 
mindre frustrerende i deres daglige arbejde.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 20 
t is early summer and, fortunately, also the final months of this research 
project. In addition, it is the week before the biannual, European science 
fair, ‘Euroscience Open Forum’1 (ESOF), occupies Copenhagen. As I cycle 
home from work, posters along the road, at bus stops and surrounding the 
continuing roadwork try to entice me to go to the fair, pointing both to the 
wonders of science and to science’s immediate relevance to me by stating: 
‘Science is a power-nap’, ‘Science is out of space’, ‘Science is Art’ and ‘Science 
is YOU’.  
 
ESOF is arranged with the threefold goal to: ‘showcase the latest advances in 
science and technology; promote a dialogue on the role of science and 
technology in society and public policy; stimulate and provoke public interest, 
excitement and debate about science and technology.’ And it is supposed to 
attract the ‘top researchers from all sciences; business leaders; senior EU and 
government officials and international scientific media. They come to discuss 
the best of European science and to address all of the current major global 
scientific challenges, including energy, climate, food and health.’2 
 
The public part of the event, where citizens and participants are invited to 
explore the intriguing world of science, is grander than it has ever been before. 
While the fair itself is not accessible to the public, the “Science in the City” 
Festival invites the public in. It takes place at the same venue as the rest of the 
fair, the former factory grounds of the international brewery Carlsberg, which is 
near the city centre of Copenhagen. Carlsberg has now moved most of its 
production away from the grounds, which are now going to be turned into a 
brand-new residential part of the city. The placement of ESOF and “Science in 
                                                
1 ESOF is organised by ‘Euroscience’, a European non-profit grassroots organisation, who represents European public and corporate 
scientists as well as public universities and research institutes. From www.euroscience.org/welcome-to-euroscience 25.08.2014 
2 From www.esof2014.org/info/about 25.08.2014  
I 
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the City” in itself feels symbolic: Carlsberg is one of Denmark’s most successful 
international companies. Moreover, Carlsberg’s brewing methods have since its 
founding been based on, at the time, revolutionary scientific knowledge about 
fermentation and yeast; knowledge that the founder shared with other brewers 
across Europe at no cost. The Carlsberg foundation has been a substantial 
provider of funding for Danish research and art for more than a hundred years. 
Carlsberg itself still has big laboratories and conducts science, and it therefore 
only seems fitting that an event that is supposed to bring together the public, 
industry, policy-makers and science in order to produce ‘dialogue on the role of 
science and technology in society’ takes place on these historical grounds.  
 
Representatives from most of the Danish universities are in attendance at the 
“Science in the City” festival, with each university giving presentations of their 
cutting-edge research, mixed with exercises that are meant to activate the 
visitors in various ways, so they can understand, discuss, respond, marvel, and 
engage. The festival is huge. Among hundreds of activities, there are, for 
instance, small talks (five minutes maximum) given by scientists about their 
own research; there is a large sculpture of the Nordic ice cap, which children can 
climb; the Department of French from Copenhagen University serves French 
crêpes; and Copenhagen Business School presents interpretations of the recent 
financial crisis. The tent of the Danish Technical University seems to be the 
most popular one. Here, you can, for instance, try to tattoo your name on an 
apple with the newest laser-technology, experiment with a 3D printer and look 
under the bonnet of an electric car. But what are the fair and the public festival 
all about? Why are so many resources and so much energy being put into the 
organisation of this festival?  
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The European Commission regards European science as a lever for the 
European economy and general welfare after the financial crisis. Europe must 
produce science that benefits its citizens and its markets. As the Commission 
said about their next funding programme for research and innovation, Horizon 
2020: 
 
‘Seen as a means to drive economic growth and create jobs, Horizon 2020 has 
the political backing of Europe’s leaders and the Members of the European 
Parliament. They agreed that research is an investment in our future and so put 
it at the heart of the EU’s blueprint for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth 
and jobs.’3 
 
Science is supposed to be sustainable, relevant to the common European future 
and create inclusive growth. This presumably requires a lot of effort for those 
who are supposed to conduct the science. The inclusion of people, networks 
between scientists, industry, policy and the public is needed to make these 
visions a reality – as the Horizon 2020 webpage also states. ESOF and the 
“Science in the City” festival can be interpreted as an effort to do so – initiated 
by Euroscience – a grassroots organisation for European scientists.  
 
However, it is not only in the EU that this seems to be the goal. As Strathern 
(2000) argues: ‘the twinned precepts of economic efficiency and good practice’ 
are pervasive on a global scale as a specific form of government culture that is 
visible in strategies such as ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’, ‘Good 
Governance programs’ and the ‘Rio declaration’ (Strathern 2000: 2). This 
dissertation is occupied with this kind of government in the domain of science, 
in which it takes particular forms. ‘Social responsibility’ has emerged as a 
                                                
3 From www.ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/what-horizon-2020 20.08.14 
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particular concern within science over the last three decades. It can perhaps best 
be described as a particular discourse or rationality that is both apparent in 
academic literature and political practice in the Western world. At the 
international policy level, the rationality is visible in soft law initiatives by the 
EU and UN, but it has also spread to national policies in, for instance, the UK, 
the USA and Denmark. Yet there is no clear, coherent definition of what this 
‘responsibility’ is, even though it is underlined as being important (Davies and 
Horst 2012). Despite the lack of a coherent definition or precise protocols of 
practice, a certain agreement seems to manifest itself around the two themes of 
economic growth and democratisation. In order to be socially responsible, 
science should preferably produce innovation, while democratic participation 
and public debate are supposed to secure the balancing of the outcomes, so that 
the knowledge and technologies are considered legitimate  
 
While this dual focus may be a recent phenomenon, the idea that science has 
responsibilities toward society is not. Historically, there have been several 
notable discussions of science’s moral responsibility in relation to the 
development of new and potentially very dangerous technologies. The 
Manhattan Project – the development of the atom bomb during WW2 – is one 
noteworthy example. In the seventies, the discovery of recombinant DNA and 
its far-reaching potentials for biological design spurred the Asilomar 
conferences, where the scientists’ ability to govern themselves responsibly was 
on the agenda (Braun et al. 2010). These discussions inspired new governmental 
organisations such as ethics committees in a number of countries and instigated 
more general discussions of the most optimal way to govern science. Many 
technological developments between these two incidents kept the debates alive 
because they were seen as controversial, specifically, the use of nuclear power 
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as an energy source, the development of the hydrogen bomb and the first IVF 
technologies.  
 
In the eighties, the gradual discovery of far-reaching environmental disasters 
due to human inventions led sociologist Ulrich Beck (1986/1992) to suggest that 
we now lived in a ‘Risk Society’. This notion implies a society where both social 
structures and material objects are (perhaps) pervaded by the negative, 
unintended side effects of technologies. The other side of the coin of the ‘Risk 
Society’ is that we always imagine the world as uncertain and risky – even when 
it is perhaps not. Around the same time, the philosopher Hans Jonas suggested 
that it is ‘not a sin to delay a benefit’ of a technology and advocated for a new 
‘responsibility’ paradigm (1981). These works were followed by requests to 
enhance the ‘reflexivity’ of science and integrate social values and democratic 
decision-making into the techno-scientific developments (Wynne 1994; Irwin 
and Wynne 1996; Irwin 1995) 
 
These debates about science’s moral obligations and controversial technologies 
have been running parallel to debates about public science’s role in modern 
society. Since the end of WW2, science has become deeply integrated within the 
government’s structure. The US government, for instance, has historically been 
the frontrunner in funding both basic and applied sciences and demanding 
groundbreaking technologies in return – not least in the area of national defence 
(Smith 1990). Later, notions of ‘globalization’ and ‘the knowledge economy’ 
gained momentum in policy discourse at the same time as the demands for 
scientists to become ‘innovators’ and ‘drivers of the knowledge economy’ 
became prominent. With these developments, the role assigned to public 
scientists has also changed. Several university reforms have been initiated since 
the eighties. The biggest changes meant that scientists were now expected to 
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compete for funding and establish close collaborations with industry. All in all, 
they were designated a role as part of a public-private network, as opposed to 
being firmly rooted and paid by the state. The notion of the ‘entrepreneurial 
scientist’ was developed to describe this new role (Etzkowitz 1989).  
Meanwhile, older professional norms on how to conduct oneself and one’s work 
have also survived the eras of fluctuating science-society relationships. Weber 
describes ‘The Scientific Vocation’ as a disciplined pursuit of knowledge in 
1917(Weber, Owen, and Strong 2004), and Merton (1973) emphasises that 
strong norms within the professional community of scientists such as objectivity 
and scepticism guide their daily work. These ideas about the scientific job are 
still pervasive within scientific communities, despite the changing role of 
science in society.  
 
While the ‘entrepreneurial scientist’ and the consequences of the ‘marketization’ 
of the universities have been objects of study for some time (Etzkowitz 2003; 
Mirowski 2011; Hackett 2014) few have made studies of how the research 
organisations and the practising scientists are affected by demands to become 
more ‘responsible’. One of the few examples is a recent study by McCarthy and 
Kelty (McCarthy and Kelty 2010), which shows that scientists translate the 
rather diffuse demands for ‘responsibility’ into specific, meaningful tasks so as 
to make them ‘do-able’ in their daily work. In the case study by McCarthy and 
Kelty (2010), ‘do-able responsibility’ becomes two practical tasks: The first task 
is to work to protect the discipline (nanotechnology) and the scientific 
community against critique, and the second task is then to protect society from 
the eventual negative implications of nanotechnology by doing more research.  
 
This study takes its point of departure in the lack of focus on the practical 
aspects of doing responsibility. Similar to Mccarthy and Kelty (2010), it focuses 
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on the specific practical work connected to being a ‘responsible’ scientist. This 
study will focus on the questions of what a scientist needs to do in order to be 
‘responsible’ and how that can be related to the emergent government rationality 
that I described above – or other rationalities. Of particular interest is how the 
notion of responsibility affects broader concerns in the research organisation, 
such as the idea of the boundaries between the organisation and its environment, 
the relationship between the daily work and the profession, the scientists’ ideas 
about science’s role in society and, not least, the emotional well-being of those 
working in science.  
 
By stating that I look at the connections between rationalities and ‘daily work’, I 
also endeavour to emphasise that the angle of this study is on science as a type 
of work, that is, a job. This is in contrast to many recent studies of science, 
which have focused on the practice of fact-making (e.g. Latour 1987; Cetina 
2009; Pickering 1992) With the term ‘work’, I indicate that there are certain 
expectations of science that extend beyond the scientists’ abilities to produce 
facts and technologies that come from it being a job. There are expectations of 
the pace and quality of the scientists’ work and of the ways by which they get 
rewarded for their endeavours. There are expectations of science’s obligations 
and of the scientists’ ideas about careers and advancements. On the other hand, I 
also emphasise that the assemblage of practices is not that special. While the 
expectations may look different, depending on the profession, we all have 
expectations of how jobs such as nursing, school teaching or accounting should 
ideally be conducted. In this dissertation, not only do I look at the scientific 
endeavours as a type of work, but I also look at a special part of that work; 
namely, ‘Public Science’. This is because I believe that there are some special 
expectations of public science that are not present in corporate science, even 
though many argue that these terms do not necessarily make sense anymore as 
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the two domains have become increasingly entangled. These preliminary 
excursions lead me to the following research question: 
 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION: 
 
How is responsible science conducted and justified by public scientists – and 
what are the consequences of these responsibilities in their daily work? 
 
1.2.1 CLARIFICATIONS 
The term ‘responsible science’, refers to the scientists’ own ideas about what it 
means to be responsible at work4. The terms ‘conducted’ and ‘justified’ indicate 
that I look at the connections between the scientists’ daily work practices and 
their general ideas of science’s role in society. The term ‘consequences’ 
indicates that I interested in the effects of such responsibilities on the 
organisation of research and the scientists’ wellbeing. The study is based on a 
document analysis and an ethnographic study of two laboratories working in the 
field of Synthetic Biology. See the chapters Methods and Methodological 
Considerations for further details.  
 
  
                                                
4 I use this term in two ways: To describe the scientists’ own ideas about what is ’responsible’ (as in the research question) and as an 
umbrella term for new science governance initiatives such as ’Responsible Innovation’ and ’Socially robust science’ (see Theory Section). 
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2. THEORY  
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n this chapter, I will describe the theoretical framework for this dissertation 
and, in doing so, describe how I situate the theme of ‘Responsible Science’ 
within a government theory framework. The reason for choosing such a 
framework is that the theme inherently addresses the question of how science 
should be conducted in the most optimal way and how it should be governed in 
order to do so. Therefore, I draw on Foucauldian studies of power and politics in 
order to understand the phenomena (e.g. Foucault 1993a/b) as well as science 
governance studies from the field of STS. Given that the main task of this study 
is to show how scientists actually conduct and justify ‘Responsible Science’ in 
their everyday work life, I will also include perspectives from the sociology of 
science that focus on how different institutional conditions affect everyday 
science (Lynch 1997).  
 
In this chapter, I will first address the current calls for ‘Responsible Science’.5 I 
argue that they share a concern for science’s lack of democratic accountability 
and that they propose ways to introduce such accountability through dialogue 
and participation. I argue that the recent calls can be seen as a shift in the 
hitherto ways of governing science, an argument that I support with examples of 
recent developments in the government of science in the USA, the UK and 
Denmark. Following that, I examine the demands for responsibility in a 
historical context, demonstrating that the theme of ‘responsibility’ as it is 
articulated now relies on a long history of debate regarding the role of science in 
society. Finally, I consider the calls in relation to broader developments in how 
the public sector should be governed and show the similarities between the calls 
for ‘Responsible Science’ and a range of other demands for accountability in 
public service in general. In doing so, I also underline the perspective that the 
                                                
5 As I show on this page, these demands have many different names. Since I consider them as representing roughly the same normative 
stance on how science should be conducted because, the conduct they advocate and the justifications for it are similar, I have not chosen to 
address one of them specifically throughout this study. Instead, I refer to these new demands for more responsibility in science as 
‘Responsible Science’. I also use this term, when I refer to ideas about responsibility among the scientists in the ethnographic field work.  
I 
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development of science’s role in society is intimately interlinked with changes 
in ideas about the most optimal way to govern the public sector in general.  
 
 
2.1 WHAT IS ‘RESPONSIBLE SCIENCE’? 
Within the last couple of decades, a range of new concepts that all propose how 
science should be done ‘more responsibly’ have emerged within the field of 
science governance – including various places in science politics across Europe 
and the USA. Terms such as ‘Responsible Innovation’ (Owen et al. 2013) 
‘Anticipatory Governance’ (Guston and Sarewitz 2002), ‘socially robust 
science’ (Nowotny, Scott, and Gibbons 2001) and ‘upstream public 
engagement’ (Wilsdon and Willis 2004) have gained momentum within science 
government literature.6 In this project, these calls are seen as attempts to steer 
public science in certain directions. They are seen as representing and 
articulating a specific ‘rationality’ (Gordon 1991; Miller and Rose 1990a, 1-31) 
that is, they have similar views on what is problematic about the way science is 
conducted in its current incarnation and how science and science government 
can be organised differently in order to be more ‘responsible’. As such, the calls 
for ‘Responsible Science’ are interpreted within a Foucauldian understanding of 
power and government, an understanding that I will unfold thoroughly in 
chapter 5. Generally speaking, the calls share the view that there is a need for 
more external governing of science as a vital supplement to the internal 
professional ethics that also guide scientific conduct (Braun et al. 2010; Jasanoff 
2011). Moreover, they agree that there is a need to enhance scientists’ abilities 
to reflect upon the ‘outcomes’ of their inventions – that is, the social, 
                                                
6 Throughout this dissertation, I use the Foucauldian notion of ‘government’ as a broad term for the steering of a specific area. In line with 
Foucault, I do not consider ‘government’ something exclusively performed by elected officials, but rather as the general act of ‘structuring a 
possible field of action’ (Foucault 1993a: 237). Within public administration theory, some distinguish between ‘government’ as the 
exercising of parliamentary rule, while ‘governance’ is considered a specific government paradigm where power is diffused from central 
administrations to ‘networks’ of heterogeneous actors, and the conduct of government is changed from formal rule to ‘soft’ forms of steering 
(Rhodes 1996; Torfing & Sørensen 2005). The literature on science politics is usually referred to as ‘science governance literature’ and I 
therefore keep that notion.  
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environmental and ethical consequences of introducing scientific knowledge and 
technologies into society. This enhanced reflexivity is supposed to come about 
by different means such as increasing the use of foresight studies, more direct 
public engagement and interdisciplinary collaborations between scientists and 
social scientists, with the latter being able to include broader reflections on the 
outcomes (Macnaghten, Kearnes, and Wynne 2005). The overall aim of this 
rationality is to achieve the dual goal of increased democracy through public 
participation and producing innovative technologies through publically 
legitimated knowledge (Kearnes and Rip 2009). Irwin (2006) even talks about 
‘the new governance of science’; thereby indicating that we are currently 
witnessing a significant shift in the way science is steered. The theme of 
‘Responsible Science’ is thus closely related to the question of what science’s 
role in society should be and what the central tasks of scientists are. Public 
science is, furthermore, part of public service and thus also entangled in 
questions about eventual special responsibilities and the general role of the 
public sector in society.    
 
While the specific features of ‘Responsible Science’ may be new, the idea that 
scientists have responsibilities is not. Science and scientists’ responsibilities 
have been discussed at least since Weber gave his lecture ‘Science as a 
Vocation’ in 1917, where he described an ‘Americanisation’ of the German 
university and increased pressures on the scientific profession as free to pursuit a 
search for ‘clarity’ (Weber, Owen, and Strong 2004: 12) Merton famously 
described the CUDOS: ‘Communalism’, ‘Universalism’, ‘Disinterestedness’ and 
‘Organised Scepticism’ as institutional norms or ideals that guide the scientific 
profession (Merton 1973). While they have been criticised for being far away 
from the everyday work of scientists, many working scientists still consider 
them as ideals, they should try to live up to. The responsibilities of scientists 
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were also a significant theme in the aftermath of the Second World War. 
Scientific knowledge had played a large role in securing the Allies’ victory via 
the development of the atom bomb. But this invention also basically gave rise to 
the questioning of science’s purpose and values: Was the atom bomb a way of 
‘helping mankind’ or was it the final proof of the profession’s irresponsibility? 
While this was being debated, science, especially basic natural science, enjoyed 
a ‘golden age’. With the USA as frontrunners, the rationale was that if scientists 
were left alone with plenty of resources, they would eventually lay ‘the golden 
egg’: A brilliant invention that could be applied in industry (Shapin 2009: 72). 
At the time, this was the foremost responsibility of science. Meanwhile, 
scientific innovation was continuously being questioned in relation to new 
technologies that were seen as controversial such as the discovery of the double 
helix structure of DNA in the fifties. This discovery led to the ‘Asilomar 
Conferences’ in the seventies, where the ‘responsibility’ of scientists and their 
ability to govern themselves was again on the agenda in relation to the growing 
field of biotechnology. There have been different interpretations of the 
conferences; some consider them a defensive strategy enabling the scientists to 
defend their autonomy, and others consider them a sign of the shift from internal 
to external governance (Braun et al. 2010). Around the same time, 
‘Entrepreneurial Science’ (Etzkowitz 2003) and the conception of public 
researchers and universities as active profit-seekers also gained momentum, 
while the public sector in the late seventies began a range of reforms that with 
time also affected the universities by forcing them to compete for funding and 
shift to the project-based organisation of research (Boden and Nedeva : 
57)Public debates about gene research and in vitro fertilisation also raised the 
question of whether science had gone too far in meddling with nature, not least 
in relation to the birth of Louise Brown in 1978, who was the first child 
conceived by in vitro fertilisation.  
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Based on this short overview of some of the older important events in relation to 
the study of public science and its responsibilities, it is clear that the purpose and 
ethics of science have been up for debate several times and the institutional 
conditions for conducting science has also changed since the beginning of the 
twentieth century. The latest shift is thus the renewed calls for ‘Responsible 
Science’, all of which have surfaced within the last couple of decades. In the 
next section, I will describe events that have led to this recent ‘problematization’ 
(Foucault 1993a 229) of the government of science, and I will examine the most 
recent shifts in science government based on cases from the UK, the USA, the 
EU and Denmark, thereby also connecting the historical description above with 
newer developments.  
 
2.1.1 MANDATES FOR NEW FORMS OF GOVERNMENT 
The recent calls for ‘Responsible Science’, as described in the intro to the 
previous section, share their justifications for more ‘responsibility’ in an effort 
to avoid the ‘un-intended side effects’ (Beck 1992) of emergent technologies as 
well as making the area of science subject to (increased) democratic rule by 
introducing deliberative forms of engagement (Nahuis and Van Lente 2008). 
Similar calls for more ‘responsibility’ have also been made in several national 
political arenas. In relation to these calls, it can be argued that they are fostered 
as a response to developments and events from the eighties and nineties that 
have problematized both the role of science in society and how science should 
be governed. These events have given mandates for new ways of governing 
science. In what follows, I will describe the developments in the UK, the USA, 
the EU and Denmark in order to show the similarities in the solutions they 
propose to the ‘problematization’ of earlier ways of governing science. By doing 
this, I argue that we are witnessing a general shift in science government 
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discourse across the Western world; a shift that entails a focus on both 
participation as an strong value in science government and the goal of adapting 
to – and succeeding in – the ‘global knowledge economy’ (Gorm Hansen 2011).  
 
In the case of the UK, two events are considered central in explaining the shift in 
science government that began unfolding (and still is) since the turn of the 
millennium. The first event is the ‘Mad Cow Disease (BSE)’ case, which 
occurred at the beginning of the nineties, and the second event is ‘GMO Crisis’, 
which occurred in the end of the nineties. In the first case, public authorities and 
scientists downplayed the risk of human infection from contaminated beef, 
meanwhile several people subsequently became very ill (Irwin 2006: 304). This 
engendered serious mistrust in both public authorities and science. This mistrust 
was further fuelled by an unpredicted public revolt against GM foods which was 
covered in detail by the British media and which shocked British and European 
legislators (Shaw 2002: 274)Analysing the content of new British science 
government initiatives, Irwin (2006) concludes that many ‘old’ discourses about 
science-society relations are still being performed: In many ways, science is still 
seen as an objective expertise that is to be used directly by formal government. 
However, fresh discourses about science’s role in government decisions have 
also spurred new discourses. They include a larger focus on the citizens’ role in 
science policy. There are intentions to trust the citizens’ concerns about science 
and expertise as legitimate and well grounded. Specific realpolitik initiatives 
such as ‘public participation exercises’, ‘consumer research’ and ‘openness to 
public critique’ have been initiated (Irwin 2006: 300). The hope is that such 
initiatives will establish public confidence in the quality and direction of 
government decisions, where scientific advice has earlier been the only source 
of legitimation (Irwin 2006: 300; Horst and Irwin 2010). This shift in the mode 
of governing can, based on these examples, thus be seen as a move away from a 
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technocratic mode of governing where science and the state are the main actors, 
toward a form of government where direct participation is considered valuable 
and where accountability is a means to secure legitimacy. While the shift can be 
seen as an attempt to avoid incidents such as the ‘Mad Cow Disease’ case and 
the GMO crisis, Irwin also suggests that another goal is to establish the UK as a 
‘powerhouse for innovation’ in the global knowledge economy and, to that end, 
the focus on participation and heterogeneity is supposed to foster an innovative 
environment (Irwin 2006: 308). Other authors describing the development of 
science government in Britain agree on Irwin’s analysis of the shifts that have 
occurred in the ways of governing (Macnaghten, Kearnes, and Wynne 2005; 
Kearnes et al. 2006), Kearnes et al. (2006) add to Irwin’s analysis by suggesting 
that the government discourse has shifted from being dominated by a purely 
technical ‘risk discourse’ to one that takes into account wider social concerns 
such as ethics, the environment and general values (Kearnes et al. 2006: 17). 
Along with Wilsdon and Willis (2004), they also suggest that the shift in science 
government should not only be understood as a narrow response to the BSE case 
and the GMO crisis, but also that science government can be seen as the 
beginning of a tendency for more inclusive and direct forms of government with 
the potential to revitalise the democratic spirit in the UK in the face of general 
declining trust and declining participation (Macnaghten, Kearnes & Wynne 
2005: 270; Wilsdon, Willis 2004: 14). In that way, the ‘new governance of 
science’ is not only considered a shift in the role that science plays in general 
government, but also a leverage for more democracy via participation and, as 
Irwin suggests, a way to establish innovation on a national scale.  
 
In the case of the USA, the shifts in science governance are best viewed in the 
light of ‘[…] a well-established culture of technological optimism, but also 
against a robust tradition of scientific activism and open debate about the social 
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impacts of science and technology’ (Jasanoff 2011: 45). While the qualities and 
side effects of scientific endeavours have thus been up for debate by scientists 
themselves (notably in relation to the development of the atom bomb and the 
discovery of the double helix structure of the genome), Macnarthten, Kearnes 
and Wynne (2005) argue that the increasingly large public investments in 
science such as the ‘Human Genome Project’ (from 1990) and the national 
venture into nanotechnology that began in 2000 needed public support. At the 
time, the government was in need of public support for these huge investments 
and therefore a move toward more deliberative forms of science government 
(ibid.: 275).  
 
The ‘Human Genome Project’ was the first public science investment where a 
proportion of the investment (3 %) was set aside for research into the ‘Ethical, 
Legal and Social Implications’ (ELSI) of the accompanying scientific pursuits. 
Furthermore, an ELSI working group had the responsibility of providing the 
general (but not very defined) ‘oversight’ of the entire project (Jasanoff 2011: 
178). Subsequently, the ELSI programme has been criticised for being an 
inefficient government tool, as the huge budget for research concerning the 
implications for society was seldom transformed into policy initiatives with the 
goal of limiting negative side effects (Fisher 2005: 323). The next big federally 
funded investment in science, nanotechnology in 2000, was therefore 
accompanied by a new set of initiatives that not only focused on the ethical and 
social aspects of new technologies, but also aimed at establishing a link between 
the government of new technologies and the research into them (Fisher 2005: 
324). In their current form, the initiatives are therefore focused on public 
participation processes in relation to the development of nanotechnology and 
they also include foresight studies and other exercises that have the following 
goals:  
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‘[…] [make] scientific cultures more self-aware of their own taken-for-granted 
expectations, visions, and imaginations of the ultimate ends of knowledge, and 
rendering these more articulated, and thus more socially accountable and 
resilient.’ (Macnaghten, Kearnes & Wynne 2005: 278)  
 
While the motivations for changing science government in the UK are thus 
different from the USA, the solutions addressing public scepticism about 
scientific expertise (in the UK) as well as addressing the presumed lack of 
public support for huge investments in science (in the USA) appear strikingly 
similar: In both countries more direct public participation in the government 
processes surrounding science are instated. A technocratic way of governing 
where science and the state are seen as the most legitimate actors has been 
problematized and more deliberative forms of governance where the public 
plays a larger role have been proposed.  
 
The phenomenon of proposing public participation in science government as the 
solution to various problems for science and government can also be observed in 
the case of the European Union. Waterton and Wynne (1996) show that, in the 
past, environmental science has been used as a way to foster cultural integration 
across European borders, as science was considered ‘neutral’ and ‘objective’ 
and thus something that could unite different European peoples who were 
otherwise considered to be very divided due to national interests and national 
cultures. The project was not a huge success. According to Waterton and Wynne 
(1996), integration around a common European environmental policy failed 
because the integration of different groups of people demands a sense of shared 
values more than a commitment to common, objective facts.  
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Recently, the approach to science has changed. The European Union has 
focused on ‘Responsible Innovation’ in both science- and innovation policies, 
which entails the double aim of achieving economic growth and the 
development of the EU in both a democratic and sustainable way (Von 
Schomberg 2012). Currently, the European Commission is debating whether 
reflections about how to handle ethical problems, strategies for public science 
communication and reflections about how to handle social aspects of scientific 
conduct should be a mandatory part of the grant applications in the next 
European framework for research (Horizon 2020). These demands are additions 
to other steering strategies in relation to science such as codes of conduct and 
the precautionary principle (Owen, Macnaghten, and Stilgoe 2012). 
 
Owen, Macnaghten & Stilgoe (2012) suggest that the most important mandate 
for the call for ‘Responsible Innovation’ is the weak European economy in the 
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. The EU sees ‘Responsible Innovation’ as 
an important building block in restoring the European economy by uniting 
business, academia and civil society in innovation processes (: 753). But on top 
of that motivation, they argue that, philanthropically and philosophically, aims 
also play a role, even though the justifications for these remain ‘unclear’. 
However, they may be linked with the aforementioned ‘GMO crisis’ and other 
public upheavals about emergent technologies (Owen, Macnaghten & Stilgoe 
2012: 756). The EU, and especially the European Commission, seem to be keen 
on having science work toward both socially acceptable and publicly desirable 
ends in the hope that this will enhance the European economy and distinguish 
Europe from its competitors in the global knowledge economy (Owen, 
Macnaghten & Stilgoe 2012: 753).  
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Much like the descriptions of the UK and the USA, it seems that the EU is 
trying to achieve several goals by rendering science (and innovation) more 
‘responsible’; in this case, this seems to mean being more responsive to the 
public’s wishes. In doing so, the hope is that the EU will overcome its current 
economic crisis as well as establish responsibility as a signature for its 
innovation and thereby create a niche that sets it apart in comparison to its 
global competitors.  
 
While similar solutions to seemingly different problems can be observed in the 
three previously described regions, Denmark stands out with a different 
development: It could almost be argued that the development is the ‘opposite’ to 
that of the other regions; that is, from participatory forms of government to 
technocratic ones (Mejlgaard 2009). Denmark has had a long tradition for public 
engagement in technology development. This culture goes back to a huge social 
movement that arose in the middle of the 19th century. As part of that social 
movement, education became a way to empower laypeople to partake in society 
rather than further specialise the upper classes (Andersen and Jæger 1999). 
Furthermore, a discourse of appreciation and respect for laypeople’s knowledge 
forms and their right to partake in important decisions was also a part of this 
movement.7  In relation to science government, this specific culture has been 
institutionalised in organs such as the Ethical Council (from 1987)8 and the 
Danish Board of Technology (from 1995), which initiated participatory and 
public dialogue about new technologies (Horst 2008). Most famously, the Board 
have hosted the widely borrowed and widely discussed ‘consensus conferences’, 
which invited laypeople to develop policy recommendations on new 
technologies based on their own deliberations and experts’ input (Blok 2007). 
                                                
7 An important event related to that movement was the abolishment of the monarchy in favour of a constitutional monarchy and 
representative democracy in 1849.  
8 The Ethical Council was a response to increasing controversies regarding medical, reproductive technologies and now advises the Danish 
government about ethical concerns in relation to gene- and biotechnology. 
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But as Horst (2012a) illustrates, the government discourse about public 
participation in science has recently changed in Denmark. The Danish Board of 
Technology lost its support from the fiscal budget in 2011. It is now an 
independent foundation that gets ad hoc support from national and international 
organs. But even before it lost its permanent public support, activities within the 
Board were declining. The last consensus conference was held in 2005, without 
funding from the Danish government. The Danish central government generally 
seems to have lost interest in democratic deliberations about science (Horst 
2012a; Mejlgaard and Stares 2010).  
 
Simultaneously, with the diminishing focus on public participation at the 
national level, there has been more focus on Danish universities as loci for the 
growth of the Danish knowledge economy. The Danish university reform from 
2003 actually made it mandatory to disseminate knowledge beyond the scientific 
community while, at the same time, introducing more competition for funding 
and competition between universities (Gorm-Hansen 2011). Combined, these 
initiatives have changed the science communication landscape in Denmark; 
whereas in the past it was embedded in a tradition of democratic participation, it 
is now focused on the branding of research groups, departments and universities. 
Moreover, the communication in the past was often fuelled by the individual 
scientist’s interest or feeling of obligation, whereas now it is more 
professionalised and exercised with the help of professional communication 
units (Horst 2012a: 104). 
 
So the science government discourse has recently shifted in Denmark as it has in 
the UK, the USA and the EU. But the shift in Denmark looks different. The 
science government discourse has changed from public participation being a 
central part of the government to a discourse whereby communication is tied to 
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inter-organisational competition. This has, in turn, also meant that the former 
deliberative ideals have been replaced by ideals closer to that of a traditional 
technocratic steering of science without much incentive for public participation. 
But as Irwin (2006) demonstrated in relation to the British case, old and newer 
discourses blend, interact and exist side by side. While the Danish governments 
(that is, forms of steering) have shifted in their perspectives on the values of 
participatory governance, Denmark still hosts a fair amount of science 
engagement activities. But where they were, in the past, supported by the central 
government, they are now increasingly funded by local universities, private 
funds or the European Union.  
 
Based on the descriptions of the four regions, it is possible to identify 
similarities between them. All of them have been through recent changes in 
science government discourse. While these changes may have been brought 
about for different reasons in each place, the changes in at least the UK, the 
USA and the EU have included an increased focus on the participation of 
laypeople in decision-making related to science. Denmark has had a rich 
tradition for deliberative science government but has recently re-organised it in 
such a way that science communication now forms part of the competition for 
funding, and the government of science has shifted to more technocratic forms – 
also as a means to enhance Denmark’s advantages in the knowledge economy. 
While this shift is thus different from the others, they all seem to, among other 
aims, share a focus on science as a means of adapting to the global knowledge 
economy.  
 
Kearnes and Rip (2009) argue for an emergent ‘government landscape’ of 
‘Responsible Science’. Based on their analysis of recent developments in 
science government in the Western world, they argue that good science 
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government is increasingly conceived of as that, which does not constrain 
innovation and commercialisation, while different strategies (such as public 
participation and foresight studies) are invoked in order to reduce eventual 
negative outcomes. Furthermore, in this interpretation of ‘good governance’ lies 
the hope that the dual goal of innovation and democracy can be achieved at the 
same time (Kearnes, Rip 2009: 23) Their analysis seems fitting in relation to the 
developments that have occurred in the countries, as described here. While the 
balance between the goal of innovation and that of increased democracy do vary 
from country to country, both goals seem to be in place. Furthermore, it also 
seems as if there is a consensus about the means required to reach these goals: 
Public participation and further reflection upon outcomes from the scientists. It 
seems striking that all the countries share the focus on innovation and 
democracy and a focus on participatory processes and reflexivity as a means to 
get there.  
 
In order to understand this relative homogeneity, I will now look at ‘Responsible 
Science’ in the light of shifts in broader government discourse on the most 
optimal way to govern the public sector as a whole.  
 
 
 
2.1.2 RESPONSIBLE SCIENCE AND BROADER GOVERNMENT 
RATIONALITIES 
In this section, I will argue that three government rationalities about the most 
optimal way to govern the public sector have influenced the content of the 
recent calls for ‘Responsible Science’. By ‘government rationality’, I mean a 
shared set of ideas about the most optimal way to govern that has influenced 
public sector reforms and tangible ways of organising the public sector (Gordon 
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1991). These three rationalities are the ‘Responsive Government’, which has 
gained momentum since the beginning of the nineties , ‘New Public 
Management’ from the eighties and onwards and the more general influence of a 
diffuse ‘neoliberal’ morality (Shamir 2008).  
 
The rationality of the ‘Responsive Government’ developed in the USA during 
the first Clinton administration but has spread and is, for instance, a vital part of 
the OECD’s recommendations for public sector reforms in its member states 
(OECD 1996). The general concern of this rationality is a lack of democratic 
accountability in public service (DeLeon 1997: 238) This is a problem that, 
according to the rationality, can lead to inefficient work on behalf of the public 
professionals and, hence, declining public trust in government and declining 
participation in democratic society (DeLeon 1997; Du Gay 2008). As a solution 
to this, several initiatives to ensure the accountability of public servants have 
been installed. These consist of formal auditing to ensure transparency. A range 
of different auditing methods to secure legitimacy has been installed in public 
service – in relation to this study it is mostly the public engagement exercises as 
a way of securing legitimacy that are interesting. Justesen and Skærbæk 2010 
look at the ‘performative effects’ of auditing in the public sector and conclude 
that they both affect the development of the auditées professional identity as 
well as their well-being at work – a point that is very relevant in relation to this 
study’s findings. Furthermore, ‘governance networks’ comprising of several, 
heterogeneous actors (e.g. scientists, civil servants, members of the public and 
representatives of industry) have been introduced as capable negotiators of 
common solutions in a specific area, ensuring accountability throughout the 
process (Boden and Nedeva : 10). Importantly, the rationality changes the form 
of accountability in the public sector. In a traditional ‘Weberian’ public 
bureaucracy, the accountability is vertical and hierarchical; the civil servant is 
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loyal to her superior and her government and her role is to fulfil the duties that 
are required of her in respect of having this particular professional role (du Gay 
2008: 338). But with ‘Responsive Government’, this accountability shifts to 
being ensured not only by formal rule and professional ethics, but also through 
the process of public ‘dialogue’ between heterogeneous actors and direct 
participation. Many concrete initiatives such as ‘user-driven innovation’ (Jensen 
2012) ‘participatory design’ (Kensing and Blomberg 1998), ‘participatory 
innovation’ (Buur and Matthews 2008), ‘Open Innovation’ (Gassmann 2006) 
and ‘Collaborative Innovation’ (Sørensen and Torfing 2011) have been 
developed within the public sector as a result of this rationality. They share a 
similar focus on the co-production of knowledge, service and commodities by 
set of heterogeneous actors and a belief in the transformative capacities of 
dialogue and participation. 
 
It can be argued that the supposed ‘lack’ of accountability that is claimed by 
proponents of ‘Responsive Government’ is not so much due to the faults of the 
traditional bureaucracy as they are a result of an erosion of exactly that way of 
organising the public sector (du Gay 2009). This has happened by re-describing 
the job of public bureaucrats as a profession of enthusiastic ‘deliverers’ of 
government policy and ‘entrepreneurs’ of public projects and change rather than 
formalistic and impersonal protectors of the administration (du Gay 2009: 379). 
The demands for more direct public participation in science government 
resemble this call for ‘Responsive Government’. There seems to be a lack of 
trust in professional ethics and internal control being enough to secure 
‘Responsible Science’. Therefore, accountability secured through public 
participation is proposed in order to ensure that public science both delivers 
what it promises and that the promises are considered legitimate in the eyes of 
the public.  
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Another influence on the demands of ‘Responsible Science’ comes from the 
rationality of ‘New Public Management’ and the value of public service as 
‘entrepreneurial’ (du Gay 2008: 336). Since the end of the seventies, both the 
efficiency and efficacy of large states have been questioned, and the public 
sector across the Western world has gone through a range of reforms that 
introduced private-sector-like management to the public sector, including a 
general re-organisation focused on ‘marketization’, ‘competition’ and a 
commitment to ‘consumer-contractor’ relationships between the state and its 
various stakeholders (Boden and Nedeva: 48-49). While proponents of 
‘Responsible Science’ do not explicitly seem to adhere to the ideas of the 
marketization of science (most of them are more occupied with the 
democratisation aspect), none of them directly contradict the demands for 
competition between research organisations or the marketization of research 
funding. Kearnes and Rip (2009) point to the fact that the methods of enhancing 
social responsibility in science are usually ‘enabling commercialization’ rather 
than restricting it (Kearnes and Rip 2009: 23), as the foresight studies and 
participation processes are happening ‘before the fact’ and thus guide the final 
technology in a legitimate direction, where no restrictions on commercialisation 
are needed.      
 
Furthermore, the science government changed that I have described above have 
as part of their goals the idea of ‘Responsible Science’ as a driver for the global 
‘knowledge economy’. ‘Entrepreneurial science’ – the phenomenon of science 
actively pursuing close ties with industry in order to commercialise its own 
inventions – has also been tied to New Public Management. Etzkowitz (2003) 
argues that entrepreneurial science was originally not necessarily linked to 
public policies, but rather to innovative individuals and universities and has 
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increasingly been linked in such a manner as a way to increase national 
competitiveness in the globalised knowledge economy. This has led to an 
explosion in entrepreneurial activities at public universities (Etzkowitz 2003: 1, 
140).9 Based on these considerations, I argue that certain demands for being 
‘entrepreneurial’ and working under competitive conditions have also inspired 
the demands of ‘Responsible Science’.  
 
The last influence that I will point to is that of a general ‘neoliberal moral’ 
(Shamir 2008: 2), which is increasingly pervading both the public and private 
sectors. Shamir (2008) describes tendencies to marketize new areas of society by 
introducing competition and markets into the public sector – as also described in 
relation to ‘New Public Management’. In his view, there is a dual motion 
whereby areas governed by ‘the market’ are growing, while a specific ‘moral’ 
that was formerly associated with the public sphere is also growing in new 
domains. His primary example is CSR (Shamir 2008: 2). Using the notion of 
‘responsibilization’, Shamir points to the fact that while ‘governance’ is 
dispersed among a range of competing actors in an imaginary ‘market’, these 
actors in turn have to assume ‘socio-moral’ tasks, which have normally been 
associated with the public sphere (Shamir 2008: 14). But he is sceptical about 
the democratic potentials in this ‘responsibilization’ because he sees the market 
logic as ‘winning’ the discourse, thereby framing social issues as business 
opportunities and leaving morality without its usual transcendental and 
emancipatory abilities (Shamir 2008: 14). In relation to the rationality on 
‘Responsible Science’, I argue that the scientists who are the subjects of this 
dissertation are also asked to assume ‘socio-moral’ tasks, such as reflection upon 
outcomes and civil engagement projects, while at the same time are also 
                                                
9 Etzkowitz (2002) also describes this as the ‘second academic revolution’ (the first starting at the beginning of the 20th century) and suggests 
the ‘Triple Helix Structure’ of government-industry-universities as an overarching methodological tool to analyse the current ways of 
organising science and innovation.  
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competing on a market – both as sellers of innovations and competing for 
funding for new projects.  
 
I have described these three rationalities because I want to point to the fact that 
the developments in public science are not exclusively tied to the public 
scientist’s profession. It is part of a general development in the way that the 
entire public sector is governed. I find this aspect important because proponents 
of ‘Responsible Science’ do not seem to connect their calls for ‘social 
responsibility’ with broader tendencies in public administration. The 
justification for these calls is often a worry that the traditional ethos of scientists 
(as, for instance, described by Merton 1973) – including such virtues as 
‘objectivity’ and ‘disinterestedness’ – have unintentionally led to many of the 
catastrophes that science is partly responsible for, such as devastating 
environmental damage and lethal weapons (e.g.Beckwith and Geller 1997; 
Wynne 1994). It remains an open question as to whether public participation and 
oversight will change that. But it is clear that proponents of ‘Responsible 
Science’, both in the science government texts and in the national cases, are 
inspired by contemporary ideas about the most optimal way to govern the public 
sector in their suggestions of how to change the way science is organised and 
conducted. In this dissertation, the three rationalities are therefore used as an 
inspiration for interpreting the scientists’ daily responsibilities. As public 
science is closely entangled with the rest of the public sector, I see these broad 
rationalities as theoretical resources that I can use to make sense of the 
scientists’ ideas about their daily responsibilities.  
 
 
  
 49 
2.2 SCIENCE AS PRACTICE AND SCIENCE AS AN INSTITUTION 
In this section, I will examine another strand of literature, namely, the sociology 
of science, which is used both as an inspiration for the project and as a strand of 
literature that I refer to throughout the analytical chapters in an iterative process. 
I have divided the literature into two main bodies: The first studies science as a 
profession and as work and has recently focused on micro-sociological studies 
of practice, and the second studies science as a specific institution in society and 
looks at this institution’s influence and role in society as a whole – here the view 
is more macro-oriented. Both views are important in answering the question of 
how ‘responsibility’ is conducted and justified on an everyday basis. Moreover, 
the sociology of science also provides more in-depth perspectives on the 
scientific profession and the development of science historically than science 
government literature and the public administration literature.  
 
The previous section provided an overview of the development of government 
demands for ‘Responsible Science’. Most of the approaches share the view that 
the public has the capacity to have a say in deciding the direction of science. 
Furthermore, they share the view that responsible innovation is something that 
comes out of deliberative processes that involve heterogeneous actors and that 
the state is trying to reach the dual goal of more innovation and more democratic 
engagement at the same time. In this section, I will establish how this 
dissertation takes its own particular stance in relation to these understandings 
and the role of social responsibility in science and situate it more within the 
broader literature on the relationships between science and society.  
 
2.2.1 SCIENCE AS PRACTICE 
Over the last century, several authors have given their own account of the 
relationships between science and society. The earliest body of literature, ‘the 
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first wave of science studies’ (Collins 2014), is concerned with how norms guide 
scientific conduct. These accounts have focused on the question of what the 
main purpose of scientific inquiry is and how the scientific profession relates to 
other areas of society. The most famous of these is perhaps Max Weber’s essay 
‘Science as a Vocation’ (Weber, Owen, and Strong 2004) in which the vocation 
is understood one where scientist pursues questions of interest in a disinterested 
and open-ended manner. This is combined with teaching, where the same ethos 
is taught to new generations of scholars (Weber, Owen, and Strong 2004: 6). 
Important for Weber’s work in general is his insistence on ‘different orders of 
life’. He argues that different rationalities are being performed in different areas 
of society (du Gay 2009). Morals and norms from one part of society cannot – 
and indeed should not – be reduced by morals and norms that transcend all of 
society (Du Gay 2005). Weber thus demonstrates that the scientific profession 
holds a special ethos that guides those persons (or personae) who are familiar 
with these specific areas of social life. But this ethos cannot and should not be 
transferred to other aspects of the social.  
 
Merton has later elaborated on these qualities of the scientific profession, most 
famously in his construction of the CUDOS norms, which are based on 
interviews with scientists and which he presents as guiding scientific practice. 
CUDOS stands for ‘Communalism’, ‘Universalism’, ‘Disinterestedness’ and 
‘Organized Scepticism’ (Merton 1973) and conceives of the scientist’s job as 
comprising strong internal norms that are continuously and consciously taught to 
newcomers in the field through apprenticeship.  These norms have the function 
of keeping society’s values and interests out of scientific conduct, thereby 
rendering knowledge objective and thus more helpful for society’s actors. 
Merton curiously modelled his descriptions of the scientific profession on 
Weber’s account of the bureaucrat in his doctoral dissertation (Merton 1970; 
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Lynch 1997) and the two forms of professional ethos do share similarities. In 
relation to this dissertation, this raises the dual question of how these two kinds 
of professional ethos overlap and whether a particular form of ‘public scientist’, 
who works in public society and for the state, can be separated from other forms 
of scientist, for instance, those working for industry (see 9.2.2 for further 
analysis). Furthermore, it raises the question of how public scientists at present 
relate to public demands for further democratisation and public participation in 
deciding the direction of science.  
 
This ‘first wave of science studies’ was followed by a second wave that 
radically criticised the focus on norms and especially the work of Merton 
(Collins 2013). Rather than focusing on the role of norms guiding the scientific 
profession, they studied scientific practice from a constructivist perspective and 
especially the practical construction of ‘facts’ (Latour and Woolgar 1979; Lynch 
1985; e.g. Pinch and Bijker 1987). In each their own way, the texts from the 
second wave show how values, cultures, interests, pragmatic decisions, 
organisations and non-human interventions shape both the construction of facts 
and the construction of the scientific work (Latour 1987; Cetina 2009; Traweek 
2009; e.g. Shapin, Schaffer, and Hobbes 1985). So the primary question posed 
by Weber and Merton addressed how the profession of science was governing 
itself as a particular, autonomous part of society. For the second wave of science 
studies, the primary question addresses how facts and society are co-constructed 
through open-ended processes (also) occurring in laboratories. Some of these 
studies (Traweek 2009) further examine how these practices in turn shape the 
overall work of scientists.   
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2.2.2 INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON SCIENCE 
While one body of literature can thus broadly be conceptualised as a sociology 
of practice, with science as its specific object of study, another can be seen as an 
institutional sociology that studies the relationship between science as an 
institution and the rest of society. Two main approaches to this institutional 
theme can be detected. Moreover, one body of literature argues that science has 
developed from a closed institution with few relations to society, to an open 
institution where the boundaries between science and the rest of society are 
gradually dissolving. Another body argues that science has never been separated 
from society as such; nevertheless, the whole of the institution has changed 
historically, with different obligations and relationships to other parts of society 
emerging.  
 
One body, where the work of Helga Nowotny, Peter Scott and Michael Gibbons 
has been especially influential (Hessels and Van Lente 2008) argues that science 
was once an institution with its own rules and norms, which separated it from 
the rest of society (e.g. Gibbons and others 1994; Nowotny, Scott, and Gibbons 
2001; Nowotny, Scott, and Gibbons 2005; Scott 2003). Gradually, this has 
changed due to a range of different circumstances, notably, that of the evolving 
‘knowledge economy’, where public science has received a special obligation as 
providers of an educated workforce, as drivers of the knowledge economy and 
as deliverers of commercial technologies. Their main argument is that science 
(and society) began with ‘Mode 1’, where science was conducted an academic 
pursuit within strict disciplinary boundaries and with a one-way communication 
of facts from science to society, which then interpreted and used them 
(Nowotny, Scott, and Gibbons 2001: 15f). This has now changed to ‘Mode 2’, 
where science is increasingly embedded in society: It is conducted in various 
places, including outside academia; its direction and qualities are debated in 
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public spheres, ‘the agora’, and these changes have in turn meant that science is 
increasingly contextualised and context-sensitive, that is, always produced in ‘a 
context of application’ (Nowotny, Scott, and Gibbons 2001: 23, 69). This 
changes even the core epistemological beliefs of science. Where the main 
concern of scientists in Mode 1 was whether their theories were ‘true’, that is, 
understood as corresponding to the phenomenon they described, ‘true’ now 
means that they both need to correspond to reality and also be ‘socially robust’, 
that is, living up to common, legitimate ideas about society’s general 
development (Scott 2003: 83). The theory of Mode 1 and Mode 2 science has 
had a great influence on European science politics in the last decade and has, for 
instance, inspired the composition of the latest frameworks for research (Hessels 
and Van Lente 2008; Gorm Hansen 2011). Some have even called the theory a 
‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ (Boden and Nedeva : 11). As it is considered a valid 
description of contemporary society, policy-makers and funders have increased 
their focus on ‘applicable science’, the importance of ‘social robustness’ and the 
necessity of conducting ‘interdisciplinary research’, thereby actively creating 
Mode 2.  
 
In contrast to this understanding, others argue that science has always been ‘part 
of’ society; that is, the demarcation between the institution of science and that of 
the rest of society is a constructed one, and it takes particular forms in specific 
periods of time. However, as science and society continuously co-construct each 
other, they are never separated (see also Jasanoff 2011; Shapin 2009). While 
science is a specific institution in society where special norms and practices can 
be studied, it does not make any sense to say that it is ‘outside’ the rest of 
society. That being said, the institution of science’s role(s) in society has 
changed historically. Various political and scientific developments have pushed 
both science and society in new directions – they have co-developed in various 
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ways. Notable historical examples of these kinds of changes are the 
consequences of ‘The Manhattan Project’, that is, the development of the atom 
bomb during WW2. Not only did this invention cause scientists to re-assess the 
enormity of their impact on society, it also led them to debate the kinds of 
obligations they had as a profession. Furthermore, the project also heavily 
influenced the organisation of public science in America after WW2, with the 
Department of Defence taking a significant role in driving scientific innovation 
forward in various areas (Shapin 2009: 68). More recent changes can be seen in 
the aforementioned calls for ‘Responsible Science’ and the tighter connections 
between science and industry. The ‘entrepreneurial scientist’ has become a 
powerful actor, who has the means to pursue big, unsolved questions and 
commercialise them faster than ever before (Rabinow 1996) These turns in the 
co-production of science and society happen continuously, spurred by different 
occasions and interpreted differently by various actors. The main question for 
this body of literature is therefore not whether science has become more or less 
‘open’ in relation to society; rather, the authors argue that it is important to 
pursue the institutional changes empirically and study their effects.    
 
In his work ‘The Scientific Life – a history of a late-modern vocation’, Shapin 
(2008) suggests that corporate science has taken over many of the features 
previously associated with academic science, such as having time to do science, 
an emphasis on curiosity and undertaking open-ended investigations. In contrast, 
academia is struggling with tight budgets, large administrative burdens, 
temporary employment and a general lack of funding (Shapin 2009: 327ff). In 
my interpretation, his assessment of this development seems to be that since 
science and society have always been interdependent, we should not worry 
much about the recent developments in the direction of a more marketized 
science. The scientific profession, which is the focus of this study, will (also) 
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survive this increasing commercialisation and marketization; nevertheless, it 
will also be transformed by this development.  
 
Other authors have criticised this point of view for being too optimistic on 
behalf of the scientific profession and the general conditions needed for 
producing scientific knowledge (Herrnstein Smith 2009; Lave, Mirowski, and 
Randalls 2010). They argue that just because science-society relationships and 
the conditions for public scientists are in constant flux does not mean that we 
should not look into these specific conditions and also assess them and their 
consequences from various critical perspectives. They agree that the working 
conditions for public scientists at present are indeed marked by the features that 
Shapin (2009) describes, but they believe he is taking this development too 
lightly. The pressure on public science is grave for both the scientists who have 
to endure the conditions of ‘a late-modern vocation’ as well as for society itself, 
which is losing not only opportunities for innovation, but also the democratic 
potential of having the bulk of its knowledge production within the public realm.   
 
In line with the second body of literature, this dissertation is based on the 
premise that science-society relations are co-productive and changing, 
depending on the different institutional contexts within which they operate. At 
the same time, and in agreement with Shapin’s (2009) critics, this project is 
primarily occupied with looking at how a specific institutional condition – that 
of ‘Responsible Science’, as described above – is actually influencing daily 
work practices in public laboratories.  It is therefore necessary to undertake 
more descriptive, and indeed appraising, studies of the effects of ‘Responsible 
Science’ on scientific conduct. Moreover, it is especially important to undertake 
studies of the fate and role of ‘public science’, that is, science conducted at 
public universities with some government funding. It seems that the question of 
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how scientists should perform their job is changing along with the changing 
demands for their societal engagement. 
 
In essence, I argue that the demand of assuming ‘responsibility’ and doing 
‘Responsible Science’ raises the question of how science should relate to the rest 
of society and its institutions (democracy, industry, the state and the public). In 
doing so, the demand also questions the ways that daily work in public science 
is being done at present. In that way, both the sociology of science that focuses 
on the work and the sociology of science that focuses on the institutions become 
relevant for this dissertation. The former is relevant because of the focus on how 
science is conducted on an everyday basis and how norms (going back to the 
‘first wave of science studies’) play a role in scientific conduct, and because it 
also acknowledges that these norms are creatively negotiated in everyday work 
life with different performative effects as a consequence (see chapter 3 for a 
description of the dissertation’s methodology). The latter is relevant, as I 
emphasise that the historically described, different institutional relationships 
between science and society are being performed in daily work as different 
normative positions in relation to science’s obligations. With that, I also make 
the argument that it is possible to locate and study ‘patterns’ in the way the 
social is performed (Foucault 1993b 229; Law 1994: 107) and that these 
‘patterns’ can both be viewed as stable long-lasting, historical institutions and as 
rather fragile arrangements that need to be sustained through careful daily 
conduct in order not to fall apart; it is a question of perspective. This argument 
will be explained more thoroughly in the next chapter, which looks at this 
dissertation’s reliance on Michel Foucault and John Law as its main 
methodological inspiration. 
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3. METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
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‘My argument is that empiricism, the assumption that there is a reality about 
which we can all agree is an effect, rather than a cause. But it is an effect. And, 
since it is an effect, it is one to which I will not only contribute […] but also seek 
to take advantage.’  (Law 1994:54, original emphasis) 
 
 
3.1 CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVES 
In the previous sections, I have discussed my research theme in relation to 
science government theory, public administration theory and the sociology of 
science. The following chapter outlines the methodological choices that have 
informed this project. As such, this chapter is intended to tie together the 
preceding chapter on theory and expand the presented logic of inquiry by 
discussing its potential in relation to the empirical material and my engagement 
in the field. This dissertation is situated within a ‘constructivist’ perspective. By 
that, I emphasise that creation of organisation, roles and materiality is a 
collective process that takes place in networks of heterogeneous actors (Law 
1994: 17). Here, I specify my two (constructivist) perspectives on the material: 
First, Foucauldian-inspired studies of government and ‘government 
rationalities’, and, second, studies of ‘modes of orderings’ (Law 1994) and 
micro-sociological studies of science. While I do not argue whether the two are 
directly commensurable, I do argue that they can be used at different levels of 
the analysis and that the choice of the two perspectives is, furthermore, not 
totally eclectic; that is, they can enter into dialogue as they share some basic 
assumptions. In this chapter, I will specify the concepts I use in the analyses, as 
well as their theoretical heritage, I have used to analyse my material. I will also 
discuss the limitations of each concept’s explanatory power and the subsequent 
choice to use various approaches in different parts of this dissertation 
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The foundational assumption is that the theoretical perspectives, the empirical 
material and my personal interests have resulted in special ‘stories’ consisting of 
the material, which could have been different if the mixture had been of another 
kind (Tryggestad, Justesen, and Mouritsen 2013; Law 1994: 15). The research 
process thus involves the active construction of results in negotiation with (more 
or less) engaged participants, dominant discourses, a variety of theories and the 
methods at hand. This does not mean, however (as some of the kind, 
participating scientists from the labs might suspect), that the results are just 
arbitrary or subjective. In line with Law (1994), I argue that:  
 
‘”Real” stories are also modes of ordering. But stories too, tell of real histories, 
real actions and real people. They are a part of, a way of talking of, some of the 
ordering patterns in the recursive fields of the social.’ (Law 1994: 71) 
 
Here, Law argues that reality is an effect. ‘Stories’, both the ones I construct 
with the present text and the ones that I see and listen to while doing fieldwork, 
have effects; they push reality in certain directions. They alter the reality in 
which they are performed and are also altered with it. Their truth-value is thus 
not based on their ability to represent the real world as correctly as possible, but 
also their ability to alter the real world.  
 
The following sections are devoted to explaining the main empirical focus of 
this dissertation, namely, the practicing scientists’ own understandings of 
responsibility in their daily work. Thereafter, I conceptualise ‘responsibility’ 
within a Foucauldian government framework and present the concepts of 
‘government rationality’ and ‘political rationalities’ (Miller and Rose 1990b; 
Gordon 1991) ‘modes of ordering’ (Law 1994), ‘conduct’ (e.g. Weber 1956) and 
‘justifications’ (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006) as the ‘tool’ used to structure and 
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analyse the material.  As such, I do not use a very uniform framework for the 
analysis. Rather, I borrow concepts from different authors and use them to build 
a specific story about scientists and their responsibilities under current 
government conditions. Despite that, I will still argue that the methodological 
approach should not be considered as eclectic. The concepts all share a 
constructivist approach to the social. Furthermore, all of them share similar 
conceptions of the ‘individual’ as decentralised and underline the importance of 
looking at ‘action’ as a phenomenon dependent of local context, expectations to 
the situation at hand and the roles of the assembled ‘actors’ (for lack of a better 
term).  
 
 
3.2 FINDING EMPIRICAL FOCUS 
This study is part of a bigger grant under the headline ‘Social Responsibility in 
Science’10, which has as its foremost aim to develop empirical knowledge about 
what current demands for ‘responsible science’ mean for the conduct, 
management and governing of public science in Denmark, the UK and the USA. 
This dissertation is the culmination of studying how bench scientists make sense 
of demands for responsibility based on ethnographic studies in Denmark and the 
USA. It was determined from the beginning that three ethnographic case studies 
(also including the UK) would be too much for a single PhD project.  
 
Within this framework, the empirical focus of this project developed from a 
curious paradox apparent in science government literature. Science government 
literature stands on the shoulders of micro-sociological studies of science that 
have forcefully demonstrated how science and society are co-constructed and 
                                                
10 The project is funded by the ‘Det Frie Forskningsråd – Samfund og Erhverv’ and managed by Professor and Head of Department Maja 
Horst. The project consists of a subproject A that studies the connections between government discourses and research management and this 
project, subproject B, that studies how bench scientists make sense of demands for responsibility.  
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that academia is far from being a distant ‘Ivory Tower’ with few relations to 
‘society’ (Pinch and Bijker 1987; Latour 1987). Despite this heritage, the 
assumption of much science government literature in the field of ‘Responsible 
Science’ still seems to be that scientists need the appropriate education if they 
are to include ‘social’ values in their scientific conduct, as their profession is 
solely characterised by an instrumental rationality (Fisher 2007; Macnaghten, 
Kearnes, and Wynne 2005, 268-291; Guston and Sarewitz 2002). Furthermore, 
few reflections about the political aspects of the demands for ‘Responsible 
Science’ have been made within the field (for exceptions see Kearnes and Rip 
2009; van Oudheusden 2014). This lack of emphasis on the political aspects of 
‘Responsible Science’ is also reflected in the surprisingly few (albeit growing) 
studies of how ‘social responsibility’ is conducted in practice and the 
performative effects thereof (for exceptions, see Fortun and Fortun 2005; 
Parkhill et al. 2013; McCarthy and Kelty 2010). This dissertation adds to the 
body of knowledge that conceives of ‘Responsible Science’ as a political 
phenomenon and also considers this phenomenon an empirical object rather than 
a normative concept.  
 
The curiosity surrounding the science government literature is further spurred by 
the development of the empirical studies. Here, the scientists often reacted with 
surprise and alienation in relation to the theme, as one of them pointed out 
during the pilot studies: ‘as I’m sure you will find out, nothing really responsible 
goes on here.’ Otherwise, they politely told me that being ‘responsible’ 
demanded too much work and bureaucracy and they did not have time for that. 
At the same time, however, they seemed rather ‘socially’ engaged:  They 
participate in various ‘outreach’ activities; they are deeply concerned about 
global problems such as hunger and infectious diseases, which they try to find 
solutions to via research; and they are also engaged in various political projects 
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that criticise big business and current government. Furthermore, they also reflect 
a lot upon their job, the (shifting) roles of science in society and the current 
political conditions in science. This contradiction of alienation, resistance and 
engagement further propelled my interest of understanding ‘responsibility’ as a 
multifaceted (political) and empirical phenomenon.  
 
Therefore, the empirical interest gradually grew into a focus on the scientists’ 
own understanding of ‘responsibility’ in relation to their jobs, without a pre-
understanding of whether these responsibilities could be understood as ‘social’ 
or not. The object of research then concerns what it is exactly that is considered 
‘responsible’ in scientific work, how this ‘responsibility’ is justified and how the 
scientists then do different forms of ‘Responsible Science’.  
 
 
3.3 CONCEPTUALISING THE OBJECT OF RESEARCH 
The object of research is thus the scientists’ own understandings of their 
responsibilities and how these are realised. This study is conducted in two 
arenas: As a document study of understandings of ‘responsible conduct’ as they 
are articulated in scientific journals and as an ethnographic study of the daily 
responsibilities in two synthetic biology laboratories in Denmark and the USA 
(more details about both arenas in the next chapter on Methods). 
 
The objective of this section is to show the translations from empirical focus to 
coherent theoretical concept, making it possible to trace and study 
understandings of responsibility within the empirical material. This study is 
situated within the area of laboratory studies, which takes a particular interest in 
how specific institutional settings influence the practical, scientific work (Lynch 
1997). The understandings are examined in two different arenas – laboratories 
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and texts – and two different frameworks have inspired the studies. The 
document study has been carried out as a study of ‘political rationalities’ (Rose 
& Miller 1990). The idea of ‘political rationalities’ is inspired by Foucault’s 
understanding of power as a ‘conduct of conduct and a management of 
possibilities’ (Foucault 1993b: 138). The focus is on showing how different 
understandings of proper scientific conduct are articulated in scientific journals 
as a way of informing the readers about the ideal way of behaving as a scientist 
in the scientific world. Thereby, the rationalities attempt to manage the 
scientists’ possibilities for action. With this analysis, I also emphasise how the 
ideas of ‘Responsible Science’, as described in the theory section (2.1), are one 
among several competing ideas about responsibility. I also use the term 
‘government rationality’ (Gordon 1991). The two concepts are closely related 
but the concept ’political rationalities’ is used to study how plural rationalities 
make a certain area of the social contested and open for change. ’Government 
rationalities’ are used to show stability; how a specific rationality has agency in 
an area and influence behaviour. I consider demands for ‘Responsible Science’ 
as a government rationality. But in chapter five, where I show how different 
ideas about responsibility compete, I call all of them ‘political rationalities’.  
 
 
Foucault mainly studied overarching historical ‘epistemes’ in Western thought 
systems. Therefore, the concept of ‘political rationalities’ is well suited to 
studying the contestations articulations of responsible conduct as they appear in 
journal papers over fifty years. However, the concept is less suited to capturing 
the unstable and shifting negotiations over meaning and action as they take place 
over the course of a day in the two contemporary laboratories.  
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I therefore turn to John Law’s concept ‘modes of ordering’ from his book 
‘Organizing Modernity’ to frame the ethnographic laboratory studies. Using this 
framework, I also move from the very coherent understandings of responsible 
conduct in the texts to the more fuzzy and unstable understandings of daily 
responsibilities and how to realise them in an organisational context (see 3.3.5 
for further description of ‘organisation’). ‘Organizing Modernity’ is in my 
interpretation both an organisational ethnography of science management as 
well as a description of how large social institutions such as ‘modernity’ are 
continuously (re)created by local action. Similarly, I use the concept ‘modes of 
ordering’ (making it into ‘modes of responsibility’) for two things: First, to 
show how the scientists’ perceptions of responsibility organise the way they go 
about their daily work in the laboratories; and, second, to show how different 
institutions related to the role of science in society are thereby also constructed 
and negotiated on an everyday basis. The two entry points for studying 
‘Responsible Science’ are described in the following two sections.  
 
3.3.1 FOUCAULDIAN GOVERNMENT STUDIES 
The first perspective that is relevant for my general view of the subject of 
‘Responsible Science’ is the late studies by Foucault, namely, his studies of rule 
in modern Western societies. Foucault describes a ‘new’ power form that 
radically expanded with sciences such as economics, statistics and the first 
biosciences at the beginning of the 18th century. This power form was different 
from the earlier ‘sovereign’ rule. He differentiates between the ‘sovereign’ state 
and ‘government’ (the new power form) as follows: 
 
‘In contrast to sovereignty, government has as its purpose not to act of 
government itself, but the welfare of the population, the improvement of its 
condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health, etc.; and the means that 
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the government uses to attain these ends are themselves all in some sense 
immanent to the population; it is the population itself, on which government will 
act either directly through large scale campaigns, or indirectly through 
techniques that will make possible, without the full awareness of people, the 
stimulation of birth rates, the directing of the flow of population into certain 
regions or activities, etc.’ (Foucault 2003a: 241) 
 
‘Government’ should not be understood as the parliament or other formal actor. 
‘Government’, which is different from sovereignty, is a specific mode of ruling 
that has the prosperity of the population and the healthiness of the individual as 
its primary goal. It does not come from a single identifiable origin, but rather 
grows out of complex networks of initiatives made by scientific, cultural, 
economic and social initiatives in the attempt to guide people and the population 
in certain directions rather than others (Foucault 2003a). The shaping of 
legitimate action thus comes from multiple sources and is taken up by the state 
itself, so, as Foucault writes, there is a ‘governmentalization’ of the state 
happening – one which is still in progress (Foucault 2003a: 244). ‘Ruling’ is not 
exclusively performed by the state, but rather always appears in a context where 
a network of formal rules, accountancy practices, expertise and available 
technologies make some forms of conduct more legitimate than others (Dean 
2013: 36). 
 
Stemming from these observations about the characteristics of Foucauldian 
understandings of power and rule also comes the realisation that norms play a 
significant role in guiding in specific ways what is legitimate and what is not in 
a given situation (Dean 2013: 35). From this also follows the idea that power is 
not about the direct articulation of what is ‘allowed’ and what is ‘prohibited’, 
but is rather about shaping the actual space in which it is possible to regard some 
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forms of conduct as legitimate (and thereby something that is ‘allowed’) and 
others as illegitimate (and thus may be unimaginable, illegal or just ill regarded). 
Moreover, government decides which areas of life and society are subject to rule 
and which could be considered autonomous. In that way, this view of power also 
demonstrates how lines between that which is autonomous and that which is 
subject to rule are in themselves contingent and a product of political struggles. 
Following this understanding of power, I will now look at the concepts of 
‘problematizations’ and what they mean in the context of ‘government’.  
 
Regarding the concept of ‘Responsible Science’, I consider it a specific attempt 
to administrate the area of science by guiding the conduct in specific directions. 
As established in the previous chapter, ‘Responsible Science’ is considered a 
solution to a range of policy problems. The ways to go about realising the ideals 
of ‘Responsible Science’ are through the interaction of a broad range of different 
actors –  citizens, scientists, politicians, social researchers, etc. – who are 
supposed to collaborate to make the outcomes of science more democratic, 
equitable and sustainable (Owen et al. 2014). The ‘Responsible Science’s’ 
inherent confidence in the transformative capacities of participatory democracy 
as a vital supplement to laws and directions emphasises the trust in norms as 
being capable of altering behaviour among scientists and measuring 
improvements. 
 
From the perspective of ‘Responsible Science’ the institution of science as it 
includes a ‘problem’ of responsibility, as the outcomes are supposedly not living 
up to the expectations of the public’s views and wishes. In a Foucauldian 
perspective, this shift can be seen as a ‘problematization’ of the hitherto internal 
governance of science through professional norms as described by Weber and 
Merton. A problematization should be understood as the emergence of 
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intensified discussions and propositions about the steering of a specific area of 
the social because the preceding ideas on how to govern have come under 
scrutiny (Foucault 2003b: 229-30). The governing of the institution of science 
has thus been fundamentally problematized and is, as such, being presented as 
something that calls for the altering of the norms, which are supposedly guiding 
the field for now. In stating this, it is important to underline that the 
problematization of the internal governance of science is not a new thing. As 
previously mentioned, the institution of science has been under scrutiny several 
times, for instance, in relation to the development of the atom bomb and the 
discovery and use of recombinant DNA, the GMO crisis and, recently, the 
financial crisis.  All these incidents have formed part of the destabilisation of the 
public’s trust in science’s ability to govern itself responsibly as well as in the 
traditional laws and regulations that have failed to prevent these catastrophes. 
But as Owen et al. (2013) describe, the features of ‘Responsible Science’ are a 
fairly new way of describing a solution to the aforementioned problems, and a 
concept such as ‘Responsible Innovation’ has not been mentioned directly, at 
least in Brussels, before 2011. But the history of the overall, demand of 
responsibility is longer: ‘[t]he last half-a century has forced a re-evaluation of 
this contract [between science and society]’ (Owen et al. 2013: 31).  
 
‘Responsible Science’ is an idea that promises to combine the dual goal of 
growth and democracy and which also gives specific guidelines as to how this 
responsibility is going to come about, namely, through more participation, 
deliberation, reflection and anticipation (Owen et al. 2013: 38). In this 
dissertation, ‘Responsible Science’ is conceived of as a specific ‘rationality’ 
(Gordon 1991: Miller and Rose 1990). Elaborating on Foucault’s work on 
power, Miller and Rose propose that one can use the concept of ‘political 
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rationality’ to study the exercise of modern government by looking at the 
following: 
 
 ‘[…] the changing discursive fields within which the exercise of power is 
conceptualized; the moral justifications for particular ways of exercising power 
by diverse authorities; notions of the appropriate forms, objects and limits of 
politics, and conceptions of the proper distribution of such tasks among secular, 
spiritual, military and familial sectors.’ (Rose & Miller 1992: 175) 
 
In the analysis, I will use this concept in chapter 5, whereby I identify four 
different ‘political rationalities’ based on a document study of how ideas about 
responsibility are articulated in scientific journals. More info about the 
analytical strategy is provided in the chapter.  
 
3.3.2 MODES OF ORDERING 
‘Modes of ordering’ are patterns of local achievements of order that are made up 
of networks of material and non-material components, such as machines, talk, 
ideals, imaginations and space (Law 1994: 110). The orders are never complete 
or pure: You will, for instance, never find a pure form of ‘bureaucracy’ – not 
even in the French central administration. There will always be traces, resistance 
and other competing orders at play. Related to this point is that orders are 
recurrent, that is, they are open-ended processes that are self-generating: 
 
‘The social is a set of processes, of transformations. These are moving, acting, 
interacting. They are generating themselves. Perhaps we can impute patterns in 
these movements. But here’s the trick, the crucial and most difficult move that 
we need to make. We need to say that the patterns, the channels down which 
they flow, are not different in kind from whatever it is that are channeled by 
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them…The social world is this remarkably emergent phenomenon: in its 
processes it shapes its own flows. Movement and the organization of movement 
are not different.’ (Law 1994: 15, original emphasis) 
 
The ‘modes of ordering’ share some similarities to ‘government rationalities’ 
and ‘political rationalities’. They are also productive in creating ordering effects 
and create differences between right and wrong, hierarchy, boundaries, etc., and 
Law also ascertains that the modes are inspired by Foucault’s writings (e.g. Law 
1994: 111). However, he also claims that his views on how modes of orderings 
interact and change in ‘real’ organisational life and his considerations of the role 
of materiality are more elaborated than those of Foucault (Law 1994: 22f), even 
though he later calls them ‘mini-discourses’ (Law 2009). The modes also share 
some similarities with Weber’s different kinds of ‘Lebenswelt’ (life world), as 
each order generates its own irreducible ideals, justifications, rationales and, 
indeed, conducts. In that way, Law tries to strike a balance between descriptions 
that neither favour structure nor agency as the explanation for behaviour. He 
does this by emphasising the relative instability of orderings, while insisting that 
it is possible to impute patterns to the networks of the social. The crucial point 
is, though, that these patterns are not different from the actual actions that are 
considered parts of the pattern (Law 1994: 112, see also quote above). In that 
way, Law is also focused on the ‘performative’ aspects of the modes; that is, 
how they have the power to generate certain forms of effects, which in turn also 
alter the modes themselves.  
 
All in all, ‘government rationalities’ and ‘modes of ordering’ are used to make 
scientists’ understandings of ‘Responsible Science’ into an object of study. The 
former emphasises the political and regulative character of the different ideas 
about responsible conduct. It can be used as a guide to pinpoint the content, 
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difference and demarcations between different ways of thinking about 
responsibility. The latter is more suited to looking at the practical efforts 
entailed in living up to the daily responsibilities associated with scientific 
worlds, while simultaneously constructing different understandings of science’s 
role in society. In the next two sections, I will describe how I trace ‘government 
rationalities’ and ‘modes of orderings’ in my empirical material by looking for 
‘justifications’ of ‘conduct’.  
 
3.3.3 CONDUCT 
Given that I have framed the object of research as ‘government rationalities’ and 
‘modes of orderings’, I have also chosen a way of understanding agency that at 
once recognises that there are patterns in the various ways we act, albeit with the 
understanding that these patterns are acquired and sustained through very 
specific processes of learning, mimicking and repetition. Thereby, our actions 
are not a mindless expression of an inevitable macro-structure (McFall, Du Gay, 
and Carter 2008: 29). The concept of ‘conduct’ has been of much interest for 
sociologists since the ‘founding’ fathers Emile Durkheim and Max Weber first 
wrote about it. The notion itself refers to the manner in which people behave in 
particular circumstances, occasions or contexts. The concept thus emphasises 
the roles that individuals assume in different circumstances, for instance, a 
policeman acts differently in a situation at work than he does in his spare time. 
There is an expectation of different forms of conduct, depending on different 
situations and, at the same time, different expectations of different and 
recognisable roles in society, such as the police, mothers, fathers, and bosses or 
– as is the case in this dissertation – scientists. In that way, studying conduct is 
both about paying attention to the specific acts of people in specific contexts 
and, at the same time, how these acts are learned and sustained through rituals, 
organisation and categorisations (McFall, Du Gay, and Carter 2008: 51).  
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With this understanding of conduct also follows the fact that the concept is not 
used to explain individual behaviour based on structural, ‘macro-social’ 
explanations, nor is too much faith put in the individual’s ability to act freely 
and determine his or her own actions. ‘Conduct’ is used to assist the researcher 
in gaining insight into a third position on agency: One where agency is of a 
distributed nature. Rather than having the individual or a structure as the focus 
of study, certain forms of conduct are in focus, as well as the fact that these 
conducts are learned abilities and have developed into special capacities and 
deportments (Mcfall, du Gay and Carter 2008: 6). Agency is thus looked upon 
as something that constitutes people in different situations, rather than 
something the individual possesses and which is expressed in actions. Several 
authors that are central to this dissertation have been interested in studying 
conduct. Max Weber, both in his ‘Vocation Lectures’ on science and politics 
(Weber 2004) and his study of the ‘The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism’ (Weber 1956), shows how particular spheres of society (e.g. puritan 
Lutheran, the political and scientific professions) during specific periods of time 
use particular techniques and practices to connect the ideal behaviour – the norm 
– with an inner consciousness (du Gay 2000). In that way, he underlines how 
certain practices – such as that of hard labour and ascetic lifestyle among 
pietistic Lutherans – constitute and sustain specific ways of thinking about the 
meaning of life and consciousness, rather than the other way around. This basic 
view about the relations between practice and individuality is also the basis for 
this dissertation: Conduct is looked upon as recognisable patterns of practices, 
which appear in certain circumstances and spaces and which make up people 
and groups in particular contexts.  
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Foucault was also interested in conduct in relation to his studies of power and 
was in fact, in his later works, inspired by Weber, but he focused more explicitly 
on the elements of power inherent in the concept of conduct. In relation to 
modern ruling, which we touched upon above, he claimed that ‘the exercise of 
power is a “conduct of conducts” and a management of possibilities’ (Foucault 
2003b: 138). His argument is that the exercise of modern government is 
characterised by the structuring of possible fields of action. Fields of action 
shape the freedom of actors to act by rendering some choices of behaviour and 
thinking (conduct) legitimate and right rather than others. For Foucault, conduct 
then becomes significant as the way that socialisation itself is constructed and 
how it takes particular forms according to time and context (Dean 1996: 217). 
He studies socialisation by looking at the mundane assemblages of moral, 
physical and administrative elements that make up the organising of space, time, 
good and bad (Hunter 1996: 147).  
 
John Law, in his book ‘Organizing Modernity’ (1994) on research management, 
is also preoccupied with something akin to the concept of ‘conduct’, although he 
prefers to talk about ‘agency’ (e.g. Law 1994: 74). However, my argument here 
is that his notion of agency is closely related to the ideas of conduct as Weber 
and Foucault describe them. Law also readily admits that both of them have 
been inspirational for his book (Law 1994: 66f and 95). Law considers ‘agency’ 
as local and contingent effects of what he calls ‘modes of orderings’ (e.g. Law 
1994: 75). Modes of orderings are patterns of local achievements of order that 
are made up of networks of material and non-material components, such as 
machines, talk, ideas and space (Law 1994: 110). The orders are never complete 
or pure (you will, for instance, never find a pure ‘bureaucracy’; there will 
always be traces, resistance and other competing orders at play). Related to that 
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point is that orders are recurrent, that is, they are open-ended processes that are 
self-generating: 
 
‘The social is a set of processes, of transformations. These are moving, acting, 
interacting. They are generating themselves. Perhaps we can impute patterns in 
these movements. But here’s the trick, the crucial and most difficult move that 
we need to make. We need to say that the patterns, the channels down which 
they flow, are not different in kind from whatever it is that are channelled by 
them…The social world is this remarkable emergent phenomenon: in its 
processes it shapes its own flows. Movement and the organization of movement 
are not different.’ (Law 1994: 15, original emphasis)   
 
The modes of orderings share some similarities to Foucault’s notion on 
‘discourse’, as they also have ordering effects and create differences between 
right and wrong, hierarchy, boundaries, etc. (Law 1994: 111). But Law claims 
that his views on how modes of orderings interact and change and his 
considerations of the role of materiality are more elaborated than those of 
Foucault (Law 1994: 22f). They also share some similarities with Weber’s 
different types of ‘Lebenswelt’, as each order generates its own irreducible 
ideals, justifications, rationales and, indeed, conducts. Another similarity is the 
relationship between agency and the construction of meaning. Like Weber, Law 
also sees a close relationship between actions and meaning creation, where 
grand narratives do not presuppose local action. Rather, the repetition and 
insistence of certain actions instate certain worldviews and discourses. Law’s 
focus, however, is not only on the construction of big, historically lasting 
constructions such as ‘capitalism’, ‘Protestantism’ or ‘science’. He also focuses 
on the flux and instability of local pools of orders, as they can be studied in, for 
instance, research organisations. Law calls these contingent pools of order 
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‘modes of orderings’ to indicate that they are a special way of understanding and 
organising in the world, depending on the present orientation. In that way, Law 
tries to balance between explanations that either favour structure or agency by 
emphasising the relative instability of orderings, but at the same time insisting 
that it is possible to impute patterns to the networks of the social (Law 1994: 
112).  
 
The individual as an explanatory reason for action is rejected in favour of a 
decentred subject, whose actions are an effect of a particular ordering attempt 
(Law 1994: 74). By looking at ‘ordering’ attempts, Law also touches upon the 
notion of authority and power, as the modes have the ability to guide agency in 
certain directions, while at the same time also re-establish and strengthen the 
particular order. Above, I present conduct as a way by which persons in 
particular circumstances take responsibility for behaving according to the 
expectations dictated by a specific situation. In my interpretation, this is similar 
to Law’s understanding of his concept ‘agency’. 
 
This dissertation has been inspired by all three authors, and their different areas 
of interests in relation to ‘conduct’ will be explored in different chapters. In 
chapter 5, I have used a Foucauldian framework to analyse articulations of 
responsible conduct of science as they appear in science journals from 1960 to 
now. Here the notion of conduct has been important in two senses; First it is 
seen as the proper way of scientists of addressing a precarious subject: by 
writing about it in scientific journals, because that is how scientists usually 
communicate; by writing and in journals (or books), so it is a way of conducting 
their job as they use to do. The other sense in which it gives meaning to talk 
about conduct is in relation to the journals themselves: Here conduct is seen as 
the process of assembling and mediate meaning through a range of different 
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technologies (the tangible papers, the journal databases, the search systems, the 
letters, etc.). In that way, the papers become a way of managing the conduct of 
others by inscribe the ideals of how science should relate to society in media, 
which spread easily both locally and globally.   
 
In the chapters 7, 8 and 9, where I describe how different ‘orders of 
responsibility’ appeared in the daily work of the two research organisations, I 
have relied on the ways that Law describes agency. He sees it as being generated 
by different orders, where irreducible logics and reasons are performed and 
negotiated. In one of the chapters, 7, I describe a mode of ordering that is quite 
similar to that which Weber describes as ‘the scientific vocation’ (Weber 1994). 
But I have also added two other modes that reflect later developments of the 
scientific work, namely, that of ‘entrepreneurial science’ (Etzkowitz 2003) and 
that of ‘Responsible science’ (e.g. Nowotny, Scott, and Gibbons 2001; Guston 
2000; Owen et al. 2013) 
 
 
 
3.3.4 JUSTIFICATIONS 
Inspired by Law’s (1994) emphasis on how different pools of orders are enacted 
and negotiated in local organisational contexts, I want to look at the diversity of 
responsibilities that are performed in the labs and how these different 
responsibilities are negotiated and ranked in relation to the daily work. 
Similarly, I want to see which different worldviews are invoked in order to 
explain science’s general responsibilities toward society as they are carved out 
in the journal papers. In order to grasp this diversity, I turn to the concept of 
‘justifications’, which has surfaced in various academic fields such as sociology, 
philosophy, economic sociology, organisation studies, institutional theory, etc 
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(e.g. Boltanski and Thévenot 2006; Stark 2000; Jagd 2011). Interest in the 
notion has mostly been spurred by Boltanski and Thévenot’s influential work 
(1987/2006) ‘On Justification’. The work is considered an alternative to French 
critical theory, especially that of Pierre Bourdieu, because of the latter’s 
tendency to emphasise social structures over actors’ capabilities to act (Jagd 
2011: 345). Instead, the authors argue for a ‘pragmatic sociology’ (Boltanski 
and Thévenot 1999), which emphasises the possibilities for the (decentred) 
subject’s ability to criticise, manipulate and resist power relations in specific 
situations by drawing on and ranking different regimes of justification 
(Boltanski & Thévenot 2006). The authors identify six different ‘modes of 
justification’: the civic, the industrial, the market, the fame, the creative and the 
domestic. Furthermore, they suggest that disputes in social life can be analysed 
as clashes between these incompatible ‘modes of justification’, where actors 
draw on different criteria for evaluating the situation (Boltanski & Thévenot 
1999). In this dissertation, I use a general understanding of the subject’s ability 
to creatively use different justifications in specific situations to make sense of 
specific choices and meanings. I also use the idea that there exist different 
‘regimes of justifications’ – different commonly acknowledged ways of 
understanding the world and how to act within it. I use this idea when I assert 
that the different ‘modes of responsibilities’ encompass different ideas about 
science’s role in society. However, I do not use the content of the six specific 
regimes that Boltanski and Thévenot describe to explain the scientists’ 
justifications. While I am sure that this would have also provided interesting 
perspectives, I have let the scientists construct their own justifications and left it 
at that.   
 
Connecting science and technology studies with specific organisational 
concerns, John Law also touches upon the phenomena that connect a specific, 
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difficult situation with a more general idea about how to solve it. He gives this 
phenomenon different labels throughout his book, for instance, ‘justifications’ 
(Law 1994: 53) or ‘problems’ (Law 1994: 111). He sees this phenomenon as yet 
another effect of ordering attempts:   
 
‘They [modes] may generate and embody a characteristic set of problems. Here 
the issue concerns patterns in the relationship between what is on the one hand, 
and what might or should be on the other. It is the gap between these that 
defines the problem (and so a need for resources).’ (Law 1994: 111, original 
emphasis)  
 
Law thus studies patterns in the gaps between how the world is at the moment 
and how it should ideally be – what connects the gap between these two are thus 
specific forms of justification that refer to specific and different forms of 
worldview. Similar to the above descriptions, Law’s idea is that there are 
different rationalities that are well known and which the actors can use as a 
resource for dictating action in specific situations.  
  
While different in scope and disciplinary origin, the different approaches to the 
notion of justification seem to circulate around the existence and construction of 
competing rationalities in the social. They share the view that actors are active in 
choosing different worldviews when justifying actions, while they, at the same 
time, agree that the worldviews are not necessarily infinite in number. There are 
certain recognisable, historically institutionalised grounds for making your point 
in ways recognised as meaningful (Law 2009: 149). In that way, the framework 
for justifications relates to the work of Weber, as he insists that there are 
different types of ‘Lebenwelt’, which inhabit different forms of rationalisation 
irreducible to each other (Weber 1956; du Gay 2000). With this also follows that 
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‘justifications’ should be understood as more than mere ‘motivations’ for a 
specific action or opinion. The justifications entail different worldviews, 
different ideas of what is right and wrong and different ideas about the 
individual or organisation’s role in society. This also becomes clear in the 
analytical chapters, where each of the ‘modes of responsibility’ also entails a 
specific view of science’s role in society and the specific character of that 
society (for a similar view on science’s construction of ‘society’ see Strathern 
2003).  
 
In this dissertation, the justifications are used throughout the analysis. The use of 
justifications mirrors the ambition to connect the diffuse demands for 
‘Responsible Science’ with the mundane practical work that is done in the 
research laboratories. How do these two entities connect or disconnect? How are 
the calls recognised, embraced or resisted by scientists, and how do they (if at 
all) implement the calls in the specific tasks they have to do? 
 
In the first analytical chapter (chapter 5), I look at descriptions of responsible 
conduct as they are portrayed in scientific journals from 1960 to 2010. I 
illustrate that these descriptions are based on specific justifications about the 
role of government: Whether they justify responsible conduct with a focus on 
internal or external steering as most responsible; and whether they consider the 
process of doing science or the outcome of scientific work as the crucial object 
of steering for ‘Responsible Science’. In the subsequent three analytical chapters 
(7, 8, 9), I look at the daily scientific work of two public biotech laboratories. 
Here, I describe what the scientists consider to be their main responsibilities, 
how they justify these responsibilities and how they conduct themselves in order 
to meet these responsibilities. I use the findings from chapter 5 as a mirror, 
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whereby I compare the daily responsibilities and the way the scientists go about 
their work with the highly idealised ideas about proper scientific conduct.  
 
3.3.5 ORGANISATIONAL CONSEQUENCES 
In each of the ethnographic analytical chapters, I also describe how the mode 
generates some specific shared ways of imagining time and fact-making, the 
boundaries of the lab, the world ‘outside’, their professional role and the role of 
science in general in society. I also indicate that the responsibilities generate 
both negative and positive feelings among the employees; the responsibilities 
are at times a joy and at other times frustrating. Law calls all these consequences 
these the ‘patterned effects of modes’ (Law 1994: 83), and that is how I also 
consider them. I want to stress that while these patterned effects may be 
performed in several places, the exact way they are performed is tightly 
connected to a local context as well. At the same time, I also emphasise how the 
scientists reproduce and uphold more general ideas about science’s role in 
society through their daily conduct. I have therefore chosen to call the patterned 
effects, for ‘organisational consequences’, because it is the consequences of a 
range of matters for people that work together in pursuit of more or less the 
same goals and who share some similar understandings of their place of work 
and of the work they do. I do know that this term also has connotations to 
various concepts in organisation theory, but these are not used here.  
 
 
3.4 ANALYTICAL STRATEGY FOR CHAPTER 7-911 
In the analysis of the ethnographic material, ‘modes of responsibilities’ are used 
to describe the three different forms of responsibility that the scientists have: the 
                                                
11 The document study, where I identify ‘political rationalities’ is a journal paper, which was published together with Maja Horst in 2014. 
Therefore I have not described the analytical strategy for that part of the analysis here. It can be found in relation to the analysis in chapter 5. 
As it is a published paper, I am afraid that some of the points from the theoretical and methodological section will be repeated.  
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‘truth’, the ‘business’ and the ‘public’ (see chapter 6,7,8). The modes are 
inspired by John Law’s ‘modes of orderings’ (1994) and each ‘mode’ entails a 
specific (patterned) way of understanding and acting in the world: What is seen 
as right and wrong, the role of the scientist, the role of science in society and a 
range of other issues that render meaning to the scientists in a given situation.  
 
The construction of the modes was done by assembling descriptions of actions 
from the field notes that were similar to each other and described common ways 
of behaving in specific situations, also called ‘conduct’.12 Similarly, I assembled 
justifications from field notes and interviews that were alike. I also (especially 
from the STIR inventions) assembled statements that compared a way of doing 
things with a way of justifying them. I did so in order to establish connections 
between conducts and justifications. I do realise that the connections between 
‘conducts’ and ‘justifications’ are a construction. This is because, firstly, actors 
make sense and thus justifications for their actions in hindsight as, among 
others, Karl Weick has described (Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 2005). In that 
way, the actors’ connections are a meaningful reconstruction of their ways of 
behaving and the accompanying motives, but not necessarily identical with what 
took place in the specific situation – which was probably much more ‘messy’, as 
John Law would say (Law 2004). Secondly, I, the researcher, also construct the 
connections between conducts and justifications on the basis of the informants’ 
descriptions and my theoretical understandings. Thereby, I also influence how 
these connections are constructed. In a similar way to the informants, I also 
create meaningful stories about responsibility, which makes sense in relation to 
the goal of making a dissertation. Given that I maintain (following Law 1994: 
109) that both the actors and I draw on well-known general stories about 
science’s role in society in order to construct a sense of meaning and 
                                                
12 This coding work was done based on field notes and transcriptions of field notes in the data coding program Nvivo. 
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responsibility in specific situations, I think it is valuable to describe the 
connections between conducts and justifications. Not as a ‘correspondence’ 
description of ‘reality’, but rather as a way of suggesting that how the scientists 
make sense of their work and how they conceive of the relation between how 
they act and why they do so is an important clue as to how the scientists adapt to 
current demands for ‘responsibility’ in science. As John Law writes about his 
own research aim: 
 
‘[…] one of the points that I tell is that how the Laboratory members tell stories, 
how they formulate their past, is an important clue to a much more general 
issue: how it is that they would like to order the organization in a much wider 
range of circumstances; and how it is that the organization is being performed 
and embodied in a wide range of circumstances.’ (Law 1994: 19, original 
emphasis)  
 
In relation to actually constructing and distinguishing the different modes, it was 
necessary – besides using ‘conduct’ and ‘justification’ – to look at some of the 
other descriptions that Law gives of the modes in order to get inspiration and 
guidance. John Law (1994) also describes ‘shared stories’ in the labs, that is, 
shared ways of thinking about the laboratory’s past, present and future, its 
boundaries, internal content and external environment, which help the lab to 
maintain itself (Law 1994: 54). I have not explicitly worked with the concept in 
the presentation of the analysis, however, during the construction of the modes, I 
became aware of working with both conducts and justifications that seemed to 
be ‘shared stories’ – either in both labs or within one of them. I want to describe 
modes as shared, as something most people in the laboratories will recognise in 
contrast to more private ideas and positions.  
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Furthermore, Law also describes ‘ordering effects’, which is in his words 
actually the only observable parts of the modes themselves, as they are literally 
the sum of the ‘recursive patterned effects of the networks of the social’ (Law 
1994: 15). Law describes that the modes may generate ‘patterns of deletion’; 
that is, the modes tend to put some aspects of the social in the background, while 
others are empowered and therefore very visible (Law 1994: 111). He also states 
that modes generate and perform  
 
‘…distributions, defining or embodying a characteristic approach to what 
might, does or should pass from whom to what under what circumstances’ (Law 
1994: 111).  
 
In my work on constructing the modes, I also looked out for these kinds of 
patterned effects in my material. I sorted them according to how some entities, 
for instance, ‘the scientific profession’, were extremely visible and active in 
some situations, while being utterly absent in others. And I distinguished 
between the different ways of constructing knowledge that the scientists told me 
about; at times, they spoke of public science as a stable institution that 
disseminates knowledge to a ‘society’ made up of huge institutions such as the 
‘state’, ‘industry’ and ‘the public’. Other times, they spoke about how 
knowledge is sold on a market where they compete with other laboratories. 
Again, the task was to group these different stories that I saw in my material, 
since I treated them as effects of a specific way of looking at the responsibility 
the scientists have.  
 
These groups of shared stories, ways of doing their work, justifications for their 
actions and the ordering effects were then combined and distinguished from 
each other in order to make up each of the modes. All of these elements did not 
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just fit together nicely like pieces of a puzzle. Therefore, I chose justifications as 
the most important part of the mode in order to be able to distinguish them from 
each other. If the justifications for different forms of behaviour or more general 
effects were the same, then they belonged in the same mode, even though the 
effects looked very different. If it was not possible for me to construct all 
elements, that is, conduct, justification, shared stories and ordering effects, then 
I did not consider the data material consistent enough to support the construction 
and description of a mode. In that way, the different components also worked as 
a way of triangulating my analysis: if all the elements were not in place, I 
refrained from further description and these ‘half-baked’ modes are thus not part 
of the analysis. In the end, I ended up with three ‘modes of responsibility’, 
whereby each generated some specific ways of doing the daily work, each 
argued in different ways for the reasons for this specific responsibility and each 
had some general consequences for how the labs were organised.   
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4. METHODS 
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n this section, the practical aspects of this study will be discussed. This 
chapter is divided into three sections. The first section looks at the cases and 
outlines why the specific arenas, text and laboratories in this study were 
chosen and, in relation to the laboratories, why I chose to compare laboratories 
in Denmark and the USA, as well as why I chose synthetic biology. The second 
section concentrates on the methods used to study responsible science 
empirically. It explains the use of document studies, observations and interviews 
and provides an overview of the data collection for this project. I also discuss 
some of the challenges I faced, especially in relation to the ethnographic studies 
and the collaboration with the scientists. Finally, I describe the analytical 
strategies for the document study (chapter 5) and the ethnographic studies 
(chapter 7-9) respectively.  
 
 
4.1 CASES 
This study is a case study of how scientists understand and conduct 
responsibility in relation to their work. I have used two cases as the loci for the 
investigation of this question. The first case is a document study of how 
scientists articulate responsible scientific conduct, and the second case is a 
laboratory study of two laboratories working within the field of synthetic 
biology. In the next two sections, I will account for why these two cases were 
chosen and why I look at them as ‘cases’. As my point of departure, I use 
Abbott’s definition of cases as:  
 
‘[…] fuzzy realities with autonomously defined, complex properties – and […] 
as engaged in a perpetual dialogue with their environment, a dialogue of action 
and constraint that we call plot.’ (Abbott 1992: 65) 
 
I 
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Based on that definition, I see cases as a defined and delimited field of study, 
where the properties of the cases can be studied as if they were acting 
independently of their surroundings. But in reality, these boundaries are 
constructed (by the researcher), and it is important to notice that the 
environment also gives meaning to the case. By using the terms ‘fuzzy’ and 
‘complex’, Abbott also underlines the importance of a case being big enough to 
expose contradictions, different layers and different themes, which can be 
unfolded by the researcher. In the articulation of this study as a ‘case study’ also 
lies the assumption that the ‘fuzzy reality with autonomously defined, complex 
properties’ is an example of something that can be generalised beyond the case 
itself (Abbott 199266; Ragin 1992: 8). I will return to these possibilities for 
generalisations, based on the findings, in the concluding discussion (10). Here, I 
will describe my cases.  
 
4.1.1 THE DOCUMENT STUDY 
The document study comprises the study of an archive of 263 papers about the 
responsible conduct of science written between 1960 and 2010 (see chapter 5 for 
further descriptions of the construction and analysis of the archive). Initially, the 
document study was intended to be a more ‘traditional’ literature review of the 
‘state of the art’ of the pre-supposed field of ‘social responsibility in science’. 
But the literature searches soon showed that rather than one or several delimited 
‘fields’ detailing this subject, there was a heterogeneous cacophony of voices 
coming from many disciplines, with each arguing for their conception of 
‘Responsible Science’ and how it can be realised.  
 
Therefore, the ‘literature review’ was turned into an analysis of different 
‘political rationalities’ that attempt to steer the conduct of science in certain 
directions; the journal papers are thereby considered data rather than background 
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and theory. In this dissertation, the document study is considered a ‘case’ on 
contemporary ideals about responsible conduct in science. The contemporary 
ideals are located by studying a specific archive (263 journal papers) that was 
assembled as representations of understandings of responsible conduct in 
general. Each paper articulates an idealised picture of how scientists should 
behave and how the institutions of science are supposed to be regulated if we are 
to ever reach these ideals. The analytical task was to identify these articulations 
and find patterns (political rationalities) in their argumentations. Based on the 
sample of texts, four rationalities about the responsible conduct of science in 
general are presented. The argument for generalising from 263 journal papers to 
a statement about ‘science’ more broadly is that the archive had representations 
from a diverse range of disciplines and voices. The analysis is presented as the 
first analytical chapter of this dissertation (5).  
 
4.1.2 COMPARING DENMARK AND USA 
Moving from the document studies to the ethnographic studies, the task 
formulated in the PhD grant was to make a qualitative study of two research 
organisations that worked in the fields of advanced biotech in Denmark and the 
USA.  
 
Besides the very practical aspect of starting with Denmark because it is my 
home country, Denmark in itself represents an interesting place to conduct 
studies of ‘Responsible Science’, as it has a rich tradition for science 
communication that has also been the inspiration for some of the recent ideas 
about including social values in scientific conduct. As I also described in greater 
detail in the theory section, Denmark is now putting a stronger focus on 
organisational communication and inter-organisational competition in the way 
that science communication is performed. In that way, Denmark is almost 
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moving in the opposite direction of many other Western countries at the moment 
(Mejlgaard 2009). The USA is also interesting for several reasons, first and 
foremost, because they are considered global front-runners in the development 
of science and science government – a fact already noted by Weber in 1917 
(Weber, Owen, and Strong 2004). While the structure of the US scientific 
system and its relationship to the state, industry and the public has been a source 
of inspiration for many other countries, public science and the university system 
is still very much different from the Danish model. The US government has 
recently developed additional outreach and engagement projects in relation to 
their strategic stake on novel technologies, but while they are very far in their 
scientific endeavours and strategic government of science, they are not as 
experienced in outreach and engagement as Denmark (Jasanoff 2011).   
 
From the beginning, there were two reasons for the comparative aspect of this 
study. First, studying two laboratories is a way to become more aware of the 
local, unique traits of each laboratory. It is also a way to make myself ponder 
over aspects that I may otherwise overlook, because I may take them for granted 
as institutional aspects of science rather than local aspects. Seeing that things 
can be otherwise in another laboratory was supposed to make me more sensitive 
toward my data material (for similar considerations in relation to comparative 
laboratory studies, see Traweek 2009; Knorr-Cetina 1999). The other idea was 
that the countries’ respective political cultures in relation to science’s role in 
society would influence how the scientists think about and conduct ‘Responsible 
Science’ (as suggested by, for instance, Irwin 2006; Irwin and Horst 2010). As I 
will discuss in ‘Observations’ (4.2.1), this second idea proved difficult to 
establish in relation to my material, whereas the former idea about sensitivity 
was very fruitful in terms of being much more sensitive during the actual 
observations. It is easier to study an interaction as something special and 
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noteworthy when it can be compared to another place where things are handled 
differently.  
 
4.1.3 SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY AND LABORATORIES 
The grant proposal also suggested different scientific disciplines such as 
nanotechnology and synthetic biology as possible empirical focuses for the 
study. I chose synthetic biology because it is a very new field (even newer than 
nanotechnology), where a lot of promises for its potential uses are already being 
made by scientists, potential funders and politicians. At the same time, others 
advocate caution and consider the discipline controversial because it combines 
biology and engineering, thereby creating new organic material that nature has 
never nurtured and which could also have potential unknown side effects for 
both humans and nature.  
 
Because the field is itself so much in the making, it was my expectation that the 
scientists working with synthetic biology would have reflected upon the 
directions of research and the questions they wanted to pursue, as there are still 
so many uncertainties surrounding the field’s potential. The last reason for 
choosing this area was the expectation that the controversies surrounding the 
field since its emergence would have familiarised the informants with themes 
such as ethics and public scepticism, thereby enabling the scientists to elaborate 
considerations and give examples from practice. All in all, my initial thoughts 
were that I would end up with two laboratories, one Danish and one American, 
and I would compare the way they related to themes of ‘Responsible Science’ 
and see if I could link their different practices to their different political cultures. 
Inspired by Flyvbjerg (Flyvbjerg 1991), the case would then be a comparative 
best-case study. The different political cultures in Denmark and the USA would 
together be the point of departure for the comparison, and I would highlight the 
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differences based on this theoretical premise. It would be a ‘best-case’ 
methodology because I expected (in both cases) to find organisations where 
people already relate to demands for ‘Responsible Science’. 
 
The two laboratories where I made the most elaborate field studies13,(which I 
will call Gyro Gearloose and Curious George respectively from now on) find it 
important to include values and ethical questions in their work – each in their 
own way.  Curious George has worked with GM plants for many years and they 
have learned the hard way that funding can disappear due to lack of public 
support (see also the description of the so called ‘GMO crisis’ in 2.1.1). They do 
not want a situation like the one that occurred around the turn of the millennium 
to happen again, and they work hard to obtain public support for their work. In 
the USA, I, helped by my American supervisor, chose a lab working on the 
development of an advanced diagnostic device that is able to distinguish 
between a wide range of different diseases. They are also developing new 
vaccines for, for instance, certain types of cancer. In comparison with the 
Danish lab, the American lab seemed much more focused on developing 
readymade technologies, but at that point, I was not sure if that was more a way 
of branding themselves than an actual ambition. Nor did I at that point regard 
the different scientific aims as being of great importance, but this perception has 
changed, as I will demonstrate in the analysis.  
 
  
                                                
13 I did two pilot studies in Denmark before I decided to continue my observations at Curious George. The other lab was also working with 
synthetic biology. While it was also engaged in different outreach activities, the lab in itself was much smaller and solely focused on one 
project: to create a synthetic living cell. At Curious George, they were part of many different projects and faced different forms of problems 
depending on the content of the projects. I was interested in this diversity and the opportunity to interview many different people at different 
levels in the laboratory.  
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4.2 FIELD WORK 
Moving away from the considerations regarding the case studies, the theme of 
the following sections relates to the different engagements with the field in the 
ethnographic study (the method for the document study is presented in 5.2). I 
used three methods of collecting data in the laboratories: observations, ‘STIR’ 
interventions and interviews. An overview of the different engagements is 
provided after the descriptions of each method.  
 
4.2.1 OBSERVATIONS 
In the beginning, I considered the observations a supplement to the interviews I 
was going to conduct toward the end of my stay. The theme of ‘social 
responsibility’ in science was something I was sure would need to be discussed 
with the scientists in order for me to understand, because, at first glance, it did 
not seem to be something that I could extract from the observations. However, it 
was important for me to know something about the laboratories, the people and 
the science well before the interviews so we could talk about responsibility in 
connection to their everyday work.  
 
But after a while in the field, I discovered that the observations were more 
valuable than just well researched background information. They provide 
valuable insights in their own right, not least when it comes to negotiations 
about the labs’ values and the consequences for how they prioritise tasks – 
themes that are discussed at both meetings and among colleagues during the 
day. The values are also revealed in newspaper clippings about important topics 
or cartoons hanging on the scientists’ doors or in the mails that circulate on the 
labs’ common email lists. Other aspects that point to what the scientists consider 
(and do not consider) their responsibilities also emerge in relation to the physical 
arrangements of the labs. For instance, I noticed the difference between the 
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perimeter and the middle of Curious George. At the perimeter (closest to the 
canteen, farthest away from the labs) sit the PR personnel. The walls are covered 
in promotions, newspaper clippings, calls for papers, and conference posters, all 
of them set up to spell SYNBIO in capital letters. But the term disappears 
completely when you enter the wet labs, the heart of the laboratory and the place 
where experiments are done. Here, the writing on the walls is about security and 
safety, what the flasks contain and which temperature the fridge has to be at. 
Gradually, the observations acquired the same status as the interviews: Valuable 
insights into how various understandings of responsibility matter for the 
scientists’ daily work, their division of labour, and how responsibility can create 
a sense of belonging to the lab and the scientific profession.  
 
The observations also helped me rethink the research theme, especially 
regarding the comparison between the two political cultures. It was as if the 
connections between the scientists’ daily work and abstract political cultures 
were quite difficult to make, however, other interesting connections stood out. 
There were many striking similarities between the two laboratories: The colours 
were very much the same (grey, white), and they told similar stories about the 
importance of accuracy and carefulness, about measuring correctly and re-
counting the flasks. Their public events also shared similarities. There were 
evenings where people were invited into the lab and scientists explained their 
field. There were meetings in public buildings, where scientists and the lay 
public discussed new scientific findings or ethical controversies. At the 
beginning, it was more surprising that similar types of contradictions and 
conflicts appeared in both labs. At times, even though I was actually in the same 
organisation, it felt more as if I was in different organisations over the course of 
one day than it had done when I went from Denmark to the USA. Sometimes, 
for instance, the scientists in both labs believed the public to be ignorant; at 
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other times, they were thought of as knowledgeable. Sometimes, they seemed 
absolutely confident about their future results and predicted scientific 
revolutions; at other times, they advised caution and carefulness in relation to 
results that were already published. Second, both laboratories also shared a 
sense of responsibility toward the organisation and toward the public, but these 
two concerns were performed differently at each lab. The observations of the 
shared recognition of norms of responsibility, as well as the two labs’ different 
reactions to them, meant that I included other forms of comparison in the study 
apart from just the difference between the two labs. I also started to compare 
different responsibilities and different situations independently of where they 
took place. 
 
The role of the ethnographer has been discussed at length in much seminal 
literature on ethnography, and the roles vary from the strictly observant to the 
fully participating member (De Certeau 1998; Neyland 2007; e.g. Law 1994) I 
decided to play a rather active role based on the very practical consideration that 
I was quite nervous about being in the field and activity makes me less nervous. 
I tried to act as a sort of consultant or confidant (dependent on my impression 
and relationship with the person) and encouraged them to discuss work 
conditions, problems with experiments, ethical considerations and other themes 
that they found important from day to day. I read white papers on synthetic 
biology and the most cited papers from each lab in order to understand the 
basics of their field. This was based on the thought that to take highly skilled 
experts’ time and then seem oblivious about their field of competence does not 
engender any trust, respect or will to cooperate. While I would not in any way 
claim that I became a favourite confidante or very important to any of the 
employees, I did over time build up trusting relations with many of them, 
especially the junior scientists and especially in the Danish lab. This also 
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occurred to a certain degree in the American lab, but due to language barriers 
and a far more formal tone of communication among the employees, the strategy 
did not work as well.  
 
In ethnographic fieldwork, some of the biggest challenges can be figuring out 
how to move around the organisations, how to be informed about important 
events and how to handle the great amount of time one spends wandering 
aimlessly around the hallways, all the while being unable to shake the feeling 
that everyone thinks you are peculiar (Neyland 2008). In ‘Organizing 
Modernity’, John Law, for instance, describes how he developed a habit of 
striding quickly through the buildings with a couple of books under his arm in 
order to look preoccupied, while he was in fact just going around in big circles 
(Law 1994: 44). Barbara Czarniawska comments that it feels as if whenever 
anything important happens in the organisation, then she is always somewhere 
else (Czarniawska 1997). In order to counteract at least some of these feelings of 
ridiculousness and ignorance, I decided to use a ‘shadowing’ strategy, whereby I 
sometimes followed a single researcher for half a day. The method had several 
advantages for me: First, I could ask this individual to explain things to me 
along the way and we could engage in conversation. Second, the method 
enabled me to move about easily in the organisation, provided that the scientist 
moved as well, and granted me entry to events that were important so long as I 
went with the scientist. I followed twelve scientists around each lab, making 
sure to schedule appointments with them in advance so I knew I had something 
to do when I arrived (although they forgot about me once in a while and 
disappeared on holiday or to conferences). The strategy also had the advantage 
that I got to know many of them quite well and could move from asking the 
same questions to engaging in discussions that developed from one shadowing 
session to the next. I continued this strategy for most of my stay at both labs, but 
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as I became more familiar with the labs, I supplemented the shadowing strategy 
with observations of various meetings, presentations and some of the public 
engagement activities that they participated in.  
 
4.2.2 STIR 
During the observation studies, I also introduced the STIR interventions (Fisher 
2007). I added this method to the observations and interviews because I wanted 
to explore the justifications for mundane decisions made by the scientists in the 
labs. The idea was that I could persuade the scientists to explicitly construct a 
connection between their daily work and some more general values.  
 
The STIR protocol was developed by Erik Fisher as a tool ‘to more reflexively 
attend to the integration of technical and social considerations’ (Fisher 2007: 
158) The initial idea is that social scientists, via the repetitive use of this specific 
interview protocol can make scientists reflect further upon their own scientific 
practice, the values inherent in that practice and perhaps even change that 
practice. In that way, STIR forms in my interpretation part of the government 
rationality, Responsible Science’ that I intend to study. Therefore, I did not use 
the STIR protocol as a way to enhance reflexive capacities. But I found the 
interview guide and the repetitive engagement (several times a week) with the 
same scientists very useful, because it makes it easier to combine everyday 
practice with general reflections on values.14  
 
  
                                                
14 The protocol consists of four phases, namely: Opportunity, considerations, alternatives and outcomes (Fisher 2007), which I translated into 
four questions, namely: Opportunity: What have you been doing today? Considerations: Did you face a dilemma during the day? If so, 
what did you chose to do? Alternatives: What do you think would have happened if you had chosen otherwise? Outcomes: Who cares about 
the decision and why?  
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4.2.3 INTERVIEWS 
By the end of each stay in the labs, I had conducted interviews with a selected 
portion of the scientists, lab technicians and PIs. These were used to help make 
sense of the observations that I had conducted throughout the previous months.  
 
The informants were chosen based on the impressions I got from the 
observations. Moreover, informants were selected based on the premise that 
there should be informants occupying different positions in the labs; that is, both 
juniors and seniors. I also wanted as many different points of view as possible in 
order to explore as many understandings about responsibility as possible and 
thereby gain broad and multifaceted material in which to look for patterns. 
Therefore, the informants also consisted of people whom I had heard express 
qualitatively different opinions about their daily responsibilities and science’s 
role in society.  
 
Interestingly, the scientists at Curious George were very curious about how I 
selected my informants. They were afraid, on my behalf, that I would not be 
able to get a ‘representative’ picture of their opinions because they could see 
that I had chosen specific persons. One of them commented that I seemed to be 
more interested in very vocal people and encouraged me to include the more 
silent ones as well. Furthermore, some of these scientists seemed quite curious 
about what was going on during the interviews, which took place behind closed 
doors. I got the feeling that being part of the project was considered a good thing 
– perhaps because they knew that management approved of the study and the 
engagements. Therefore, I ended up with many more interviews from Curious 
George than I had originally intended: I could never refuse to interview people 
who actually want to participate. 
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The interviews consisted of three overall themes: I asked about their daily tasks 
and inquired about specific situations from the observations that I wanted to 
understand; I asked about their motivation for working in public science and 
their responsibilities in relation to their specific position; and, finally, I asked 
them to relate to common ideals about science’s responsibilities, including the 
four political rationalities from the document study.  
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4.3 OVERVIEW OF FIELD ENGAGEMENTS 
 
OBSERVATIONS 
Place Pilot 1  Pilot 2  Curious George 1 Curious George 2 Gyro Gearloose 
Duration 1 week  
(2011) 
1 week  
(2011) 
6 weeks 
 (2011) 
4 weeks  
(2012) 
10 weeks  
(2012) 
Persons shadowed 3 3 9+ 10+ 10+ 
Positions PhD student, 
postdoc, full 
professor/PI 
PhD student, 
postdoc 
Lab technician, 
research assistant, 
PhD student, 
associate professor, 
PI, project 
coordinator  
PhD student, 
associate professor, 
PI, full professor, 
group manager 
PhD student, 
assistant professor, 
PI, lab manager, full 
professor, Master 
student, postdoc 
 
STIR INTERVENTIONS 
Place Gyro Gearloose Curious George 
Duration 6 weeks 6 weeks 
Participants 4 participants 4 participants 
Missed out (numbers indicate how 
many STIR interviews did not 
occur during the 6 weeks) 
One person one time Three persons, one time each 
 
INTERVIEWS  
 
Pilot 1  3 Interviews 
Pilot 2  3 Interviews 
Curious George 1  8 interviews 
Curious George 2  11 interviews 
Gyro Gearloose  9 interviews 
All in all:   34 interviews  (between 40 minutes and 2 hours) 
 
SEMINARS 
By the end of my fieldwork, I had conducted two seminars, one at Gyro Gearloose and one at Curious George 
respectively. Here, I presented initial findings and discussed them with the participating scientists. Field notes 
done by Sarah Davies and Emil Husted. 
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4.4. CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT THE KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION	  
 
4.4.1 WHO ENTERS MATTERS – IDENTITY WORK 
During the field studies at the labs, it became clear that I had to partake in what 
Emma Bell (1999) labels ‘identity work’ for ‘impression management’ (Bell 
1999: 17 see also; Goffman, Jacobsen, and Kristiansen 2004). In order to obtain 
the knowledge that I was looking for, it proved important that I appeared as 
someone whom the scientists could legitimately confide in (Baarts 2007). In that 
relation, the informants’ perceptions of my identities such as ‘female’, ‘non-
scientist’, ‘appreciative’, and ‘junior’ affected the knowledge created. In this 
section, I will account for this ‘identity work’ that I did, especially in relation to 
being female and coming from a business school, in order to be regarded as a 
legitimate receiver of information  
 
My physical appearance mattered for the engagements at Curious George. I am 
relatively young, relatively tall and relatively female. Even though all of those 
identities already exist at Curious George, the combination of all three does 
seem to attract attention. One of the scientists, that I did not know, commented 
loudly that it was obvious that I was not used to the hard lab-work, since I saw it 
fitting to wear high-heeled boots at work. I also found out that I was referred to 
as Cecilie ‘with the big, brown eyes’, and there were other incidents where it 
became clear that my physical appearance had been a theme of discussion in the 
lab. I enjoyed conversations about fashion and clothes with some of the female 
scientists during lunch breaks. It works very well as an icebreaker, however, the 
other scientists still teased us for pursuing such “ridiculous” subjects and I 
thereby definitely (if not before) acquired an identity as ‘female’ by doing so – 
an identity that did not always seem to be as respected as the male one. At least 
it seems that ‘female’ connotes ‘less scientific’ (an observation, frequently made 
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by feminist science studies (e.g. Reinharz and Davidman 1992).  At Gyro 
Gearloose, the tone of the entire lab is much more formal and gender is not on 
the agenda, neither mine, nor theirs. Once, someone questioned the fact that I 
was pursuing a PhD degree while my husband was ‘only’ finishing his Master’s 
degree. Apparently, he did not consider that the correct role distribution. But 
those who overheard the remark looked extremely embarrassed and the room 
fell silent. Gender is clearly not seen as a legitimate measurement for 
appropriate behaviour at Gyro Gearloose.  
 
However, at Curious George it was perhaps my affiliation with ‘Copenhagen 
Business School’ – or ‘Money School’ as they called it – that proved to be a 
greater legitimacy problem than my gender. As we shall see in the analysis (both 
chapter 7 and 9), business is not considered a serious science in the same way as 
the biosciences, nor is the pursuit of profit considered very noble. While neither 
of these issues form a particularly big part of the present research project, just 
the fact that I had an office on the CBS campus was a point of curiosity and 
suspicion regarding my abilities among some of the scientists. Women from 
CBS (the students) were also referred to as ‘dolls’. Sometimes, they mentioned 
that it was people like me (studying business) who could figure out how to make 
money on their technologies – but they clearly did not consider that to be an 
advantage. At Gyro Gearloose, I got almost the opposite reception. There, 
especially the lab director seemed disappointed that I could not say more about 
market potentials and ethics, as he considered those my subject. He told me to 
be more daring and actually give some recommendations – very much in line 
with his philosophy that knowledge for the sake of knowledge was of no use.  
 
My gender (at Curious George) and my academic affiliation (at both labs) were 
certainly the two most pervasive obstacles in relation to being considered a 
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legitimate knowledge seeker in the labs. And most of the time, neither of these 
were a problem. But there were times when I got the impression that I had to 
manage my identity carefully in order to be considered an individual whom they 
wanted to share their knowledge with. While it may have been an advantage that 
I was an outsider and thereby more ‘safe’ to confide in, it was also important for 
them that they found me capable of handling that knowledge and a worthy 
partner of conversation – and it is here that the impression management is 
important.   
 
These identity negotiations vary from situation to situation. But in relation to 
gender and academic affiliation, I often tried to compensate for my 
‘disadvantages’ with humour and other traits that were valued – strategies also 
described by Bell (1999: 23) and Baarts (2007). I also took care to underline that 
I had understood the science the scientists told me about (not that I always did), 
by referring to similar experiments or asking about certain topics that I 
remembered and had read about. I provided knowledge about science politics 
and explained certain logics in that system in order to show that I also possessed 
specialised knowledge. I also made fun of my ‘business background’ or 
provided ironic comments to distance myself from CBS. Furthermore, I repeated 
that I was not doing business studies at Curious George, however, at Gyro 
Gearloose, I did discuss the development of bio-business, the medical sector, 
FDA and the like with the PIs to show that I was well-informed and interested in 
their work. However, I never volunteered any specific advice. All of this may 
seem ridiculous and perhaps quite self-absorbed. But as Bell (1999) suggests: 
 
‘Though the ethnographer's working role within the research setting is, to some 
extent, predetermined by ascribed characteristics, such as gender, which 
constrain data collection and colour narrator perspective, these impressions are 
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highly negotiable within the research process. The researcher is practically 
capable of utilizing social skill to exercise a degree of agency (Giddens, 1984) 
in defining a working role and shaping relationships with organizational 
members.’ (Bell 1999: 32, original reference)   
 
To compensate for characteristics that, at times, were not seen as favourable in 
relation to being considered legitimate, I used my ‘social skills’ to change the 
scientists’ impression of me and move attention away from the business school. 
But an important part of balancing this ‘impression management’ is also to 
remember personal integrity throughout these situations. I am actually quite 
proud of working at CBS – and I am certainly proud of being relatively female. 
Therefore, I also employed other strategies that were more offensive than 
defensive. After some of the incidents at Curious George, I started to wear even 
higher heels, more make-up and more feminine outfits than I usually do. This is 
also impression management – it is just another strategy. By doing so, I both 
wanted to assert that women, of course, have a legitimate place in academia as 
equal partners in all kinds of conversations, and, at the same time, to use the 
reactions evoked to gain more knowledge about the culture.   
 
Most importantly, at both labs I was eager to disassociate myself from the field 
that I am in fact a member of, namely, that of visiting laboratory ethnographers. 
While the scientists were positive and welcoming, they had tried having 
ethnographers around before and therefore seemed tired of discussions involving 
the same topics, such as ‘for and against GMO’ or ‘for and against vaccines and 
diagnostic devices’ (the two labs respectively). It seemed important that I come 
up with new angles on my project about ‘responsibility’ if I wanted their 
attention and confidence. Their abilities to reflect about their own role in 
society, combined with annoyance with laboratory ethnographers ended up as an 
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inspiration for studying the scientists’ own ideas about responsibility instead of 
only ‘looking’ for ideas about responsibility that resembled those in the 
‘Responsible Science’ literature.  
 
 
4.5 OVERVIEW OF THE ANALYTICAL CHAPTERS 
In this section I will, before moving on to the proper analysis, present an 
overview of the structure of the analysis.  
 
In chapter 5, I present the results of the document analysis. I describe four 
different political rationalities that are constructed from the study of an archive 
of scientific journal texts. The first, the ‘Demarcation Rationality’ advocates for 
a strict separation of science and society; science can only objectively describe 
and thereby help society if it is ‘outside’ society. The ‘Reflexivity Rationality’ 
sees science’s responsibilities as being inspired by society’s many problems – 
not least the ones science has created – in its priority of projects and research 
goals. The ‘Contribution Rationality’ does not share the two previous 
rationalities’ faith in science’s ability to govern itself responsibly and therefore 
suggests the firm external control of science, in order for it to live up to society’s 
demands for innovation and democracy. Finally, the ‘Integration Rationality’ 
also articulates the external governance of science as being necessary, but sees 
dialogue and collaboration between science and societal actors during the 
research process as the way to reach a more responsible outcome.  
 
In the next chapters, I move from the study of documents to the ethnographic 
study of two laboratories. In a small prelude, I introduce the two laboratories 
before moving on to the descriptions of three different modes of responsibility.  
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In chapter 7, I present the first mode of responsibility, namely, that of Vocation. 
This mode generates three different forms of conduct: checking, repeating and 
criticising. The scientists justify these ways of going about their work with the 
responsibility they have for the ‘truth’ – a phenomenon they continuously have 
to take care of by doing their work in a specific way. This mode also generates 
some more general consequences for the scientists and the way they consider 
their work and their role in society. They regard themselves as being part of a 
large, international scientific community and do not regard the specific 
laboratory where they work as being of particular importance. They consider 
time an endless resource, because working meticulously with the experiments is 
valued more highly than finishing a project. This also has to do with their 
understandings of a ‘fact’ as a phenomenon entailing extreme caution on their 
part in not predicting too much without a lot of evidence to back it up. They 
consider themselves a part of a society where ‘science’ is a stable institution that 
delivers (at times relevant) knowledge to other stable institutions, namely, that 
of the state, the industry and the public. They also closely relate this relationship 
with the part of their work they label ‘scientific’, that is, doing experiments, 
analyses and writing papers. This is their main job as scientists, and therefor the 
responsibility for the ‘truth’ also holds the highest value.  
 
In chapter 8, I describe the second mode of responsibility, namely, that of 
‘Oikos’. This mode generates three different conducts: investing, saving and 
maintaining. The scientists justify these ways of doing their work with the 
responsibility they have for the ‘business’; that is, the laboratory’s survival. In 
order to make sure that the lab and its members will be there in the future, they 
have to take care of their resources.  This mode also generates some specific 
consequences for the entire lab and the way they consider their role in society. 
Instead of being part of a worldwide community, they are now much more 
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attached to their organisation and consider themselves in competition with other 
organisations. Scientists are no longer members of the same large group and can 
even be ‘enemies’. Their perception of time has also changed: Where before the 
scientists valued working hard to perfect their results over a long period of time, 
they are, in this mode, much more aware of their resources being finite and they 
need to do as much work as they can with as few resources as possible. Their 
view of facts has also changed: Where Vocation generated a carefulness about 
bold predictions and faith in results, the scientists are now much more bold and 
believe they can prove their own hypotheses. It seems as if a certain anxiety is 
also traceable among the scientists; they are aware of their temporary 
employment and the risks of not being funded again. They consider science’s 
role in society as one where scientists are sellers of knowledge on a market, but 
they never know whether anyone will buy their knowledge, thereby ensuring 
their survival. While the scientists are perhaps not that fond of this part of their 
work, the three forms of conduct do take up much of their time, since they are 
not able to live up to their other responsibilities without a lab, that is, the 
business.  
 
Finally, in chapter 9, I describe the mode of Citizenship. Three forms of conduct 
are connected to this mode, namely, ‘speaking about science’, ‘listening to the 
public’ and ‘simply doing research’. They justify these conducts with their 
responsibility for conducting science that is legitimate in the eyes of the public. 
Science’s role in society is now considered part of the public sector and has to 
live up to certain standards of transparency and legitimacy in the public’s eyes. 
This also generates the consequence that the scientists engage themselves in 
activist-like activities, where they take an active stance in how science should be 
conducted and used. On the other hand, it also engenders a certain sense of 
‘basic science guilt’ among those scientists who cannot readily state how their 
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scientific findings can be translated into usable technologies. In contrast to the 
two previous modes, Citizenship does not generate a clear understanding of time 
and fact-making; perhaps because the mode is relatively new and no general 
understandings of these areas have been established.  
 
In each chapter, the mode of responsibility is described as if they were ‘pure’, 
that is, as if the other two modes did not exist and the scientists only made 
choices and decisions based on one responsibility. In that way, it is almost as if I 
describe three different organisations in the three chapters, but it is the same two 
labs being used as the basis for all three chapters. In the scientists’ everyday 
work, the three forms of responsibility are constantly mixed and they are 
weighted against each other in specific situations. Throughout all the chapters, I 
also show examples of how the responsibilities are weighted against each other. 
I comment on the difficulties in understanding and prioritising between the 
different responsibilities in specific situations, and I discuss this as being one of 
the biggest challenges in relation to the realisation of ‘responsible science’ in 
practice.   
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5. MAPPING SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN 
SCIENCE  
 110 
ne of the characteristics of the ‘new governance of science’ (Irwin 2006; 
Guston and Sarewitz 2002) is that the ability of science to govern itself 
in a responsible way has been fundamentally problematized (Braun et. 
al. 2010; Jasanoff 2011)15. Along with this problematization has come a new set 
of sensibilities and demands for more deliberative forms of governance (e.g. 
Irwin 2006; Kearnes & Rip 2009).  The theme of social responsibility of 
science, or even ‘Responsible Research and Innovation’ (von Schomberg 2011), 
has gained momentum within both policy and academic discourse (Guston & 
Sarewitz, 2002; Fisher & Mahajan 2006; Owen et al 2009; Stilgoe 2012; 
Sutcliffe 2011). In particular, notions of the social responsibility of science are 
evolving in soft law and international settings, yet there is no unifying definition 
of what this term means (Davies & Horst, 2012). Rather, the notion of social 
responsibility of science can be seen as political: It is open for contestation 
about how it should be defined and interpreted, and each of these interpretations 
has consequences for the governance of science, i.e., the way science is 
regulated and practiced (Foucault 2003a).  
 
The notion that science has a responsibility towards society, however, is not 
new. Scientists have a long tradition of discussing their responsibilities as a 
balance between their professional autonomy and their general moral 
responsibility as human beings (Douglas 2003). Nevertheless, there are no clear 
connections between scientists’ own discussions and that of policy makers and 
scholars of the new scientific governance, although it should be recognized that 
the literature on social responsibility ‘in practice’ is growing (e.g. Mccarthy & 
Kelty 2010, Phelps & Fisher 2011, Stilgoe, Owen & Macnagten 2013, Davies, 
Glerup & Horst, forthcoming). This paper contributes to the understanding of 
                                                
15 This chapter is co-authored with Professor Maja Horst and published in Journal of Responsible Innovation in 2014: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23299460.2014.882077#.VTgYsrrXUps 
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the relationship between scientists’ discussions and that of policy makers and 
other actors by mapping the overall landscape of ideas about social 
responsibility in science as it can be found in academic journals. It takes as its 
point of departure the position that both scientists and scholars of new scientific 
governance are addressing the same ‘problematization’ of science, namely how 
it should be governed – or govern itself – in a responsible way. In doing so, all 
voices addressing this issue are viewed as ‘political’ because they contribute to 
the shaping of ideals about how science is to be performed and regulated. The 
paper, therefore, makes no a priori distinctions among different types of voices. 
Rather, it deliberately treats all voices equally in order to investigate the 
governance effects of these discussions. 
 
Mapping discussions on social responsibility in academic journals, we have 
employed a Foucauldian analysis of governance to understand how a particular 
conceptualization of responsibility implies a political rationality, i.e., a particular 
form of governance of science. The analysis identifies four different political 
rationalities. They differ according to whether they advocate internal or external 
regulation of science and whether they are focused on regulation of the process 
or the outcomes of science. They all imply, however, that a particular 
relationship between science and society is necessary in order for science to be 
responsible and also that scientists need to conduct their science within the 
structure of this relationship in order for their practice to be legitimate and 
proper.  
 
 
5.1. RESPONSIBILITY AS A POLITICAL RATIONALITY 
Debates about the social responsibility of science are far from new (Shapin 
2009). While many events, important for these debates, have occurred, we 
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restrict our brief discussion to two. First, the Manhattan Project – the 
development of the atomic bomb in the United States during World War II – led 
a number of scientists to discuss the purpose of their occupation (Rhodes 2012). 
Shapin (2009, 65) describes how scientists in this context moved their 
discussions into the public sphere by debating their moral obligations in relation 
to the development and use of nuclear bombs. These discussions are continued 
in present debates about dual use (McLeish and Nightingale 2007), but also 
more broadly in the discussion of scientists’ responsibilities for the use of the 
outcomes of their science. In 1973 and 1975, the Asilomar Conferences on 
recombinant DNA brought together scientists – and importantly some non-
scientists – who gathered to discuss potential hazards in connection with the 
discovery of restriction enzymes and the incipient field of gene technology. 
These discussions inspired new governmental organizations such as ethics 
committees in a number of countries and instigated more general discussions of 
scientists’ abilities to govern themselves responsibly (Braun et. al. 2010). The 
case of Asilomar demonstrates the contested nature of such activities: Is it a 
successful story about the will to self-governance, a discussion led by a small 
elite of scientists, or a story of how scientists were forced to further regulation 
by outside actors (Barinaga 2000)? Regardless of how one interprets the event, 
Asilomar epitomizes the question of science’s ability to govern itself.    
 
While the discussions about the relation between the scientific profession and 
society are thus not new, the debate following the Asilomar conferences marked 
a shift in the character of the problems discussed and the kind of actors who 
might have a legitimate say about them. In a Foucauldian perspective, this shift 
can be seen as a ‘problematization’ of the hitherto internal governance of 
science through professional norms. A problematization should be understood as 
the emergence of intensified discussions and propositions about the steering of a 
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specific area of the social, because the preceding ideas on how to govern have 
come under scrutiny (Foucault 2003a, 229-30). In this instance, what had come 
under renewed scrutiny in the second part of the twentieth century was science’s 
ability to govern itself responsibly, its strong connections with the state and its 
weak links to the public, and its traditional morality as basis for state regulation 
of new technologies (Braun et. al. 2010, 512). In more recent years, discussions 
of science and social responsibility have also been connected to more general, 
theoretical debates about governance. Some consider the demands for 
responsibility an instance of a growing market-embedded morality spurred by 
neoliberalism (Shamir 2008); whereas, others are worried that questions of 
ethics and responsibility are neglected in favour of market considerations 
(Hellström 2003). The discussions of how responsibility in science relate to 
broader societal developments further underscores its more prominent place on 
the agenda as a governance-problem.   
 
Our use of the term ‘governance’ follows Foucault’s argument that the exercise 
of modern government is characterized by the structuring of possible fields of 
action (Foucault 2003b, 138). Fields of action shape the freedom of actors to act 
by rendering some choices of behaviour and thinking (rather than others) 
legitimate and right – what Foucault (2003b, 138) has referred to as ‘the conduct 
of conduct’. First, it implies a move away from a state-centered view of 
‘government’ as something that is conducted by specific individuals or classes 
of individuals with a pre-defined set of interests. Rather, governance should be 
understood as attempts to shape individual and collective behaviour performed 
not by individuals or classes of individuals, but by rationalities or discourses 
(Foucault 1976/1998, 94, Foucault 2003b, 128). Hence, modern governance is 
understood as complex multitudes of language, agencies and technologies that 
seek to administer the lives of others (Foucault 2003a, 237).  Second, it implies 
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that studies of modern governance should focus on how these multitudes make 
different fields of action possible by turning our attention to the study of 
‘political rationalities’ (Rose and Miller 1992) – ‘the changing discursive fields 
within which the exercise of power is conceptualised, the moral justifications 
for particular ways of exercising power by diverse authorities, notions of the 
appropriate forms, objects and limits of politics, and conceptions of the proper 
distribution of such tasks among secular, spiritual, military and familial sectors’ 
(Rose & Miller 1992: 175, our emphasis). In order to study modern governance, 
we thus have to study how different forms of rationalities about responsibility in 
science are conceptualized, how they are justified, and to whom the practice of 
responsibility is distributed.  
 
We pursue this agenda by studying articulations about the social responsibilities 
of science as they appear in academic journals. As a medium for professional 
and normative discussions about the role of science, such journals are an 
important venue for discussions about this issue, and due to the intensity and 
breadth of viewpoints they present, the analysis can serve as an indicator of the 
current, more general perspectives on the social responsibility of science. Using 
empirical material from academic journals accentuates the fact that the 
governance of science is, to a large degree, structured by the profession’s own 
norms and standards. Merton emphasized this point when he described the 
norms of communalism, universalism, disinterestedness, and organized 
scepticism based on interviews with various scientists (Merton 1973). 
Sociologists of science have subsequently criticized these CUDOS norms for not 
capturing what goes on in the daily work-life of scientists (e.g., Lynch 1997). In 
our view, such criticism should not be taken to imply that the CUDOS norms are 
irrelevant, but rather that they are insufficient as an account of the practices of 
science.  
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Departing from our focus on the conduct of conduct, norms – and among them 
norms similar to what Merton described – have an important influence on ideas 
about the objectives of science and the purpose of the scientific profession. 
Rather than study scientific norms of professional conduct as a good or bad 
description of scientific practice, we are studying their performative effects for 
the governance of science. In this way, the discussions of social responsibility of 
science as they take place in academic journals are a governance technology, 
part of ‘the complex of mundane programmes, calculations, techniques, 
apparatuses, documents and procedures through which authorities seek to 
embody and give effect to governmental ambitions’ (Rose & Miller 1992: 175). 
The journals are the specific, material technology (albeit not very ‘high-tech’) 
that allows arguments about responsibility in science to be circulated and read 
by those who are considered as the objects of governance, namely, scientists, 
science scholars and science policy actors. It is thus a specific ‘apparatus’ that 
shapes conduct and ways of thinking towards a more responsible practice 
(Miller & Rose 1990: 8).  
 
This is not to say that political rationalities on social responsibility in science are 
a straightforward phenomenon to study. As Foucault points out, modern 
governance can have a plurality of specific aims, and these aims can be 
ambiguous and even contradictory and yet still work on the same object of 
steering (Foucault 2003a: 237). There can, in other words, be different political 
rationalities at play at the same time. They overlap, contradict and supplement 
each other continuously. Furthermore, arguments about enhancing the 
responsibility of science are pervasive, and they flow in many directions with 
circular forms. No a priori distinction between arguments coming from ‘within 
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science’ or from ‘outside science’ can be made, as this distinction is itself an 
effect of political struggles.  
 
On this basis, our task in this paper is to map the different political rationalities 
of social responsibility in science as they appear in contributions to academic 
journals. We have done that by studying how the ‘problem’ of social 
responsibility in science is articulated in various journal papers by asking of a 
sample of such papers the following three questions:   
 
• How is the specific problem (or problems) about lack of responsibility in 
science articulated? 
• What are the central aspects of science (or its relation to society) that need 
to be changed according to each articulation?  
• What kinds of solutions to the problems are imagined in these 
articulations and how are these solutions supposed to be put into place?  
 
Through these questions, we want to carve out how spaces of action are 
constructed as legitimate for scientists and how these spaces differ from each 
other and overlap. In the next section we will go further into the description of 
how we constructed an archive that made it possible to map political rationalities 
about social responsibility and investigate their implied effects on the 
governance of science.  
 
  
 117 
5.2 BUILDING AN ARCHIVE OF POLITICAL RATIONALITIES ON 
RESPONSIBILITY 
The first step of a Foucauldian analysis is to define and delineate the archive in 
which to study political rationalities (Foucault 1972/2010). Based on initial 
readings of a large number of papers, we identified 13 keywords central for the 
responsibility of science:  
 
• Science policy  
• publishing  
• public 
participation 
• Research 
misconduct  
• Social 
responsibility 
• responsibility  
• upstream public 
engagement  
• risk management 
• Ethics 
• environmental 
impact 
assessment 
• science  
• moral and ethical 
aspects 
• Public opinion  
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We combined the keywords into different search strings and the resulting searches 
yielded approximately 1000 articles.16 From this collection we then selected all 
papers that explicitly stated normative ideals about the governance and responsibility 
of science, i.e., statements about the purpose of science and directions for how 
science should be regulated or steered towards this purpose.17 For each of the 
remaining 263 papers, we summarized the answers to the three research questions 
above and extracted illustrative quotations. 
 
The papers in our sample are diverse and range from editorials addressing problems 
such as fraud in laboratory research to journal articles on how science can become 
more innovative. The sample also includes critical papers on science’s damaging side 
effects and how they can be avoided, as well as debate pieces on how the direction of 
science could be subject to more democratic decision-making. Some papers are 
focused solely on the development of their own discipline, while others are concerned 
with the entire scientific community. Some papers are written by scientists and others 
by scholars in the humanities and social sciences with opinions about the 
development of science. In the analysis, we do not distinguish a priori between 
different speech positions, and so we have not differentiated between papers written 
by scientists and non-scientists. Rather, we have treated all voices equally in order to 
understand the total sum of possible articulations of the responsibility of scientists. 
The archive is therefore quite diverse and the positions plentiful. Nevertheless, all the 
papers offer answers to our three research questions and, in this way, they all point to 
a political rationality with implications for how science is governed. 
  
                                                
16 The searches were conducted in the three databases, Scopus, EBSCO Host and SAGE. Based on the content of the databases, our searches go from 
1960 to 2011 and they were done within all disciplinary areas. The selection of papers from the end of the nineties and onwards is noteworthy larger 
compared to the amount of earlier dated papers. There could be many reasons for this; a growing interest in the phenomenon; more publications in 
general, etc. We believe that this difference in size is also due to the fact that papers have increasingly been available online automatically, whereas 
older papers are not necessarily so.   
17 Papers were excluded either, because they did not address the governance efforts at science or scientists (but rather the media or citizens), or they 
were too descriptive. Many papers were descriptive empirical studies about scientists’ engagement in society, for instance studies of how scientists 
and citizens interact in certain public participation exercises. In a more all-encompassing Foucauldian analysis of regimes of knowledge these should 
also have been included, but for this limited study we chose to focus on the normative papers. 
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5.3 FOUR KINDS OF RESPONSIBILITY 
Based upon our close readings of the texts, we have identified four different political 
rationalities, which can be described using a 2x2 matrix. The first dimension describes 
whether regulation of science should be internal or external; the second dimension 
describes whether issues of responsibility relate to the process or the outcomes of 
science. Figure 1 illustrates the four rationalities and their relationship to each other. 
The Reflexivity and Demarcation rationalities both advocate internal regulation of 
science but, while the Reflexivity rationality insists that the responsibility of science is 
to strive for outcomes that can work as solutions to society’s problems, the 
Demarcation rationality aims for a total separation between science and society in 
order to prevent social norms and values from biasing the otherwise objective 
production of knowledge. The Contribution and Integration rationalities both point to a 
need for the external regulation of science, but they also differ in their focus on 
whether responsibility relates to the outcome of science, as the Contribution rationale 
proposes, or its process, as the Integration rationale suggests. 
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Figure 1: An overview of the four political rationalities. They are arranged in relation to whether they advocate internal 
or external regulation of science and if they propose the process of science or the outcome of science as their object of 
steering.  
 
In the following sections, we will describe each of these political rationalities in more 
detail using illustrative quotations from the papers in our archive. We have chosen 
the quotations as poignant examples of the patterns found in the analysis, but they 
should not be understood as ‘evidence’ in their own right outside of the analytical 
context. Within the Foucauldian analysis, it is not the individual texts but rather the 
patterns found in specific articulations – in this case the arguments – presented in the 
texts that matter. When including references to similar arguments in other papers, 
however, we have used the conventional way of referencing the entire paper rather 
than trying to reference the specific argument. It should also be noted that these four 
rationalities are found throughout the archive. As such, the findings are robust in 
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describing a recurrent pattern. However, as Foucault has also pointed out, different 
rationalities overlap and intersect even though they can seem contradictory. Our 
description of these four rationalities should therefore be understood as an analytical 
construct that points to some patterns in the archive, while not offering justice to the 
full complexity that is also at play.  
 
5.3.1 THE DEMARCATION RATIONALITY 
The Demarcation rationality often commences from a pride in science’s endeavours, 
and it considers the job: ‘a noble and exciting calling; those who take part in it are 
fortunate’ (Danforth and Schoenhoff 1992: 351). Basically, science is a honourable 
profession, but unfortunately it is increasingly tormented by fraud and misconduct, 
which threatens its ability to do good for ‘the people’ (Danforth and Schoenhoff 
1992: 355). This rationality articulates two interrelated problems as the reason for 
increasing fraud and misconduct in science. First, it worries about the increasing 
pressure for results and publications demanded of scientists, for instance: ‘The 
number of papers to consider is increasing rapidly, but the space [in journals] 
available for publication is not keeping pace’ (Brice and Bligh 2005: 84). These 
pressing conditions make fraud and misconduct more tempting for scientists: 
‘Academic advancement, ‘publish or perish’, as well as prestige, are other important 
driving forces [for publishing scientific papers]. Finally, there are many financial 
benefits (direct and indirect) in publishing such as promotion and further research 
funding. Many of these forces can lead to ethical lapses.’ ((Anderson and Boden 
2008: 155); (Caelleigh 1991; Evered and Lazar 1995; Anderson and Shultz 2003; 
Editorial 2006; PLoS Medicine Editors 2010).  
 
Second, it expresses the fear that increasing incidents of fraud and misconduct will 
lead to an increasing public mistrust in the capability of science to contribute 
positively to society. This fear of declining public trust is expressed in Claxton 
 122 
(2005a, 27), for example, when he states that ‘all scientists must be aware of the 
potential for fraud so that science can continue to pursue truth and serve mankind’ 
(Schmaus 1983; Danforth and Schoenhoff 1992; Whitbeck 1995; Fleischmann 2008; 
Frankel 2000; Caveman 2002; Illes et al. 2010). Public trust is often described as 
important for maintaining science as the institution that drives ‘mankind’ forward, 
and instances of fraud and misconduct fostered by increasing pressure to produce 
results are viewed as threats to this trust. 
 
According to this rationality, the solution, i.e., the way to secure the responsibility of 
science, is to install: ‘a moral code that the vast majority of scientists embrace’ 
(Caelleigh 2003: 225) where only strict scientific methods are seen as legitimate 
(Schmaus 1983; Smith 1998; Heitman and Bulger 2005; Wolpe 2006; Wager 2011; 
Perlis and Shannon 2012). The reinforcement of such a ‘code’ is exemplified in the 
‘Responsible Conduct of Research’ education program for young researchers, which 
should cover ‘almost every domain of scientific activity: data management, conflicts 
of interest, authorship, publication, peer-review, collaboration, mentoring and 
misconduct’ (Roland 2007: 707). A number of scientific actors and structures are 
enrolled as responsible for fostering this strict culture. The most frequently 
mentioned are: the scientific advisor, who has the duty to transfer these professional 
norms to the next generation of scientists (Brice and Bligh 2005; Roland 2007; Seiler 
et al. 2011); the review system and the journal editor, which have the final 
responsibility for declining manuscripts due to fraud (e.g., Pittenger 2003; Cain 1999; 
Slesser and Qureshi 2009); and ethical guidelines, which prescribe good scientific 
practice and authorship in both disciplinary societies and journals (Caelleigh 2003; 
Davidoff and Batalden 2005; Claxton 2005; Perry and Mittelmark 2008; Poff 2009).  
 
These actors and structures are all articulated as legitimate means to creating a moral 
culture that can enforce strict scientific methods. Their legitimacy is described as 
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being rooted in the fact that scientists are all part of the same profession: ‘Members 
of a scientific discipline, like other professional groups, are bound together by similar 
aspirations, values and training and enter into a community of common purpose’ 
(Frankel 2000: 216). This membership is contrasted to a whole range of outsiders to 
science who should refrain from instilling or enforcing proper conduct: ‘Regulations 
imposed from outside science cannot promote the kind of atmosphere necessary to 
ensure ethical practices. An ethical climate must be fostered from within the scientific 
community’ (Frankel 2000: 216; (Rothman and Poole 1985; Wolpert 2005; Marchant 
and Pope 2009; Martinson, Anderson, and DeVries 2005). 
 
In this way, the Demarcation rationality articulates science as a profession that should 
have a high level of autonomy from other actors: Outsiders to the scientific realm 
should not interfere with the discussions about scientists’ responsibility and how to 
achieve it. But the profession itself ought to employ a number of techniques to install a 
specific kind of responsibility to be honest and objective in every single individual 
scientist. So the profession’s freedom from interference from external actors is 
articulated as dependent on the internal establishment of a strong professional culture. 
This internal control system should constantly monitor the members of the scientific 
profession by scrutinizing methods and results and by socializing aspiring scientists into 
the system. Only by assuring that each individual scientist is rigorous, honest, 
transparent and not influenced by society’s interest in her work, is it possible to 
maintain proper responsibility within science (Edsall 1975; Bulger and Heitman 2007; 
Vollmer 2007; Evans 2010; Wager 2011). 
 
Interestingly, the demarcation between science and society also points to decisions 
that scientists should not feel responsible for: ‘There is a real danger in asking 
scientists to be more socially responsible - the history of eugenics alone should show 
at least some of the dangers. For, by asking scientists to be socially responsible, in 
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terms other than the obligations already discussed [to be rigorous and honest in 
relation to your results], would be to give power to a group who are neither trained 
nor competent to exert it. It was not for scientists to decide whether or not to build 
a[n atomic] bomb . Nor will it be for scientists and doctors alone to decide whether or 
not to introduce genes into the germ lines.’  (Wolpert 1989: 943) see also (Rothman 
and Poole 1985; Fisher 2003; Nüsslin and Hendee 2008; Stieb 2008). In such 
articulations, the effort to construct a strong internal commitment to truth 
simultaneously exempts the scientific profession from taking responsibility for 
decisions on the direction of society, even though the scientists’ own insights or 
inventions are used in these decisions.  
 
5.3.2 THE REFLEXIVITY RATIONALITY 
Where the Demarcation rationality clearly praises science as a honourable profession, 
the Reflexivity rationality is more ambiguous in its appraisal. It acknowledges that 
science has solved many big problems for society, but it also worries that scientists 
do not assume responsibility for the wrongs that modern science has also produced: 
‘Scientists can no longer get away with accepting credit for the glorious 
achievements of science, but must also respect some of the responsibility for the 
misapplications of science’ (Brouwer 1994: 193); see also (Vessuri 2002; Waelbers 
2009; Schuurbiers, Osseweijer, and Kinderlerer 2009). The ‘no longer’ in the above 
quotation indicates that the Reflexivity rationality describes a change in the scientific 
profession. Perhaps it was possible in some distant past to be disinterested and not 
care for the consequences of scientific developments, but: ‘a transformation…has 
taken place in science since the Second World War whereby [science] can be said to 
be a social institution and not something engaged in by disinterested seekers after the 
truth’ (Forge 2000: 348) (Ziman 1998; Liska 2004; Waelbers 2009; Schuurbiers, 
Osseweijer, and Kinderlerer 2009). 
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Whether scientists appreciate this development or not, they need to assume the 
responsibility that comes with being a ‘social institution’. But, the Reflexivity 
rationality claims, scientists have not done so to a proper extent and they need to 
realize this challenge in order to be responsible: ‘Attention needs to be paid to recent 
changes in the research context: the principles of good scientific conduct themselves 
may need to be revisited and the capacity to address moral issues within research 
cultures should be addressed’ (Schuurbiers, Osseweijer, and Kinderlerer 2009: 230). 
The strong commitment to the use of rigorous scientific methods, praised by the 
Demarcation rationality, is not seen to be nearly enough to assure that scientists have 
acted responsibly. In fact, quite the opposite is seen as true, since science is 
considered to be a vital part of many societal catastrophes by the Reflexivity 
rationality. New technologies are not only creating progress, but they also cause bad 
side-effects, which are largely ignored by science (Cournand 1977; Sassower 1996; 
Koepsell 2010). What scientists are missing in order to be socially responsible is 
articulated as a kind of self-awareness, an ability to foresee the consequences of their 
own practice. For example, Sweeney (2006: 458) considers the lack of reflexive 
thinking with regard to nanotechnology:  ‘What appears to be missing at the present 
time is a clearly articulated prognosis of the potential global social benefits and harms 
that may develop from further scientific and technological advances’. As long as 
scientists are not considering how their own practices are affecting society, science 
cannot be understood as socially responsible (Watson 1974; Studer and Chubin 1977; 
Strydom 1999; Nicholas 1999; Forge 2000; Beckwith and Huang 2005). 
  
The solution to this lack of attention is to improve scientists’ self-awareness and their 
ability to incorporate such considerations in their research: ‘as previously stated, “To 
act responsibly,” means “to act in an inquiring and reflective way”.…One has to try 
to understand how, in the specific situation, the human actors and the technologies 
mediate with each other, influencing the eventual outcome’ (Waelbers 2009: 62. See 
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also Smith 1992; Rotblat 1999; Wing 2003). Scientists thus need to make an effort to 
foresee – or at least discuss – how their research affects their surroundings. They 
need to be able to look at their own role as part of a bigger society, where actions 
have consequences at other places and other times. In other words, scientists need to 
increase their reflexivity, even though it might not be an easy task: ‘While I agree 
that it is difficult to predict all the consequences of new scientific discoveries, I also 
have to stress that we scientists are seldom asked to reflect on the long-range effects 
of our work’ (Brouwer 1994: 193). 
 
The Reflexivity rationality describes various techniques intended to help scientists 
get better at reflecting on their own practices. These techniques are focused on 
making scientists aware of their own values and motivations, as well as making them 
reflect on the possible outcomes of their scientific inquiries. This rationality often 
articulates faith in education as a means to make scientists more reflexive: ‘what 
science education now requires is “metascience”, a discipline that extends beyond 
conventional philosophy and ethics to include the social and humanistic aspects of 
the scientific enterprise. For example, students need to learn about the…societal 
responsibilities of research scientists, and to rehearse in advance some of the moral 
dilemmas that they are likely to meet”  (Ziman 2001: 165. See also Kirman 1992; 
Ernst 2003; Peiffer, Hugenschmidt, and Laurienti 2011). It also points to other 
methods whereby scientists should adapt a specific attitude towards their work, such 
as ‘co-responsibility’ (Strydom 1999), ‘social role responsibility’ (Waelbers 2009), or 
‘strong objectivity’ (Wing 2003) – terms that all cover the development of more 
awareness of values, interests, and the consequences for society. But there are seldom 
any specific guidelines as to how scientists can adapt these attitudes in practice.  
 
Compared to the Demarcation rationality, the Reflexivity rationality adds 
responsibility to the practice of individual scientists: Scientists not only need to 
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perform science according to the highest standards of quality, but they should also be 
able to oversee and reflect on the consequences of their own practice. In this way, 
reflexivity appears to become a sort of add-on:  ‘Researchers still have a 
responsibility to produce ‘good science’ – in two senses: science that is as ‘truthful’ 
as the semantic, philosophical and ideological confusions surrounding that word 
allow; and science that is ‘socially responsible’ (Scott 2003: 84 see also Pimple 
2002). So not only do scientists have a responsibility of finding truths about the 
world, but they also have a responsibility for assessing if their science is good or does 
good in society. This rationality indicates a purpose for scientists beyond the one 
proposed in the Demarcation rationality. The Reflexivity rationality sees part of 
scientists’ task to be attentive to society and its problems – not the least of which are 
problems that science may itself have caused.  
 
5.3.3 THE CONTRIBUTION RATIONALITY 
The Contribution rationality articulates science as a societal institution akin to the 
healthcare and the education systems. It is part of society and serves certain societal 
goals: ‘Clearly, the aims of science, particularly in the case of the biomedical 
sciences, are closely linked to certain ethical, social, or political goals’ (De Melo-
Martín 2008: 39 see also (Brown and Guston 2009; Swierstra and Jelsma 2006; 
Sandler 2007; Allyse 2010). In this rationality a particular vision of what is good for 
society is inherent in the specific goals that science pursues. According to the 
Contribution rationality, it is therefore paramount that society has a decisive role in 
shaping these visions and goals and that scientists see themselves as working to 
produce a valuable contribution to society.  
 
The arguments of this rationality center on two societal prescriptions that should 
guide scientists. The first is that science should be innovative and contribute with 
knowledge and technologies in order to improve national and regional growth. For 
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instance, Heitor advocates stronger European universities in order to improve 
competitiveness: ‘There are...challenges that still remain in this reform movement to 
adapt higher education in Europe to the global landscape and to improve funding for 
R&D’ (Heitor 2008: 611). He suggests that universities adapt models from the 
financial sector and become more ‘responsive’ to societal needs, as this 
responsiveness is a precondition for the adaption to a global knowledge economy 
(Heitor 2008: 609) see also (Etzkowitz et al. 2000; Weed and Mckeown 2003; 
Beesley 2003; Nature editors 2009).  
 
The second societal demand articulated by this rationality is that of democracy. 
Democracy is here understood to mean that scientists’ activities should be in line with 
expressed public preferences and that experts’ conduct should be subject to public 
scrutiny: ‘in a democracy a sceptical and questioning attitude towards experts of all 
kinds is a thoroughly healthy thing’ (Durant 1999, 317. See also Abraham and Davis 
2005; Bubela et al. 2009; Cho and Relman 2010). 
 
Independent of whether the rationality addresses the demand of innovation or that of 
democracy – or both at the same time – the rationality is concerned with the ‘goals’ 
(De Melo-Martín 2008) or ‘purposes’ (Rappert 2003: 467) of science. The 
Contribution rationality measures science’s ability to be innovative and democratic 
by looking at what comes out of the laboratories – the results and applications. If the 
knowledge and technologies are out of line with society’s preferences and do not 
create growth, science has not lived up to its responsibilities. Therefore, following 
this rationality, scientists can be perceived as a sort of public servant working to 
materialize the objectives of society in their knowledge production: ‘Scientists should 
conceive of themselves as artisans working for the public good, whose efforts are 
directed toward an ideal of well-ordered science; and this ideal of well-ordered 
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science should be understood in a global and democratic fashion’ (Kitcher 2004: 
331). 
 
According to the Contribution rationality, the current problems with responsibility in 
science is that scientists do not see themselves as these ‘artisans working for the 
public good’. Instead, they consider themselves and their work as separated from 
society and pursue irrelevant and perhaps dangerous paths that are not beneficial for 
anyone: ‘Curiosity-based research may provide new knowledge, but what can one 
now do with that knowledge — of what use is it?’ (Beesley 2003: 1529). According 
to this rationality this question – of what use is this knowledge? – should be forefront 
in all scientists’ work, but it is not. Rather, scientists tend to be ‘retreating to the 
safety of the ivory tower’ (Drenth 2006: 15 see also Swierstra and Jelsma 2006; 
Taylor 2009; Werner-Felmayer 2010). Scientists have been allowed to be cut-off 
from criticism and public inquiry, but this allowance needs to change: ‘Knowledge, 
as Francis Bacon famously observed, is power. If today’s enormous scientific-
knowledge-that-is-also-enormous-power is to be harnessed democratically, it is 
essential that it should be subjected to close and careful public scrutiny’ (Durant 
1999: 317. See also Abraham 2003; Abraham and Davis 2005; Drenth 2006; Brown 
and Guston 2009; De Melo-Martín 2008). Scientists’ results are thus too important to 
be left to the scientists, but scientists are, seemingly, unwilling to be under public 
control.  
 
To change this problem, the Contribution rationality proposes to enhance outside 
(societal) control over scientists. According to this rationality, the scientists do not 
have the ability to become more responsible by themselves (von Hippel 1978; 
Redman and Caplan 2005; Bates et al. 2010; Underwood 2009; Sandler 2007). 
Therefore someone outside the system needs to intervene. In line with the 
Demarcation rationality, the Contribution rationality argues for more control within 
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science, to avoid fraud and misconduct. Contrary to the former, the Contribution 
rationality articulates a strong need for external control.  As with other public 
servants, i.e., doctors and teachers, the misuse of professional status should not be 
tolerated and, in fact, needs to be punished: ‘Lack of criminal sanctions for scientific 
misconduct appears to create an elite class of persons who are exempt from 
punishment for cheating, stealing and outright lying’ (Redman and Caplan 2005: 248. 
See also Lancet Editors 1996; Andersen 1999; Riis 2001; Bosch 2010; Miller 2011). 
Various kinds of external controls with results must therefore form part of scientists’ 
work life.  
 
The Contribution rationality also articulates a more general need for public scrutiny 
of the directions of scientific inquiries. The rationality calls for improved governance 
in a range of areas such as potential patent possibilities, industrial potential, 
environmental harm, and (as in the following quote) the risk of ‘dual use’: ‘A clear 
normative articulation of acceptable and unacceptable behaviour would therefore 
contribute towards improved governance. Currently there is a lack of international 
criminalization of individual activity in relation to biological weapons production that 
might allow actors to rationalize their choices’ (McLeish and Nightingale 2007: 
1649). Thus, the rationality demands public control from different kinds of external 
bodies in order to assure that scientists are more innovative, that they collaborate 
more with industry, and that in general they aim to fulfil the public’s stated 
preferences when aiming for various outcomes of science (see also von Hippel 1978; 
Baylis and Robert 2006; Drenth 2006; Bubela et al. 2009; Underwood 2009; Taylor 
2009).  
 
In the Contribution rationality, scientists have a responsibility to deliver results that 
are wanted by society. Science should not just pursue knowledge for the sake of 
curiosity, but it needs to contribute to society. The purpose of science is to be at 
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society’s service and scientists need to be focused on this. Since scientists cannot, 
however, be expected to do so on their own accord, their conduct needs to be 
overseen by non-scientific actors, who are perceived to be more able to sustain 
responsibility. 
 
5.3.4 THE INTEGRATION RATIONALITY 
The fourth of our identified rationalities is similar to the Contribution rationality in so 
far as it articulates that science is supposed to be firmly rooted within society, but it 
does so in a different way. The Integration rationality is centered around the vision, 
that actors from science and society need to work together as equal partners in order 
to produce better results: ‘The exposure of citizens, public interest representatives 
and scientific experts to each others’ perspectives might contribute to a 
transformation of how these different participants define their interests or take 
account of others’ interests’ (Abraham and Sheppard 1997: 163). Here, scientists are 
conceived of as actors with special experiences who, in collaboration with other 
actors, can develop solutions for society (see also Ball 2002; Nowotny 2005; Roco 
2006; Elshtain 2008; Horton 2010; Vogt, Baird, and Robinson 2007). It is the 
collaboration between different actors that is crucial in this rationality. While the 
Contribution rationality is focused on the outcome (that science lives up to the 
objectives of innovation and democracy), the Integration rationality does not seem to 
have a fixed societal objective. Rather, the goals for science and society should come 
out of a process in which scientific and societal actors agree on the preferred 
objectives together. Whereas, democracy is also a strong value in this rationality; it is 
the process of discussing, rather than public oversight and control that is seen as 
crucial.  
 
In line with the previous two rationalities, the arguments of the Integration rationality 
take as their point of departure the negative side-effects of science when describing 
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the main problem in current scientific conduct. Science is articulated as producing 
outcomes that are unsustainable and controversial, because scientists work without a 
thought for the wider societal implications of the knowledge and technologies they 
create: ‘Given the environment in science, scientists, on the whole, are unlikely to 
participate in soul-searching over the consequences of their work. Those who argue 
for the social implications of their findings may do so without any framework for 
thinking about the consequences’ (Beckwith and Geller 1997: 147. See also Beggins 
1978; Cohen and Gotlieb 1989; Schuurbiers et al. 2009; Thorpe 2004; Woollard 
2006). According to this rationality scientists, do not themselves engage with other 
actors and thus do not experience ‘a transformation’ (Abraham and Sheppard 1997: 
163) that could lead scientific developments in more substantially democratic 
directions. Rather than pointing to a lack of internal considerations (Reflexivity) or a 
lack of external control (Contribution) as the key reason for these problems, this 
rationality points to the lack of integration between science and other actors in society 
as the main problem to be corrected.   
 
In the Integration rationality, the solution is to enhance the dialogue between 
scientists and other actors in order to develop a new kind of ‘integrative’ 
responsibility that can transgress today’s very specialized society: ‘Genuine 
responsibility is not to be found in the compartmentalized roles of the professional, 
expert, scientist, government official or career politician. It is, rather, in the cracks 
between such specialized roles that the basis for an integrative sense of human 
responsibility is to be found.’  (Thorpe 2004: 79; Steckler 1973; Ritterbush 1977; 
Schrag et al. 2003; Rip 2009; Mikulak 2011; Roco et al. 2011). Within this 
rationality, responsibility is thus an outcome of a process in which several different 
actors meet and together learn and change based on common deliberation. 
Consequently, science needs other actors – lots of other actors – to become 
responsible. Scientists need to be challenged continuously by different view-points so 
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they can integrate them into the development of knowledge and technologies. Within 
this rationality, several techniques are proposed to expose scientists to society’s 
values: Scientists need training in philosophy and social science during their 
education in order to be more aware of the importance and works of norms and 
values; scientists need to engage in various public-participation exercises, in which 
emerging technologies are discussed with citizens (Miah 2005); scientists should be 
better at communicating with public media (Fischer 1999; Evans 1999); scientists 
need to develop their methods in cooperation with those whom they study, so they 
can develop knowledge together (MacKenzie, McDowell, and Pittaway 2007; 
Hugman, Pittaway, and Bartolomei 2011). Scientists need to engage with these 
various other perspectives to jointly and collaboratively find a way forward.  
 
The Integration rationality articulates as a crucial point that these dialogues should be 
on-going and happen ‘before the fact’, that is, before knowledge and technologies are 
finalized and implemented in society, at which time it becomes more difficult to 
change their properties and the way they affect their surroundings. Instead, it is 
important that various perspectives on emerging technologies are surfaced, while they 
are still in the making, so they can be integrated as development is on-going: ‘Public 
engagement processes should be established early so that stakeholders who will bear 
the risks and benefits of synthetic biology have the opportunity for meaningful input 
into the trajectory of this field. To be meaningful, public engagement must recognize 
that some avenues of research will not be acceptable and some products may be 
prevented from reaching the market’ (Bubela, Hagen, and Einsiedel 2012: 136; 
Schuurbiers et al. 2009; van der Burg and van Gorp 2005; Roco 2006; Fisher 2007).  
 
According to the Integration rationality the main responsibility of scientists is to 
develop knowledge that is aligned with society’s norms and values, having first 
realized that these norms and values should be contextually identified. The rationality 
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sees scientists as a special kind of citizen, one who possess specialized knowledge 
that can be used to develop society in better directions. But this is only possible if 
science opens up and allows social concerns to form part of the scientific process, 
instead of focusing only on technical aspects. In this way, the Integration rationality 
diverges from the Contribution rationality by articulating that knowledge production 
is collaboration among different actors and responsibility is something that develops 
through this collaborative process.  
 
 
5.4 CONCLUSIONS 
Analysing 263 contributions to academic journals, we have identified four different 
rationalities of the social responsibility of science. Each of these rationalities 
articulates a specific way of defining problems, as well as a specific way of 
legitimizing certain political steering mechanisms as solutions to these problems. The 
analysis illustrates a wide variety of views on how science and the scientific 
profession should be governed. The proposals range from strict self-governance and 
autonomy to a very integrative view in which a large group of different stakeholders 
from outside the scientific system should be involved in the conduct of science. The 
Demarcation and Reflexivity rationalities both articulate scepticism towards external 
involvement; whereas, the Contribution and Integration rationalities embrace external 
regulation, albeit in different forms. In this way, we could argue that the four 
rationalities seem to stretch over a continuum from an idea of no involvement at all 
from society, to an idea of radical involvement from society in which citizens, social 
scientists and other actors literally enter the laboratory and co-develop knowledge.  
 
A different pattern emerges if we focus on the object of steering. The Demarcation 
rationality focuses on optimizing the scientific process before-the-fact by installing a 
strict moral code among the scientists that should be focused on honesty and accuracy 
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in their work. In this way, it resembles the Integration rationality, which also has as 
its object of steering the scientific process before-the-fact.  Even though the two 
rationalities are radically different with regard to their choice of internal or external 
regulation, they are focused on the process of science as the crucial object of steering 
in order to make science responsible. In contrast, the Reflexivity and Contribution 
rationalities share a focus on the outcome of science as the important object of 
steering, although they differ in terms of the steering mechanisms they want to use. 
While the Reflexivity rationality describes how scientists themselves should use 
society’s problems as an inspirational framework that guides their research, the 
Contribution rationality advocates firm, external control and guidelines from society 
that scientists should be compelled to follow.  
 
When looking at the four rationalities in their totally, we can also reflect on the 
distribution of morality or ethics in each rationality. On one hand, the Demarcation 
and the Reflexivity rationalities articulate science as a fundamentally ‘good’ 
institution that has an in-built capacity to know how to serve society best. On the 
other hand, the Contribution and the Integration rationalities point to society as a 
necessary source of moral knowledge about how to develop ‘a good society’ from 
which science needs to learn. This perspective strongly reverberates with social 
studies of science and technology that advocate further involvement of philosophers 
and social scientists as teachers of responsibility in scientific processes (e.g. 
Macnaghten et.al. 2005, Fisher 2007, Flipse et.al 2012).  
 
Following Foucault (2003a) we do not consider the four political rationalities as 
mutually exclusive or strictly separated. From a very general perspective, they all 
stress the need to regulate the relationship between science and society. Even in the 
Demarcation rationality, society plays a large part as that which has to be excluded. 
The definition of a boundary (or an integration) between science and society is 
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therefore an overall shared problematization in the four rationalities. In this way, the 
analysis portrays the current situation of the profession of science as one in which it 
is impossible to not ‘have a relationship’ with society. Rather, the main political 
question is how to define and regulate this relationship.  
 
The identification of these four rationalities serves as a map of contemporary ideas on 
science governance. Like any other map, it excludes a lot of shades and details, and 
we might have enlarged certain differences in order to make the map intelligible. 
However, the map is intended as a reference point for directions and the 
understanding of differences, and as such it is useful as an overview of directions in 
the governance of science. It is clear that there is no uniform agreement about what 
social responsibility of science is and should be. It is equally clear that the definition 
of this concept is inherently political – in the Foucauldian sense of structuring fields 
of action. Similar to Braun et al. (2010), our analysis demonstrates that a particular 
definition of responsibility also implies a particular understanding of the proper 
conduct of science, sustaining the description of some forms of practice as 
responsible and others as irresponsible. Following from this perspective is also the 
realization that an argument for more responsibility in science is not a way of dealing 
with the fact that science has political consequences – it is itself a political statement.  
 
However, our map does not make us any wiser about the practice of science and the 
relationship between what scientists actually do in their laboratories and the 
normative and political statements about proper conduct of science investigated in 
this paper. As seminal laboratory ethnographies (e.g., Bloor 1976; Latour and 
Woolgar 1979; Knorr-Cetina 1999) have shown, scientific norms and scientific 
practice are at times worlds apart. We therefore propose further studies of this 
relationship – in particular of the ways in which scientists are influenced – if at all – 
by these political rationalities in their daily practices of making facts in the laboratory 
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and making organizations when doing research management. It would be interesting 
to investigate whether there are more or different rationalities at play in these forms 
for practice. It is also pertinent to explore how these proposals of responsible conduct 
of science are played out in connection with such mundane organizational concerns 
as next year’s budget, a debate piece in yesterday’s paper, a failed experiment, or the 
need for a new coffee machine in the canteen.18 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
18 We would like to thank Emil Husted for great assistance with the building of the archive and development of the method. Furthermore, we want to 
thank Alan Irwin, Erik Fisher and Paul du Gay for reading earlier drafts and provide useful comments.   
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6. PRELUDE TO VOCATION, OIKOS AND 
CITIZENSHIP 
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n the next three chapters, I will present an analysis of what scientists consider to 
be their specific, daily responsibilities, why they consider them to be so and how 
they try to live up to these. The analysis is based on the ethnographic studies of 
two research organisations, Curious George and Gyro Gearloose, but, as I will touch 
upon in the concluding discussion (chapter 10), I believe that the results can be useful 
in other research contexts as well.  
 
Each chapter presents a specific ‘mode of responsibility’; that is, a specific way of 
perceiving and conducting a responsibility, which is shared among the observed 
scientists and which generates some specific understandings of the general 
organisation and its surroundings (see also 3.3.2). I have described each mode as if it 
were ‘pure’ (Law 1994: 6f). That means that each chapter is written as if the 
scientists only had one responsibility and everything they did was connected to this 
one responsibility. This is of course not how their daily work life looks in reality. I 
identified three different responsibilities (it is possible there are others that I did not 
detect). These three were constantly performed and negotiated. In every chapter, 
there is a section near the end in which I try to demonstrate how the different modes 
are negotiated and where I have no ambition of being ‘pure’. This allows us to see 
how these modes contradict each other and create difficult situations. Their 
separation is an analytical construct that I have made (inspired by Law 1994), in 
order to be able to describe each of them in detail and also to demonstrate that 
inherent in each of them is a complex set of worldviews, understandings and 
practices that are all interconnected. Finally, I also want to emphasise their 
differences and it seems like these differences stand out more clearly if I describe 
them in their entirety, one by one. In doing so, it almost seems (and that was how it 
felt) that the three modes are descriptions of three entirely different laboratories, even 
though it is a mixture of the same two laboratories that I describe all the way through.  
 
I 
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The two laboratories are called Curious George and Gyro Gearloose. They have 
received these names because these figures, both of which are cartoon characters, 
remind me of them. Both laboratories are working in the field of synthetic biology. 
Curious George is located in Denmark and is part of one of the big universities there. 
It has changed name a couple of times due to mergers and reforms but is, in any case, 
quite old. Most of the staff occupy temporary positions or hold their own temporary 
grants. There are a few permanent positions, but they are so few vis-à-vis the 
numbers of employees that it does not even seem like the scientists compete for them. 
All of the scientists are occupied with plant chemistry in one way or another, mainly 
gene modification of some type. The scientists take pride in being curious, doing 
‘solid basic research with a product on the horizon’, as one of them puts it, and they 
also explore ‘where no one has been before’. At the same time, Curious George has a 
long tradition of having close relationships with its users, such as plant breeders and 
foresters. This identity seems – as I will demonstrate – quite important for their ideas 
about responsibility and that is why I have named it Curious George. 
 
Gyro Gearloose is located in the USA. It is a fairly new laboratory and part of a fairly 
new initiative at the university, to which it is attached. A range of laboratories has 
been established under the same roof and Gyro Gearloose is one of them. They are 
independent of faculty, they rely 100% on external funding and they are assembled 
under the mission of making ‘translational research’ in the field of advanced biotech; 
that is, connecting basic research with revolutionary, tangible technologies. Gyro 
Gearloose takes that mission very seriously. The lab director explains that they are 
‘inventors’ and that they continuously strive to live up to such a designation by trying 
to invent technologies that sound impossible; for instance, a vaccine that will cure 
cancer – one of their goals on their webpage. They are so forward-thinking that they 
also meet much resistance in the scientific community, but that only seems to make 
them more determined in their pursuits. As with Curious George, the identity that is 
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connected to the form of science they do seems important for the way in which they 
consider their responsibilities. They have therefore been given the name Gyro 
Gearloose, after one of the most famous inventors ever.  
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7. VOCATION 	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his chapter presents the first ‘mode of responsibility’, which I have chosen to 
call ‘Vocation’. The description of a ‘scientific vocation’ is by no means a 
new one. Weber described it as early as 1917. Many of the noteworthy, 
ensuing works on the scientific profession have at least partly been comments on 
Weber’s classic lecture and essay (e.g. Merton 1970, Merton 1973, Rabinow 1996, 
Shapin 2009, Law 1994).  
 
Of those, perhaps Merton has been most occupied with describing the scientific 
vocation as a responsibility to society, as reflected in the ‘CUDOS’ norms – 
Communitarianism, Universalism, Disinterestedness and Organized Scepticism  – 
which he derived from interviews with scientists (Merton 1973). As mentioned in the 
theory section, the norms were later criticised by the ‘second wave of science studies’ 
(Collins 2014) for being too idealised and far removed from practice. As we shall see 
in later chapters, there are other norms that also guide conduct in scientific work. But 
in relation to duty and responsibility connected to the scientific profession, ideals 
very similar to the CUDOS norms and the idea of a ‘disciplined pursuit of 
knowledge’ play a huge role – both as ideals that the scientists strive to live up to and 
as a practical, embodied way of conducting one’s work on a daily basis. Law (1994) 
describes what the vocational, performing agent ‘scientist’ (or persona) looks like. 
While he focuses on how these responsibilities are learned and conducted locally 
rather than describing them as an institution (in contrast to Merton), the two share the 
focus on the combination of exploration and conservatism:  
 
‘[…][t]he scientific agent is told of and performed as a puzzle-solver who seeks 
solutions that are both creative and conservative […]. Distinctively it [the mode] 
speaks of the importance of the roles that are played in this by the body and the eye, 
of the tacit knowledge acquired during the course of professional training, which 
comes to shape both perception and action. . And it tells of the need, but also the 
T 
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difficulty in incorporating these ways of seeing and doing into the body of the 
person.’ (Law 1994: 81, original emphasis)   
 
I have chosen the name ‘Vocation’ for this mode to underline the close connections 
with earlier descriptions of scientific conduct. As Law suggests, the mode combines 
the conservative and the creative. It does so by sticking to some very strict norms 
about what good scientific work process should look like on the one hand and 
emphasising the possibilities of new discoveries on the other. It is also suggestive of 
the hard work on mind and body that a practitioner has to perform in order to live up 
to the dictates of this ‘vocation’. It is very much this work – and the results – that I 
explore in this chapter. As ‘responsibility’ is the overarching theme of this study, the 
way I look at the scientists’ conduct will continually be connected to how they see 
this way of doing their job in relation to their idea of the role of science in society.   
 
Besides sharing similarities with Weber, Merton and Law’s analyses, this mode also 
shares similarities with the ‘Demarcation Rationality’ and the ‘Reflexivity 
Rationality’, which I described in the previous chapter 5, a point I will return to at the 
end of this chapter. Despite the fact that the observations in this chapter thus may not 
seem very original, they are nonetheless important because the scientists consider the 
development and adherence to them as their foremost professional responsibility. 
They are also important, because aspects of this conduct are not seen as having value 
by some of the proponents of ‘Responsible Science’. Specifically, the idea of 
‘Disinterestedness’, to deploy Merton’s vocabulary, is seen as counterproductive to 
pursuing the goal of a more ‘responsible’ way of conducting science. Some of the 
texts from the archive I analysed in chapter x, considered this neutral ‘technical-
rational’ thinking of scientists as one of the reasons why more external regulation was 
necessary (e.g. Fisher 2005; Owen et al. 2013; Schuurbiers and Fisher 2009). The 
ideals of Vocation are not considered very compatible in regard to responsibilities 
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such as democratising science and concerns for society’s general development. These 
tensions will be discussed toward the end of this chapter. First, however, I will show 
how Vocation generates specific forms of conducts and justifications.  
 
 
7.1 CONDUCT 
I’m entering one of the small PhD offices, where three students are crammed 
together with big, square desks, heavy bookcases, battered bikers’ helmets, a bunch 
of jackets and scarfs, humming computers and potted plants in various degrees of 
erosion. Miriam looks up from her screen as I come in. ‘Oh hi’, she says, ‘Do you 
care to come and take a look?’ She waves at two grey images on her screen. I 
approach. ‘Can you see anything here?’ she asks and points at the upper image. I 
squint at the almost entirely mono-coloured picture: ‘Uhm, perhaps I can see some 
faint darker grey lines here in the middle?’ I volunteer. ‘Good’, Miriam sighs 
relieved, ‘If you can see them as well, then perhaps they are really there, but I guess I 
should do the whole thing again, just to make sure.’  
  
This story is from one of my last visits to Curious George. By that time, I was not 
even that surprised anymore about being asked a question related to their specific and 
highly specialised work. That happened more often than expected, considering that I 
knew little about the technical specificities of each of the scientists’ projects. But in 
both laboratories they would ask whether I could see ‘something’ on a screen; or 
whether I had an opinion about the best way to do this or that; or whether I thought 
their methods were correct. But compared to how much they asked each other, my 
ration of questions was far from impressive. During a workday, I would observe 
people constantly moving away from their screen or laboratory desk to ask someone 
else their opinion or advice. Juniors approached seniors. Seniors approached other 
seniors. Juniors and seniors approached people with special expertise: For instance, 
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the guy who had the most experience with a specific machine, or the woman who had 
conducted this or that experiment many times before. One of the conducts that I will 
focus on in this chapter is that of ‘checking’.  
 
Another conduct is ‘repetition’. In the story above, Miriam concludes that she 
probably has to redo the whole experiment again. This is also something that has 
taken up much space in my field notes: Scientists doing the same procedure again and 
again and again. I have encountered people recounting their flasks, re-writing the 
ciphers, re-examining their infected plants or mice, re-inspecting that infected entities 
were separated from non-infected ones, checking up on all ingredients of an 
experiment and re-readings of papers. This I will also return to in due course. 
 
Finally, we move on to the last form of conduct: being critical of methods and results. 
Returning once again to the story above, Miriam seems all in all quite critical about 
the existence of the darker grey lines in her images. She wants me to confirm them. 
She is not sure ‘if they were really there’ and she wants to do the experiment that led 
to them again ‘just to make sure’. This is not about Miriam being particularly 
insecure about her own abilities; quite the contrary, Miriam seems quite self-
confident. It is a particular, stance in relation to their work that people adopt. People 
question their own results and motives, scrutinise their own actions and place 
disclaimers at the beginning of texts. And perhaps they will, as part of this, also 
repeat their own experiments and check up with colleagues. This third aspect will 
also be studied later in this chapter.  
 
In the story about Miriam three different forms of conduct that I attribute to the order 
of Vocation are identified. The three conducts are closely interwoven – as they are in 
the story about Miriam. In fact, perhaps the scientists would not distinguish between 
them, as I do. They are in that respect analytical constructs, which I have assembled 
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in order to show characteristics of the mode Vocation. In the following sections, I 
will return to each of them and describe them in more detail. Then I will connect the 
conduct to specific justifications for why this particular form of behaviour is 
desirable. Finally, I will show that Vocation has specific effects on the overall 
organisation of the work in the two labs notably how it generates specific ideas about 
the scientific profession and the role of science in society.  
 
7.1.1 CHECKING 
The encounter with Miriam and her possible faint grey lines is not the only time I 
have observed people checking up on results with colleagues.  
 
One of the juniors at Gyro Gearloose sits solemnly in front of her screen. She is 
going through numerous power point slides. On them are colour diagrams that shift 
from ice blue to orange and deep red. The blue colours indicate that the test shows a 
healthy person, the orange and red ones that there is a risk of contamination with 
valley fever19. ‘I’m going through the presentation for tomorrow’, she tells me. ‘I’m 
presenting for the group in order to make sure that my results are correct.’ The next 
day, at the presentation, they go through the details of her experiments and her 
results. All aspects seem to get turned inside out: ‘Why use milk as buffer?’20 asks 
one of the attendants at some point – he is not trained in lab work but in advanced 
statistics, however, all questions seem welcome.  
 
This is business as usual. In both labs, people present their work and their progress 
internally; sometimes to their closest colleagues, sometimes to the entire laboratory. 
They do this not just because others might find it interesting or that it could spur new 
collaborations with colleagues, although these are important aspects as well, but also 
                                                
19 Valley fever is an infectious disease caused by a fungus endemic in the Southwestern part of USA and Northern Mexico. 
20 ‘Buffer’ is a dissolution used in chemical experiments, in which it is important to keep the pH-value constant. 
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to check that all the results are ‘correct’ and that the experiments have been 
conducted as they should. Some of these meetings are quite informal. They are 
agreed upon by a specific group of colleagues. Perhaps the presentation forms part of 
a meeting, where other items are also discussed, perhaps it is part of doctoral 
supervision, if it involves assessing students’ results. At other times, the presentations 
are more formal. Both labs have a weekly seminar (at Gyro Gearloose even several) 
where the scientists take turns presenting their results. At Curious George, the juniors 
talk a lot about these presentations, which are called ‘CRAMS’. When it is their turn 
to do a CRAMS, they talk about how well people have done at the last CRAMS, or 
they gossip about those who have made a bad impression with their research – be it 
juniors or seniors. The way the juniors talk about this seminar made me think about a 
rite of passage. It is something testing and significant that they all have to go through. 
There are risks of both shame and failure, but also of glory and fame. And the juniors 
all seem equally unsure about how their own presentation will go beforehand. Of 
course, the glory and fame – which is perhaps not as great as it sometimes sounds – 
does not only come from having correct results. I suppose they should also present 
some interesting and original results to obtain that. Furthermore, they probably also 
have to do it in an arresting way. Shame, on the other hand, originates from sloppy 
work and thus incorrect results. It is quite evident that the juniors fear that their work 
will be looked upon that way. The seniors never talk about CRAMS in that way. 
They are supposedly quite used to being scrutinised in this manner and therefore do 
not fear any shame. It is my impression that the presentations also work as a way to 
teach newcomers (juniors and other newly-employed people) about both the quality 
standards at the lab and how checking should be done. The seminars at Gyro 
Gearloose and Curious George therefore work as important places to learn about 
proper conduct in the mode of Vocation. As a sort of side effect, they also distribute 
(at least temporarily) local glory or shame to those who present, at least at the junior 
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level. Shame, as I will also show in some of the coming sections, is inherent to the 
mode as a way of regulating individual behaviour.  
 
The exposure to criticism and collegial scrutinising of results and methods starts early 
on. I attended the final seminar for a bachelor student, who had done part of her lab 
training at Gyro Gearloose. She had brought homemade cake, she squirmed and 
smiled more than the students I have seen and there were fewer people in the 
audience than at the normal seminars (only her two supervisors, her two friends and 
me), but otherwise the scene was the same. She made a PowerPoint presentation of 
her experiments and analysis. The supervisors went through her experiments and 
results and asked about all the methods, how it was done and how she got the results. 
Afterwards, we ate her homemade cake and chatted. When the scientists are further 
along in their careers, there may be more audience members and the cake is replaced 
with champagne (or just black coffee if it is an ordinary seminar), but the ritual is 
basically the same from bachelor level onwards. These seminars are one of the ways 
that the scientists check up on each other. But there is a lot of informal ‘every-day’ 
checking going on as well. The first story with Miriam and the faint grey lines 
illustrates this point well.  
 
I’m sitting in one of the wet labs, where Jack is working. He has just complained that 
he has made a mistake and has to redo some of his work again. His supervisor comes 
in and looks at the progression. He examines the three Petri dishes on the table 
closely. ‘This is not what it’s supposed to be,’ he says and opens one of them and 
sniffs. ‘Here, you can smell it.’ He hands over the Petri dish to Jack. ‘Can you detect 
that sour thing? That’s mucus. It’s contaminated.’ They laugh, but Jack still looks 
annoyed as his supervisor leaves. He turns to me: ‘Do you know what mucus is?,’ I 
shake my head. ‘It’s snot,’ he states, flatly. ‘I’ve sneezed into the goddamn Petri 
dishes. Now I have to redo even more work…’  
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I often encountered this supervisor/student relationship. Good supervisors come 
around and check up on their students’ work. They have more experience with 
experimental work; they can distinguish snot from E. coli simply by the smell. 
Supervisors often just show up, see what their students are up to and then lead them 
in the right direction in very tangible ways. Those supervisors who are considered 
‘good supervisors’ check up in a calm and respectful way. When I followed the 
seniors, who often sit in their offices, juniors would constantly come in and ask 
questions about everything from sentence constructions in papers to the status on 
chemical supplies. As one of the seniors, Sandra, at Gyro Gearloose explains to me: 	  
‘I learned a lot from one of the seniors in the lab, where I was a graduate student. 
That’s why I really try to support and advise her [a bachelor student, ed.] – and also 
help you.21 How else should you guys learn your way around?’ 
 
However, this is not a relation reserved exclusively for the supervisors and students. 
It is a way of going about your work that I encountered at all levels. At Curious 
George, many of the scientists share an office, often two to a room. As I sat there, I 
saw how the scientists constantly ask each other for advice, make each other check 
numbers or formulations in their papers. At times, checking up is extended beyond 
the members of the lab as when the members are at conferences or external 
discussants are invited to present or assess PhD students, associate professor 
applications, etc. One of the scientists at Curious George told me that she at times 
writes to the authors of published papers and inquires about their methods – and that 
she has kept all her own notes from her lab work in the eventuality that somebody 
may write to her. Something she both hopes for and dreads, because on the one hand 
                                                
21 I often got the impression that the seniors considered me as yet another young pup, whose ‘up-bringing’ as a valuable member of academia was 
their responsibility as well.  
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it would be an honour if somebody were that interested, but on the other she is afraid 
that her notes are too sloppy.  
 
Those ways aside, the most common way of checking is the self-monitoring, which 
the scientists constantly exercise.  
 
Today I’m following Catherine around. We are in the basement of the building where 
the plants for her next experiment are kept in a cool, dark room. She is going to infect 
half of the plants with mildew fungus and half of them will remain untouched. She 
explains the process –partly to herself, partly to me – during the process of infecting 
the plants. ‘Infected plants to the right, healthy plants to the left.’ She repeats this 
phrase many times. ‘I really have to remember,’ she explains to me, ‘it’s so important 
that they are not put together. They look the same with and without infection at this 
stage, and they have to be in the same climate chamber after infection to ensure the 
same light regimen.’ She continues the work. ‘They are to the right,’ she reassures 
herself, as she puts another potted and infected plant on a rack. She writes it down in 
her lab notes so she can remember for later. Then she counts the plants on the two 
racks. It is as it should be: Half of them to the right, half of them to the left. She still 
looks a little concerned as we leave the room and she casts glances back at the two 
filled racks.  
 
Much of the checking is actually mostly directed at the scientists themselves. They 
are very careful in everything they do and constantly just look again. In that way, it 
takes immense concentration to do fairly mundane tasks such as filling ten flasks with 
liquid or measuring the amount of buffer correctly.  
 
Annie is sitting in front of her screen as I approach. She shows me some graphs that 
she is currently working on. According to her, they do not look as they should. She is 
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going to go through all the numbers to check up – or otherwise do the statistics all 
over again, because something seems wrong. She wants to check whether it is the 
samples or the techniques that are causing the problems. 
 
The scientists, first and foremost, check up on their own procedures  and results to 
see whether they seem reasonable. They go through their papers many times before 
they show them to others. They check the statistics, the measurements, the way they 
have positioned their samples, the timer on the fridge, the oven or a third device, and 
they write the measurements down, so they can return and check on their former 
selves. This constant checking up on their own behaviour seems to take a lot of 
intense work: 
 
I have chosen to assemble a range of observations under the heading of ‘checking’. 
One could also interpret some of the examples as ‘helping each other’. The good 
supervisors help their students in the lab; scientists are given the opportunities to 
practice presentations at internal seminars; good colleagues help each other write 
papers and handle the complex and stubborn machines. I consider both interpretations 
quite valid. It depends on the angle of research. Davies and Horst(In review) point 
out that the notion of ‘care’ in scientific work has been neglected. They suggest that 
the feminine connotations to such notions as ‘care’ have made it difficult to focus on 
such interpretations in a world dominated by (traditionally masculine) discourses 
about ‘objectivity’ and formal rules. Their paper shows, in contrast, how research 
management is also very much about ‘caring’ for the research group and ‘caring’ for 
the juniors (Davies and Horst In review). Agreeing with Davies and Horst, I do not 
suggest that the ‘checking’ should be understood in a way that excludes friendships, 
wishes to help a colleague or care for inexperienced PhD students. Rather, I suggest 
that ‘care’ and governance in the form of checking up are not mutually exclusive. 
They can, in fact, be two sides of the same coin.     
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The reason that I have chosen to focus on the more disciplining aspects of the 
examples is that the examples resonate with the descriptions of responsible conducts 
as I encountered them during my work mapping social responsibility in science, as 
shown in chapter 5. Many of the texts22, which I categorised as ‘Demarcation 
Rationality’, state that internal control with methods and results are vital. As 
described, the scientists consider it paramount that science is autonomous, but 
governed by strong, internal ideals so as to ensure integrity. Here, they often name 
the daily, mundane processes such as peer review, supervision, presentations and 
collegial supervision of work as ways of enforcing these ideals. Seen in this light, the 
many encounters that I have described, (also) become instances of checking up on 
fraud and laxity.  
 
7.1.2 REPEATING 
I will now return to the story about the faint grey lines from the beginning of the 
chapter. Besides checking, that story also illustrated another vocational aspect, 
namely, the repetitive character of the scientists’ conduct. Miriam was still not 
completely sure that the grey lines really were in place, so she wanted to do the 
experiment again ‘just to make sure’. I have often observed the scientists repeating 
their actions. People do the same experiments over and over again and they check and 
re-check the single elements of the experiments again and again. I once helped one of 
the scientists give numbers to 1080 small plastic flasks that she was going to use for 
her next experiment. We counted and counted and counted. And we re-counted the 
numbers four or five times. And I am sure that she did some additional re-counting 
when I was not present. I got the impression that she thought I was a bit careless with 
numbers. Often the repetition also takes place because the scientists suspect that 
                                                
22 I often claim that in the overall picture, most areas of the sciences are represented in each of the political rationalities, but I must admit that feminist 
theory is quite absent from the Demarcation Rationality. 
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something may be wrong (as in the re-counting of the 1080 flasks), or because they 
have actually discovered that ‘something’ is indeed wrong: 
	  
Josh tells me about an experiment he is currently doing. He has redone it six times 
and each time something has gone wrong. In one instance the enzyme, which was 
supposed to cut the gene, did not do so precisely enough. Another time, he did not 
succeed in getting the whole gene transplanted into an E. coli bacterium: ‘To 
optimise these processes…It takes a week every time, or a week and a half. And every 
time, you have to do the whole thing again,’ he sighs.    
 
The scientists ‘optimise’ their work all the time. And that optimisation demands the 
repetition of what they have done. They often express quite a lot of frustration about 
this aspect of their work. They complain about an experiment they have worked on 
for weeks because small things keep going wrong. Or they are grumpy because they 
simply do not know what is wrong, but they have for some reason not been able to 
get the same (good) results as the first time they tried it. Repetition can take place for 
a lot of reasons, and despite the scientists’ frustration, it takes up much of their 
workday. 
 
Angela is pacing back and forth between one of the fridges and her desk in the wet 
lab. She is finding materials for an experiment. ‘It’s really routine today,’ she tells 
me. ‘I’ve done this experiment a hundred times before. It was even part of my Master 
thesis and I’ve published it. But our partners in China have not been able to post-test 
it. I don’t know what the fuck they have done wrong. But anyway, now I‘m just doing 
it one more time to show them that it’s correct.’  
 
While verifying may not be the ideal way of doing science according to Karl Popper, 
this happens quite a lot on an everyday basis. Other labs are unable to confirm 
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experiments and repetition is needed. There could be various reasons why work has 
to be repeated, and various actors who demand it: The scientists themselves, 
supervisors, reviewers or external partners at other institutions. But no matter who it 
is, back the scientists go into the lab and try again. As Clark comments in relation to 
the many, repeated experiments, only half jokingly: 
 
 ‘I believe that there is perhaps some kind of brain imbalance in scientists. We miss 
the receptor in the brain that normally is responsible for the transmission of 
frustration.’  
 
But they do actually complain a lot, and they do seem frustrated. Perhaps they use 
these kinds of stories about ‘scientists’ not being frustrated to keep themselves from 
falling apart from frustration: In that interpretation, a good scientist is one who just 
starts again, patient and without complaints. In my notes, my initial thoughts in 
relation to that comment were that another explanation could be that the scientists 
lack the brain receptor responsible for quitting something, even though it makes them 
extremely annoyed. In other words: They appear extremely stubborn rather than 
eternally cheerful.   
 
Repeating work is considered a quality. I have mostly observed that attitude in 
relation to experiments and journal paper writing, but not exclusively. At times, the 
attitude will also surface in relation to other tasks. For instance, Mike told me, how 
he tries to educate his juniors about science communication. He told me that he wants 
his students to be as rigorous with articles for the general public as they are with 
writing papers for scientific journals:  	  
‘I ask them [the PhD students about a claim in their text]: “Is this true”? And the 
students answer “no, but nobody knows”. To that, I point out that “you know” and 
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then I make them sit down and rewrite the thing over and over again, until it is 
exactly true. In the end, they spend as much time with science communication as they 
do with experiments and papers.’  
 
Repeating work in order to refine it until it is ‘true’ is, in general, considered a value. 
That also became evident when they at times asked me about my methods. They 
would question how I validated my observations if I was not able to repeat them. Or 
they would comment that it seemed weird that I could conclude anything, when they 
(themselves) are not separated from the rest of the world and are fed with the same 
inputs several times. These comments always made me squirm. On the one hand, I 
did not want to go into big scientific theoretical discussions about knowledge and 
how to produce it. I did not want to discuss my own field and its flaws or their field 
and its shortcomings, because we are very far from each other, and I did not want 
conflict. Another thing is that when I was embedded in a field where different 
ontological and epistemological ideas are present, I found it difficult to remember or 
defend the social scientific stances. I think my insecurity and forgetfulness of my 
own scientific heritage testifies to the pervasiveness of the ideas about accurate 
repetition as a way to make results truer. It is part of a strong scientific stance, which 
is also well known outside the labs. When I faced it in daily practice, the confidence 
and security with which they posed questions about my methods left me mumbling 
and uncertain in comparison. Observing and interviewing seemed so careless all of a 
sudden.  
 
Repetition is an integrated part of the scientists’ daily tasks and, at the same time, 
they also consider it a valuable aspect of their behaviour. They repeat things in order 
to make sure that they are as good as they can be; ‘in order to make sure’, as Miriam 
said, or even to secure that something is ‘true’, as Mike demanded of his students 
doing science communication.  
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7.1.3 BEING CRITICAL  
The last form of conduct connected to Vocation is that of being critical. As already 
mentioned in the introduction, the three forms of conduct are closely related. 
‘Checking up’ can also be seen as a way of being critical by controlling how things 
are done, and the scientists often repeat their experiments in order to avoid future 
criticism. But while ‘being critical’ is not a singular act like repeating an experiment, 
I will still argue that it is an active attitude, something that one takes upon oneself in 
different situations.  
 
For the last time, we return to the story about Miriam and the faint grey lines. She 
told me that she was not sure whether those lines were ‘really there’. The scientists 
are very critical about their ability to judge their own work. In their view, faint grey 
lines on a screen could be so many other things than the result they are looking for. 
Or it could be pure luck that what they are looking for is there the first time they try 
it. I have encountered this critical attitude towards their own results many times 
during my fieldwork. People doubt their own results; they try to pose as many critical 
questions to their findings as possible and turn and twist their hypotheses in order to 
find weaknesses. In general, I get the impression that the scientists are quite hard on 
themselves. They assess everything they do themselves with a very critical eye, 
constantly scrutinising their own actions and motives. At times, they have actually 
expressed that they want to be a little less critical, because all that scepticism 
frustrates them: 
 
Christian is preparing an experiment with some plants. He has done the experiment 
several times before, but is once again checking that the results are correct. ‘I get so 
irritated with myself sometimes,’ he complains: ‘I mean, I’ve done this before, I 
KNOW how it is. But then I get insecure again. I really wish I could just say “it is like 
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that” or “it is not like that”, but I just can’t bring myself to do that. I need to make 
sure over and over again.’ 
 
This irritation due to not knowing whether something ‘is like that’ or ‘not like that’ is 
one I have often encountered among the juniors – but never among the seniors. This 
difference between the insecurity among juniors and security among seniors provides 
a solid basis for studying a critical attitude as an acquired ability. I have observed 
many of the juniors getting very frustrated in several situations similar to this one. 
They often feel that they should be more self-assured about the correctness of their 
own results. But on the other hand, they cannot do it because they do not trust 
himself. Furthermore, they do not think that trusting results excessively is right. As 
one of the other juniors comments on another occasion:  
 
‘I believe that we [him and his colleagues] could be a little more critical about 
results. I’m actually a little disappointed about the scientific world in that regard. I 
thought there would be more focus on being critical about [our own] results.’ 
 
He often feels that his supervisors only look at the final results and not at the notes, 
the numbers and the calculations that precede the results. My impression is that he 
considers it to be an overly-trusting attitude, which does not sit well with his idea 
about how critical one should be in academia. So, on the one hand, he is frustrated 
with his own reactions because he cannot bring himself to be less critical about his 
own results, and he therefore progresses slowly. On the other hand, he is disappointed 
in the ‘scientific world’ because it does not live up to his conception of a critical 
standard. Another junior tells that he feels that those among his junior colleagues who 
are, in his view, less critical about their own work somehow seem to do better 
professionally, being more at the centre of management’s attention and publishing 
faster. These mixed feelings are typical among the juniors. I have encountered them 
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in almost all my interviews. The juniors feel insecure regardless of whether they ‘do 
well’ and publish or have not done so yet. The difference between them is mostly in 
how they cope with these work conditions. Some of them become frustrated and 
develop a critical attitude toward the institution of science or the organisation they 
work in. Others somehow come to terms with the condition that the critical attitude is 
always contextualised in relation to other concerns and that this condition does not 
necessarily make the results less ‘true’.  
 
Among the seniors, the theme is hardly discussed – at least not as a personal 
challenge. Most of them do emphasise that a critical attitude is an important skill to 
teach their juniors. But frustration at their own results or not knowing when their 
work is good enough never comes up. My interpretation of this junior-frustration and 
senior-silence is that the scientists gain more embodied and less analytical knowledge 
about the right dosage of scepticism during their career. This dosage is something 
that is hard to teach to the new generations of scientists because it is about a certain 
Fingerspitzengefühl, which only comes with experience. It is a tacit skill that they 
develop over the years by being embedded in the scientific system. They learn it by 
making revisions for submitted papers, by being rejected or published, by making 
presentations or patents and by having followed another senior’s work when starting 
out in the system or by supervising younger students. I suspect that the seniors have 
learned (though they do not say so explicitly) that the appropriate amount of criticism 
is also dependent on culture and they accept that this culture does not mean that what 
they do is wrong or not true. Linda, one of the seniors, comments in an interview:  
 
‘To conduct experiments and be a scientist, that is to be critical, especially about 
your own results.’  
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So, in her opinion, a scientist is a person who is critical, especially about his or her 
own results; it is not just something you do, it is something you ‘are’. So in that way 
of talking about it, the critical attitude becomes an identity, something you possess if 
you are a real scientist. This is, in my interpretation, a little different from the juniors’ 
ways of talking about it. Miriam, for instance, says that she thinks ‘it is important to 
be careful in saying that “everything is good over here” [that their own results are 
good], because nature has its intricate way of sneaking around your theories.’ The 
difference in the two comments is that for the senior, critical is something one is if 
one is a scientist. For Miriam, a junior, it is something one needs to become by 
practising being careful in trusting oneself. It is not something she takes for granted 
as a trait; it is an attitude that only comes through careful practice.   
 
Despite my impression that the seniors have a nuanced and embodied understanding 
of how one is critical in the right way, it is passed on in a very abstract way. Many of 
the seniors whom I have interviewed underline the importance of teaching their 
students to have a critical attitude toward their own work. One of them even has a 
laminated poster in his office stating ‘In God we trust; all others must bring data’, 
and I think it is there in honour of his students more than for himself. This way of 
talking about the need to put forward data as a universal obligation (for all but God) 
that is beyond time and space is typical of how this responsibility is passed on from 
seniors to juniors. But the seniors also try to teach the juniors about ‘the truth’ in 
much more tangible ways. As I told earlier, then good supervisors give specific 
advice on how to move on with experiments or they tell their juniors that something 
is true enough. But it is difficult for the juniors to learn. They are so used to being 
critical that knowing when something is good enough becomes very difficult. The 
difference between the juniors’ and the seniors’ attitude toward a critical attitude 
indicates that it is an ability, of which the finer nuances the scientists acquire over the 
years, but that it is an extremely difficult skill to learn.  
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7.1.4 SUMMING UP 
The three different conducts of checking, repeating and being critical are all valued 
ways of working. They are passed from seniors to juniors, even though the juniors 
seem to have difficulties learning how they should be translated into practice. In the 
next section, I will illustrate how the scientists justify these forms of conduct as 
essential for maintaining a specific role for science in society as the profession that 
guards ‘the truth’. First, however, I will comment on the findings so far in relation to 
the concept ‘conduct’.  
  
I have used the notion of ‘conduct’ to describe some specific ways of going about 
daily work. This notion comes with a welcome blurring of the lines between thinking 
and doing or ideals and practice. The idea is not that scientists have an a priori ideal 
about being guardians of ‘truth’. Instead, I argue that the relationship between ideals 
and practice is recurrent and historical.  The scientists’ way of doing their work has 
been repeated over time. It has also been connected to an idea about ‘truth’ as 
something that one can discover ‘out there’, and certain forms of working have, over 
time, become the way that ‘the truth’ is best demonstrated. This is similar to the way 
Weber describes how a pietistic lifestyle paved the way to both heaven and (over 
time) wealth for Northern European Protestants and instated a certain ‘Capitalist 
Spirit’, where hard work and a modest lifestyle were valued (Weber 1956). The point 
about the relationship between mundane practices and ideal is also one that Shapin & 
Schaffer (1985) demonstrate very well in their account of ‘Leviathan and the Air-
pump', where the public ‘demonstration’ of an experiment in front of an assembly of 
‘gentlemen’ secured the experiment’s validity. It does not mean that the scientists do 
not deviate from this ideal or do a lot of other things: In the next chapter, Oikos, I 
will, for instance, demonstrate that they also cut a lot of corners and do not always 
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worry as much about the truth. But that there are limits to Vocation does not mean 
that it does not exist. As Law (1994) asserts:  
 
‘Pools of order […] do not last for long. They are pretty limited. And they are the 
product, the outcome, or the effect, of a lot of work – work that may occasionally be 
more or less successfully hidden behind an appearance of ordered simplicity.’ (Law 
1994: 5)  
 
So the ‘simplicity’ of Vocation, the way it makes the checking, repeating and being 
critical look coherent and in the form of ideals is the result of the continued work of 
different students, rules, supervisors, sayings like ‘In God we trust; all others must 
bring data’, and lots of other agents that hold the mode together and perform it – until 
it is disrupted. But they do also work like this, and they think of it as a huge 
responsibility to do so. In the next section, we will take a closer look at how they 
justify these ways of working with ideas about a specific role for science in society.  
 
 
7.2 JUSTIFICATIONS 
In the coming sections, I will look at the scientists’ justifications for the duty to check 
up, repeat actions and be critical. The question is which kinds of worldviews and 
ideas about science’s role in society justify these ways of doing the job.  
 
7.2.1 TRUTH 
Scientists rarely feel the need to justify why they find it so important to conduct their 
work the way they do. It seems to be something everybody knows, and they therefore 
see no reason to bring it up over lunch. Boltanski and Thevenot (1999) suggest that 
justifications surface in ‘critical moments’, that is, in disputes; moments where two or 
more parties discover that they do not share the same viewpoint and need to draw on 
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a specific moral order so as to justify their opinion (1999: 359). Such moments about 
these conducts seldom arose. Therefore, I tried to construct a ‘critical moment’ by 
comparing the empirical material from Gyro Gearloose and Curious George. But that 
did not help much, as the two labs, to a large extent, share the understanding of 
responsibilities within the mode of Vocation.23 In the end, my best strategy was to 
create ‘critical moments’ in the labs. I did so by using the STIR interviews (see also 
4.2.2) as opportunities to make the scientists connect some of their everyday, routine 
tasks with specific values. I did that by constantly asking ‘why do you do that’ and 
‘why could it not be otherwise?’. In this example from an interview with Annie from 
Gyro Gearloose, we are talking about her job in general and which responsibilities 
follow from being employed as a graduate student: 
 
Annie: ‘Well, as a graduate student and as part of my PhD, we have to get a thesis 
definition or outline approved, basically. And a couple of aims – a couple of things 
we have to accomplish through those three or four year periods. One responsibility, 
of course, is working towards accomplishing those. Right, the second responsibility is 
being honest while doing that.’ 
Me: ‘Mmmm, why honest? In which way?’ 
Annie: ‘Honest as in, you know, if there are data that maybe contradict general 
thinking, then it should still be presented as it is instead of any manipulation. 
Because we have to make our opinions based on real data, it should not be the other 
way around. So, that’s what I mean about it: You have to be honest about what it is 
that you are doing.’ 
 
So Annie is talking about the importance of being ‘honest’ in what she does. She 
contradicts this honesty with  ‘manipulation’ and explains that ‘honest’ means that 
she has to base her opinions on ‘real data’. The excerpt is about two forms of 
                                                
23 I will return to these similarities later in the chapter. 
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honesty: It is both about the responsibility to look for a truth – ‘real data’ out there in 
the world or under the microscope – and the responsibility to speak the truth and 
thereby be ‘honest’ as a scientist should be. The commitment for scientists to be 
honest, meaning basing one’s work and words on ‘real’ data,	  will probably not come 
as a surprise to many. The scientific profession is commonly known for having high 
standards for honesty, despite lapses here and there. The interesting thing is to see 
how the responsibility for being honest is turned into hard work in the laboratories – 
both hard work with the materials in the repeated experiments and hard work with the 
scientists themselves in internalising these responsibilities as a tacit skill. One of the 
scientists from Curious George who justifies her way of working in a similar manner, 
articulates the connection between conduct and worldview here: 
 
‘I have a big responsibility for doing it [the research] properly and noting it down 
properly. Be meticulous, I think. Both because I really don’t want any wrong results 
going out – in that way it is also in a way a responsibility for the group – you don’t 
want to do, like a “Milena-thing”24. […]. Unconsciously, you can by accident be a 
little lazy with your stuff and think, “Well, it’s probably [going to be] the same 
[result].” I mean, not thinking the problem through properly. But I really think you 
have a responsibility for doing that [thinking the problem through] […]. I mean, so 
your data are reproducible and what you say is correct. That’s also why I’m 
probably one of those who check [my data] an extra time – rather once too often than 
the opposite – before I say anything about my numbers. I know that especially one of 
my supervisors is irritated about that… he thinks I should really move on and that I 
have already proven my point once […]. But, I mean, damn it, what if… I mean, I 
would really, really be ashamed about that.’ 
	  
                                                
24 The scientist is referring to “the Penkowa Case” about Danish scientist Milena Penkowa, who was recently convicted of very serious scientific and 
financial fraud. The case received a lot of media attention because she had been known as a young talent with a very promising career in front of her.   
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This quote illustrates the great seriousness that is apparent in relation to the mode of 
Vocation. She takes her responsibility to both find and speak the truth very seriously 
– so seriously, in fact, that she does a lot of ‘extra’ checking (at least her supervisor 
thinks) in order to ensure what she says ‘about […] numbers’. It also illustrates how 
her daily conduct (in this instance checking) is related to the great responsibility she 
feels for her general research being ‘done properly’, that is, so her data are 
‘reproducible’ and ‘correct’. The responsibility for that is so great that one can 
almost feel how terrified she is that she might accidentally not live up to this 
responsibility. In addition, she also explains that refraining from this responsibility 
for finding the truth through meticulous work and speaking the truth about the data 
would leave her extremely ‘ashamed’. So the double responsibility for finding the 
truth and being honest comes up again as in the interview with Annie. In general, this 
is the responsibility the scientists articulated – more or less directly – in relation to 
Vocation. Mike, from my first pilot study, says it very directly when he compares 
journalists and science:  
  
Mike, the PI, and I are chatting over our respective lunch boxes. Mike asks if I can 
really secure full anonymity, because their field is so specialised that people with just 
a little knowledge about it would recognise them immediately. He comments, taking 
another piece of vegetable pie, that he knows journalists have a tendency to ‘twist 
things’ and he doesn’t want that. I assure him that I am not in journalism, but in 
social science and say that I want to tell ‘complex stories about the lab’. Mike looks 
annoyed and says, ‘Don’t tell me that you want to tell complex stories, tell me that 
you want to find the truth.’  
 
While this story is a comical account of a PhD student without much experience in 
how to address people outside her own field (I do not even know what on earth I 
meant by ‘complex stories’), I do believe that I actually managed to create ‘a critical 
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moment’ (Boltanski & Thévenot 1999: 359), even if it was not exactly on purpose. 
Mike indirectly compares journalists with scientists. Whereas the former have a 
tendency to ‘twist things’, and are thereby not honest, he is looking for a commitment 
to the ‘truth’. In his view, journalism, as a profession, does not have – or does not 
take seriously – the obligation one has to the truth. Again, the reference to ‘truth’ is 
double in that it is both the act of ‘find[ing] the truth’ and speaking the truth, the 
latter in contrast to journalists, who ‘twist things’. It seems as if he thinks this 
obligation is something that sets the scientific profession apart from most other jobs. 
He mentions this special obligation to find the truth and tell the truth in several 
contexts, emphasising that scientists are special due to responsibility. It is also Mike 
who – as I showed earlier (7.2.1) – encourages his juniors to tell ‘the truth’ when 
making science communication, a skill that takes time to acquire.  
 
In quite subtle ways, ‘the truth’ surfaces here and there in my conversations with 
many of the scientists, but the responsibility for the truth is still not expressed very 
clearly. I mostly encounter these subtle references to ‘truth’ when they compare 
themselves with other professions or groups. There are, for instance, many 
expressions about politicians or the public’s lack of understanding of true science at 
Curious George; this is seen as a reason for those types to stay out of decision-
making about, for instance, GMO on open fields. In an interview with Clark from 
Curious George, I present the four rationalities from chapter x for him one by one, so 
he can comment with his personal opinion. I present the ‘Reflexivity Rationality’ for 
him in a very shortened version:  
 
Me: ‘Number two states that scientists are supposed to solve problems for society, 
but they should decide for themselves what they want to solve, when and why.’ 
Clark: ‘That’s very pragmatic. I do think this is correct to some degree. Yes, we are 
problem-solvers, and yes, we do make that decision on priority.’  
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Me: ‘Do you think that is the way it should be?’ 
Clark: ‘Yes, because we are the ones who are best informed about what problems 
there are. No one else might be better informed to make that decision, unless you are 
a politician, who will adjust things from different perspectives – to say it carefully.’ 
 
Clark considers scientists the best decision-makers in regard to societal problems that 
should be solved, as they are the ‘best informed’. He contrasts this with politicians, 
who ‘adjust things from different perspectives’. Based on that quote – and Clark’s 
general scepticism toward politicians and their opinions – I interpret this as yet 
another manifestation of the difference between the scientific profession and other 
professions, notably, that of the politician. Scientists can and should evaluate what is 
best for society; because they have access to the truth about the world, they are ‘the 
best informed’. Politicians, on the other hand, evaluate from ‘different perspectives – 
to say it carefully.’ They do not have the same obligation to speak truthfully nor the 
true knowledge needed to make the right kind of decisions. This distinction between 
science and politics is one I often heard among the scientists. Politicians evaluate 
things from a different perspective than scientists. Sometimes they scorn the political 
profession for being too focused on personal power (again in contrast to scientists), at 
other times they do not judge the different responsibilities as such, but just state that 
scientists have distinct responsibilities ‘to do the science’, whereas politicians and 
government share a responsibility for ethics and legislation: 
 
‘It’s the state’s responsibility to legislate in an area, and it is the Ethical council’s 
responsibility to keep a check on the ethics, and it’s the Agency of Science’s and 
Innovation’s responsibility to take care of the economic aspect of the public science 
and then it’s my responsibility to actually do the science.’ 
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If the subject becomes more contextualised than the very abstract descriptions that I 
have shown above, the scientists find it harder to explain their responsibility for the 
truth and how they are going to handle it in a specific research situation. The 
following is an excerpt from my interview with Tim from Curious George. We talk 
about the reason he chose his research theme – the effect of climate change on 
specific crops. First, he tells me that he is quite content that the subject is relevant to 
small farmers from developing countries and how they should adapt to climate 
change. But after a little while, he adds some considerations: 
 
Tim: ‘When you do research, you shouldn’t think too much about what it should end 
with – at least not if you want special results for that reason, and if you think too 
much about social responsibility, it might be that you are pushed too much in specific 
directions, which you perhaps wouldn’t have been if you didn’t have those general 
thoughts.’ 
Me: ‘Would that matter?’ 
Tim: ’Yes, I actually think so, but it depends if you can do it… matter-of-factly, or 
how should I put it, I mean, that [if] you don’t influence the results, then it wouldn’t 
do any harm that you had that thought in the back of your head.’ 
 
Tim points to the problematic in thinking ‘too much about what it should end in’, 
because that means that one would perhaps manipulate the results in order to reach 
certain ends. The important point for Tim is that the scientists should separate what 
they want from the specific way they work with their data. In our interview, that is 
his main argumentation for being careful when working with ‘social responsibility’. 
Tim separates some ways of thinking about social responsibility from others. It is 
okay if the scientists think about it ‘matter-of-factly’, where they ‘don’t influence the 
results’. This ‘matter-of-fact’ way of thinking is a bulwark against letting your own 
interests influence the results. But by making this boundary, he also establishes a 
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possibility for thinking about outcomes – as he did himself in relation to his choice of 
PhD subject – as long as this thinking is not directly influencing the core research 
itself: ‘the results’. So Tim establishes a boundary between the general visions for a 
project and the daily laboratory work. This is a form of boundary work that I have 
often met. It becomes a tangible way of handling the responsibility to find the truth, 
speak the truth and still have an ambition about solving some kind of problem.  
 
I often heard arguments similar to this. The scientists find it of the greatest 
importance that their ‘results’ are not influenced by any desires. But they make a 
distinction between ‘results’ and their research project in general. It is okay – and can 
even be a very good thing – that the ideas and framework are inspired by social 
challenges, but the core of their job, the experiments, need to be kept pure and value-
free, so that the results do not get ‘turned in specific directions’. They should speak 
for themselves ‘without influence’. As an extra point, it is also noteworthy that the 
scientists often have difficulties handling the close entanglements between the pairs 
of basic research/applied research and internal/external regulation of science. 
Sometimes an argument about science’s noble character due to its responsibility for 
the truth becomes a defence of their right to do basic science. In a similar way, 
applied research at times means the same as external regulation of science. This is a 
theme I will return to in the section ‘Basic Science Guilt’ (9.3.3).  
 
All in all, I will argue that the scientists do feel a responsibility for ‘the truth’ – a 
responsibility that is tied to their professional norms and conduct. Their job is to find 
the truth and speak the truth without their own prejudices or interests being involved. 
Therefore, they should also be careful not to involve themselves in something in 
which their interests would be influenced in certain directions, such as ‘social 
responsibility’, because that would affect both their ability to find the truth and speak 
it. But the scientists do see it as their job to take care of the truth by striving to find it 
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and be honest. In my interpretation, this they consider to be theirs and science’s role 
in society: to be the caretakers or guardians of the truth.  
 
7.2.2 ‘COMMUNITY’ AS PROXY FOR ‘TRUTH’ 
As mentioned in the previous section, the responsibility for the truth is something that 
is seldom directly spoken about by the scientists. This is partly because they all 
seemed to agree upon this responsibility for the truth, and partly based on my 
impression, because most of them (perhaps with the exception of Mike) consider it a 
bit silly to talk about something as pretentious and abstract as ‘the truth’. They often 
argue for something a little more tangible and specific, for instance, in the STIR 
interviews (see 4.2.2). The last question, “Who cares about your choice?” often 
prompted answers such as ‘my supervisor’, ‘my boss’, ‘other scientists’, ‘the 
reviewers’, or ‘my field’.  The scientists consider these people as the ones who would 
be interested in whether they have made the right choices in the lab or not. They are 
also the people whom the scientists would be afraid to face if they had not lived up to 
the standards required of them. In the following, it is one of the scientists pondering 
over the case of Milena Penkowa:  
 
‘Poor girl, I mean, she must be so sorry for what she has done. How is she ever going 
to be able to face her family, her colleagues or her boss after what she has done? It’s 
one of my big fears that I by accident/ could end up like he due to an unfocused 
moment...’ 
 
‘Family’, ‘Colleagues’ and ‘Bosses’ are the three groups that he would be afraid to 
face if he had not done his work properly. Those are the people he fears would judge 
him and perhaps also the people who compel him to check up on his experiments an 
inordinate number of times and to be very meticulous about his notes and very 
critical about his own results. My interpretation is that he feels accountable towards 
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them. He considers them as having a legitimate right to shame him and make him feel 
‘sorry for what she has done’, that is, if he had committed fraud like Milena Penkowa 
– even if it was not on purpose. The scientist believes that he has to answer to them.  
 
What all those groups have in common (besides ‘family’ from the latter quote) is that 
they are all fellow members of the scientific profession.  So besides having a 
responsibility for the truth, Vocation is also about being accountable to the other 
members of the same profession. Sometimes when they talk about how they would 
feel unable to face their colleagues if they were caught perpetrating fraud, an image 
comes to mind of an enormous group of white coated people peeking out from 
everywhere: behind a curtain, through the laboratory windows, over the scientist’s 
shoulder, and so on, while they scientist is working. This is because I get the general 
impression that the scientific community is a unit that they always (in this mode) feel 
accountable to. 
 
So in a way, it is hard to tell how exactly they justify their conduct. My field notes 
and transcriptions point in two directions. Is it as guardians of the truth, where they 
are the one profession in society with that obligation, or is it as a responsibility to live 
up to some internal norms for rigorous work stated by fellow colleagues? I am not 
sure, and of course the two are not mutually exclusive. But I will suggest that the 
scientific community works as a ‘proxy’ for ‘the truth’. ‘The truth’ is an abstract and 
quirky entity, about which it can be hard to talk explicitly, as illustrated when the 
scientists have to explain themselves to the visiting ethnographer. Hence, it is easier 
and less abstract for the scientists to say that they are afraid of what their boss and 
colleagues would do if they were not living up to the expectations for proper conduct 
in academia. Or perhaps the two are seen as so entangled that they do not distinguish 
between the scientific community and ‘the truth’: The truth is something they have to 
care for, and they see their colleagues as fellow guarantors of that truth.  
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I argue that they have a responsibility for the truth; to take care of it by finding it and 
speaking it. But when they talk about the ‘scientific community’, it is about whom 
they feel responsible to (Douglas 2013: 2). In the first instance, ‘responsibility for’ 
means what they believe they have an obligation to take care of; in the second 
instance, it is about whom they are accountable to and believe they have to answer to. 
I believe this makes a difference. The first indicates that the scientists have to take 
care of something (the truth), whereas the second points more to those who will 
punish them, mainly by making them feel shameful if they do not guard the truth. 
 
7.2.3 SUMMING UP 
The justifications that are performed in Vocation are about the professional 
responsibilities that scientists have to live up to. Vocation is performed as a 
worldview where science is one among many professions, but the only one (at least 
compared to journalism and politics) that has a commitment to take care of the truth – 
their responsibility thus plays a unique role in society. The responsibility is twofold, 
as it is both about a commitment to find the truth and a commitment to be honest – 
speak the truth. This responsibility obliges them to work carefully and meticulously 
and helps them avoid being excessively bold in their statements. But it is difficult to 
bring this justification to the surface because the scientists seldom talk about ‘truth’. 
First, they seem to agree, also across the labs, that this is the way of the world and 
therefore they do not need to discuss it at work. Second, my impression is that, while 
most of them agree that they have a responsibility for the truth, they have difficulties 
expressing this, as it seems rather strange, abstract and pretentious. Therefore, they 
use different members of the scientific community as ‘proxies’ for ‘the truth’. They 
argue that they need to conduct their work according to the highest principles, as they 
are accountable to their scientific peers. The fact that they use the scientific 
community as a proxy for the truth does not make the scientific community any less 
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important; it is very clear that they consider the scientific community a group whose 
ideals and expectations they have an obligation to live up to.  
 
 
7.3 ORGANISATIONAL CONSEQUENCES 
In the two previous sections of this chapter, I have shown the different conducts 
Vocation performs. I have also demonstrated how the scientists justify their ways of 
working with a specific responsibility to and for ‘the truth’; a responsibility that is 
solely associated to their profession in society. In this section, I will illustrate how the 
Vocation mode also creates some specific ways of organising the scientific work in 
general.25  
 
‘So the way I think of them, these modes of ordering tell of the character of agency, 
the nature of organizational relations, how it is that interorganizational relations 
should properly be ordered, and how machines should be. […]. I’m saying, then, that 
they are imputable ordering arrangements, expressions, suggestions, possibilities or 
resources.’ (Law 1994: 20, original emphasis)  
 
What to make of a statement that explains the qualities of modes in such a way? Does 
it even make us any wiser about their nature? Certainly John Law is avoiding being 
too specific when he describes what modes of ordering are. In accordance with a 
‘modest sociology’ (e.g. Law 1994: 2), he only tentatively suggests definitions, and 
they are usually garnished with several reservations. However, I still believe that 
there are some features that can be drawn from these tentative suggestions, which 
will be productive for the discussions about how to govern science such that it will be 
deemed ‘responsible’. While Law conducts microsociological studies of the Darebury 
laboratory, his ambition is to say something about the nature of the social and how it 
                                                
25 For my specific take on ‘organisational consequences’ see also chapter 2. 
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is accomplished (Law 1994: 39). In my reading, his claim is that this is done through 
the continuous organising of everyday (work)life in recognisable patterns, where 
narratives, for instance, about the ‘character of agency’, ‘the nature of organizations’ 
and ‘how machines should be’ are used as resources to steer action in what would 
have otherwise been an incomprehensible ‘mess’ (Law and Singleton 2005: 2). As 
this is done, the narratives, the agency, the nature of organisations and so forth are 
also reproduced, altered and maintained. This I have already touched upon in the 
theoretical chapter.  
 
What I want to dwell on here is the question of what exactly is being ordered. John 
Law offers a connection between science and technology studies and organization 
studies. But ‘Organizing Modernity’ is in my reading less about the mundane work of 
organising daily laboratory work in itself and more about how macro-structures and 
(even) grand narratives of modernity (which is also indicative from the book’s title) 
are constructed through the exercise of mundane, daily organising. In that 
understanding, the daily laboratory work is both used to show how local agency 
constructs macro-structures as well as to argue that the social is thus made up of 
contingent and fragile ordering arrangements, held together on an everyday basis. In 
this reading, ‘organising’ does not primarily refer to how work is distributed, how 
different sections compete or how new work procedures are implemented – all 
themes that ‘classical’ organisation studies address. But they are used to say 
something about how ‘society’ itself is ordered. Where John Law’s ambition was to 
reveal how ‘modernity’ itself is made up of these fragile orders, mine are smaller. 
 
I will use this interpretation of ‘Organizing Modernity’ to say something about 
Vocation (and the other orders in the next two chapters) that goes beyond the two 
laboratories I have studied. I will to some extent consider the performative effects of 
Vocation in the two laboratories. However, I will mostly focus on Vocation as a 
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general order that asserts which role science should play in society in order to be 
‘responsible’ – not just in the two laboratories, but also beyond. Modes make up 
science’s role in society through local conducts in a specific way. This role has some 
special characteristics, which are different from what science’s role is considered to 
be in the next two chapters. These characteristics are my focus in the remainder of 
this chapter.  
 
Law makes a ‘check-list’ of the ‘patterning effects’, which he believes the modes 
generate (Law 1994: 110). I will use some of the key descriptions from this check-list 
to describe which patterning effects I believe the modes perform. I will also add some 
‘patterned effects’ that I have observed myself. In the theory section, I already 
described one of these patterning effects, namely, what he calls ‘problems’ (see 
3.3.4), and I described that this was very similar to the notion of ‘justifications’. In 
this section, I will take a closer look at the effects that he talks about as ‘deletion’ and 
‘distribution’ (Law 1994: 111), but I will also look at the understanding of ‘time and 
truth’ and ‘boundary work’. In the next chapters, Oikos and Citizenship I will also 
describe these patterned effects. Some of them will relate to the same subject, some 
of them will be entirely different. It is so, because each mode makes certain parts of 
the social very visible, while others become of less significance (Law 1994: 110).    
 
In my reading of Law, the modes are created and sustained locally but may be so 
stable that they can endure over time and space – as do the four modes he describes. 
Therefore, the description of the mode Vocation at Curious George and Gyro 
Gearloose can also be seen as broader ideas of science’s responsibilities in society. I 
see Law’s ‘check-list’ as a way to understand how modes regulate behaviour, similar 
to the way I described how government rationalities work in a macro-perspective. 
They create a space for possible actions by rendering some forms of action legitimate 
and others not so. Whereas I described how the political rationalities did so by quite 
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actively stating guidelines for proper conduct (Rose and Miller 1992: 175), the modes 
of ordering do not necessarily explicitly prescribe proper conduct, but rather 
construct space for agency via a range of different tactics, which I will now discuss in 
relation to Vocation. 
 
This section about organisational consequences is divided into four themes. First I 
will demonstrate how Vocation generates a focus on science as a profession and a 
community, while the importance of the single labs are downplayed. Second I will 
show that a consequence of checking, repeating and being critical is that it 
dramatically reduces the speed of work on a daily basis, making the process of doing 
science very slow. Third, I will display how Vocation continuously sets the 
profession of science apart from other professions thereby protecting its autonomy. 
This is also connected to fourth theme, namely the scientists’ idea about science’s 
role in society as one of several stable, demarcated institutions that work on 
improving life for mankind.  
 
After these sections I will explicitly look at the differences in how the mode is 
performed in the two laboratories. Here, I assert that the mode of Vocation is quite 
strong, as the differences between the laboratories are few, despite the fact that they 
are situated on two different continents and do not work with the same scientific 
questions. Finally, I will demonstrate the mode of Vocation is not ‘pure’, as the 
related conducts and justifications are negotiated with other concerns in the daily 
work of the two laboratories.  
 
7.3.1 DELETING THE ORGANISATION, FOREGROUNDING THE 
PROFESSION 
Law asserts that orders ‘may embody and perform relatively consistent patterns of 
deletion’ (Law 1994: 111, original emphasis). That means that the performance of a 
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particular order tends to put some objects, entities or ways of thinking in the 
foreground, while other ways are more in the background. In relation to the mode of 
Vocation, I did experience that some aspects of scientific life were in the foreground, 
while others were almost absent. Most striking was that the relation between the 
individual and the scientific community seemed of great importance, while entities 
such as the local lab, the exact university or national state seemed unimportant and 
were seldom mentioned. In my interpretation, it is this relationship that is considered 
vital if the responsibility for the truth is to be maintained.  
 
I base this interpretation on several factors. First, the fear of shame, of which the 
juniors are especially aware (see 7.1.3 and 7.2.1). They are worried by the idea of not 
living up to the responsibility and thereby being exposed as sloppy or – even worse – 
cheating scientists. My impression is that this fear is very individual. It is something 
they fear for themselves, but not for their colleagues. And the fear is seldom 
articulated other places than in the one-to-one interviews with them. They fear being 
shamed as individual scientists; it is not something they fear on behalf of their 
research group or organisation. They consider neglecting the responsibility for the 
truth to be something between them and the scientific community. As one of them 
says, then he would be afraid of what his family, colleagues and bosses would say if 
he had committed fraud – even by accident. So closer relations are seen as specific 
embodiments of all those who would judge his character, but in his opinion, they 
would not share in his guilt. Fraud and bad work are solely considered his 
responsibility and a lapse in his moral character. While ‘the Penkowa Case’ did 
expose some considerations about both the University of Copenhagen’s role and the 
role of Milena Penkowa’s closest colleagues, this has not seemed to affect the belief 
among the scientists that not living up to the standards is a matter between them and 
the community.  
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The foregrounding of the individual and the community on the one hand and the 
deletion of the organisation on the other also appear in other situations. As shown in 
earlier sections, the scientists often mention the ‘community’ as their stakeholders, 
and they say ‘we’ when they talk or write about their results and research rather than 
naming single authors or a specific position. The ‘we’ does not refer to their own lab 
or their group as the ‘we’ I will discuss in the next chapter. Instead, they are speaking 
on behalf of science. In that way, there is the single individual who speaks (writes) 
and then the community backing up the statement. They also make clear the 
connections between their professional identity as ‘scientists’ and their responsibility 
for the truth, while the membership of a particular organisation or group is of no 
importance in that matter. As one of the scientists put it: ‘To be a scientist, that is to 
be critical.’ And a large part of the learning process in academia is about learning to 
understand and embody this responsibility in practice. This is what separates them 
from other professions, notably, those of ‘politicians’ and ‘managers’. Other 
identities than that of the professional are again ‘deleted’, using Law’s term; it is not 
about their organisation, their university, their nationality or their research group. The 
profession stands out, while the lab disappears. This point will be further elaborated 
on in the next two chapters. In those, I will illustrate how the professional community 
fades into the background and entities such as the research organisation and shared 
citizenship become visible instead.  
 
The point about professional identity is a clue to explaining how the responsibility for 
the truth becomes a way of regulating science. The responsibility for the truth and the 
conduct that supports it are seen as the most central part of the scientific profession. 
Compared with the other two modes, I would argue that this is ‘the strongest’ mode, 
and it is so in two senses. First, it is a very strong institution; I have already 
mentioned how it performs across time and space. Second, it is also the most 
persistent mode within the two organisations. The struggles of adapting to it for the 
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juniors create some of the most serious personal crises I have witnessed. The seniors 
also confirm that this responsibility is the foremost value to teach the juniors. The 
other responsibilities, which I describe in the next chapters, are seen second to this 
and considered ‘political’ conditions that they should learn to ‘navigate’ in. From the 
perspective of Vocation, these are seen more as annoying work conditions that they 
unfortunately need to adapt to, not as something that defines or is the core of their 
profession.  
 
In a way, it seems almost commonsensical: The responsibility for the truth is 
performed through meticulous work with materials and text, where checking, 
repeating and being critical is vital. Basically, the scientists consider this their job: 
This is what they do and are supposed to do – otherwise they would not even be 
‘scientists’. But the other responsibilities, that for the organisation and that for the 
public, are a little different; they could (if they were free to do so) choose not to be 
responsible for those parts of their work, but they would still be scientists. However, 
it does not work the other way around. They cannot quit the responsibility for the 
truth but still be responsible for, say, the organisation’s economy or for their findings 
being turned into products and still call themselves scientists. Doing that would make 
them administrators or innovation consultants or a third category, but they would not 
be scientists anymore. Without the responsibility for the truth, the profession 
disappears as well. This may seem almost trivial; of course, scientists are not 
scientists if they do not research something. But as I will describe in the next 
chapters, it is not necessarily so in everyday work, when a multitude of other 
responsibilities start to pile up and the time to perform the responsibility for the truth 
becomes limited. The responsibility for the ‘truth’ is thus closely related with the 
aspects for the job, that the scientists consider as their core tasks. Therefore it is also 
the most stable.   
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7.3.2 SLOW SCIENCE 
Besides creating a sense of community Vocation also installs a certain idea about 
time in the labs. No matter when or where I looked, all the scientists were very busy, 
but their respective business seemed to be of different kinds. My argument here is 
that the idea about time and how the scientists should relate to the organisation’s 
understanding of time is dependent on the mode of responsibility. 
 
As a consequence of the central conducts in Vocation, repeating, checking and being 
critical, it takes a long time to conduct science, and the scientists work a lot. Curious 
George was situated on one of my regular cycling routes through Copenhagen. When 
I cycled passed in the evening, lights could usually be seen in several windows facing 
the route, and I am sure it would have been the same had I passed Gyro Gearloose 
after dark. People drop in over the weekend to check up on their experiments – or 
they simply stay the night in the lab to monitor their experiments.  On the days I 
follow Annie from Gyro Gearloose, she often politely dismisses me at lunch, as she 
does not have more time for me: ‘You should eat, that’s important’, she teaches me, 
but when I ask if we could have that important lunch together, she refuses because 
she does not have the time. She rarely sits down for lunch. She just quickly goes 
outside the wet lab (food is prohibited in the wet lab for safety reasons) and eats a 
bun or a roll, while pacing impatiently back and forth in front of the huge windows, 
which separate the lab from the hallways. The juniors tell me about seniors who 
answer their e-mails in the middle of the night and seniors tell me about juniors who 
‘spend their life in the lab’. According to most of the scientists, they work on 
weekends and bring work home with them in the evenings. People have supplies of 
food and snacks in their drawers for workdays that last longer than the closest delis’ 
opening hours. Here and there, pizza menus are pinned to boards. Time and work is 
also a favoured subject of talk and discussion among the scientists. In the following, 
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it is one of the Gyro Gearloose scientists who tells an anecdote about time 
management: 
 
At an evening get-together at Gyro Gearloose, one of the graduate students tells the 
closest dinner guests that he has heard from a friend that the laboratories in Europe 
close everyday at 5:00 p.m. and are closed over the weekend, which makes it 
impossible to conduct time-consuming experiments. He considers this closing policy 
‘completely crazy’, albeit not, apparently, unlikely.  
 
While I can testify that the laboratories do not close at 5:00 p.m., nor over the 
weekends (at least not in Denmark), the story is interesting, because it is clear how 
work outside normal business hours is seen as so normal that weekend closing sounds 
extravagant and odd. In fact, it sounds so ‘crazy’ in the ears of the graduate student 
that it is something only ancient, decadent Europeans could pull off. The story 
illustrates that the scientists consider it an utmost necessity to have a lab that is 
always open and a great amount of time in order to be able to do their work properly. 
A related point, which will be examined in Oikos, is that the scientist also implies a 
difference in work morality and in what it takes to create results in Europe and the 
USA (see 8.1.2). The tale about laboratories closing at 5:00 p.m. is considered so 
exotic and absurd that it is appropriate entertainment at a dinner party. But that story 
is just one among many stories about work hours. The scientists complain about the 
lack of economic awards for the long work hours compared with that of industry. 
They explain that they never see their families, and especially about the lack of 
attention their children receive and that the latter are always picked up late from 
kindergarten. Casual remarks about being stuck at work on a Friday evening are 
common, as are stories about reading papers while the children watch (too many, 
according to the stories) films on their iPads.  
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At Gyro Gearloose, juniors with children are rare; in fact, I never met one. At 
Curious George, the juniors are older than at Gyro Gearloose (due to different 
educational systems and cultures), and there are thus more juniors with children 
there. The PhD students with children complain that those without children could 
produce better dissertations because they have more time to do so. The PhD students 
without children, on the other hand, claim that they are less structured and do not 
accomplish as much during a workday as the parenting students do: ‘I do the same 
work in 12 hours that they do in six’, as one of them says.  
 
It is hard to come across a work place anywhere where people gossip about how little 
they do, how easy their job is, and how much time they have on their hands. Even if 
that were the case, few would admit to it. Hard work, and a lot of it, is generally 
considered a virtue for better or worse. In many workplaces, people work long hours, 
have a lot of assignments and bring work home with them, as they do in the two 
laboratories. In that way, the two labs resemble most other contemporary work 
places. My argument is that hard work and long hours are ways to perform 
Vocation.26 The scientists associate a large workload with true results. As Catherine 
from Curious George wrote on Facebook as a subtext to a picture of a precipitous 
curve: ‘Hello Good-looking! Priceless to get such a beautiful peak, when you have 
optimised for three days.’ Catherine connects a good result, ‘such a beautiful peak’, 
with very intense and meticulous work, that is, she ‘optimised for three days’. So in 
my interpretation, the endurance of long workdays – and talk about them – is a way 
for the scientists to be good at their job and also show it. Living up to the 
expectations of finding and speaking the truth is done through the very slow, but 
careful work of materials. As such, working long hours is a way for the scientists to 
show themselves and the world that they are great at their job.  
                                                
26 As I will go more in depth with this in the coming chapters, other concerns contributed to the long workdays as well, such as the hope of career 
advancement, competitions for jobs and after-hours voluntary science communication work.  
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So the idea is that the scientists work long hours because they repeat, they check and 
they are being critical. By doing this, they also live up to what is expected of them in 
the mode, and therefore this becomes a sign that one is a good scientist. I have chosen 
to call this phenomenon ‘Slow Science’ because it reminds me of the ‘Slow Food 
Movement’, where quality, meticulous work with the basic ingredients and many 
hours in the kitchen is considered the best way to make delicious, healthy food. Slow 
Science is a sign of quality because repetition, checking and scepticism slow progress 
down immensely. The next story is a good example of how Slow Science is 
cherished.  
 
At a late dinner party, some of the scientists are discussing the latest developments at 
Curious George. This morning, there has been a big breakthrough in the 
experiments. While breakthroughs are always welcome, this one was particularly 
welcome. The previous year, the lab was surprisingly excluded from a big 
collaboration – perhaps (the rumours are plentiful) because they did not deliver fast 
enough and the partners did not believe in them anymore. But now they have the 
results that prove their hypothesis. And they no longer have to share them with their 
former partners. The participants at the dinner party are quite satisfied with this 
development. This will teach the former partners a lesson and show them how good 
science should be done. ‘Slow and steady wins the race,’ one of them comments.  
 
The scientists are proud that they did not deviate from good scientific norms in order 
to produce faster results. They are proud that they have done solid work, which one 
can trust, and find it suspicious that the other collaborators were so interested in fast 
results. To them, that is a sign of rotten professional character. Good scientific work is 
about never taking shortcuts, even though it may cost partners and money. So at 
Curious George, they have chosen not to deviate from their scientific standards, 
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despite the fact that they lost a partner due to their ‘slow’ work. But this is turned 
around and seen as a victory (especially because they now actually have the results), as 
it demonstrates that Curious George is willing to sacrifice its own resources to 
maintain professional responsibility.  
 
All the scientists seem to share the view that the work is so complex and difficult that 
they are bound to have many failures and few successes. Repeated efforts are 
considered a sign of seriousness and devotion, whereas instant success with 
experiments is just mediocre ‘luck’. Repetition and failure is as such a vital part of 
being a (good) scientist. The earlier quote from Clark about brain imbalances comes to 
mind again: ‘I believe that there perhaps is some kind of brain imbalance in scientists. 
We miss the receptor in the brain that normally is responsible for the transmission of 
frustration.’ If we look at this quote again, it is possible to interpret it as a statement of 
professional pride: Scientists are a particularly tough species, who, in contrast to 
everybody else, can endure an environment where disappointment and boring, 
meticulous work is the name of the game and the rewards are few.  Working long 
hours is a consequence of making high quality science. The longer the scientists stay in 
the lab, or the longer they work on a paper, or the more time they spend on a grant 
proposal, the more convincing they are as dedicated scientists. In that way, the mode 
of Vocation contributes to fostering a work climate where working long hours are 
expected and appreciated and where quick results are not necessarily considered a 
virtue.  
 
As a result of Vocation, time becomes perceived as, on the one hand, an endless 
resource – as there should ideally always be time to make another experiment – and, 
on the other, something that should be well spent; there is room for repeating the 
experiments, checking again and receiving critical comments from colleagues. But 
there is no room for breaks, going home early, parties or chatting. Taking one’s time 
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while still working hard throughout the day (and possibly night) is recognised as the 
way to live up to the Vocation. As a consequence of Vocation, the daily work of 
science is organised as a never-ending exploration of possibilities, albeit one that 
should be conducted in a concentrated and focused manner. I will return to the 
differences between this understanding of time and the one in Oikos in the next 
chapter.  
 
7.3.3 BOUNDARY WORK: SCIENCE VERSUS OTHER PROFESSIONS 
Vocation also generates a specific way of organising the profession outwardly in 
relation to questions of regulation. Here, I will argue that the scientists also use 
differences in responsibility actively to set them apart from other professions. It is an 
instance of ‘boundary work’ (Gieryn 1983). Gieryn argues that ‘science’ as a specific 
form of knowledge and practice is a construction that is performed and maintained by 
scientists (Gieryn 1983: 781). He further argues that ‘boundary work’ is ‘ideological’ 
and serves the purpose of ‘enlarg[ing] the material and symbolic resources of 
scientists or to defend professional autonomy’ (Gieryn 1983: 782). This ‘boundary 
work’ can be observed in the two labs. They often compare themselves with other 
professions in ways that flatter themselves more than the occupation to which they 
are compared. Sometimes, the work does not seem to have a particular strategic goal, 
such as professional autonomy; it sounds more like a repeated statement of something 
everybody already knows. This is, for instance, the case in relation to the course in 
‘bio-business’, which Miriam attended at the local business school. 
 
She is not particularly impressed with the curriculum or the teaching. After one of the 
classes, she scowls: ‘Those management types [the teachers] always share the same 
banal points; you might as well have a chat with your mother.’ 
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In Miriam’s interpretation, ‘management types’, be it researchers studying 
management (some of the teachers running the course) or professional managers do 
not add much of value. They only share ‘banal points’ and do not possess much more 
knowledge or expertise than the average layperson. My impression is, based on this 
experience and the PhD students’ disdain for the course in general, that they do not 
consider it real knowledge in line with the norms of their own Vocation. It is not 
scientific. This may also have something to do with the fact that this course is about 
earning money on medical inventions. Despite the fact that some of the PhD students 
will end up doing exactly that, and have voluntarily enrolled themselves in the 
course, they consider business a lower pursuit in life; something that ‘management 
types’ tend to do, not scientists. Scientists take care of ‘the truth’ and that is not an 
occupation they are supposed to earn money on. It also seems as if they equate 
making money with being a bit banal. Having a business is not something that 
demands highly specialised knowledge (your mother could advise you on it) in 
contrast to doing science, which demands skill, brains and patience (for more stories 
and elaboration in relation to the bio-business course, see Citizenship). This 
difference between science (as in the natural sciences) and other forms of research are 
often pointed out by some of the scientists. In the following, it is Henry, the lab 
director at Gyro Gearloose, who comments: 
 
‘The real goal, if you have a real goal, is… you know you [scientists] are trying to 
find out if this hypothesis is true, and you do actually have some sort of real 
grounding, where in social science, my view is that social science would say, “Well, 
[…] we all agree this is the right thing to do”, but two years later, [social scientists] 
can all agree that this is the wrong thing to do.’  
 
So scientists have a ‘real grounding’ because they are looking for a long-standing, 
solid fact, whereas social scientists can change their opinion every second year. 
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Again, this sets the natural sciences apart because they have that obligation to take 
care of the solid fact, something that not even other members of academia can claim. 
So there is much talk about how the responsibility for the truth sets the scientific 
profession apart from other professions. But at times, they also – as Gieryn (1983) 
suggests – use this special obligation as an argument for professional autonomy, 
especially in relation to public science’s ability to deliver innovation and growth. 
Miriam from Curious George is preoccupied with the differences between private 
industry and public science: 
 
‘It’s a source of annoyance when you follow the public debate and you listen to 
companies who complain that we [public scientists] are not innovative enough and 
[they say things like] “If our company got a better tax agreement, then we could get 
all the world’s scientists up here.” Well, that’s not true, because you can see how the 
companies cut and cut in their Research and Development departments, and they 
focus on ‘perfume-big-sellers’ where they wrap their old innovations in new 
wrapping paper and then that’s what they make their money on. And fair enough, if 
that’s what they want, but then don’t come crying and say that Danish scientists are 
not ready to take the big chances in science and innovation.’  
 
Miriam complains that public science is pressured by industry in the media. In this 
view, public science is being accused of not being ‘innovative’ enough or ready to 
take ‘big chances’ in science and innovation. In my interpretation, she tries to 
negotiate some space to do science as she wants to do it, by firing some of the same 
claims back at industry: They are not nearly ‘innovative’ enough, as they do not 
actually contribute with new inventions, they just make some small adjustments to 
known technologies and sell them as something new. The implicit argument is that 
this is in stark contrast to public scientists, who actually do real science, which is 
understood as discovering important stuff by ‘taking big chances’. The difference 
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between industry and public science is often up for debate in different contexts. The 
scientists position themselves as different because they do not have to worry about 
the bottom line. In the following, it is Simon from Curious George: 
 
‘You asked what qualifications are needed in order to work at a place like this […], 
you need flair for – and find delight in – being occupied with things that are 
politically decided and politically oriented. And by that, I contrast it to things being 
decided by black numbers on the bottom line. And that is a difference in ways of 
thinking. If you only want black numbers on the bottom line and want that to control 
your research, then you’re an industrial scientist – or you should consider becoming 
it. I’m not saying that this affects you all the time, but there are some connections in 
some kind of way. As a public scientist, you can see it in the way that you adapt your 
applications to the calls, but it doesn’t affect your research. You adjust the 
application, even though you research the same subjects as always – and that is a 
talent as well.’  
 
First, Simon asserts that being a public scientist demands that one work with the 
political conditions and in a system whose directions are decided politically. He 
contrasts being regulated at the political system with that of being regulated by the 
market – ‘black numbers on the bottom line’. He adds that it takes a special kind of 
person to be in public science, someone who does not want to be regulated by 
numbers, but rather something else (which he does not explicate). In my 
interpretation, this unmentioned something else is the ‘truth’. Being regulated by the 
political system does not ‘affect research’ because only what is true or not true do 
that. But it takes a special ‘talent’ to write applications and still not let it affect your 
daily work. Again, I consider it as an instance of boundary work. This is because 
Simon contrasts being regulated by the market with that of being regulated by the 
political system. But the trick in the political system is that the scientists can still 
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maintain their responsibility for ‘the truth’ – as long as they know just how to write 
the right things in their applications.  
 
Considering the two last quotes, Miriam’s and Simon’s, together, they present a 
picture of science in competition with industry, one where public scientists need to 
assert their particular virtues in contrast to those framing private science, and thus 
underscore their right to certain forms of autonomy. Turner (1980) comments in his 
analysis of Victorian public science that, ‘the pursuit of public science has involved 
lobbying various non-scientific elites […] and defining the position of scientists vis-à-
vis other rival intellectual or social elites, such as the clergy’ (Turner 1980: 590) 
 
Whereas the clergy has a less prominent role in relation to these cases now, I consider 
‘industry’ to be a ‘rival’ that puts pressure on public science to perform in a specific 
way and in relation to different principles, most notably those of  ‘the bottom line’. 
Gieryn (1983) comments that boundary work is locally constituted and strategic in its 
endeavours (: 784). Here, the strategy seems to be that the scientists distinguish 
themselves from industrial science in order to maintain their autonomy. The scientists 
try to construct a space for themselves where they can pursue their scholarly interests 
and get funding despite the pressures they feel from industry as well as from those 
university reforms that have forced public research organisations to mimic private 
industry, with competition as a basic incentive (Shore and Wright 2000) They do that 
by referring to two principles; namely, by actively stating that they are ‘ready to take 
big chances’ while, at the same time, being grounded in responsibility for the truth, 
where the research ‘is not affected’ despite different political priorities.  
 
As such, they use boundary work to distance themselves from what they feel most 
pressured by, namely, industry and being regulated by financialisation. But this 
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boundary work also has consequences internally. The extra emphasis on the scientific 
profession as noble adds to the pressure that the juniors feel for doing a good job:  
 
As part of the closing seminar I gave at Curious George, I had included anonymous 
quotes from my interviews that I found telling about the nature of that organization. 
The idea was that the scientists should discuss whether they recognised the situations 
or values that were described in the quotes. It was a way for me to ‘test’ whether 
some of the impressions I got from individual scientists during interviews were 
recognised among the rest of the group. One of the quotes expressed disappointment 
in the research environment in terms of prioritising fast publications over self-
criticism. When I reached the slide with that particular quote, the ambience of the 
approximately 40 scientists grew uncomfortable. People whispered and looked 
worried. Only one of the PIs spoke up. He was troubled by the quote and said that 
‘something should be done’ if this was a general impression. He maintained that 
scientific rigour was one of the most important issues for the lab. The juniors mostly 
looked at their shoes. Afterwards, one of the juniors approached me. He was worried 
that it was his quote [it was not] that I presented. If it was his, he stated he felt that he 
had shared more with me during the interview than he should have. Furthermore, 
Canute, the head of the section, was quite worried and wanted to know if that quote 
was a single incident or a more general impression. He really wanted the juniors to 
understand that the importance of honesty and scientific rigour was above everything 
else. Nothing should change that, not even demands for fast publications.   
 
It took some time to sort things out. I promised the PhD student that he could read his 
interview through and withdraw all the statements he was not comfortable with. 
Meanwhile, several of the juniors approached me with comments about recognising 
‘their’ quotes. None of them were right, however. I also spent some time explaining 
my interpretation of the situation and the quote to Canute and a couple of other PIs. 
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As soon as they got the interpretation, they were not worried anymore and even 
agreed.  Roughly the same interpretation as I put forward here. As I have already 
described in ‘being critical’ (7.1.3), the juniors feel that it is quite difficult to learn the 
appropriate level of criticism. They simply have difficulties in knowing when 
something is ‘true’ enough. Usually, they are more rigorous and critical – just to be 
on the safe side – than the seniors think necessary. Looking at this phenomenon again 
in relation to boundary work, another dimension can be added to this picture of 
insecurity. Not only is the responsibility for the truth something they need to learn 
and contextualise in specific situations. At the same time, they need to maintain that 
they are noble, trustworthy and deserve to do autonomous science. The grand and 
shared stories about scientific virtues are not necessarily compatible with ordinary 
organisational work life to someone just starting out on a scientific career. But as the 
juniors have learned to be honest and respect ‘the truth’ since the beginning of their 
university lives, they do not look favourably at the specific everyday setting they are 
part of.    
 
So on the one hand, the responsibility to be precise sets the scientists apart as a 
special profession, which takes responsibility for the truth and not just having ‘black 
numbers on the bottom line’. On the other hand, being a member of this special 
profession also feeds the insecurity related to the standards for good work among the 
junior staff. The mode of Vocation does not only produce rigorous work, an 
understanding of time as precious resource and an identity as a noble professional, it 
also produces a large amount of insecurity for those learning to conduct themselves in 
this system.  
 
7.3.4 DISTRIBUTING RESPONSIBILITY BETWEEN INSTITUTIONS 
Another ‘patterning effect’ that John Law describes is that of ‘distributing’. He says 
that modes:  
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‘…generate and perform distributions, defining or embodying a characteristic 
approach to what might, does or should pass from whom to what under what 
circumstances’ (Law 1994: 119 original emphasis).  
 
This effect is something I have observed being performed as part of Vocation. In this 
case, the objects that are to be distributed are different forms of responsibility and the 
actors between whom the responsibilities should be distributed are the state’s 
different institutions, namely, those of science and politics.  
 
The exact conceptions of the best forms of distribution vary a little. At times, the 
scientists believe that both the responsibility for the truth and for deciding how to act 
on that knowledge should be bestowed upon them. This is, for instance, the case 
where Clark states that he (and scientists in general) are in the optimal position to 
make decisions concerning how society’s big problems should be handled, as they 
(scientists) are ‘better informed’ about the problems. He also acknowledges that 
politicians could partake in that responsibility, but he is still sceptical 
 because he does not think they have sufficient knowledge to do so. At other times, 
the distribution between state actors looks different. The scientists still have the 
responsibility for ‘the truth’, but they refrain from taking the responsibility for what 
is to be done with their knowledge. For instance, Annie explains, as I showed, that it 
is her responsibility to state in the papers that her findings could be used to construct 
biological weapons, but it is the politicians and other actors’ responsibility to figure 
out what needs to be done in relation to that risk. While the scientists in both 
examples believe they have the responsibility for the truth, it varies if they believe 
that this responsibility also grants them responsibility for how society should act as a 
consequence.   
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Either way, the way the scientists consider the distribution of responsibility between 
science and politics shares some similarities with the way Shapin (2009) conceives of 
the relations between science and the state after the Second World War and in the 
first decade of the Cold War. Shapin explains that scientists had never been as 
entangled in societal matters as after the Hiroshima bombings, which led to 
ambivalence about the merits of the scientific profession. Some celebrated the 
development of the atomic bomb as a victory for both science and democracy – 
without it the war in the Pacific Ocean would have continued. Others were deeply 
ashamed that science had played a decisive part in developing such a lethal 
technology; others again saw it as being out of the profession’s hands. They might 
have developed the technology, but it was not their choice as how to use it (Shapin 
2009: 65). While this debate went on – also among scientists far from experimental 
physics – the conditions for conducting science had never been more favourable in 
Shapin’s opinion. He describes how public science received almost limitless amounts 
of funding, both for basic and applied science. This also meant a fast expanding job 
market for academics. Furthermore, science had, via its engagement in the wars, 
gained access to political circles, where they found themselves wielding power in 
terms of advising on directions for both scientific exploration and national strategies 
in areas such as growth and military (Shapin 2009: 64).  
 
In my interpretation, this way of both debating and arranging the role of science in 
society is mirrored in the ways which Gyro Gearloose and Curious George see the 
ideal distribution of power between science and politics. As scientists, they have the 
responsibility for the truth, they should have quite a lot of freedom to take care of that 
responsibility, and, perhaps, also the power to dictate politics based on their findings. 
Either way, knowledge is channelled from science to politics and not so much the 
other way around. Moreover, it is the distribution of responsibility between the state 
and public science that is in focus. ‘The public’, for instance, who will be very 
 195 
apparent in chapter 8, is not given any sort of responsibility here; nor is ‘industry’, 
which actually played a huge role in the development of scientific work in the post-
war years (Shapin 2009: 128). This is solely about the relationship between science 
and the state.    
 
This way of thinking about the distribution of responsibilities may be highly idealised 
(also compared to the actual situation after WWII, despite the favourable conditions). 
Conveniently, it also grants the profession of science the very privileged position of 
both being able to take or not take responsibility for further outcomes. But it is still 
interesting how the ideas about distribution of responsibilities, to some extent, are 
also an institution with historical roots, which can be traced back to the decades after 
WWII. In my interpretation, these distributions of responsibilities between public 
actors are the way that Vocation constructs science’s role in society. Society is 
considered as ‘made up’ of rather stable institutions with distinct responsibilities. 
Science is supposed to deliver advanced and new knowledge – also basic science – 
and a work-force to these other institutions. But in order to do so, they need a good 
amount of funding and relatively free hands. I will compare this view of science’s 
role in society with those expressed in Oikos and Citizenship in the next chapters. 
Here I will move on to the last considerations about Vocation, before the conclusion. 
The first of them shows how Vocation’s responsibilities are weighted against other 
concerns in the two labs and is as such not pure. The second takes up considers the 
differences in how Vocation is performed across the two labs. The two sections are 
therefore also ways of addressing the questions of methodology and generalisations.  
 
 
7.4. NEGOTIATING VOCATION 
In the previous sections of this chapter, I have described Vocation as if it were a 
‘pure’ mode, where nothing interfered. But, of course, it is not quite so simple. As 
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Law comments, modes are never ‘pure’, but rather constantly disturbed by resistance 
and competing concerns (Law 1994: 111). Therefore, I have devoted this section to 
clarifying how the mode of Vocation is constantly moderated and demarcated in daily 
work at the two labs.  In this section, I examine how the responsibility for the truth is 
negotiated and at times set aside in favour of other concerns, such as economic issues 
or public scepticism.  
 
I’m overhearing Canute explain why they do not plant GMO in open fields, but rather 
only in securely closed tanks. I have heard the argument many times before. It 
usually goes like this: ‘I have decided that we won’t plant any form of GM plants out 
in the open. Despite the fact that we actually could – it’s not illegal. But I just don’t 
want to bother with the hassle and the debate. I don’t think it’s dangerous at all, but 
there’s just too much opposition and I have given in.’   
 
Most of the scientists at Curious George believe that the question of whether GMO 
can be planted in open fields should be assessed from crop to crop; that is, it depends 
on the crop and its qualities. They also think that the public’s resistance to GMO is 
rather silly. But they have followed the debate on GMO, and they do not want to face 
the kind of public resistance that they met around the turn of the current millennium. 
So they follow what they believe to be the public’s desire and only harvest their 
plants from tanks, despite the fact they might be able to do interesting experiments if 
they could plant it outside. This is an example of the scientists actually listening to 
the public. Although they do not agree and they even find the idea of resistance to be 
highly irrational, they acknowledge it as legitimate and something that needs to be 
followed if they want to gain and preserve public trust, which is vital for their 
funding. So the ideal of striving for the best possible science (for instance, using 
fields as the laboratory) is set aside in favour of the concern for public – and thereby 
economic – support. Vocation ‘looses’ the negotiation. This concern for public 
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support comes up once in a while. In the following, it is Benson from Curious 
George:  
 
During an interview, Benson tells me about a science contest he has recently 
participated in as a supervisor for a group of students: ‘We didn’t do that well, the 
experiments didn’t go well and the ideas were not good enough. But I still got a lot of 
praise for the participation. The story about the participation in the contest went to 
the media and my bosses are glad because I have contributed to showing society the 
importance of our field and that we need money.’  
 
Benson is not very proud of the work he did in the science contest. Evaluated from 
the perspective of Vocation, ‘the experiments didn’t go well and the ideas were not 
good enough’. He is therefore also a little surprised – and almost disappointed it 
seems – that he has received so much praise for the job. His ‘bosses are glad’, 
however, he had expected them not to be due to the poor experiment work. But they 
have evaluated his performance based on a different criteria: the work might not have 
been the best but that is not of great importance, as they got media attention and were 
able to show ‘society’ both that they are an important field and that resources are 
needed to pursue their important work. From the perspective of Vocation, these 
criteria are not that significant. But there are other concerns in the lab. Those people – 
such as the happy bosses – who are preoccupied with themes such as society’s 
acceptance of synthetic biology and the lab’s resources evaluate Benson’s 
participation in another, much more positive, light. For Benson, who is a junior and 
still learning to navigate in public science, this is confusing and a little disappointing, 
as he sees the responsibility for the truth above all – even the organisation’s survival. 
In this instance, negotiations are about different criteria for evaluating a specific 
situation. At times, the criteria from Vocation are set aside because other concerns are 
seen as just as important – or more important – than responsibility for the truth. 
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Different actors, here Benson and his bosses, evaluate the same situation based on 
different criteria of evaluation: they justify the work from different perspectives. At 
another occasion, one of the seniors explains to me that, from management’s 
perspective, Benson has done a great job. He has succeeded in promoting Synthetic 
Biology in the media. He has managed to get a group of young undergraduates 
engaged in biochemistry and they had actually ended up with some results. No one 
(at the senior level) would expect the same standards from undergraduates and young 
PhDs as from experienced scientists. The manager underline that there are times 
where the responsibility for the truth is set aside because other concerns are just as 
important. So in this instance, different positions in the organisation evaluate a 
specific situation differently. But there are many different forms of negotiation going 
on all the time. In the excerpt below, it is Canute who speaks about funding 
opportunities:  
 
During an interview, Canute tells me about a presentation they did for a group of 
potential funders. They were in competition with other labs, which also did 
presentations. The PI had emphasised that their group should be ‘modest’ and 
‘realistic’ about their ideas and the potentials. They should not promise the funders 
that their work would surely lead to big inventions or very specific technologies. He 
thought it was important that they presented themselves as serious and reliable 
scientists who did not try to spice their talk up with too many loose promises. In the 
end, when they got their evaluation from the funders, it stated that the science seemed 
very solid and genuine, but that they were too modest and should have been braver in 
their predictions, therefore they did not get the money. Canute is disappointed. He 
thinks that all these different evaluation criteria make science ‘a really complex 
system to work in.’ It also makes the job as manager quite hard because it is difficult 
to give the right advice or teach the younger generations how to navigate in 
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academia. The criteria for what is considered good work are unpredictable and shift 
fast.  
 
I often encountered descriptions like this. The scientists find it difficult to manage the 
different evaluation criteria that arise in relation to their work. In some ways, Benson 
and Canute’s stories are quite similar, despite Canute being senior, Benson being 
junior and the ‘competitions’ being very different. But in both stories, they expect to 
be evaluated on other criteria than what turns out to be the case. They see it as 
science’s responsibility to produce steady, reliable knowledge; they should be 
‘modest and realistic’, in Canute’s words, have good ideas and provide good 
experiments. But then they fail because that is not what others expect of them. In 
Canute’s story, they do not receive the funding because they (apparently) should have 
been ‘brave’ and – at least – express hope for some fantastic results. But this is 
contrary to Vocation, where scepticism is considered a virtue and excessive 
confidence in the results not so. In that way, Canute would have neglected what he 
considers his responsibility had he been bolder in his predictions.  
 
Both Benson and Canute do, at times, justify their actions with other ideas than the 
responsibility for the truth. Also, they can both act extremely strategically or choose 
not to, depending on the situation at hand. Despite this, they are very confused and 
considers the different criteria a challenge to handle. Not just because they failed to 
read the situation correctly and conduct themselves accordingly, but also because the 
work it takes to jump between different criteria for evaluation – and neglect those 
they find important – is really frustrating. Canute, who is considered really good at 
‘all the political stuff’, as his colleagues say, often complains about the ‘very complex 
system’. Even for him, it is extremely difficult to work in an environment where it is 
very unclear as to which kinds of responsibilities they need to live up. Furthermore, 
he is concerned about the juniors, like Benson, and how they are supposed to survive 
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in this system. He is very preoccupied with the idea that he wants to educate ‘decent 
human beings’. But he doubts whether this is possible nowadays, as the scientists 
have to fight for the jobs and face a system that is too complex to ‘navigate in’ – and 
stay decent, that is. This discussion about decency and the conditions for conducting 
‘responsible science’ will be taken up and developed several times throughout the 
next chapters.  
 
Annie is looking through her lab book as I arrive. She is scribbling additional notes 
in the margin and seems occupied: ‘I’m going to run a sample that compares 
diseased people with normal people,’ she tells me. This is a big addition to the 
experiments she has already done in order to show the efficiency of a new diagnostic 
method. In what she calls ‘standard studies’ in the field, such an addition would not 
be necessary. But as the scientific statement is quite bold, she needs very convincing 
data, she tells me. If they cannot convince the scientific community about the method 
and publish the paper, it is going to be difficult to raise further funding for the 
project.     
 
In many ways, this situation resembles many others that Vocation generates. It 
illustrates the decision to do additional experiments in order to convince the scientific 
community about the truth of a claim. But the difference lies in the justification. In 
the previous sections, I have argued that Vocation generates certain forms of conduct 
that are justified with the responsibility that the scientists share for the ‘truth’. But in 
this situation, Annie’s justification does not refer to the responsibility for the truth, 
but rather to the concern for future funding. She needs to repeat, check and be even 
more critical than usual, because without really strong truth claims, the lab will 
probably loose opportunities for further funding in that area. The choice to run 
additional experiments becomes a means to reach the goal of sustaining the lab with 
more resources. It seems that the conduct that I have described as ‘typical’ for 
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Vocation is not necessarily always so. In this situation, these forms of conduct are 
used strategically to reach another goal than caring for the truth, namely, caring for 
the lab’s economy. Without a lab, the scientists cannot perform their Vocation. 
 
The situation with Annie is not the only one where I have witnessed such a 
combination between conduct and justification. Once in a while the scientists tell me 
that they have to redo experiments they consider ‘routine’, even though they believe 
they have already proven their point. But some of their partners have not been able to 
repeat them and get the same results and the partners need results in order to keep the 
funding flowing. This is especially the case at Gyro Gearloose, where they work with 
a method, immunosignaturing 27 , which has qualities that are contested in the 
scientific community. Therefore, the scientists often need to do additional 
experiments to prove their point for journal reviewers and foundations. Journal 
reviewers and foundations are also equally important for the scientists: If they cannot 
convince their scientific peers about their claims, they will not publish anything, and 
without publications, no further funding. Below is another example of this kind of 
negotiation from Gyro Gearloose: 
 
Annie gives a presentation for the group. She is showing how a new diagnostic 
method can detect and distinguish various infectious diseases quite quickly. There 
are questions from the group as the presentation goes along. One asks Annie why she 
has not used immunosignaturing as a method for the device. Emma, the PI, who is 
among the audience, breaks in and answers on behalf of Annie: ‘Well, frankly, the 
funders don’t like immunosignaturing, so we have chosen to do it both ways.’ 
 
                                                
27 Immunosignaturing is a method of diagnosing diseases by studying which kind of antidotes the body develops in order to fight the disease. Each 
disease provokes a unique set of antidotes and can thereby be used to find and distinguish different diseases from each other. 
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Most of Gyro Gearloose’s work is built on a belief in the qualities of 
immunosignaturing. But they are met with opposition from research funders and 
other scientific environments. These actors do not believe as strongly in the method 
and do not think that the data the lab has provided so far is convincing enough. So 
what should Gyro Gearloose do when they want to explore the possibilities with 
immunosignaturing, but funding opportunities are slim? Should the lab succumb to 
their funders’ demands and use a more traditional method to detect the diseases – or 
should they stand their ground because they think that their evidence is strong 
enough? In this instance, they choose a third way. The funders have made it quite 
clear in the contract: They want a functioning diagnostic device that can be used to 
detect specific infections for a specific group of people who are at risk of being 
infected with a broad range of diseases. The PI decides that the group will both 
develop the device based on more ‘traditional’ diagnostic methods as well as make 
experiments proving they could use immunosignaturing – perhaps even with better 
results. It probably means that the scientists have to work twice as hard for the same 
money, but at least they get the hope of future funding in return.   
 
This story illustrates how the order of Vocation interweaves with other concerns in 
intricate ways. Both immunosignaturing and the other method live up to the standards 
of being ‘true’. Based on careful work with materials, Gyro Gearloose has come to 
the conclusion that there is more potential in immunosignaturing, as it diagnoses 
faster and perhaps more precisely so. In order to receive funding, they agree on the 
funders’ conditions, but also move along with their own work. Ideally, they would 
like funding for immunosignaturing no questions asked, but their scientific claim is 
not strong enough (yet). They need to continue to build up evidence and make as 
many ‘true’ statements about immunosignaturing as possible in order for the 
scientific community, and thus their (potential) funders, to follow. However, to do 
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that, they have to pass through more traditional diagnostic methods in order to 
receive funding.  
 
In contrast to the previous case, this is not a straightforward story about the mode of 
Vocation being set aside because of a concern for the lab’s economy. Vocation is still 
performed regardless of whether the scientists choose one method or the other. It is a 
conflict between different ‘truths’, which turns out to have implications for Gyro 
Gearloose’s economy. They still conduct their work in the same way: they repeat, 
they check, they are critical. The external resistance against immunosignaturing 
actually makes them do even more checking and repeating. At a glance, one could 
interpret this story as an instance where economic ‘strategy’ is prioritised over ‘truth-
making’. While I believe this happens at times, it is not the case here. Irrespective of 
whether the scientists work with immunosignaturing or the other method, they strive 
to make the results as accurate as possible. They make truth claims about diagnostic 
methods that are more renowned in the scientific community and among the funders. 
But they also use the funding to advance their ‘own’ truth: Immunosignaturing is a 
better way of diagnosing. The relationship between the different concerns is 
complicated in this instance. They still strive to do rigorous work; they also strive to 
advance a niche where they believe their laboratory is strong, namely, the field of 
immunosignaturing. But in order to do that, they need to make a ‘detour’ (Latour 
1987: 116) around a more well known form of diagnosing. The responsibility 
connected with Vocation is never neglected. However, another concern has appeared 
and the two move alongside each other: namely, that of maintaining the organisation 
(a responsibility I will return to thoroughly in the next chapter x). They see it both as 
their responsibility to make rigorous work and advance the organisation’s speciality. 
And the one responsibility supports, in this instance, the other.  
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As I write this, I am reminded of the two-headed Janus figure, which Bruno Latour 
deploys in ‘Science in Action’ (1987). Here, he uses this figure to show how facts 
become stabilised over time. The two heads cannot see each other and offer different 
stories about a ‘fact’. The head looking to the left says, ‘When things are true they 
hold’, while the one facing right says, ‘When things hold they start becoming true’ 
(Latour 1987: 12). So the right expresses the idea that when and if others are 
convinced about a phenomenon, it will be taken up and used in various ways; the fact 
will be cited, and it can be used as the foundation for the production of other truths – 
it ‘starts becoming true’. However, it takes a lot of work to work on this truth; it takes 
additional experiments, more papers and several checks, and, all the while, the 
scientists fear the money running out. If no one will ever be convinced about the 
merits of immunosignaturing, then the fact becomes more and more of an artefact, an 
idea forgotten in a drawer somewhere, never cited (or only few times) and never used 
(Latour 1987: 12f). The story would be that the scientists at Gyro Gearloose never 
managed to get it right; immunosignaturing was not the ‘true’ way of diagnosing and 
therefore the idea never caught ‘hold’, except among a few stubborn believers at 
Gyro Gearloose’s.  
 
Having been studying Vocation in action in general, I have mostly seen the right 
Janus head speaking. The scientists have constantly told me that they need to do more 
work for a fact to become true (though they never describe it in those exact words). In 
the above story from Gyro Gearloose, in contrast, somehow the two heads speak at 
once. On the one hand, the scientists really believe that immunosignaturing is the way 
forward in diagnosing – they believe that to be a truth as the left head says. It even 
seems that the more others try to discourage them from that precarious road, the more 
convinced they become. They believe, as Latour puts it, that they have ‘stumbled 
over the right structure’ (1987: 13). In other words: ‘When immunosignaturing is 
true, it holds’. But many others are not equally convinced and this perforce makes 
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them do more work; they need to make immunosignaturing ‘hold’ more securely. 
Therefore, the right Janus head also appears and the lab still does additional 
experiments and succumbs to other methods because the scientists are concerned 
about the organisation’s economy and possible future. 
 
In Latour’s account, the figure of the Janus head illustrates how a successful fact 
develops over time as more and more allies start to support it, until finally – as if by 
magic – the rhetoric turns and the fact becomes the explanation for other factors 
instead of just being the result of careful work (Latour 1987: 14). In relation to the 
negotiations of different concerns, I will argue that the two Janus heads can also be 
viewed as representing different responsibilities: In Vocation, the right head tends to 
speak and the insecurity of the validity of a fact makes the scientists work more 
carefully with their materials, always being critical about results. But in the next 
chapter, Oikos, where the responsibility for the organisation’s survival is in focus, the 
right Janus head is almost silenced in favour of the left: ‘When things are true, they 
hold’. Suddenly, the scientists become much more confident in the truthfulness of 
their predictions and fight for them, even without checking and repeating. Scepticism 
reigns as a consequence of Vocation; faith as a consequence of Oikos. I will return to 
that point in the next chapter.  
 
Summing this section up, it is clear that the mode of Vocation is not the only form of 
responsibility that the scientists have to deal with at work. Other concerns such as 
that for the lab’s economic stability continue to play a vital role. At times, these shifts 
frustrate the scientists because they turn academia into a ‘complex’ work 
environment, where decisions are difficult to make, as the expectations are difficult to 
read. At other times, the different concerns reinforce each other instead of excluding 
each other – as we saw in the last story from Gyro Gearloose. As such, this factor 
does not make the work environment less ‘complex’; it still takes a lot of skill and 
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time to turn the complexities into opportunities. But the scientists do find ways to 
take advantage of this complexity, rather than becoming hapless victims.  
 
 
7.5 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO LABS 
In this section, I will take a closer look at the differences between places. While their 
justifications remained identical, on closer inspection the way the scientists at 
Curious George and Gyro Gearloose reflected on how to fulfil their responsibilities 
differed slightly. However, these differences are not great. In fact, this mode 
generates some strikingly similar organisations. The next two modes expose greater 
local differences. It is interesting, how the differences between the modes seem 
bigger than the differences between the labs. This testifies to the relative stability of 
especially the mode of Vocation.  
 
At Curious George, the importance of honesty and rigorous work is often openly 
emphasised and reinforced, for instance, the laminated poster stating, ‘In God we 
trust; all others must bring data’, as described above. Management and the seniors 
are very preoccupied with teaching their juniors about the values of honesty and the 
responsibility they have for finding and telling the truth – though they never express 
it in so many words. Many of the STIR interviews are about considerations related to 
different choices about how to proceed with work and the choice between an easier 
solution and a more difficult one. The choice usually falls on the difficult solution, 
with the justification that it will make the claim much stronger. It only dawned on me 
exactly how important, as well as difficult, it is for the scientists at Curious George to 
handle this responsibility for the truth when I left Curious George for Gyro 
Gearloose. At Curious George, the subject is both somewhat delicate and, at the same 
time, highly valued. I could see this at the final seminar at Curious George, where the 
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presentation of the quote about being in doubt as to whether they are critical enough 
created high suspense and conflict, as I described in 7.3.3.  
 
This is in stark contrast to Gyro Gearloose. It is not that they do not care about their 
responsibility for the truth, indeed they do. But it is not a delicate subject, nor 
anything they talk much about. They never discuss it at meetings and it seldom 
surfaces as an issue in the individual interviews either. The only times it does is when 
the scientists want to do me a favour and very patiently explain the basic norms of 
science, as I am considered an outsider; for example, Annie, who tells me about her 
responsibilities as a scientist: 
 
‘And to be truly honest with you, I also have the responsibility to present my results 
as honestly as possible, so people pursuing this research can use them – including the 
things I do not succeed in.’ 
 
The scientists at Gyro Gearloose tell me about the importance of ‘honesty’ in the 
same way that they patiently teach me about the double-blinded peer review, the 
importance of citations or the logics of Web of Science. They never tell me about it 
as a personal issue: something difficult, which they need to learn or cope with. They 
tell me about it as an inherent part of the job, part of the natural prerequisites for 
being a scientist, and they usually explain it in very general terms – not as something 
that is (or is not) an important issue for them personally. Most of the time, that is just 
the way it is. Period.  
 
The only instance where the responsibility for the truth is explicitly up for discussion 
is in relation to authorship. All Gyro Gearloose’s projects are interdisciplinary, 
understood in the sense that scientists representing different disciplines are assembled 
in order to solve a specific problem; for instance, how to develop a cancer vaccine. 
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Different specialists such as immunologists, molecular biologists, biochemical 
specialists and statisticians would be united in that pursuit. But Henry, the PI, told me 
about the difficulties associated with these collaborations. It becomes, for instance, 
very difficult to distribute the responsibility (and honour) for the work across papers, 
as the different disciplines have different traditions. Some disciplines cite the main 
author first, some last. It is also difficult to assess how much each scientist has 
contributed to a paper and whether it is enough to attribute her or him authorship. 
Given that they come from different disciplines, they may have contributed with 
something crucial, but still not enough to become an author. Henry told me that these 
issues cause conflicts at times, although I never experienced that during my stay. He 
said that the solution to these problems are to always apply the ‘Vancouver Protocol’ 
of authorship.28 He even claimed that, as long as they are followed, such conflicts 
would never arise. The Vancouver Protocol states that authorship credit should solely 
be distributed based on ‘substantial contributions’ to the following three aspects of a 
paper: 
 
1) Conception and design, or analysis and interpretation of data; and to  
 2) drafting the article or revising it critically for important intellectual 
 content; and on  
3) final approval of the version to be published  
(see footnote 28 for source). 
 
The Vancouver Protocol for authorship reflects the ideas of proper conduct from 
Vocation. It emphasises the duty to work meticulously on the paper itself, by stating 
that scientists need to be part of both the analytical part, the writing part and the 
critical assessment of the result in order to be ‘an author’. They also emphasise the 
                                                
28 The Vancouver Protocol was first drafted in 1978 by a group of editors from medical journals, who wanted to standardise the formats for 
submitting manuscript, inclusive bibliography styles and authorship. The standards are recognised internationally in a broad range of scientific fields. 
The group has continued its work with standards and ethics and its recommendations are continuously published. From: 
http://www.research.mq.edu.au/about/research_@_macquarie/policies,_procedures_and_conduct/documents/Vancouver.pdf 26.07.2014 
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obligation to check, repeat and be critical, by stating that one should be part of 
‘revising it critically’ and giving it ‘final approval’. In that way, proper conduct in 
how to act as a scientist is reflected in the construction of a paper; what a scientist 
needs to do in general is also what they need to do in the specific case of being 
acknowledged as authors. While Henry believes that adhering to these principles can 
solve conflicts over authorship in interdisciplinary collaborations, I remain a little 
sceptical. I think the principles are rather abstract and leave room for interpretation, 
not least the notion of ‘substantial contribution’. How do you establish that 
something is – or is not – a substantial contribution? In any case, it is one of the few 
occasions where the responsibility for the truth is articulated as some sort of problem 
at Gyro Gearloose. And even here, it seems that they quickly silence a potential 
conflict by reference to general standards.  
 
It is difficult to answer the question of why the responsibility for the truth is such a 
contentious subject at Curious George but not so much at Gyro Gearloose. One 
explanation is that ‘the Penkowa Case’ (see footnote no 24), seems to be omnipresent 
at Curious George as an example of the worst form of disgrace of both a single 
scientist and science itself. Almost everyone I talked to at Curious George mentioned 
it in detail; she had put not only herself, but also the entire medical science 
community in bad standing internationally. And that her scientific fraud was also 
garnished with financial fraud and the nasty rumours that she had slept with both the 
president of the university to avoid prosecution and the minister of science in order to 
win the prestigious ‘Elite Scientist Prize’ given to excellent scientists by the Ministry 
of Science. In that way, it seems as if the scientists made her scientific fraud more 
plausible by the fact that she had rotten morals in general, or perhaps the other way 
around; that lapses in the responsibility for the truth lead to a moral free fall, ending 
in financial crimes and promiscuity.  
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Some of them expressed, as I mentioned, a great fear of ending like her. Not that it 
seems like any of them are on their way. It is more as if her failure vividly evoked 
their biggest nightmare: One where they had involuntarily somehow been discovered 
engaging in considerable scientific and financial fraud. Their descriptions remind me 
of people’s general fear of experiencing a moment of insanity that makes them jump 
off a bridge or out in front of a train; I believe Freud calls it the ‘Death Drive’. It is 
quite unlikely, but being unlikely perhaps makes it all the scarier. Milena Penkowa 
embodied their fears of what happens if the responsibility for the truth was neglected 
and the scientific community stopped supporting them. They have witnessed a 
professional suicide. That subtle threat of being disgraced and excommunicated from 
the scientific world has a face at Curious George; it is more real because it happened 
very recently – and it did not look pleasant. The scientists at Gyro Gearloose do not 
have such a figure to relate to. For them, the responsibility seems much more a 
general norm, which they of course have to live up to; however, the idea of not doing 
so and the consequences thereof seem so far away that they do not give it extra 
thought – at least not to me.  
 
But perhaps the phenomenon of Milena Penkowa cannot alone account for why the 
responsibility for the truth is such a precarious topic at Curious George but not so at 
Gyro Gearloose. An additional interpretation could be that the scientists in each place 
have quite different ideas about what kind of science they are doing, and this factor 
has consequences for their attitude toward the responsibility for the truth. I will argue 
that it is about two different modes, really: Basic science and applied science (which 
have been described thoroughly elsewhere in the literature, so I will not do so here). 
Even though the sociology of science has provided accounts of how these are quite 
blurred in practice (e.g. Gibbons and others 1994) they still have quite an influence 
on how the scientists consider their professional roles and the work they do. At Gyro 
Gearloose, they mostly seem to be project workers, who develop different parts of a 
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machine. None of them can construct all the pieces themselves, and they need each 
other in order to realise the end product. When I asked people at Gyro Gearloose 
what they were currently doing, their answers were something in the line of: ‘I’m 
working at the cancer vaccine’ or ‘I’m part of the group working with the diagnostic 
device’, whereas people at Curious George answered, ‘I’m synthesising this or that 
gene’ or ‘I’m looking for the right buffer for my next experiment’.  The answers at 
Gyro Gearloose indicate that it is the end product that is in focus, while the answers 
at Curious George are about the process of doing the work. In that way, the foremost 
problem at Gyro Gearloose is perhaps not ‘Is this true?’, but rather ‘Does it work?’ – 
and if it does work, then it is probably true. As I heard Henry comment at a meeting: 
‘if it’s good enough for a product, then it’s good enough for a paper’. The logic 
seems to be that if they can make their methods function as they want them to, then 
what they have done must reflect a reality – otherwise the technologies will not work.  
 
At Curious George, they define themselves as ‘basic scientists’ and are sceptical 
about the idea of being inventors of products – they want to understand the world, 
and it is an extra bonus if their understandings can be used for something practical. In 
that way, the question ‘Is it true?’ becomes much more prevalent than ‘Does it 
work?’ They cannot test whether their technologies ‘work’; instead, they are left to 
check whether they are still ‘true’ the next time they perform the experiment. ‘Is it 
true?’ has the effect of the constant questioning of one’s own and one’s colleague’s 
abilities to be guardians of the truth and thereby a rightful member of the scientific 
profession.  
 
But despite these differences in how much the scientists reflect about their 
responsibility for the truth and the personal fear of not living up to it, they are in total 
agreement about having that responsibility. As I mentioned at the beginning of the 
section, this mode is by far the one where the differences are the slightest between the 
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two labs. This, I believe, says something about how strong Vocation is in science. It 
can be observed regardless of whether I walk into a lab in the States or in Denmark. It 
performs regardless of whether the scientists are juniors or seniors – they just become 
more self-assured over the years. Based on the analysis of the journal papers in the 
last chapter, it also seems that these norms are pervasive across disciplines. If we 
look at the literature on the scientific profession, Weber describes norms similar to 
those described in Vocation in 1917 and by Merton in 1973. It is quite a strong and 
persistent mode, seen both from a historical perspective and across places. In the 
theory section, I briefly described trends in science government within the last 
hundred years and how the role of science has shifted in connection with the purpose 
of government (2.1). In these different periods, the pursuit of the ‘truth’ regardless of 
whether it was for the sake of curiosity, as a means for efficient fighting in war or as 
a motor for national growth has always been the central part of the job. The problems 
arise, when other concerns start to make it difficult to actually perform the research 
and thereby guarding the truth. Responsibilities such as those to commercialize or 
‘engage’ with citizens start to loose their meaning if they are not done on the basis of 
actually doing a lot of research.   
 
In my interpretation, this is why this mode is so strong and so uniform; it has been the 
key responsibility for scientists historically, and even if other responsibilities have 
come and gone, this one has persisted. I will continue the discussion about the 
pervasiveness of the modes in the next two chapters and in the final discussion.  
 
 
7.6 VOCATION IN A ‘SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE’ CONTEXT 
I began this chapter by asserting that descriptions of the scientific profession as a 
vocation had been done by several authors. I also identified political rationalities akin 
to that of Vocation in chapter 7. Now I will return to these former descriptions and 
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consider the mode of Vocation in the light of these writings. First, I will discuss 
Vocation in relation to the political rationalities from chapter 5. Second, I will discuss 
the findings in light of Merton’s CUDOS norms, Weber’s ‘Science as a Vocation’ 
and the descriptions of Vocation in ‘Organizing Modernity’ (Law 1994).  
 
In chapter 5, I identified two political rationalities that bear similarities to Vocation, 
namely, the ‘Demarcation Rationality’ and ‘Reflexivity Rationality’. What these two, 
first and foremost, have in common with Vocation is the insistence on science’s right 
to autonomy. The Demarcation Rationality articulates this autonomy as a 
precondition for making science work: if ‘society’ – understood as interests and other 
motives besides truth seeking – is not kept out of scientific conduct, science is simply 
not responsible – nor is it really science. The articulations of the Reflexivity 
Rationalities are more pragmatic in so far as they identify science’s main 
responsibility as solving society’s problems. Thus, a need to engage with society is 
acknowledged, but the right to decide which problems they want to engage with and 
how remains.  
 
The descriptions of Vocation are very similar to these two rationalities. The scientists 
consider themselves as having the responsibility to find truths about the world and 
solve problems. The checking, repeating and being critical can be understood as very 
practical attempts to keep ‘society’ out of the scientific work. By checking, repeating 
and being critical the scientists try to make sure that ‘society’ in form of issues as 
personal bias, a wrong measurement or a badly cleaned flask influence the 
experiments and the following conclusions. The connections between the 
responsibility for the truth and the way the scientists try to live up to this standard are 
seldom made explicit in the daily laboratory work the way they are in the texts from 
the previous chapter. Helping ‘mankind’ and similar statements are rarely made in 
connection to the mundane everyday tasks; these procedures are just part of everyday 
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work life. Both laboratories recognise the responsibility to address societal problems, 
though they do so in slightly different ways. Curious George considers the conduct of 
what they see as ‘basic science’ as a way to engage in society, whereas Gyro 
Gearloose has a strong emphasis on providing tangible technologies that answer more 
immediate and known needs in cancer treatment and diagnostics. In that way, both 
ideas from the Demarcation Rationality and the Reflexivity Rationality are 
interwoven in the ways that the two laboratories try to live up to their perceived 
responsibilities. However, there is quite a lot of room for adapting to and interpreting 
the ideas about the responsible conduct of science as presented by the two 
rationalities. So the mode and the rationalities share the emphasis on autonomy and 
internal regulation of science as a condition for being responsible.  
 
But the findings from the previous chapter suggest that Demarcation and Reflexivity 
differ in their understanding of the process of scientific conduct or the outcomes of 
scientific investigations as those that should be ‘responsible’ (see 5.4). In my 
interpretation, the focus of Vocation is entirely on the process. The checking, 
repeating and criticising are all aspects that seek to address the way scientific 
investigations are conducted, but it only relates to the process of doing science, not 
the wider consequences of their findings. The scientists do seem to find it amiable 
and meaningful to work on subjects that they believe improves aspects of society, but 
the connection between responsibility and their daily work mainly concerns the 
process.  
 
Based on interviews with scientists, Merton developed the CUDOS norms as a 
description of the general norms that guide scientific work. The scientists in the two 
laboratories often make claims and conduct themselves in ways reminiscent of the 
CUDOS norms. At least they underline the importance of the scientific community 
and as I have shown they are indeed also very critical about their own work. They are 
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also very careful to remain ‘disinterested’ and not letting their personal interests 
interfere with their experimental work.  
 
But there is also another similarity. Merton described the norms guiding science 
without much concern for the contemporary institutional conditions that made these 
norms possible at that specific time and place in history. In the descriptions, he does 
not write anything about the setting these norms are working in; the research group, 
the university or the science-based firm. Neither does Vocation generate any talk 
about the setting. The scientists describe their responsibility for the ‘truth’ as a 
general and natural phenomenon that will look the same, no matter the context and 
conditions. In my interpretation, this is because the scientists exclude these conditions 
on purpose; In the same way that ‘society’ should be kept out of scientific work, so 
should external conditions be excluded from their ideas about responsibility, as 
responsibility is a question about personal morals and integrity. Neither the scientists 
nor the CUDOS norms seem to take into consideration the external context in which 
the scientists have these obligations; namely, that of being affiliated to a university 
that also has a significant role in society, being part of a group or an organisation, and 
working under (perhaps) changing institutional conditions. All these aspects of 
scientific work are excluded and only the individual’s inner morals and the 
profession’s standards seem to play a role for their understanding of – and also 
performance of – responsibility in this mode. 
 
In that respect, both the scientists in the laboratories and Merton’s CUDOS norms 
differ from Weber’s descriptions of the scientific Vocation. Weber starts out by 
describing the conditions for conducting science (comparing Germany and America) 
at public universities; that is, the hierarchies and the job’s core tasks. Furthermore, he 
describes the changing role of scientists working from Humboldtian ideals to science 
as a job and career, a development that Weber does not embrace wholeheartedly 
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(Weber, Owen, and Strong 2004: 4) He combines these conditions with the inner 
vocation, the need for passion for the tedious processes and the contributions science 
can make in bringing ‘clarity’ (but not truth!), if not to society, then at least to the 
scholar himself:  
 
‘This brings us to the last contribution that science can make in the service of clarity, 
and at the same time we reach its limits. We can and should tell you that the meaning 
of this and that practical stance can be inferred consistently, and hence also honestly, 
from this or that ultimate fundamental ideological position.’ (Weber 2004: 26, 
emphasis added)  
 
In Weber’s insistence on the institutional conditions as an inherent part of the 
vocation and his insistence on ‘clarity’ rather than truth as a goal for scientific 
inquiry, his description varies quite a bit from that of Merton and indeed the scientists 
at Gyro Gearloose and Curious George. While I believe that the differences between 
Merton and Weber can be attributed to differences in theoretical standpoints29, the 
case is different in relation to the scientists in the two laboratories. I believe these 
differences have something to do with the theme of ‘responsibility’ and the way I 
asked them about their jobs. They also spoke about ‘passion’ for the job, the 
creativity involved and what it meat to be part of a group, a public institution and a 
university. But they did not connect these aspects with their meticulous work with 
materials or their responsibility for being ‘honest’. Neither did they seem to believe 
that ‘clarity’ was enough; they were, as shown, very preoccupied with the 
responsibility for taking care of ‘the truth’ as an inherent part of their profession.  
 
                                                
29 Merton was quite inspired by Weber in his doctoral dissertation (1970) but his descriptions of the scientists were (according to Lynch 1997) based 
on the descriptions of the ‘bureaucrat’ rather than the Scientific Vocation.  
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Law’s descriptions of ‘Vocation’ embrace both the aspect of abiding to strict 
standards for how science should be conducted and the creativity, both of which are 
ensured through the adherence to these standards (Law 1994: 81). His focus is on 
how Vocation is about skill; how to successfully internalise the very conservative 
rules and the very explorative potentials in the job and make them into a 
Fingerspitzengefühl, something the scientists just know how to do, instead of 
knowing it theoretically. While this focus on skill is perhaps not something the 
scientists talk that much about, it is a big aspect of Vocation: I have describe how the 
young scientists struggle to learn this very delicate combination and how they at 
times suffer in doing so. In that way, Law’s ideas also relate to the responsibility in 
Vocation, because they do need to learn to balance and integrate these two aspects of 
their work in order to be ‘scientists’. That being said, they do not seem to talk much 
about the creativity involved in their job in relation to the theme of ‘responsibility’. 
They do articulate the opportunity to discover something great or invent something 
that addresses a huge challenge, but not as a responsibility, more as something they 
hope to do.  
 
So some aspects about seminal descriptions of the scientific Vocations can be 
recognised in the way that the scientists consider their responsibilities. But the 
specific theme of ‘responsibility’ makes the mode of Vocation a little different from 
earlier descriptions. The focus on process and adhering to strict norms for good work 
are in the foreground, whereas aspects such as ‘creativity’ and ‘clarity’ and the 
context in which the scientists do their work are in the background. However, some 
of these aspects are seen as significant in the two next modes that I describe. I will 
therefore now turn to the chapter called ‘Oikos’. 
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7.7. CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, I have shown how the scientists share a certain responsibility for the 
‘truth’ and how they exercise specific forms of conducts to honour and uphold that 
responsibility. I have also shown how guarding the truth is a skill that it takes time 
and practice to learn and that the juniors struggle to learn so. I have argued that the 
scientists look at the responsibility for the ‘truth’ as closely related with what they 
consider to be their central job, namely that of doing research: conducting 
experiments and writing papers. Therefore they also consider this responsibility to be 
the most important one, compared to the two other responsibilities that I will look at 
in the next chapter. I have argued that the way the scientists tell about this 
responsibility is closely tied to an understanding of science’s role in society, where 
science is one among several stable institutions. Its job is to distribute new 
knowledge and a good work-force to the other institutions, but this demands that the 
scientists are left free to be creative and have substantial funding and time on their 
hands. Therefore the scientists fight to be as autonomous as possible. This idea about 
science’s role in society brings thoughts of the conditions for American science in 
their Golden Age, right after World War II, where scientists were generously funded 
and had much freedom to do ‘basic research’ in the hope that it would eventually lead 
to revolutionary technologies (Shapin 2009). This specific way of organising science 
is thus still performed in Vocation.    
 
In relation to the question of governance, it is clear that Vocation is connected to 
strict self-governance through norms for good scientific behaviour; that is behaviour 
such as checking, repeating and criticising and that these norms are uphold through 
apprenticeship, where the juniors learn the skills from the seniors. Society does as 
such not ‘speak back’ (Nowotny 1999) in this mode, but that does not mean that the 
scientists see themselves as ‘outside’ society or exempt from norms about good 
behaviour. But their norms are closely related to the core task of doing research and 
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deliver knowledge to the other stable institutions in society. This is in itself quite a 
big job and takes up a lot of time. Therefore they are also careful to protect their 
autonomy.  
 
In that way this mode can also be seen as in contrast to the newer demands for 
‘Responsible Science’ as the scientists do not embrace the ideas of external 
governance and further responsibilities for the ‘social’ aspects of science. But this is 
not necessarily an argument that simply relies on technical-instrument rationality. 
Instead it relies on the idea of a ‘society’ with different specialized tasks and where 
the scientists believe that politicians will take care of these concerns. Furthermore, it 
relies on the concern for their everyday worklife, where they are already fairly busy 
in having the responsibility for the truth. While the scientists are at times frustrated 
with the many failed experiments and the time they need to spend to get a good 
result, it is a part of their work that they never question – they are even proud that 
they are able to go through such hardships in order to guard the truth. It sets them 
apart fro other professions. Adding to this responsibility can be burdensome and takes 
up quite a lot of time. A point that I will return to in the coming chapters.  
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8. OIKOS 
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n this chapter, I will describe a different mode of responsibility than that of 
Vocation. I have chosen to call it ‘Oikos’, and, from this perspective, the labs all 
of a sudden look very different from how they appeared in Vocation. People, 
work and things are arranged acceding to another responsibility, and, consequently, it 
is as if I have entered two completely different labs than Curious George and Gyro 
Gearloose, though the observations took place at the same time and place as those of 
Vocation. Suddenly, as I will demonstrate, severe scepticism is replaced with firm 
beliefs; time has become a scarce resource; and the juniors are left to do ‘science’, 
while the seniors do ‘politics’.  
 
Oikos is the Greek term for ‘household’, and the prefix ‘eco-‘ in, for example, 
economy and ecology, stems from it.30 In Greece, Oikos referred to the entire 
household, including men, women, children, slaves, the possessions and animals 
within it, as well as the property itself. While the male head might have had the 
responsibility for managing the estate in its entirety, everybody had a contributory 
function. I have chosen this name because this mode has the responsibility for ‘the 
business’ as its core. By ‘business’ I mean each lab’s procedures in maintaining 
resources to keep it alive and well. In order to meet that responsibility, the scientists 
do certain things that remind me of the chores we all have to do in a household so 
that it does not fall apart or get taken over by somebody else. We have to clean the 
bathroom, take care of the kitchen equipment and turn off the lights before we leave. 
We also have to make sure to pay the rent and lay money aside for future, unknown 
expenses as well as save up money for things that will improve and maintain the 
home, such as a dishwasher or a weekly cleaning service. If that is not enough, we 
also have to work or invest in order to have an income. Furthermore, we have to 
make sure that all the members of the household are doing reasonably well and are 
                                                
30 http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/178273/ecology 07-06-2014 
I 
 223 
doing their part in maintaining it. The things that are expected vary, but they are 
united by the responsibility for keeping the home economy healthy.   
 
In some ways, Oikos shares similarities with seminal descriptions of ‘the 
entrepreneurial scientist’ (Etzkowitz 1998). The entrepreneurial activities of 
scientists are, as such, not a new phenomenon. There are examples of scientists 
making businesses out of their inventions as early as the 17th century in Germany, 
but, before the 1970’s, these activities did not alter the laboratories or the scientific 
profession in any serious way (Etzkowitz 1998: 824). However, within the last four 
decades, a  
 
‘web of relationships has grown up among academics, university originated start-ups 
and larger firms. Often the same academic scientists are involved in both types of 
companies, managing a diversified portfolio of industrial interactions’ (Etzkowitz 
1998: 423).  
 
These developments have created a new figure, ‘the entrepreneurial scientist’, who is 
an academic and a businessman at the same time: One who seeks to take commercial 
advantage of his or her innovations. According to Etzkowitz (1998), this has also 
changed the organisation of research. The boundaries between industry and academic 
science are dissolving as academic science is done in R&D departments, and industry 
both contracts university researchers and funds their studies. As more universities 
take on these collaborations, which are also encouraged by public university reforms, 
the competition for funding between universities has expanded (Shore and Wright 
2004: 58). In turn, tenured positions are set aside in favour of project employment 
based on external funding. This makes the academic job market more dynamic and 
changing. These tendencies started in biotech but have expanded to various parts of 
the universities, mostly the natural sciences. While the rise of ‘entrepreneurial 
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science’ as a structure is described here, Etzkowitz does not say as much about the 
behaviour of the ‘entrepreneurial scientist’, though he does mention a ‘cognitive 
shift’ in the way the scientists see science’s role in society (Etzkowitz 1998: 829). He 
claims that the disciplined pursuit of knowledge (Vocation) is supplemented with an 
attitude that acknowledges science for its commercial uses as much as for its 
intellectual properties.  
 
Law describes ‘enterprise’ – one of the modes of orderings – as a specific attitude 
among the scientists, which also shares similarities with my findings: 
 
‘So this [enterprise] is an ordering mode about agency, about how people are, or how 
they should be. But it is necessarily, at the same time, an ordering practice that has to 
do with structure too. […] [T]he fragments of structure add up to a set of 
opportunities, a set of resources. For if they are not treated as an opportunity, then 
the agent is no longer acting responsibly; instead she is in the process of retreating 
from the proper performance of agency; she is undermining her very status as an 
agent. So, like the other modes of ordering, enterprise is a morality tale as well as a 
description.’ (Law 1994: 75-76)  
 
The entrepreneurial mode is thus one where the conditions for doing science, ‘the 
structure’, should be seen as opportunities and resources, rather than limits and 
annoyances. They should be creatively used by the scientists to make their lab thrive. 
If this is not the attitude, one is not even living up to one’s responsibility, one is not 
even ‘entrepreneurial’ anymore. Law’s description of entrepreneurship as a certain 
moral comes close to the descriptions of Oikos in this chapter. Oikos is about having 
some tough conditions and attempting to make the best of them. Even attempting to 
turn them into an advantage for the lab, so that it may do better, and they will be able 
to hire more people or buy new equipment. However, it is also different. While 
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entrepreneurship is definitely needed as a skill to make the labs survive, this mode of 
responsibility is not identical to ‘enterprise’. There is more to it: Oikos is not only 
about the responsibility to seize opportunities, it is also about the daily care of the lab, 
where both juniors, machines and buildings are handled carefully, so they can 
continue contributing to the business’s economy. 
 
As in the previous chapter, the description of Oikos is structured as follows. First, I 
will identify three forms of conduct, which I believe to be typical of this mode, 
namely, ‘investing’, ‘saving’ and ‘maintaining’. Second, I will carve out the 
justification for these three forms of behaviour, namely, the responsibility for the 
‘business’. Third, follows the descriptions of the organisational consequences of this 
responsibility and how it is negotiated in relation to other concerns and how the 
performance of the mode differs between the two labs. Last, I discuss the findings in 
relation to seminal literature about entrepreneurial science and public reforms of the 
universities. 
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8.1 CONDUCT 
In this section, I will describe three forms of conduct, ‘investing’, ‘saving’ and 
‘maintaining’, which are pertinent to Oikos. Though they may look very different, all 
three of them have at their core a care for the organisation. They all constitute ways 
of going about daily work that are considered necessary if each lab is to survive. In 
that way, the three forms of conduct are also ways of dealing with the current 
conditions for doing scientific work and actively relate to the lab’s surroundings. It 
varies according to whether the scientists consider themselves as being victims of 
powerful structures or as being able to change the way things are done. I will relate to 
this topic during the descriptions.  
 
8.1.1 INVESTING 
This form of conduct is the one that I first noticed, mainly because there is so much 
talk about it. The scientists often mention the efforts they put into securing the 
survival of the lab in the future. They explain that they have invested time in writing 
new research applications, have invested money in new machines for future 
experiments or have hired new PhD students, of whom they have great expectations. 
Some of these explanations have developed into anecdotes that are shared among the 
scientists. These stories are about their great efforts and the achievements or failures 
that followed. One of the most popular stories at Curious George is about how the lab 
– or Canute, as the story often goes – landed the biggest national public grant in 
Denmark. When Canute tells the story himself, it goes something like this: 
 
Professor Canute and his group had applied for one of the biggest national grants 
and had used a ton of time on the application process. After submitting the 
application, Canute was asked to come in for a meeting at the Vice Chancellors 
office. Another PI from a nanotechnology lab had also submitted a proposal for the 
same national grant was also invited. The Vice Chancellor was very straightforward: 
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‘I see the term synthetic biology in both your applications,’ he stated. ‘If you can 
develop a common project around synthetic biology, we shall forward your 
application to the granting agency’ Professor Canute and the other PI agreed to give 
it a try. Professor Canute recalls the process: ‘We sat down and worked for two 
months. We come from different disciplinary backgrounds and it took a lot of time to 
truly understand each other’s theories and methods. At times, we had to go back to 
basic high school chemistry and biology in order to reach a mutual understanding. 
But in the end, we developed a common framework with synthetic biology as a 
common denominator. And subsequently, we got the grant.’ 
 
Due to professor Canute’s efforts, the lab got a large amount of resources to hire new 
staff and buy new machinery. They also received new research goals to achieve, new 
methods they had to learn, new administrative chores and new partners in other labs. 
The laboratory grew due to the new grant. Synthetic biology also became an entity 
they had to relate to and, not least, actually do, which I will tell more about later 
(8.3.4). Curious George, and not least Canute, thus invested a considerable amount of 
work hours and manpower in writing the application and starting a meaningful 
collaboration with the other lab. In return, they got resources, new research agendas 
and new collaborations. But this influx of resources needs to be quite stable. An 
expansion of the lab needs to be maintained. As of this writing, the grant is still 
running (five years all in all) but Canute has started to invest his time in new 
opportunities: 
 
‘Where’s Canute?’ I ask as I haven’t seen him around for a couple of days. 
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‘Oh, he is in Brussels’, Inez, the communication manager replies, ‘He is trying to 
persuade the EU Commission to give synthetic biology a prominent role in the next 
Framework Programme for Research.’31  
 
Now that they had worked on the National Grant for a couple of years, it was time to 
see how the knowledge, the machines and the personnel they had gained could be 
reinvested. Canute had gone to the EU capital to promote synthetic biology as an 
important solution to a range of societal challenges. The framework had not been 
made in its final form yet. Therefore, it was important to influence how it was 
framed, that is, which disciplines and challenges were mentioned and how, so the 
chances of actually answering in a meaningful way on the proposals would be easier 
later on.  
 
But Canute does not solely focus on synthetic biology during his visits. He also talks 
about ‘social responsibility’ in science. His lab worked together with a philosopher 
and some social scientists during the previous project. They focused on ‘ethics’ in 
connection with the development of synthetic organic materials and democratic 
legitimacy in science. Canute now tries to promote the idea that considerations about 
social aspects of scientific development should be included as part of the calls.  
 
In the next chapter, I will take a closer look at concerns for the responsibility the 
scientists feel for ‘the public’. But in this chapter, the concern is for the business, and 
Canute is investing some of the lab’s gained ‘capital’, namely, experience in working 
with social responsibility, to enhance Curious George’s chances in the next round of 
investments. By suggesting that concerns for social responsibility are emphasised in 
the next framework for research, his own business gets a strategic advantage in the 
                                                
31 Horizon 2020, the new EU framework for research focuses explicitly on science’s response to Europe’s great challenges such as innovation, 
growth, climate change, sustainability and democratic inclusion. From www. http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/h2020-sections 
20.08.14 
 229 
application process as they already have experience in that area. So the knowledge 
from working with synthetic biology and the experience with social responsibility is 
reinvested in an attempt to land a new grant.  
 
Landing grants is a big issue at both Curious George and Gyro Gearloose. At Curious 
George, 75% of the lab’s budget is based on external funding. The last 25% is 
granted by the university as payment for the teaching the department partakes in. At 
Gyro Gearloose they rely 100% on external grants. During my visit there, I heard a 
rumour that the square feet of all the labs in the building are allocated based on the 
annual budget of each lab. So not only are the labs shrinking or expanding in 
manpower depending on the local economy, but the actual space to do the work 
follows suit. Though I heard the rumour from several sources, I never had it 
confirmed, so I am not sure whether it is true. But even if it is not, it is telling for the 
way that many of the scientists look at their workplace – as a place where everything 
is uncertain, even the ground they stand on. 
 
Investing time in opportunities for grants matter because they are essential for both 
the scientists’ own job opportunities and the lab’s survival. These are interdependent. 
Therefore, many of the employees at the lab spend a considerable amount of their 
work time on applications in one way or another. They invest time in writing grant 
applications, meeting with representatives from funding agencies or gathering 
potential manpower for a new group. Mostly, it is the seniors who invest their time in 
such a fashion. Not only do they work to secure their own salary but also to secure 
new positions and new equipment. Some of the PhD students and postdocs tell me 
about that kind of work to, albeit on a smaller scale. They mostly invest time in 
securing their next position, either by writing grant applications or cultivating good 
relations with the seniors, who may let them participate in the next project.  
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The question of how to land a grant is a topic of constant discussion among the 
scientists. Where to invest? Which foundations or councils are considered low-risk, 
high-gain? Should all the resources be placed in one unique fund or is it better to 
spread the risk and apply for several smaller funds? The question of the quality of the 
investment is also up for debate: Is there an optimal way of phrasing their words, 
formulating the texts and interacting with potential stakeholders? Perhaps this is the 
most discussed issue. New research ideas are assessed on their ability to generate 
funding. The scientists discuss new grants in relation to their ability to relate to 
immediate societal challenges among the funding agencies, such as ‘cancer’ or 
‘climate change’. Or they go into areas of research that are similarly topical such as 
‘metabolism’ or ‘enzymes’. If their idea does not relate to a popular theme directly, 
they discuss how it could be shaped in order to do so, either by rhetorical means or by 
changing the research idea slightly so it is more in line with what they expect funding 
agencies to go for. The following excerpt is an example of this kind of discussion 
from Curious George. The upcoming deadlines for relevant funding are on the agenda 
at a meeting among the PIs: 
 
One of the PIs needs a new TRM machine in order to proceed with his work. The one 
they already have in the lab is almost worn out. He considers applying for money 
from the Lionburg Foundation, an agency that was founded by an international 
brewing company. The others think it is a great idea. ‘Remember to mention hops in 
the application,’ one of the other PIs comments. ‘Lionburg wants to develop sweet 
beer, so they can convince women to drink more beer, so hops are the new black.’     
 
By establishing a connection between the new TRM machine, the prospects for 
brewing based on hops, and the lab’s expertise in cereals, the PIs expect to increase 
their chances of getting the grant, even though research in hops is not on the 
immediate research agenda. A few minutes after the exchange about the TRM 
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machine, the PIs discuss options with regard to the Halleys Foundation as their 
deadline approaches. They are not really sure what to apply for but: ‘Remember not 
to mention anything about applications [applied science]. They are only interested in 
basic science’, one of the PI reminds the others. So in one of the stories, it is all about 
the application potentials. The job is to make reliable connections between a TRM 
machine and beers for women, but without promising to look at the challenges related 
to beers for women. In the other story, it is paramount to disconnect their research 
from any kind of applied science. In some instances, the scientists at Curious George 
try to convince the funding agencies about their merits in applied science, whereas at 
other times they emphasise their expertise basic science. It depends on what they 
need and what they can get. The scientists often tell me that ‘this is how the system 
works’, and they do not see any way of changing that. But they can learn how to 
‘navigate’ it. Simon, one of the PIs from the meeting, explains about navigating in an 
interview afterward: 
 
‘The secret is to write an application in a way where you meet the politicians – or 
those who distribute the money – so they hear what they want to hear and you get to 
study what you want to study. Those two things do not necessarily need to be the 
same, but the secret, as a scientist, is to answer their questions in the applications, 
and then you must, five years later, explain why you, by the way, couldn’t solve the 
problems. And there is always a good explanation for that. And I also believe that 
they [those who distribute the money] know that this is how it works. I certainly hope 
that they know that, because otherwise they are pretty naïve and I don’t necessarily 
consider them to be that.’  
 
Interpreting Simon’s statement, it seems as if the relationship between funders and 
those receiving funds is staged and everybody takes on particular roles – one part 
hears what they want to hear and the other part tries to attune the application to what 
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is expected. Then they go their separate ways and both parts do what they had 
planned to do anyway for the next five years. But according to the PI, both the 
scientists and the funders know that this is how it works – otherwise they are ‘pretty 
naïve’. So my interpretation of Simon’s quote is that this is about a specific attitude 
to your job. The scientists at Curious George agree to partake in a staged performance 
where they have to say or write certain things at the right time – mention potential 
applications or not, for instance – in order to receive money so they ‘get to study what 
they want to study’. The scientists consider this a system they cannot change: This is 
just the way things are, ‘…this is how it works’ and you have to play by the rules of 
that system in order to get as much out of it as possible. In the previous chapter (7), 
the scientists asserted that while they do not particularly like the funding system, it 
does ‘not affect their research’. I cannot judge whether Simon’s statement is true or 
not. I know that while most of the scientists also find the funding system very 
complex and at times confusing, not all of them will agree that it is just a staged 
performance. But Simon’s considerations reveal the extent of the efforts the scientists 
do in order to ‘study what they want to study’. While the scientists at Curious George 
at least feel that they move in directions they want to, the investment of time and 
skills in reaching that point takes up much of their workday.  
 
The scientists at Gyro Gearloose also invest a considerable amount of work hours in 
applications. But the way they go about their investments is a little different. While 
they also consider how they can tap into different popular themes and areas of 
research, they claim that they simply refuse to take part in a staged performance, 
where they either make too many compromises or say that they want to study 
something other than what they intend to study. As Henry says: ‘We actually mean 
what we say’. This has something to do with the way they set their goals ‘backward’: 
They start with a goal they want to reach, e.g. a prophylactic cancer vaccine, and then 
they work backward and try to see what kind of knowledge they need to reach that 
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goal. They therefore only apply for grants where this strategy is possible, either by 
making a contract where they are hired to invent a very specific technology, or grants 
where they can explore a wider range of potentialities, albeit taking their point of 
departure in the final technology.  
 
While their approaches to investment differ, the two labs do share the idea of neither 
having much power in the relationship with the funding agencies nor in the general 
structure for obtaining resources. The golden era, when the researchers had a stable 
influx of money, is over, and they now see themselves as small players in a big 
market with fierce competition. They can learn to ‘navigate’ in the system, as they 
constantly say, but they do not believe that they can change the rules of the system. 
Law (1994) talks about ‘agency lost’ (Law 1994: 60) in relation to research 
management. This concept covers the feeling of being a victim to structures that 
cannot be conquered but only managed to the best of one’s ability. In relation to 
funding, the scientists generally feel like victims of a structure. But as I will illustrate 
later on, they also have possibilities to ‘regain agency’ (Law 1994: 61), it just takes a 
lot of work. 
 
Observing the scientists invest reminded me of the ‘Credibility Circle’ that Woolgar 
and Latour described in ‘Laboratory Life’ (1979).  The ‘Credibility Circle’ shows 
what a scientist needs to do in order to ‘move’ forward in a scientific field. They 
demonstrate how recognition in the scientific field can be translated into a grant 
(money). The money is then invested in equipment that can generate data, which the 
scientists (if they are good) can translate into arguments and articles. These articles 
can then be exchanged for recognition, which lays the ground for yet another (and 
perhaps bigger) grant; hence the circle (Latour and Woolgar 1979: 201) In this 
understanding, the scientific work is seen as an economy, where knowledge and 
recognition can be exchanged for money and grants. The investment of time and 
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skills in getting new grants reminds me of this economic circle. In this interpretation, 
the endeavour is quite strategic: The scientists know that the grants presuppose 
knowledge and recognition and they try to build up an ‘economy’ for themselves. But 
the scientists are not only doing this work in order to make a move in the scientific 
field, they are also doing it because they have a responsibility for and to their place of 
work. They need to supply the lab with resources so it can survive and thrive. As in 
most economic theory, the scientific agent in Latour and Woolgar’s circle is self-
interested; the theory is about the advancement of a scientific fact and personal 
recognition. But my argument, which I will describe in the Justification section, is 
that the scientists are not necessarily thinking so much in individual terms as in 
organisational terms when they invest.   
 
8.1.2 SAVING 
Investing time, skills and knowledge in the next project is not the only form of 
conduct that Oikos performs; the conduct of saving is just as important. I noticed a lot 
of concern for the resources that the scientists handle in their daily work. They are 
careful to return chemicals to the correct shelves so others can use the leftovers; they 
think about how much water they use; they are painfully aware of the prices of all the 
ingredients in their experiments; and they handle their expensive machinery with kid 
gloves. Once, when I followed Sandra around, she complained about the computer 
programs being old. ‘But I guess I’m spoiled’, she hurried to add; ‘[w]e had 
exceptionally good funding at my last job’. Complaints about the labs’ equipment 
were otherwise quite rare and awareness of using the lab’s equipment with 
consideration was generally high.  
 
I’m following Miriam around the halls. She is gathering different kinds of materials 
for her next experiment. ‘I really can’t screw up this experiment,’ she tells me, ‘it’s 
too expensive. These two babies,’ she shows me two bottles each the size of the 
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perfume samples they hand out for free in department stores, ‘cost around 100.000 
grand each.’ She notices my sceptically raised eyebrows. ‘Oh yeah, well perhaps not 
that much, but they are really expensive, so I need to get the experiment right in 
order not to waste them.’  
 
In the last mode, redoing experiments showed dedication and the right kind of 
attitude to the work, however, in Oikos, things have been turned upside down. Now 
an experiment should preferably produce the wanted results the first time around 
because the scientists feel obliged not to use too many of the lab’s resources. The 
responsibility for the truth from Vocation has been replaced with a concern for the 
lab’s resources. That does not mean that Miriam will not repeat the experiment if the 
experiment goes wrong. But she will probably have to argue her case and underline 
the importance of that specific experiment in relation to her overall studies. She will 
also have to consult both her supervisor and the very strict purchasing department. 
Another concern is now all of a sudden of the greatest importance, a concern that was 
invisible in Vocation. The scientists do their utmost to reuse where they can. They 
consider new ways by which experiments could be more efficient and thereby 
cheaper to conduct. Their meticulous way of considering efficiency is similar to the 
meticulous work conduct observed in Vocation; however, their responsibility is not to 
find the truth, but rather to make the resources last. They invest in machines that 
reduce costs in energy and time, and they remind each other of best lab practices, 
which save energy and money. 
 
This concern for materials is not only confined to their current experiments, it 
pervades the way they think about working as scientists in general. Concern for not 
wasting their materials also comes through when the scientists imagine what will 
become important in their future work lives. Not wasting resources is, for instance, a 
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great concern in relation to the new laboratories that the university is building for 
Curious George and other areas of the science faculty: 
 
Curious George will be moving to new buildings within the next couple of years. But 
the buildings are not finished yet. In fact, they are still just sketches on the architects’ 
drawing boards. I follow Simon, who is engaged in the building project, to a meeting 
with the architects. They discuss the design of the new laboratories. First, how much 
it will cost to make a triple security system in order to avoid experiments and 
materials getting ruined in the event of a major electricity cut. They find it difficult to 
assess if it is worth the money. Who knows what the risk is and how much they would 
eventually loose? Then they move on to the general lighting of the laboratories. 
Simon insists on LED lighting because it is so much cheaper than other forms of 
lighting. ‘Even Barney [referring to one of the other scientists] is finally convinced 
that LED is the way forward and it actually works,’ he says to the architects, ‘so go 
for it.’  
 
As the new buildings are being planned, the scientists try to implement structures in 
them that will hinder the waste of money, time and materials. They attempt to 
estimate how much their future work is worth and how much protection against 
potential breakdowns can be obtained in return for the huge price of the building. 
They also suggest what they believe to be the cheapest and most modern form of 
lighting, namely, LED lighting. It is interesting how the scientists stretch their 
responsibility to include savings in the future. They try to assess what they will need 
and what scenarios could possibly occur: For instance, a breakdown of both the 
general electricity system and one of their local power stations at the same time. 
These discussions between architects and scientists actually remind me of those 
public engagement exercises on emergent technologies that I have observed as part of 
my studies and in earlier jobs. And it strikes me how fragile the decisions are. All the 
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actors involved in the building try to imagine the best solutions for the future based 
on their personal and professional knowledge and values. Furthermore, they try to 
foresee future catastrophes for the lab and think of how to avoid them. They also 
suggest state-of-the-art technologies such as LED lighting because its energy saving, 
but it seems such a small detail compared to the entire project (though I am sure they 
have gone through tons of other details at meetings when I was not present). Their 
deliberations about the future therefore seem quite fragile and insecure to me. 
However, in the same way that public deliberation about emerging technologies 
perhaps says less about what the future will bring than about present values (Borup et 
al. 2006), the discussions here say something about what is an important value for the 
lab right now.  That is, the foremost concern is how to save resources and make sure 
their work is never wasted. 
 
The same kind of awareness is true of how they spend time. The scientists often 
check smartphones and watches in order to assess whether more tasks can be 
squeezed in before the day is over. Catherine brings tubes home with her after hours 
so she can number them after the kids have been tucked in. It is ‘much more 
efficient’, she tells me, to do the routine work at home instead of at the lab. The 
scientists often have strategies like that for saving time. They calculate whether they 
are able to run another sample while another part of the experiment is cooling down, 
or whether they can stir a couple of ingredients before the next meeting begins. 
 
Alan has two jobs at Gyro Gearloose. He is developing a treatment for acne and he 
works as a lab technician. He tells me how he plans his workday, moving between his 
own experiments and helping the others. It takes careful planning. He has to strike a 
balance whereby he can move his own project along at a reasonable pace because he 
needs to be done by the summer, when he will start grad school. At the same time, he 
also has to do the work as a lab technician for the other scientists. He carefully puts 
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some time aside for each experiment and he often has several tasks to attend to at the 
same time. The trick is to assess the amount of time for each task and make them fit 
together, he says. He is becoming much better at that recently, he tells me. In the 
beginning, he ‘wasted’ a lot of time because he was not that experienced in handling 
each machine and in attending many tasks simultaneously.        
 
Reducing time ‘waste’ is considered just as important as reducing material waste. 
This demands that the scientists have a good feeling of how their materials behave 
and how to operate the different machines. Often something goes wrong and the 
scientists have to start all over – as described in Vocation. But in contrast to 
Vocation, the scientists are suddenly very concerned with wasting time and curse 
when they have to start all over again. The missing brain receptor that Clark describes 
in Vocation (7) – the one whose absence makes the scientists immune to frustration – 
is suddenly very much present in their brains.  
 
The same considerations about time are present in relation to the longer-term 
perspectives of their work. Not only do the scientists carefully manage their time on 
an everyday basis, they also do so in relation to an overall assessment of how much 
work they can do before the money runs out, before the project finishes or before the 
PhD stipend is used. How much can they accomplish in the time that is left? Can they 
attend the next important conference with a paper presentation or is that too much? 
They do not distinguish between time and materials in this mode: Both are considered 
finite resources, which they need to handle respectfully. As Sandra from Gyro 
Gearloose answers to the STIR question about facing a choice during the day: 
 
‘Uhh, yeah. Just figuring out which of the different projects to work on… So… I 
needed to move the re-immunizations along, but I have been waiting to talk to Emma 
[the PI on the projects] about possible ways to move along. Like, [I] just don’t want 
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to plough ahead with that and then have her say ‘why did you do that?’ And then we 
have wasted time immunizing mice and wasted materials […]. So you are basically 
left with two choices; either work on the array data from last week or finishing 
characterizing the […]'   
 
While the technicalities of this statement may be difficult to comprehend for an 
outsider to Sandra’s work, a general concern comes through; how to manage time and 
materials in relation to the research projects is something she has to think about 
everyday. She does not want to ‘waste time immunizing mice and waste materials’ if 
things can be done more efficiently. Time and materials are the two most precious 
resources not to waste and the scientists are careful not to. So careful, in fact, that 
Sandra thinks that the question of how to move along is a management decision and 
not just her own choice. Management does seem to have a big say in how to spend 
the resources, not least because the financial limits are often set by the PIs of each 
project. In the mode of Vocation, I described a situation where Annie from Gyro 
Gearloose presented her work to the others in the group (see the full story in 7.4). 
Someone from the audience asked why she had not used the diagnostic method called 
‘immunosignaturing’ in the method she developed. The PI cut in and told the 
audience how the funding agency had set the use of a more traditional method as a 
condition for the grant. Gyro Gearloose had accepted that but decided to move the 
project along with both the traditional method and the immunosignaturing method. 
They therefore developed both a technology for their funders as well as their own line 
of research.  
  
In connection with the mode of Vocation, I clarified that these two methods are a 
result of a negotiation between a concern for the organisation’s finances and a 
concern for advancing a certain type of truth – that of the efficiency of 
immunosignaturing. Looking at this story from the perspective of Oikos, the story 
 240 
takes another twist: Gyro Gearloose applies for money to perform a specific form of 
research, namely, developing a diagnostic device based on a specific method. They 
receive the money and move along, not only with that assignment, but also an 
assignment where they develop a device based on immunosignaturing. However, this 
means that they have to make two projects for the price of one in terms of manpower, 
materials and time. Seen in that light, the importance of saving becomes very 
apparent. They need to be very meticulous when undertaking an assignment that is 
larger than the funders imagined it would be. The resources, be it the scientists 
themselves, time or the materials, are spent carefully, but creatively. And to make 
ends meet, it is deemed important that the PIs be involved in the decisions on how to 
move forward. The scientists believe that the PIs should decide the right balance 
between different priorities. I will go into more depth on the role of the PIs in Oikos 
in the sections ‘Oikos and Hierarchy’ (8.3.1) and ‘Fast Science’ (8.3.2). But in 
connection with this story, I want to emphasise that this part of being 
‘entrepreneurial’ is discussed to a lesser degree in the literature (for exceptions, see 
Gorm-Hansen 2011). The competition for funds demands that more work is done for 
less, especially if the laboratories want to ‘regain agency’ (Law 1994: 61) and move 
in a specific direction with their science. Earlier, I showed that the scientists believe 
that reliance on external funding does not affect the way they do their research, but 
the amount of work and ‘navigation’ they need to do in order to pursue their own 
scientific interests becomes apparent.  
 
The interpretation of another story from Vocation also takes a twist if seen from the 
perspective of Oikos. I described a scientist entertaining a dinner party with a story 
about ‘European’ laboratories closing after 5:00 p.m. and being closed on weekends. 
Something they considered quite strange (see 7.3.2 for the full story). In the previous 
chapter, I interpreted this story as part of an understanding of time that is performed 
in Vocation: Scientists need a large amount of time to work with their materials if 
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they are to handle the truth responsibly. However, in Oikos it can also be interpreted 
as an articulation of the competitive advantages that the USA (according to the story-
teller) obviously has. This is because the USA has realised that it is necessary to 
engage the workforce over the weekend and after hours if they are supposed to do 
high quality science on limited resources. The ‘Europe’ that he portrays in the story 
does not have these conditions – or perhaps they do science under quite different 
circumstances since they can afford to close their labs.  
 
All in all, ‘saving’ reveals another attitude to conducting science than that of 
‘investing’. The scientists invest their knowledge and skills in new projects and 
develop strategies to study what they want to study, while they still sufficiently 
answer the funders’ calls. But they also manage the resources they already have very 
carefully. It seems they have this feeling that there is never enough money and they 
therefore have the responsibility of saving where they can. This point makes even 
more sense if it is connected to the way that the scientists prioritise projects and 
work. In order to accomplish what they want, they sometimes have to do both the 
work the funders ask of them and the work they want to do – for the same amount of 
money and during the same period of time. While this may send their research in the 
direction they favour, it also means that both time and materials are even more 
limited.  
 
This is another side of the ‘entrepreneurial scientist’, as described by Etzkowitz 
(1998). While the ‘entrepreneurial scientist’ can be described as perceiving 
commercial as well as scientific potential in her scientific work, it is perhaps also 
someone who has learned to adapt to circumstances where resources are very limited. 
As Law points out, then, the entrepreneurial scientist is also someone who never fails 
to see an opportunity, even in the instances where it may be disguised as a constraint 
(1994: 61). ‘Entrepreneurial’ in that sense does not refer as much to the commercial 
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side of science as to the way they manage to turn the conditions for doing their work 
into an opportunity. In that sense, the way the scientists ‘save’ makes sense. They do 
so because funds are limited and temporary, but also because saving time and 
resources opens up new possibilities and perhaps even the possibility to do the 
science they wish. All it takes is extra work.  
 
8.1.3 MAINTAINING 
The last form of conduct that I want to touch upon in this chapter is that of 
‘maintaining’. Again, the analogy goes to a home where the roof, the pipes and the 
kitchen equipment need maintaining; but so do the relationships between the 
members of the household and the relationships with entities on friendly terms with 
the household (stakeholders). In a similar vein, the scientists maintain their lab 
carefully in many ways.  
 
I will start with the equipment. Before entering a lab for the first time, I had some 
highly futuristic ideas about what a lab looked like: shiny white machines and 
fluorescent lights shining out from under the doors. In reality, the labs look much 
more rattled. Some of the machines are quite old, some of them just look old; in any 
case, they all look used and not very shiny. Here and there, they are fixed with gaffer 
tape or a dishcloth is wrapped around a pipe. Some of them are probably really 
advanced, but this is hard to believe because they look almost homemade, with their 
plastic-pipes and flasks attached together by tape. The computers are not always up to 
date and run quite slowly.  
 
I noticed how many of the scientists are responsible for a specific machine. Many of 
them are experts in using a particular machine and they each keep their respective 
machine running. To do this, they sometimes need to use a small trick for when the 
machine will not start or when it makes other mistakes. They know where it usually 
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leaks and they remember to put a bucket under it before they turn it on. They are the 
scientists the others call if something goes wrong. Some of them may even build their 
career on their knowledge of a certain machine because its maintenance is vital for 
the entire lab’s experiments and this reliance on their expertise grants them a 
position. In relation to some of the machines, the maintenance is a shared 
responsibility. At Curious George, they have a rotation for the cleaning and 
maintenance of machines. Even the espresso machine in the kitchen is part of it, 
though I doubt anyone can build a career on that.  
 
As with many of the other items in the labs, the machines are ridiculously expensive 
and it is therefore important that they are preserved for as long as possible. At the 
same time, they can be quite fragile and delicate, and it takes a great amount of 
knowledge to know how they work. I was fascinated by how practical that work 
sometimes is. When a scientist has been summoned to fix a machine, she will 
resolutely hit the machine on the top and suddenly it will start up after it has been 
stubbornly silent for hours. This underlines the point about how having very specific 
knowledge about a certain machine is very important for its maintenance.  
 
Another item, of which the PIs take especially great care, is that of their ‘group’. A 
group is a collection of people who are working together on the same project and 
usually also on the same grant under the direction of the PI. Simon from Curious 
George underlines that, as a PI, ‘[w]e have an organisational responsibility for our 
group’s wellbeing.’ The maintenance of a cordial ambience among the group 
members seems to be of great importance. Almost all the PIs I speak to mention that 
as their biggest responsibility. Here, it is Clark who ascertains that maintaining a 
‘happy’ group is a necessary skill as a senior in academia: 
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‘…social skills I think, are really, really important. You have to be able to maintain a 
happy group. That’s the only way. I think this is the last part of experience [you get 
through training], and I have seen a number of models, so I had the chance to learn 
how to do it and how not to do it […].’  
 
He continues by underlining how maintaining a ‘happy group’ is about its 
composition, something I hear often:  
 
‘You have to make sure that there is a good balance of people […] I think, especially 
in Denmark, social interaction is really, really important. Thus, you really actively 
foster [a good environment] and then it works and we don’t pick people [here] 
because of their excellence but because they fit well into the team.’ 
 
So the PIs spend a considerable amount of their time being managers of ‘people’ and 
‘groups’ and they feel a responsibility to compose these ‘groups’ such that they 
‘work’ in the right way. This means that they, at least at Curious George, in addition 
to a potential applicant’s academic virtues also make the selection based on his or her 
ability to contribute to a cordial ambience among the group. This is not only 
important in order to accomplish the goals that have been set in the grants, but also, 
as Canute explains, because ‘we try to make decent people out of our students.’ The 
juniors are seen as a special responsibility. It is not just for the sake of the 
organisation that the group needs to function well, but also for the sake of the juniors, 
because they are encountering the academic workplace for the first time and need to 
learn ‘good behaviour’ as well as experience that academia can be a decent place.  
 
Most of the PIs tell me about the great responsibility they feel for the group, 
especially the most junior members. Simon from Curious George compares it to 
being a good host: not only does he need to be good at inviting the right people in – 
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those who will benefit from each other – but also at serving the right food and 
playing the right music, so all of the guests will enjoy the evening. Curiously, most of 
the PIs at both labs claim they are not particularly good at managing ‘people’. They 
consider it a personal skill but not one they possess themselves – or they believe they 
have too little time to actually manage people. I am not sure why. Perhaps, it is again 
the old myth about scientists not being good with people; or, perhaps, it is a constant 
headache, whereby they always feel behind as a result of time constraints. It is hard to 
assess whether everyone thrives in an environment, and also difficult to do something 
about. 
 
Maintaining the lab is about maintaining the relations between the different people 
working there. The PIs say that this has not historically been a priority in academia 
but that it is increasingly becoming so because they all work together so much. Henry 
from Gyro Gearloose explained that he tries to teach the juniors in the lab about the 
managing of groups, as nobody ever told him during his academic upbringing. He 
was quite surprised to learn about the importance of maintaining a good group when 
he became manager. And the younger scientists seem to be aware of this fact as well 
and add it to skills they need to possess. It is not only about being dedicated to 
science or being very good at it, they should also commit to the lab and the work 
environment itself. For the juniors, the main thing is, perhaps, not maintaining a good 
group environment, though most of them are happy to contribute, but rather thinking 
of it as a way to get a job. Miriam speaks about the employment process she went 
through: 
 
‘I think that the most important skills were that I am sociable, that’s how it felt 
anyway, because I don’t have the most impressive CV, so to speak. And also that I’m 
laborious, perhaps, in any case, I think that my old employers told them [Curious 
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George] as much, when they called them – and also that I’m ready to embrace 
changes and I’m good with sudden changes, and that I’m willing to travel…’ 
  
All of the juniors are quite interested in maintaining their job, as all of them are 
employed in temporary positions. They are eager to enhance their chances of further 
employment by also being easy to work with. I do not consider this interest in 
maintaining a job as part of Oikos because it cannot be justified as a responsibility for 
the local lab; it is much more an individual interest. The PIs work to maintain a really 
good group; the juniors work to maintain their employability. While both 
perspectives are understandable, the behaviour of the juniors is not necessarily a 
consequence of a responsibility for the lab’s wellbeing, but rather for their own job 
situation.  
 
The last item will be taken up in relation to maintaining the scientists’ responsibility 
for their external relations. By ‘external relations’, I am mainly referring to people in 
the different foundations, but figures such as ‘the public’ or ‘partners’ in the private 
sector also come up once in a while.  
 
During an interview, Charlie tells me about some data Gyro Gearloose needed for a 
paper – without it, the editors refused to publish. The problem was that the lab did 
not possess these data and were not able to make them. Charlie ended up contacting 
a guy they know somewhat from a German company. He was really in doubt as to 
whether it was too much to ask – nor did he know if a company would give their data 
to a public paper. But the guy did, and he was of course listed as co-author on the 
paper, Charlie underlines.  
 
Stories about external relations are usually about some sort of exchange, such as the 
one about data above. Gyro Gearloose asks for data and they are able to provide 
 247 
authorship in return. While it is difficult for me to assess whether authorship and the 
data are of equal worth in the exchange, the stories about external relations are 
usually about exchanges. However, they are also about the limits of normal conduct 
in relation to actors outside the lab and about going beyond that limit. Charlie is not 
sure whether he can contact a man from a private company and ask for data, but he 
does so anyway and Gyro Gearloose gets what they need. This is often the case in 
stories about external relations; it is about transgressing some rules or structures in 
order to reach a goal that benefits the organisation:  
 
During an interview I ask Simon about his collaborations with the perfume industry. I 
can’t help but think that it must be a very different feeling [admittedly, I think of it as 
less noble] to work on developing pheromones for perfumes compared to developing 
cancer treatments, despite the fact that both technologies stem from the same 
research project. But Simon tells me that I should try to look at things from another 
angle. It was the perfume industry that contacted him and gave enough funding for 
him to hire a PhD student and a postdoc to work on the project. So all in all, he now 
gets much more knowledge about the cancer treatments by working on the 
pheromones.  
 
This is a very typical way of both seeing and doing things in Oikos. The scientists see 
opportunities and subsequently take them; as Law concedes: ‘if they [conditions] are 
not treated as an opportunity, then the agent is no longer acting responsibly; instead 
she is in the process of retreating from the proper performance of agency.’ (Law 
1994: 116). So maintaining can also be about taking chances and doing something 
unexpectedly, which changes the structures and enables the scientists to work with 
what they want. Working with the perfume industry turns out to be a way to maintain 
the cancer research, and so the scientists go for it.  
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‘Maintaining’ is about looking after those parts of the lab that the scientists find most 
important: Machines, people, groups and external relations. It is both about learning 
the skills related to taking care of machines and people as well as making all of them 
do what is expected of them. These two things are gained through experience, 
irrespective of whether it is about machines or people. At times, it is also about 
bending norms and rules in order to reach a goal that will benefit the organisation. 
These maintenance activities are connected by the fact that they are continuous tasks 
that need to be followed up once in a while. They are never really complete, they 
always need to be returned to – just as I return to my dripping kitchen tap and fix it 
once in a while.  
 
8.1.4 SUMMING UP 
Oikos generates some patterns of behaviour that can be compared to the work we all 
(ideally) do to take care of our own home; namely, spending our resources with care 
(saving), looking after our equipment and our relations (maintaining) and investing 
our time and resources in order to secure a necessary income in the future (investing). 
Throughout this section on conduct, I have claimed that these forms of behaviour are 
generated by a specific responsibility that the scientists feel for fostering the 
laboratory they work in. I will try to argue this point based on empirical data in the 
next section. In conclusion, I will say that in comparison to Vocation, the scientists 
do not seem to enjoy the work needed to maintain the lab in the same way they 
seemed to enjoy the checking, repeating and being critical. It seems that they all 
believe that these forms of conduct are necessary but mostly as prerequisites for 
getting back to what they really want to do; namely, experiments and writing papers. 
While these actions can also be seen as necessary in order to maintain the lab 
(without citations, no grants – such is the logic of the credibility circle (Latour and 
Woolgar 1979: 201), the scientists seem to enjoy them much more. They consider 
them as inherent parts of their job, while, as I will show, the conducts here – 
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especially that of investing – are considered mere ‘politics’, which they want to 
escape. 
 
 
8.2 JUSTIFICATIONS 
In the previous chapter, Vocation, it turned out that it is actually difficult to pin down 
what it is exactly the scientists feel responsible for. My interpretation is that it is ‘the 
truth’, but that most of them seem to consider that notion a little too grand to 
articulate. Furthermore, the responsibility for the truth is so inherent to their idea 
about their professional identity as ‘scientists’ that its nature or importance rarely 
comes up as an issue. It turns out that some of the same difficulties are present in 
relation to Oikos. Over time, I get the impression that the scientists feel they share a 
responsibility with their colleagues for their workplace. That includes the physical 
surroundings, their colleagues and the shared fate of the lab. But it is difficult to point 
to because, rather than talk about it, they conduct themselves in ways that suggest it: 
they apply for grants, they help their juniors, they fix the old machines, they clean the 
fridges, and engage in any other kind of activity that shows they care for the place. It 
seems too self-evident to address.  
 
Another thing is that it is difficult to pin down what exactly they feel responsible for. 
Surely, it has something to do with their colleagues, it has something to do with the 
future and it has something to do with the physical place they work at every day. But 
all of these terms are slippery. At times, their ‘colleagues’ are the people in their 
research group – perhaps two or six other people. Sometimes it refers to everyone at 
the universities where the two laboratories are situated. At other times, their 
‘colleagues’ are the people in the same department, the same section or the same 
centre. It is difficult to say for sure. The same ambiguity appears when they talk 
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about the future of their workplace. The future for whom? Sometimes it is the next 
generation of researchers, sometimes it is the university, sometimes it is the future of 
their group and its research, and sometimes it is the entire scientific community. And, 
of course, defining the boundaries of their workplace is also difficult. The lab is at 
once part of the university, the physical wet lab, or part of a department (whose name 
changed twice while I was at Curious George due to structural reforms at the 
university). It means that I can never be entirely sure what they are referring to when 
they do, for once, voice a responsibility for colleagues, time and place.  
  
Therefore, it is evident that the assembled conducts and their shared justifications 
have been defined by me. ‘The business’ is thus to be considered as an analytical 
construct made from the very many, more or less, explicit entities that the scientists 
exhibit concern for. For instance, ‘the group’, ‘students’, ‘other employees’, ‘the 
machinery’, ‘my supervisor’, ‘my group leader’, ‘my colleagues’, ‘this place’, and so 
on. So when I, based on the remaining paragraphs in this section, claim that the 
scientists feel a responsibility for ‘the business’, it does not mean that they 
necessarily share a clear picture of what that ‘business’ is. Their imagination of ‘the 
business’ is fragmented and the scientists’ conception of it depends on the situation at 
hand. The conundrum of being certain that there is a common denominator but being 
unsure about what it is exactly clearly illustrates that the mode is an analytical 
construct. The scientists probably have a much more fine-tuned idea about this 
responsibility than I do, and, perhaps, they are also able to distinguish between the 
different responsibilities that I have assembled here as one. But despite these 
reservations, I will still conceive of it as a coherent phenomenon that can describe 
what they feel responsible for. 
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8.2.1 THE BUSINESS 
First, I turn to Canute and his thoughts about research management: 
 
During an interview, Canute reflects on what it takes to be a good manager. He says 
that one of the crucial things for him is to refrain from being the last – and thereby 
main – author on the papers of the young promising investigators he has recruited 
and that he never co-authors manuscripts to which he has not made a significant 
contribution in order to secure himself a high h-index or citation number.32 He 
argues that good Post doctoral fellows and PhD students will never return to his lab 
after they have graduated if he does such things.  
 
Plentiful reasons can be given for refraining from becoming the main author. Canute 
could also argue (he does so on other occasions) that letting his students be the main 
author will help move their career forward or that he has actually not done enough 
work to deserve main authorship. But the reason he gives above is neither about him 
nor his students directly. It is about the future of the lab. His argument is that if he is 
not a fair and, perhaps, nice supervisor, this will reflect back on the workplace and 
good people will not return to work there. Canute is, in other words, investing in 
future employees by treating them well at the beginning of their career. For Canute, 
the missing authorship is an investment in the future lab. If he focuses too much on 
his own career, that is, the ‘h-index’ and ‘citation numbers’, the lab will potentially 
suffer the consequences later on. And in this situation, he puts the lab’s future above 
his own career.  
 
Simon from Curious George has just signed a patent agreement together with one of 
the juniors on three new inventions. He sits at his desk humming to himself as I enter 
                                                
32 The citation number is an expression for how many times a particular paper has been cited by other authors. The h-index is an index that attempts 
to measure both the productivity and impact of the published work of a scientist or scholar. The index is based on the set of the scientist's most cited 
papers and the number of citations that they have received in other publications 
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his office. He tells me that the deal is done and now he ‘just sits and waits for all the 
gifts that will pour in from the others as a thank you for the good work.’ 
 
At a glance, this story is primarily about a single scientist. He is happy with a job 
well done and awaits the recognition. But, as many of the scientists have assured me 
during the fieldwork, patents are good news for the entire lab in general. While the 
money may never benefit others than the individual scientist, the lab gets recognition 
from patents. ‘Think about MIT,’ as one of them explains to me. ‘Everybody knows 
that they are the best. Otherwise, how can they obtain that many patents’? So if 
scientists patent their inventions, it signals that they do valuable work and that 
reflects back on the whole environment. The logic seems to be: The more patents the 
lab has, the better it must be. In this light, it makes sense that Simon awaits 
champagne, chocolate and flowers from his colleagues. Besides helping his own 
career, his work contributes to creating a good reputation for the entire lab – perhaps 
even for the university.    
 
Responsibility for the business surfaces here and there in the organisation. There are, 
for instance, plenty of posters in the wet labs reminding people to clean up after 
themselves so others can use the equipment, or reminding them not to use more 
materials or chemicals than necessary so there will be enough for everyone. Of the 
posters, my favourite – from Curious George – states: ‘Close a fume cupboard, afford 
a PhD dude’33. While the poster is part of a big campaign for a ‘green university’, the 
justification for the plea does not refer to concerns for CO2 emissions. Rather, the 
reasoning goes that careful use of the fume cupboards will make it possible to hire 
more people. It is, of course, easy to argue that it is very uncertain whether money 
saved from the consistent closing of fume cupboards will go directly to funding new 
                                                
33 A slogan that is more catchy in Danish, where it rhymes: ‘Luk et stinkskab/få råd til en PhD-flab’. 
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PhD staff. It would at best be difficult to ascertain connections between specific 
energy saving practices and a rise in staff recruitment. But that is not the point. The 
poster refers to something that everybody knows and understands: Money is a scarce 
resource and the contribution each individual makes will benefit the entire 
organisation.  
 
In all of the stories, the arguments refer to a shared responsibility for the place the 
scientists work. They do not, as in Vocation, refer to the entire scientific community, 
but rather to a ‘we’ that is closer to home, so to speak. The stories all describe a 
responsibility for the immediate surroundings: the colleagues, the young students that 
are educated in the lab, the physical surroundings they work in. However, I still need 
to argue why I have chosen to call this ‘we’ ‘the business’. I will attempt to move 
forward with that argument now. In order to do so, I return to Simon’s comparisons 
of research groups and good parties, segments of which I described further above:  
 
‘[…] you’ve got to hope that some of the people you have hired have the ability to 
make things work. I mean, for instance, if I’m throwing a party, then I also have to 
rely on that they [the guests] will make a good melting pot that works and that the 
party turns into a cosy place, because that’s one of the things you can actually say: if 
the social frame is right and the chemistry between the group members is good, well, 
then there is also a bigger chance that your impact will be much greater.’ 
 
What I find interesting in this quote, besides the nice party analogy, is Simon’s focus 
on the relationship between the people’s synergy, ‘the chemistry between the group 
members’, and the result, ‘the impact’, they are going to create. While I believe that 
Simon finds the wellbeing of the group important, what really matters here is 
‘impact’: what they create together. Something more than the group itself is at play. 
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They need to move forward, to obtain results together. The group and what the group 
is hopefully creating, namely, great impact, are interdependent. Without the group, 
this would be difficult, and without the impact the group is of less importance. So 
while there is a responsibility to take care of the people within the lab, this concern 
always goes hand in hand with the goal to perform. The scientists are not assembled 
to have a great party; they are assembled to accomplish great things. 
 
At Gyro Gearloose, Henry, the PI and lab director, calls all of his employees for a 
meeting in the big auditorium. Henry wants new ideas for research projects. And he 
wants all of the attendees to contribute with ideas. He asks openly if they have any 
ideas for ‘a new big research project’. He thinks that the lab has developed cutting 
edge technologies on the grants they already have but that they now need to move 
further ahead in two ways; both by applying at the biggest and most prestigious 
agency, namely NIH34, and by trying to combine the technologies they have invented 
and thereby create some new extraordinary ones. None of the scientists answer the 
call for ‘a big idea’ right away, but there are lots of questions and people seem more 
attentive than usual.  
 
The meeting is held during a time of insecurity at Gyro Gearloose. A number of 
people (lab technicians) have been laid off, and the annual ‘state of the lab’ speech 
that Henry gives every spring has been postponed this year. Rumour has it that Henry 
does not want to give it until they are sure about a big research application that is 
being assessed at the moment. He wants to present some good news. In the mean 
time, they still need to move on and come up with ideas for ‘a new big research 
project’, which they can invest their time in. The story is interesting because Henry 
addresses the lab as that which needs to move forward. While this demands that the 
                                                
34The National Institutes of Health (NIH), is a part of the USA. Department of Health and Human Services and functions as the nation’s medical 
research agency. From www.nih.gov 25.08.14 
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scientists also develop new science, this is not the focus. The argument goes that all 
the assembled scientists need to move forward, and, in order to do that, they need to 
develop new science. The situation can be interpreted in different ways. Seen in light 
of the current crisis, which has necessitated making people redundant, the story can 
be interpreted as something close to a pessimistic prophecy: If the scientists do not 
come up with good ideas that can generate an income, then the lab cannot survive and 
they will all loose their jobs in the long run. If it is interpreted in a more optimistic 
light, it can be viewed as a compliment to all the present scientists: They have 
accomplished so much that they are now good enough to compete for funding in the 
most prestigious funding agency in the nation. No matter which version, the 
justification for action remains the same: Together, the assembled employees and 
Henry are a unit that should be taken care of, and this will happen if they ‘move 
forward’.  
 
In the previous section (8.2), I claim that the justification for why the scientists 
‘invest’, ‘save’ and ‘maintain’ lies in the responsibility they feel for ‘the business’. 
Based on the stories, I can begin to argue why. The scientists seem to both recognise 
and put forward the idea that they are part of a common unit, whose survival and 
wellbeing is a reason for action in its own right. In the story about Henry and the 
other scientists from Gyro Gearloose, they are assembled to discuss how ‘they’ – the 
lab – are going to proceed from their current position. In Henry’s eyes, they need to 
make some bold investments with their knowledge: They should go to the most 
prestigious investor, NIH, and they should invest everything they already know in a 
new technology that cleverly combines all the previous ones. But the ultimate reason 
for that, more than the wonder of such a technology, is that it will move them all 
‘forward’ from where they are now.  In the above interview excerpt with Simon, he 
tells me how the better the group, the greater the ‘impact’. I do not interpret this as 
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them creating a more exciting type of science, necessarily – perhaps that is self-
evident for the scientists. But more than doing great science, this is about a group 
having a great ‘impact’, something that will benefit all of them in the long run. This 
is also based on the great importance of funding, which is influenced by one’s 
‘impact factor’35. Referring back to the credibility circle: A great ‘impact’ can be 
exchanged for new grants and new positions. Besides relating to exciting results, 
‘impact’ refers to how much influence the scientists’ findings will get; the 
prestigiousness of the journals they may be published in; whether it will be possible 
to patent their knowledge; and whether the findings will reach the attention of the 
media and the general public. In both Simon’s party analogy and the meeting at Gyro 
Gearloose, I see traits that remind me of a ‘business’: What matters is to create 
growth for the ‘business’. This demands investments, as the story from Gyro 
Gearloose indicates, and also a good composition of human capital, which Simon 
underlines in his quote. While the two labs can still produce a good product – or 
rather good science – the important thing is not the scientific results being true, as I 
show in Vocation, but rather the movement and, indeed, the survival of the 
‘business’: The labs and the inhabitants therein. Clark from Curious George also 
emphasises this responsibility: 
 
‘I think the department has the idea that for the department a publication is really 
good. For the department, patents are really good. For the department, it is really 
good if I get public exposure so stuff gets put on the back page – or even in articles – 
of newspapers. So publicity and of course money [is important].’ 
 
                                                
35 The journal Impact Factor is the average number of times articles from the journal published in the past two years have been cited in the JCR year. 
The Impact Factor is calculated by dividing the number of citations in the Journal Citation Reports year by the total number of articles published in 
the two previous years. But the scientists also use ‘impact’ almost as slang for how much influence (funding, media attention, citations, etc) they 
expect as response to work they have done  
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Clark talks about a local entity (the department), of which he is a member and where 
it is therefore considered of importance that he take a responsibility for striving after 
publicity and money. Oikos seems to generate the idea of science’s role being one 
where scientists are members of a local ‘business’ and therefore have a responsibility 
to keep that business going, preferably, with a surplus for new investments. They do 
so by investing, saving, maintaining and by making a contribution that has an 
‘impact’. In an interview with Henry from Gyro Gearloose, this responsibility to 
‘contribute’ is also underlined. He tells me how they differ from other labs by being 
focused on a common ‘project’. He even literally compares the lab with a ‘business’: 
 
‘We [management] say: “You may think of yourself as a biochemist, but we do not 
necessarily think of you as that. We think of you as a contributor to the project.” And 
so, if we […], say, need someone to work on cell biology over here on this different 
thing, [then] people have to move [because] we cannot afford not to. And I think this 
is good. It is more like business that way: You do what you have to do. And I think 
that’s good, because people in academia tend to be… it relaxes them more, you know. 
[But here] they have to move […] we have had people who did not necessarily like 
that […], as one of them said: “I want to know that I can come in and do the same 
thing everyday, you know. I want to know that I’m secure […]”. And I don’t blame 
them, but that’s not what we do here.’  
 
So Henry actually compares Gyro Gearloose to ‘academia’ as if they were something 
else, namely, more of a ‘business’. In his eyes, this means there is more dynamism at 
their workplace, whereby the scientists have to ‘move’ and should not think of 
themselves in terms of their discipline but in terms of what they ‘contribute’ to the 
overall ‘project’. This is contrasted with ‘academia’, a place that ‘relaxes’ people 
and enables them to do the ‘same thing everyday’. So Henry takes pride in running a 
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place that looks like a business in so far as it is more dynamic and more focused on a 
common project. At the same time, there is also a dual focus on the economy and the 
project – or even product – both of which have to constantly be thought of together. 
People have to ‘move’ and do something besides their own expertise, such as 
biochemistry, because the ‘business’ ‘cannot afford’ them doing only biochemistry if 
cell biology is needed. The responsibility for the business comes before their 
disciplinary roots, and the economy and the scientific project are closely entangled. 
In this quote, the contrast to Vocation’s justifications is made very explicit. In 
Henry’s interpretation, academia’s hallmark is not the pursuit of truth, but instead a 
traditional way of thinking and a lack of concern for a common project. Business 
breaks these habits by focusing the scientists’ energies on the creation of a project; 
that is, integrating the economy and the scientific pursuits and thereby shaking the 
scientists out of their usual roles.  
 
8.2.2 SUMMING UP 
In the previous section, I have argued that the scientists justify the conducts 
‘investing’, ‘saving’ and ‘maintaining’ with their shared responsibility to keep ‘the 
business’ running. By ‘business’ I mean the local entity that the scientists consider 
themselves members of and where their contributions and their budgets are closely 
entangled. ‘The business’ is abstract and ambiguous: The scientists do not speak 
about exactly the same thing when they refer to it. At times, it is the research group, 
at other times the department, their centre or the whole university. But despite these 
different references, the central point is that it is a place they consider themselves 
members of and where its survival – and hopefully success – is considered a 
justification for action. Responsibility for ‘the business’ makes the scientists look at 
their findings with a different point of view compared to that of ‘Vocation’. It is not 
only the truthfulness of a statement that matters; now its ability to create ‘impact’ and 
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be used for further investments is considered vital. Therefore, other entities that do 
not seem significant in Vocation suddenly become so; namely, patents, publicity and 
human capital.  
 
In the following sections, I will show some of the overall effects of this responsibility 
on the everyday work life of the scientists. As in the previous chapter, I will also 
demonstrate that Oikos has limits. Like Vocation, it is negotiated and rejected 
continuously. Finally, I will also discuss this mode in relation to both notions of the 
‘entrepreneurial scientist’ and recent public science reforms.  
 
 
8.3 ORGANISATIONAL CONSEQUENCES 
From the perspective of Oikos, Curious George and Gyro Gearloose look very 
different than they do in Vocation. A very idealised description of work life in the 
labs seen from the perspective of Vocation would go like this: The two labs are 
inhabited by scientists who take their time to check up on their plants and cells, 
constantly question their previous actions and next steps, and do not really pay more 
attention to their closest colleagues than they do to colleagues across the globe. The 
juniors are in training among older professors and slowly learn the art of taking care 
of the truth, a skill they struggle with immensely and which makes them forget their 
family and laundry. Over lunch, the scientists discuss current catastrophes that 
threaten mankind and make subtle complaints about the fact that neither politicians 
nor the media would listen to their advice.  
 
The laboratories look radically different in the mode of Oikos, as I will examine in 
this chapter. Scepticism is replaced with a firm belief in the lab’s abilities to create 
usable results, and the training of young scientists-to-be is replaced with a division of 
labour where the juniors conduct experiments and write papers while the seniors 
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write grant applications and do ‘politics’. The slow and meticulous work as seen in 
Vocation is replaced by a constant awareness of time as a finite resource. The 
uncertainty related to how the truth is taken care of is replaced by a worry over the 
lab’s future and the personal job prospects.  
 
In this chapter, I will examine the consequences of Oikos for how work is organised 
in the two labs. First, I will show how Oikos relates to the hierarchy in the 
organisations; how the responsibility for the business is congruent with the formal 
hierarchy – but also how this is, at times, transcended. Second, I will turn to the 
question of how the scientists perceive the relation between time and work and how 
time becomes a crucial issue. Third, I will describe how the scepticism in Vocation is 
put aside for what I consider a strong belief in the labs’ abilities. Last, I will study 
how the organisation is very much in the foreground, while the profession – a 
significant factor in Vocation – fades into the background. Finally, I turn to the limits 
of Oikos and the differences between the two labs.  
 
8.3.1 OIKOS AND HIERARCHY 
An interesting aspect of Oikos is how different tasks for maintaining the business are 
distributed across scientific ranks. The simple rule of thumb is that the more senior 
one is, the more responsibility one has for the business. Simon from Curious George 
describes elements of the different positions: 
 
‘Well, if you as a PhD student have to be educated to become a scientist, then you 
have to concentrate on that small corner of your desk and nothing else for three 
years, while as a postdoc, you also have to take responsibility for managing the PhD 
students. As an assistant and associate professor, you all of a sudden have to 
implement new elements in the education [Bachelor and Master level], and it is 
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especially here that it starts to get “political”, when you talk about sharing teaching 
across departments and research groups and what have you…’ 
 
Simon often explains to me how the work becomes more ‘political’ as the scientists 
move up the ranks. In Simon’s interpretation, ‘political’ is basically all the aspects of 
the job that are not directly related to experiments, writing papers or the actual 
teaching of students - whereas the management of teaching, for instance, is a 
‘political’ subject.  
Most of the scientists seem to share this idea that their responsibility for the business 
is limited to them doing the work demanded by their funders. The PhD students and 
postdocs, for instance, usually describe their tasks in terms of the questions they need 
to answer within a limited period of time. As Annie from Gyro Gearloose puts it: 
 
‘My responsibility is to fulfil the requirements of this grant. My job is done when I 
have fulfilled those.’ 
 
They do not feel that it is their responsibility to take part in investing time in grand 
grant applications, nor are they asked to do so. This seems to be an explicit and 
conscious decision in the labs. In order for them to concentrate on their research, the 
PhD students should be free of obligations or tasks that are not relevant. Simon 
remembers his own period as a junior: 
 
‘I always had the feeling that a lot of things were going on that I could then read 
about in the paper the next day. Things I was not necessarily a part of… […]. I 
remember discussing it with Canute; that it was really nice to be exempted from those 
things. Because there is a lot of politics and a great need to take a stance in relation 
to things that are not necessarily related to your present science. If our research is to 
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get somewhere, well, then those who are actually doing the scientific work need to 
have time available to actually do it.’ 
 
In Simon’s account, responsibility for the business also includes the obligation to 
exclude the juniors from the world of ‘politics’. This is not only done so they have 
time to be ‘educated to become a scientist’ – a logic I have already touched upon in 
the previous chapter – but also a way of separating several tasks, all of which need to 
be done. The job of doing ‘politics’ is so large that it takes up a lot of time and 
energy; therefore, the seniors also have a responsibility to create a politics-free 
vacuum, where it is actually possible to do science. There has to be ‘time available to 
actually do it’, the science, that is. Otherwise, they all agree that the business will 
never ‘get somewhere’. Curious George and Gyro Gearloose share the idea that the 
juniors have a special responsibility to do the science, not only for themselves, but 
also for the sake of the business, whereas the more ‘senior’ they become, the more 
responsibility they get for negotiating ‘politics’. At times, however, what it is the 
scientists actually mean by ‘politics’ can be a little blurry. Sometimes, it seems that it 
is just all the work they do not want to do. At other times, it seems as if ‘politics’ is 
what is happening when other parties such as university management do not agree 
with the lab’s decisions. ‘Politics’ can also be all the footwork that is needed in order 
to obtain a grant. And finally ‘politics’ is about interacting with the media regarding 
stories that relate to the science done in the labs.  
 
But while the scientists speak about a certain division of labour, this division is now 
changing due to the labs’ two directors, Canute and Henry. They agree that the 
juniors should not have too many obligations besides doing science, but they also 
consider it important that they get a clearer idea of ‘how the system works’, as Henry 
puts it. While Simon cheerfully recalled above that he was omitted from being told a 
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lot of information before he found out about it in the newspapers, the two directors 
believe it should be different for the new generations. Henry tells me that it is an 
explicit goal for him to teach his students about the system that they work in: 
 
‘No one told me about these things [university politics] when I was a graduate 
student. But I think it’s important that you know all of these things and you learn how 
to navigate in this system. That’s also why I have let my future students follow the 
mail correspondence between me and the management about their education. 
Because it concerns them. And because they need to learn how to deal with issues 
like that.’ 
 
‘These things’ refer to, a controversy about a new graduate programme that Henry 
has initiated but which university management is not in favour of and therefore wants 
to close down, even though several students from across the world have already been 
accepted. Henry does not think that the prospective students should intervene. That is 
his job, as he is the manager; however, the students should learn that university is not 
free of politics and it is important to be able to navigate this system. In a similar vein, 
Canute also wants his juniors to be aware of the many aspects of working in 
academia besides doing research. Curious George has been working with GMO for 
many years and they experienced the ‘GMO crisis’ in the late nineties, when 
suddenly all the funding for anything to do with gene modification rapidly dried up 
(see theory section 2.1.1). He wants his students to know that these things may occur 
and that they can severely affect their prospects for work. He says they should learn 
how to ‘navigate’, a term they all use a lot. He discusses the GMO crisis and similar 
issues with his students at meetings and supervision sessions, and it is his explicit 
goal that the juniors develop an attitude and a stance in relation to these issues. Not 
necessarily the same stance as his own, but a stance.  
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However, perhaps the juniors are learning to navigate in the academic system without 
the help of the two directors. In any case, the juniors need to adapt to a work 
environment where the tenured positions are scarce, and where they need to rapidly 
learn how to secure funding for their own jobs. As Linda, one of the seniors from 
Curious George, observes during an interview: 
 
‘[…] we don’t have many tenured positions, I mean, in this section we only have three 
permanent scientific positions and you know yourself how many we are, so especially 
for the young ones, this is a period of insecurity, because they need to look two years 
ahead and perform all the time.’ 
 
The juniors need to ‘look ahead’ and ‘perform’ if they want a chance to continue in 
the scientific system – either by acquiring funding independently or by being chosen 
as a member of a large research grant. So in a way, the juniors also need to do 
‘politics’, even though the seniors may think the juniors’ involvement is limited 
compared to their own. But most of them really want to move to a more secure 
position – or at least a position where they are not dependent on temporary funding 
from their colleagues. A permanent position may be a pipe dream, but most of them 
tell me that they would like to manage their own grant. As Simon says: 
 
‘If you are capable of maintaining your own salary, then it is of course really nice [to 
work here]. But if you have to begin to rely on others’ applications, then it starts to 
become a problem…’ 
 
Simon considers it ‘a problem’ if he has to rely on others’ money. If he does that, 
then he also has to give up the benefits he has come to enjoy as PI, such as the 
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freedom to formulate his own research questions (as long as he can fund them) and 
the right to supervise PhD students. As there are very few permanent positions in 
both of the labs, most of the scientists are either funded as part of a bigger grant or 
have received grants and have the position of PI. This means that they have the same 
obligations as the tenured scientists in terms of project management, PhD supervising 
and teaching, but they do not have the benefits that a tenured position gives in terms 
of job security. Therefore, they constantly have to be on the lookout for money if they 
want to ensure they keep their office and lab space. 
 
After about three weeks at Gyro Gearloose, I start to notice a rather tense atmosphere 
in the lab. People whisper about the ‘budget’ and there are rumours about 
redundancies and missed grant opportunities. One of the scientists confirms that 
something is indeed amiss:  
 
‘…a number of people in the whole building [not just Gyro Gearloose, but the whole 
centre] has been let go over the last week because it is just that time of the year with 
the budget.’  
 
Apparently, there is not enough money for them on next year’s budget. Everyone 
seems worried that they are next. Sandra, who is new in the lab comments:   
 
‘I think as I look back at the almost three months I have been here, I have got a lot 
done, so that really feels good. Because, you know, there has been a bit of disruption 
in the lab recently with… we had one of our techs let go…’  
 
So not only is she glad because she is progressing with the experiments. She is also 
glad that she has ‘got a lot done’ because that puts her in a less vulnerable position if 
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more redundancies are necessary. She also tells me how she has reoriented her career 
moves within the last few years, as science is a tough ‘business’ to be in: 
 
‘[…] I’m trained for the daily stuff and then the end goal… I always kinda picked 
topics that interested me and now I like… I’m trying to get more towards what is 
going to help keep me employed. And it’s more infectious diseases and cancer and 
things that there’s funding for – or should be funding for.’ 
 
She tried to apply for her own funding for some years before she got to Gyro 
Gearloose but never succeeded. Earlier, she was more interested in ‘basic science’, 
but the current conditions for funding has turned her attention towards ‘infectious 
diseases and cancer’. While Sandra is one of the senior scientists, she is not 
employed on a permanent basis. She therefore always ensures that her work is done 
and that she accomplishes a lot so management will ‘keep her involved’ in her own as 
well as other projects in the lab. Sandra has therefore learned to ‘navigate’ the 
academic system under the current conditions. While she never complains or blames 
anyone, she does seem to be in a difficult position, that is, dependent on others’ 
contemporary grants. It is understandable that many of the scientists ascertain that 
they would like to become PIs, as there is a certain degree of freedom connected to it.  
 
So at the bottom of the hierarchy, there are the graduate students, postdocs and non-
tenured scientists who are all responsible for conducting science, while those higher 
up in the hierarchy do ‘politics’. But while the bottom does not have a formal 
responsibility for investing in new grants and negotiating university politics, they still 
need to make a substantial contribution in order to be noticed by management and 
perhaps also apply for their own funding.  
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At the bottom of the hierarchy, there are many scientists employed in temporary 
positions, and these positions are becoming more widespread in the system as 
permanent positions disappear. Therefore, taking care of the business is increasingly 
about making sure that there is a steady inflow of funding to sustain the single 
scientist’s career and keep the business staffed. While those scientists who have been 
in the system for some time seem quite confident that they will be able to continue to 
fund themselves, the younger ones are much more anxious about their prospects and 
do not necessarily consider a career in academia as a wise choice in terms of job 
security and stability. Even among the more experienced members of the business, 
the constant focus on funding is an annoyance. Simon comments: 
 
‘What makes the difference between being employed in a permanent position than in 
the position that I have now is really based on whether the organisation gives you 
room to make mistakes once in a while. And it doesn’t do so in relation to my current 
position. I mean, I can’t have three years where I don’t get money in the bank, so to 
speak, because then I’m out of this system – and you can do that if you’re in a 
permanent position. Not that I’m saying it’s popular, but if you got a track record 
and they [management] know that once in a while some really great ideas are coming 
from you, then they will let you do it. I mean, I’m sure that Holger Beck36 has had 
some periods in his life where he did not roll around in money, and it’s seldom that 
there are scientists who have constantly had a lot of money, but the big elephants in 
biological research have perhaps always had it, because they have been great at 
following the political trends […].’ 
 
Simon has been quite adept in the art of getting funding for both himself and several 
juniors. Despite this, my interpretation is that he asks for a little more space to ‘make 
mistakes’, which gives him room to manoeuvre and time to think more about the 
                                                
36 Holger Beck is a renowned Danish theoretical physicist, who has recently retired from his position as professor at Copenhagen University.  
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research without constantly having to worry. He cannot work at the lab for three 
years without providing funding via new grants, because otherwise he will be forced 
‘out of the system’. This worry and need for room to actually conduct research is one 
I recognise in both Gyro Gearloose and Curious George. It pervades the mode of 
Oikos, from the juniors to the seniors, and they spend much of their workday both 
working on maintaining the business and worrying about the business’s future.   
 
These descriptions remind me once again of ‘agency lost’ as described by Law (1994: 
61). The scientists believe themselves to be victims of powerful structures, where 
they need to ‘navigate’ carefully in order to both maintain the business and keep their 
own jobs – two concerns that are closely entangled.  The demand for external funding 
keeps the scientists on their toes and leaves no room for mistakes; if they are unable 
to obtain funding for the business, then they will soon be out of a job themselves.  
 
But as Law also describes, there are some ‘cowboys’ (Law 1994: 62); that is, a few 
individuals who are seemingly capable of favourably utilising these conditions and 
regaining at least some agency by managing their opportunities in creative ways. 
Given that Law is quite sceptical about the notion of ‘individual’, he considers 
‘cowboys’ to be results of orders, namely, that of ‘enterprise’ and ‘charisma’ (the 
latter is inspired by Weber’s ideal types of managers). As such, these ‘cowboys’ are 
not the individual conceived of as an essential personality, but rather are a lucky set 
of circumstances that transforms certain individuals into a ‘cowboy’ in certain 
situations, while in other situations they may still be victims. The most illustrative 
example from my material of such a ‘cowboy’ is Canute from Curious George. Two 
aspects turn him into a cowboy in my view: First, that the other scientists perceive of 
him being in this position and continuously re-articulate him as such, and second that 
he has taken it upon himself to be the primary force in moving the business of 
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Curious George forward – and thereby also taking some of that burden from the 
others. 
 
The first aspect is one that I mainly encounter among all the other employees at 
Curious George. Several scientists call Canute their ‘mentor’ and mention him as one 
of their main reasons for working at Curious George. He is also described as being 
‘extremely good at politics’. Furthermore, people tell me that they would not be in 
their current position if it were not for Canute. For example, they state: 
 
‘I only got this job because of professor Canute, he found the money somewhere’; or, 
‘The lab would not be this vibrant without Canute around. He makes things happen’; 
or, ‘Professor Canute is pretty special and very good with strategy and politics.’ 
 
The juniors are in awe of him and describe him in almost mythical terms sometimes. 
They speculate about who has the potential to become ‘the next Canute’; that is, 
someone who can make a lab into a vibrant and prosperous place. They are a little 
pessimistic about the prospects, as they cannot see how anyone can replace Canute. 
At a PhD graduation party, one of the parents of the newly graduated students even 
sang a tribute to Canute and everyone joined in on the refrain. So the myth 
surrounding Canute is sustained through a continuous re-articulation of his merits and 
talents (at other times, it is his more quirky side and brightly coloured socks that 
garner recognition from the students).  
 
In my interpretation, this mythologising stems from Canute having taken an extra, 
and rather unique, responsibility to look after the business. He has been extremely 
skilled at landing grants, for instance, the biggest national grant. He is adept at 
foreseeing new tendencies and has recently been the driving force behind the lab’s 
involvement in ‘Responsible Science’. He is also convinced that science 
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communication is becoming increasingly important and has hired new staff, including 
a ‘Head of Communication’, to integrate this into the scientists’ daily work.  
 
The remarkable ability to both ‘do politics’ and sustain the lab is of great significance 
to the scientists. In my interpretation, the scientists have so much confidence in 
Canute that their daily worries about the future of the business evaporate somewhat. 
By taking this responsibility upon himself, Canute gives the others, not least the 
juniors, the chance to feel unburdened and enables them to concentrate on their 
research tasks. Even though I think that this responsibility is actually borne by a lot of 
people in reality, Canute’s exceptional skill does seem to assure the others that the lab 
and their jobs will be there in the morning.   
 
In that way, Canute is made into ‘a cowboy’ who somehow transcends the structure 
that the rest of the scientists at times feel disempowered by.  His often-successful 
efforts to supply the lab with money are not only seen as a result of his official rank 
(lab director), but also as a result of his special personality. He possesses charisma 
and he never seems to fail in his responsibility to treat new demands as opportunities.  
 
All in all, the responsibility to take care of the business is shared across different 
positions. The juniors are, on the one hand, mostly expected to do research while the 
rest are busy doing ‘politics’; somebody needs to do the research because this is a 
prerequisite for sustaining the business. On the other hand, the juniors also need to 
partake in ‘politics’ if they want to secure a career for themselves in academia; they 
need to find money for their next project or need to work hard to be considered as 
candidates for a job in a big grant. Most of the scientists are employed in provisional 
positions secured by external funds. This condition makes all of them invest much of 
their workday in their future projects. It also makes them anxious about the future, as 
there is no room for error. Without money, they will soon disappear from academia. 
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A few scientists seem to have a special talent for ‘politics’ and they take it upon 
themselves to take care of the business. This also grants them a special status among 
their employees, because they unburden the bench scientists of some of the 
responsibility. So it seems that the responsibility for taking care of the business is in 
line with the hierarchy; however, most of the positions also include the daunting 
responsibility of securing their own jobs and that of the others.  
 
8.3.2 FAST SCIENCE 
Another consequence of Oikos is the shared perception of time. In Vocation, I 
describe time as being considered a precious but limitless resource and that spending 
time on experiments is considered a sign of quality. The responsibility for the 
business turns this view of time upside down. Suddenly, time is a scarce resource 
because they have temporary grants and have to compete with other businesses:  
 
I’m entering Angela’s office. She sits by her desk and writes eagerly. She tells me 
there is a rumour that another lab has results similar to theirs in the pipeline, and 
they now need to publish fast so her research group will be credited for the finding.  
 
This story underlines how the responsibility, and with it the meaning of time, has 
shifted from Vocation to Oikos. Vocation emphasises the fellow scientific 
community and the scientists are considered one big group. But Oikos emphasises the 
responsibility for the business, of which the scientists are members, and the fact that 
they are in competition with other labs. They therefore need to publish before the 
competition and their time is thereby suddenly limited. But the time limit is not just 
an issue in relation to the competition with other labs. It is also a question of micro-
managing throughout the workday, as the scientists need to divide their time between 
different projects: 
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Alan has just finished his Bachelor degree. He had an idea for the treatment of acne 
based on the methods they use at Gyro Gearloose. The director found the idea 
intriguing and he hired Alan as a part-time lab technician, and part-time researcher 
on the acne treatment project. As a lab technician, he has to help the other scientists 
prepare and run experiments. As a researcher, he has to move his own project along 
and hopefully finish it before he starts grad school at another university after the 
summer holidays. He finds it difficult to balance these two tasks and is behind with 
his own studies. I ask him whether he thinks that the other scientists and the lab 
director are interested in him actually finishing the acne project and he could 
therefore ask to be unburdened of some of his other tasks?  ‘Well, yes…’ he answers 
hesitantly, ‘but perhaps they [the other scientists and the lab director] are more 
interested in getting the cancer vaccine out, where I’m helping out. So if that gets out 
very fast and I get my work done, but not as fast as we all had expected, then I believe 
that they will think it’s okay.’  
 
Alan is at times frustrated at having to balance his own scientific project and his 
chores for the other scientists. But given that he is sure the lab will prioritise getting 
their work on the cancer vaccine published over his project on acne, he cannot do 
much about it. Therefore, all he can do is work hard and carefully move between the 
different tasks in order not to waste time, because the clock is ticking and the end of 
summer – and thereby the deadline for his project – are fast approaching. The feeling 
of having a lot of work and little time is shared among the scientists and across the 
labs.  
 
It is, for instance, addressed in a joke between two PhD students, whom I overhear at 
Curious George. One of them has caught a cold and is afraid that he will become too 
ill to attend work in the next couple of days. ‘Don’t fall ill, you don’t have time for 
it,’ the other one jokingly replies to his worries. Jokes about ‘slaving life away’ in the 
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lab and it not being possible to fall ill if one wants to finish on time are common 
among the students. But it also reflects the concern they have about the amount of 
time available vis-à-vis the work they are expected to do. They mostly consider this 
discrepancy between time and the amount of work as a personal problem and not 
something that has anything to do with the general expectations related to being a 
scientist. Most of them just consider themselves to be too unstructured in their work 
to get through the PhD without it being a struggle against time. They seldom connect 
it to the official amount of time allocated to PhD work or to expectations from 
management. This idea of time management as a personal problem can, for instance, 
be seen in a story about Miriam, where she complains that she is bad at assembling 
materials and organising experiments in an efficient manner. She considers herself 
‘slow’ compared to her colleagues:  
 
‘You know, I’m always running around the hallways looking for stuff and people. 
Good scientists, they are organised, they can think ahead, and get all the things they 
need in one round. I spend a lot of time in here – a lot more time than the other 
PhD’s, but I don’t think that I accomplish more. I’m just not that structured. You 
should not let yourself be fooled into thinking that those people who are staying in 
here all the time are the most dedicated or the people who get the most work done. 
It’s more that they are not as structured as the others.’ 
 
She blames herself for not having enough time and even considers that to be a sign 
that she is not a ‘good scientist’. She describes good scientists as ‘organised’ and 
having the ability to ‘think ahead and get all the things they need in one round’. 
These abilities are somewhat different from the ones that are stressed in Vocation, 
where being critical and very meticulous are in the foreground. Vocation generates 
scientists who spend a lot of time on their work, because this aspect indicates that 
they take their work seriously and are committed to the truth. But Oikos is different. 
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Here, it is about not having enough time, and therefore time-management becomes an 
important issue. Being busy is conceived of in another way.  
 
At a PhD graduation party at Curious George, there is a speech about the young 
graduate. One of the stories is about how he had been sitting in the lab late one 
Saturday evening. One of the Chinese scientists had come by and had acknowledged 
the young graduate by saying that he now finally worked ‘the Chinese way’. 
 
As I describe in Vocation, the scientists work on weekends a lot. But seen from the 
lens of Oikos, this work takes on another meaning. In Denmark, many consider China 
to be Europe’s (and especially Denmark’s) biggest competitor, as it is perceived of as 
being full of hardworking, serious people, in contrast to the not so hardworking 
Danes. Therefore, there is the expectation that Chinese science and innovation will 
outmanoeuvre the Danes in a few years. I therefore interpret the speech as implying 
that the young candidate has finally learned to live up to his responsibility of working 
hard and not wasting time.  
 
The understanding of time in this mode is very much tied to the conduct of ‘saving’ 
(see also stories about time as a finite resource here: 8.1.2): time is a scarce resource 
and should therefore be spent carefully. Spending time in the lab on a Saturday night 
is, in this mode, not considered as an instance of being meticulous and taking time to 
work carefully with the data. It is more seen as recognition of the fact that the 
scientists would be wasting the time of the entire laboratory if they did not work over 
the weekend to finish their work as fast as possible. The two ways of understanding 
time generated by Vocation and Oikos co-exist, but they are not reconcilable. 
Depending on the mode, two different contexts in which to do science are apparent. 
From the perspective of Vocation, the scientists are responsible for the truth and 
should thus spend time on getting the most precise results. From the perspective of 
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Oikos, these professional duties fade into the background. It is more important that 
the scientists work fast and get the work done, so they can move on to something else 
for the sake of the business. So the idea of time shifts between the modes.  
 
This focus on time as a scarce resource also sheds light on an analysis that I present 
in Vocation (7.1.3). In that analysis, the junior scientists worry that their work is not 
living up to the standards related to the truth. If one considers that analysis again, but 
with time as a scarce resource, one can see an extra layer of confusion appearing for 
the junior scientists. Not only do the scientists have to produce something truthful, 
which they all appreciate takes an enormous amount of time, but they also have to 
simultaneously treat time as a scarce resource because all the grants and projects are 
temporary. In that way, the scientists have to weigh concerns for the standards of 
scientific rigour against time as a scarce resource; the evaluation criteria are thus 
doubled. 
 
In the chapter on Vocation, I name their understanding of time ‘Slow Science’ 
because it reminds me of the Slow Food movement, which equates the slowness with 
which one prepares a meal with the quality of that meal. Following that logic, I call 
the understanding of time generated by Oikos ‘Fast Science’ in reference to fast food. 
I do realise that the connotations to fast food are not as positive as those to Slow 
Food. But the fast food scene has improved much recently and they offer healthy and 
delicious alternatives, so neither fast food nor fast science should necessarily be 
understood to be of bad quality. But that aside, perhaps the understanding of time in 
this mode does not deserve as glorious a name. While the scientists do believe they 
need to take care of the business, they are not necessarily that fond of the focus on 
time management that Oikos generates. Many of them seem to find it quite frustrating 
and tiresome to have so little time on their hands and, as Simon mentioned earlier, no 
‘room for mistakes’.  
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Interestingly, Merton has described the time pressure on scientists in the paper 
‘Priorities in Scientific Discovery: A Chapter in the Sociology of Science’ (Merton 
1957). Merton describes how controversies about ‘who was first’ with regard to 
grand new discoveries have always been an inherent part of science (dating back to 
Galileo). He attributes these controversies to the ‘institutional norms of science’. 
These norms remind the single scientist that his role is only fulfilled if he advances 
mankind’s knowledge. To do so, according to Merton, is also the way to garner 
professional recognition and esteem in the scientific community (Merton 1957: 639) . 
In some ways, the analysis by Merton also makes sense in relation to ‘Fast Science’ 
as described here. But whereas Merton describes the relation between the institution 
of science and the individual scientist as the locus of analysis (the norms assert 
pressure on the scientist), Oikos sheds light on how the competition between different 
labs creates the need for priorities in scientific discovery and renders the demand for 
being ‘first’ important. Establishing findings and publishing papers are important 
aspects in the attempt to acquire funding. It thereby becomes extremely relevant as a 
way to take responsibility for the business. Being first and being fast is, in this 
interpretation, not only about personal recognition for each scientist but also of vital 
importance for the business’s survival.    
 
8.3.3 STRONG BELIEFS 
Another organisational consequence generated by Oikos is that the scientists have to 
have a strong faith in their assumptions. This is in stark contrast to the critical attitude 
that was a hallmark of Vocation. However, here the scientists are much more certain 
that their hypotheses are correct – even before the experiments are done.  
 
In an interview, Annie explains how Gyro Gearloose is moving toward accomplishing 
the promises they have been giving to the funding agency. She tells me that the grant 
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was based on three subprojects. Now that the first project has worked out, chances 
are that the same agency will fund them again. According to Annie, the lab made 
some bold claims in the proposal. They promised that they could create a diagnostic 
device that, with just a single drop of blood, can detect and distinguish a range of 
different infectious diseases. No one has been able to do that before. But at Gyro 
Gearloose, they have continued to strive toward this goal and believed they would 
pull it off, and now they have done it. Annie tells me that the funding agency has been 
a bit sceptical about the science, but now that the scientists have actually developed 
the method, Annie is quite certain that they can get funding from them again.  
 
One of the most striking consequences of Oikos is how it diminishes the scientists’ 
doubt about the truthfulness of their own predictions and promises. Vocation 
generated a doubtfulness that always accompanied the work. But Oikos turns things 
around. The scientists’ scepticism is replaced with a firm belief in their own abilities 
and assumptions.  
 
I have been invited to join a party that Henry is hosting at his house for the students 
who are applying for the graduate programme that he and the lab have initiated. As 
the evening draws to a close, many of the students are assembled in the living room, 
where Henry tells them about how his career began. He describes how ‘no one 
believed in his ideas’ in the beginning. He had applied for a position but was rejected 
in favour of another scientist. Eventually, she – the other scientist – said no and he 
was accepted instead, but he had great difficulties in obtaining funding and the lab 
was filled with machines the other scientist had left behind and which he could not 
use. In order to obtain money for his own project, he sold all the lab equipment. 
Eventually, he got a small grant due to a single member on a funding committee. She 
assured him that she found his ideas ‘crazy’ but that she was willing to give it a shot.  
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Throughout the story, Henry emphasises that few people believed in his ideas and he 
had to work hard to convince people, but he finally did – at least about his initial 
findings. The scientists at Gyro Gearloose are still met with scepticism from other 
labs. But Henry is used to opposition, as the story illustrates, and he is also used to 
believing in his own ideas when others do not. When this is the case, the lab just 
works harder to prove their results in even more ways.  
 
At Curious George, they also have some beliefs that they withhold despite 
opposition. The scientists at Curious George are, for instance, quite convinced of the 
merits of GM crops as a way to solve hunger problems despite great public – and at 
times scientific – opposition. At the closing seminar I give at Curious George, the 
scientists and I discuss the difficulties associated with working in a controversial 
field. Josh, one of the PhD students, raises his hand and comments:  
 
‘I don’t think it’s difficult at all. I mean, I considered this issue before I even started 
working here. And I’ve made up my mind. I think it’s a good technology. So I really 
don’t think about it anymore.’ 
 
Again, this is different from the critical attitude that pervaded Vocation. In that mode, 
the scientists are perhaps still in favour of GMO, but it is based on their work with 
the plants, the many papers they have read on the subject, and the fact that they are 
continuously keeping themselves up to date with the latest developments. Here, in 
Oikos, Josh states that he has simply stopped considering the subject – even before he 
started as a PhD student. He believes in what the lab does, period.  
 
Where the critical attitude from Vocation compels the scientists to go back into the 
laboratory, the strong beliefs generated by Oikos also have a productive effect. The 
act of believing means that the scientists can do certain things that would have 
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otherwise been difficult: They can apply for funding, make bold claims, publish – or 
at least try to – and they can patent their findings. When the scientists believe in 
something, they make decisions based on that fact. For instance, GMO is a good 
technology, hence I can work here; immunosignaturing will revolutionise diagnosing, 
hence I should apply for this grant; or this diagnostic device works, hence we should 
write a paper about it. When the scientists doubt something, they make decisions 
based on this uncertainty: We have not proved that the diagnostic device works, 
hence we need to retreat to the laboratory; or I am not sure that I separated the treated 
plants from the non-treated, hence I have to start this experiment all over.  
 
The belief that one is right about something is often seen in Housekeeping, for 
instance in this statement by the director: ‘We have some amazing results that would 
make other places green with envy’. But it is difficult to convince others. We have to 
do it slowly, one paper at a time’. The belief that what the lab finds out is actually 
correct, is apparent, they have ‘amazing results’, but despite this belief, they have 
troubles making other people believe in what they are doing. The way to change that 
is through production of papers. So papers are also used as arguments for a statement, 
which the scientists at Gyro Gealoose have already settled as a fact. They are means 
to convince those who are not part of Gyro Gearloose that the lab is indeed moving in 
the right direction and their results are reliable.  
 
Moving in the direction of establishing facts is important because it increases the 
labs’ chances of getting funding. Therefore, convincing facts are of the utmost 
importance in Oikos. In section (7.4), I discussed how negotiations of Vocation 
reminded me of the two-headed Janus figure described in Bruno Latour’s ‘Science in 
Action’ (Latour 1987): One head says ‘When things are true, they hold’ and the other 
head says ‘When things hold, they start to become true’. In the previous chapter, I 
stated that the scientists are only making statements similar to that of the right head of 
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the Janus figure: ‘When things hold, they start to become true’, but now we have 
suddenly moved to the left head. Now things are true and thus they hold: The 
diagnostic device works and they can therefore also write a paper about it; the lab has 
amazing results, thus they just need to convince outsiders; or their ideas are 
ambitious, thus someone should provide the money. In Latour’s account, the two 
heads of the Janus figure are not just stating opposites; they are also separated in 
time. When a scientific controversy is not yet settled, the right head talks. In the 
language of ANT, more actants need to be enrolled in order for the statement to 
become a settled truth (Latour 1987: 15). But when a controversy is settled, the left 
head talks. The fact becomes the reasoning behind new actions and new networks can 
evolve based on this fact (Latour 1987: 14). But in my study, the two heads do not 
seem to be separated by time; the two heads are in fact speaking at the same time, 
depending on the mode of responsibility. When the scientists feel responsible for the 
truth, they tend to be in doubt. They think they need more evidence in order to 
provide the truth. However, when they are responsible for the business, they tend to 
be convinced that things are true. The responsibility for the business thus generates a 
firmer belief in the lab’s abilities. 
 
8.3.4 DELETING THE PROFESSION – FOREGROUNDING THE 
ORGANISATION 
As I explained in the theory section Law (1994) describes the modes of ordering as 
generating specific patterns of the social (: 110). For instance, the modes tend to 
make certain parts very visible while other aspects are ‘deleted’. In the chapter on 
Vocation, I illustrated that the scientific profession and the scientific community are 
very visible as a result of the mode Vocation, while the labs as organisations faded 
into the background. Oikos generates the opposite pattern. The labs become very 
visible, while the scientific community is, if not entirely deleted from view, at least 
transformed and less important.   
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Together with Henry, I’m leaving a meeting that I have just observed. ‘You sent me 
an email yesterday,’ I volunteer. ‘Oh yes, I did… I did… why did I do that?’ he 
replies, half to himself. ‘Oh yeah, now I remember, it was so you could see the kind of 
opposition we are facing and I have been telling you about. No one believes in our 
results and people can get very hostile just because the results are so unbelievable 
and can shake the whole community.’ The email was from a scientist from another 
lab who – in so many words – concluded that Gyro Gearloose’s assumptions and 
results were rubbish and that the lab neither deserved funding nor any praise for its 
work. 
 
In the mode of Vocation, the scientific community seems to be both an enormous 
group of colleagues from across the globe and, at the same time, custodians of the 
truth who make sure fraud is not committed. But essentially the scientists think of 
themselves as members of a large community. This solidarity is no longer visible in 
the mode of Oikos. Instead, it seems that the scientific world consists of competing 
labs that do not always treat each other respectfully. Instead of being a member of a 
large community, Gyro Gearloose has suddenly gained significance as a smaller 
community where they believe in specific ideas and are in opposition to the wider 
scientific community. Oikos generates a ‘we’ – Henry sent me the mail so I could 
‘see the kind of opposition we are facing’ – that has its foundation in the lab and their 
shared assumptions.  
 
At Curious George, they are, among other areas, working with synthetic biology. 
This is also visible in other parts of their buildings. On the communication officer’s 
door, there are lots of comics, small posters, debate pieces and illustrations related 
to synthetic biology pinned up. Canute and the communication officer write many of 
the debate pieces; however, in other parts of the lab, synthetic biology is utterly 
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absent. Synthetic biology is, for instance, never mentioned in the wet labs or in 
relation to the scientists’ daily work tasks. At times, some of them tell me that they do 
not ‘do’ synthetic biology at all or that they have always worked with synthetic 
biology, but it is only recently that it has got that name – and they only use it for 
strategic reasons. But they go to conferences where synthetic biology is included in 
the headline, and they also collaborate with another lab that is famous for its exciting 
results related to synthetic biology.    
 
In the beginning of my the field work, it annoyed me that I could not get hold of this 
term and if the scientists actually worked in the field of Synthetic Biology. Did they 
‘do it’ or not? And for strategic reasons or not? But the question about the sincerity is 
not that important. Synthetic Biology seems to ‘do’ a lot of things for Curious 
George. One of the things that Synthetic Biology did for Curious George was to 
create a ‘we’ that separated them from other labs. For instance they distinguish 
themselves from the top-down approaches used at other laboratories and identify 
themselves with the bottom-up approaches characteristics of Synthetic Biology as 
expressed in the “share-your-parts” idea. When they work together with other 
faculties under the Synthetic Biology grant and things are a little difficult to run, they 
remind themselves that this is part of working with Synthetic Biology that is in its 
nature ‘interdisciplinary’. Synthetic Biology is also present when they participated in 
Public Engagement exercises and see that as their duty, because they were part of 
something ‘new’. The PhD students are at times going to ‘synbio lunches’ together, 
where prominent scientists and industrial people give talks and they can discuss 
different aspects of the discipline and the developments. At the same time, the 
scientists get their papers accepted in top synthetic biology journals, Canute is 
evaluating grants for centres for synthetic biology in Great Britain and the lab gets 
invited to give plenary lectures at international conferences.  
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In many ways, it is actually irrelevant in this dissertation to answer the question about 
whether the scientists actually ‘do’ synthetic biology, because, no matter what, 
synthetic biology creates many situations where Curious George performs as a united 
entity. So in many ways, synthetic biology unites the scientists at Curious George and 
distinguishes the lab from other labs. My impression is that synthetic biology makes 
the lab into a distinct entity more than it makes the scientists part of an international 
scientific community. Synthetic biology plays different roles in maintaining the lab 
and enabling it to thrive.  
 
The responsibility for the business unites the lab, perhaps not surprisingly, in its core 
assumptions and distinct scientific field, making it stand out as a unified whole. The 
wider scientific community, which has a strong presence in Vocation, is more in the 
background here – or, rather, is not considered as a community but instead as voices 
from other organisations. This deletion of the profession and foregrounding of the 
organisation is also an important clues to how the scientists consider science’s role in 
society. Vocation generated a view of science as one among several other stable 
institutions that had some distinctive responsibilities and together made this society 
work. In this mode, the scientists do not talk about the distribution of responsibilities 
between different institutions. Instead they seem to constantly focus on their own lab 
and its possibilities compared with other labs and their possibilities. Their idea of 
society has become one of a market populated by many small labs that are in fierce 
competition for very scarce resources. Big institutions as ‘the public’ or ‘government’ 
disappear – only industry and funding agencies are left as other actors on the markets. 
And they are only visible in respect of their roles as providers of funding or buyers of 
knowledge.  
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8.4. NEGOTIATING OIKOS 
In the last couple of sections, I have treated Oikos as if it appeared as a pure mode 
that was never questioned and that pervaded all of the scientists’ work. But, of 
course, it is not. There has already been an entire chapter devoted to another mode, 
namely, Vocation, and I will describe yet another one, Citizenship, in the next 
chapter, therefore Oikos is of course also limited. In this section, I will describe some 
situations where Oikos is negotiated in relation to other modes. In the last chapter, I 
described some negotiations used by the scientists to alleviate situations where the 
performance of Oikos is in conflict with Vocation. In what follows, I will add some 
more descriptions of these negotiations.  
 
I’m following Alan around. He explains the different projects that he will hopefully 
have time to do today. As we talk, one of the scientists approaches and asks whether 
Alan has time to help her with an experiment in the afternoon. ‘Of course,’ Alan 
volunteers. Afterwards, I ask him how he prioritises the different projects he is 
working on. ‘Carefully’ he answers and laughs. But he continues by explaining that 
the trick is to make the incubation times fit, so he can work on one project while 
another is stirring. But it requires him to remember all the things that he is doing and 
to know the exact reasons behind the steps he has taken. This is difficult at times. He 
also says that he is a little afraid that his focusing on the many different tasks makes 
him a little less critical with his own scientific work. If he had more time and fewer 
things to consider at the same time, he believes he could prepare his experiments 
more properly and consider more carefully why he chooses as he does.   
 
In this story, Alan is concerned that some of the values that are inherent in the mode 
of Vocation are neglected because he has the responsibility to move many different 
projects along at the same time, as this will benefit the business the most. While he 
considers it his responsibility to do so, he is at the same time afraid that it is actually 
 285 
affecting his ability to make decisions regarding the project with acne.  While it does 
not change his behaviour, if his responsibility for ‘the business’ seems too 
burdensome, then it does makes him weary, as he gets the feeling that he is actually 
neglecting the responsibility that he feels for the truth.  
 
The scientists often question the responsibility for the business because they simply 
feel that they neither have the time nor the experience to do it. Clark from Curious 
George explains to me that since he is not really educated to commercialise his 
findings, he finds it inefficient that he has that responsibility. We continue: 
 
Me: ‘Would you like to become better at that aspect of your work?’ 
Clark: ‘Actually no.’ 
Me: ‘Why not?’ 
Clark: ‘It is not really that interesting. I would like to have assistants for that or an 
office where I state: “This is my technology. Now go and see if you can sell it 
somewhere”.’ 
 
In this quote, Clark is not directly rejecting the idea of commercialising his 
technologies, but he does not find that aspect of his work particularly interesting, and 
he also finds it suspicious that he has to do work that he is not educated to do. While I 
am sure he knows that it is utopic, he would prefer some kind of work division, 
where others took the responsibility for patents and commercialisations so he can 
focus on doing science. I interpret this as an instance where the responsibility for the 
business is challenged by the concern for doing what the scientists consider their 
main job. Clark considers it his main job to conduct research. That is the task that he 
is educated to do. The responsibility to do something with what he invents is 
secondary – not that he is against it, but he believes that these different 
responsibilities should be kept separate. So the responsibility is rejected on the basis 
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of a special form of division of labour, where scientists invent and others 
commercialise. While this is not realistic, it shows some of the resistance that the 
scientists feel for this part of their job.  
 
Another way that the scientists negotiate the responsibility for the business is by 
stressing that they are exactly not businessmen. They are public scientists and public 
scientists should not care about making a profit in the way businessmen do, because 
that makes them neglect the concern for those duties they have as public scientists. 
As Miriam underlines: 
 
‘I think it’s important that we [public scientists] stand up and say that we don’t want 
to be a service organ for industry, because then we’ll never make any kind of work 
that matters in the long run and that’s an important part of academia’s role. Because 
the way they make science in industry… I fear that it isn’t about the big discoveries 
but just improvements of old stuff, because it’s all about the bottom line.’ 
 
In this quote, Miriam distances herself from thinking too much about ‘the bottom 
line’, because that concern will take her focus away from the responsibility she has as 
a public scientist, namely, that of doing science that is not readily applicable, but that 
somehow may turn out to be a great and useful discovery later on.  
 
Oikos is negotiated during the scientists’ daily work in a range of different ways. In 
some instances, the responsibility for the business is questioned because the scientists 
are worried that it will collide with their responsibility for the truth – as Alan and 
Clark describe in relation to different situations. Here, it is mainly a matter of time 
and how they cannot fulfil both responsibilities to the extent they wish if they are to 
focus on their research as well. This is something I saw rarely. The responsibility for 
the business is also contradicted with the responsibility the scientists feel they have as 
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public scientists. Therefore, they think that this responsibility for the business sets 
some limitations for their research and should be reserved for corporate scientists. In 
the next chapter, Citizenship, I will take a closer look at this distinction between 
public and private. 
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8.5 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO LABS 
The two labs share many similarities in terms of how they construct the responsibility 
for the business and the way they handle it. The basic responsibility for the business 
is shared and so are the organisational consequences of this responsibility, such as 
how the responsibility is shared between different professional positions, how the 
work conditions make them anxious about the future and how they believe in their 
own assumptions.  
 
However, their attitudes toward this responsibility vary. At Curious George, they see 
the work they have to do as necessary, but quite tedious. They view much of the 
responsibility for taking care of the business as something quite annoying and 
counterproductive for their work. They consider most of it as something that is 
demanded of them from the outside, most likely from politicians. On the whole, they 
consider the part of their job that takes focus away from their core responsibility 
(developing new scientific insights) an annoyance. In an interview, Clark from 
Curious George describes the joy he gets from doing scientific work:  
 
‘I can develop my own projects. If I stumble across something that sounds interesting, 
I am absolutely free to follow up on that as long as it fits in the concept. And I have to 
define the concepts through my interests. This is why I was picked for this job and, 
since I think that I fit this job very well, there is a very good overlap between what I 
am supposed to do and what I like.’  
 
Mostly, he finds that he is able to ‘develop his own projects’, and he also believes 
that this is what he has been hired to do: ‘This is why I was picked for this job’. But 
on the other hand, he also has to do a large amount of work to make ‘something that 
sounds interesting’ into a research project that can be funded and done at Curious 
George. That part, he finds annoying:  
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‘I think the stretch is sometimes a bit over the top. There are certain keywords from 
which you get funding. If you don’t have those in your application, then you can 
almost guarantee that the reviewer may not even see it – that it will be kicked out 
beforehand. So if you want to get money, you have to make the stretch and bring that 
into the project. And hopefully it will be close enough, so that it includes your interest 
as well.’  
 
He is less satisfied with this part of the job and also finds it slightly silly, as they have 
to fit certain terms into their applications in order to get the attention of the funding 
agencies. His comments on the balance between what the scientists find ‘interesting’ 
and the interests of the funding agencies echo many other comments from employees 
at Curious George. When I ask about the parts of the job that relate to maintaining the 
business, all of them point to the quest for funding as a demanding and difficult part 
of their work. They seem to believe that these conditions are getting worse and that 
they fill up more of their workday than in the past. They also consider the ‘freedom’ 
to choose interesting patterns of research as an important aspect of their job. 
 
One of the scientists at Curious George explains that he likes the job because there is 
a lot of freedom to be creative connected to the position. But he thinks this is 
changing due to the increased reliance on external funding and political demands for 
more ‘relevance’. He is afraid that this will ruin the fruitful scientific environment, 
because he believes that the less freedom they have to be creative in their work, the 
less creative they will become, and thereby not deliver the solutions that society is 
asking for:  
 
‘[…] I believe […] that if you are asked to solve a problem very explicitly, like: 
“Solve this problem now!”, then you will walk down a path where everybody else has 
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already been. Then it all turns a little more into mechanical thinking and automatic 
thinking, because you may also feel that there is a deadline and no time for 
reflection.’   
 
So for the scientists at Curious George, the part of Oikos that relates to external 
funding and political demands for the direction of research is tiresome and perhaps 
damaging for the scientific results, as it demands time and energy. ‘The freedom of 
research’ is an ideal that has been both described (e.g. Merton 1973) and discussed 
before as a specific relation between the institution of science and the rest of society. 
In order for science to investigate, improve and criticise society, it is supposed to be 
kept at arms length from other institutions and pursue directions that it finds to be the 
most pressing. What the scientists in the above excerpts are describing share some 
similarities with this principle. But in Oikos, this principle is not thought about as an 
institutional prerequisite, but as an organisational one: The scientists at Curious 
George see ‘freedom’ as being time and space to do what they believe is their 
primary job, namely, doing research. The rest is thought of as ‘politics’ or 
‘bureaucracy’, something that leaves less time for their core responsibility. On the 
other hand, they never question their responsibility to be careful when using 
materials. It seems that they consider this element as both fair and meaningful. In any 
case, the materials are never really up for debate. Their concern about not having 
enough time is a little trickier: While they perhaps do not question that they should 
not waste time directly, this virtue is closely connected to the temporary projects and 
the temporary positions that they are critical of.  
 
The attitude toward this responsibility is a little different at Gyro Gearloose. First, it 
seems as if management is embracing this way of managing science, as it keeps 
public scientists on their toes and forces them to think creatively and move out of 
their disciplinary comfort zones – as described in the quote by Henry. The scientists 
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who are not part of management do not speak much with me about these aspects of 
their work life. I am not sure if this is because I have never really gained their 
confidence and have remained an outsider - or they in general do not discuss these 
issues. While they do not voice their opinions much, there seemed to be an anxious 
ambience in the lab due to recent firings and talk about budgets. But it is not my 
impression that this necessarily makes the scientists sceptical about the way the lab is 
organised. It seems that they have accepted that temporary positions and external 
funding is the way to organise scientific work.  
 
It is difficult to say something very distinct about why the two labs have a different 
attitude to this responsibility. In Denmark, the great reliance on external funding and 
the increased competition between labs is relatively new. The university reform from 
2003 fully initiated this development. Before that, the universities’ economies were to 
a much larger extent based on stable public funding (Gorm-Hansen 2011). The 
reform has received much critique from the scientific community in Denmark, and 
many of the working scientists are fiercely against it. This opposition may be an 
explanation for the differences between Denmark and the USA. But on the other 
hand, the USA has been through similar reforms of the funding system. The 
governance structures of the universities are similar in both countries, even though 
the universities in the USA are in more competition than they are in Denmark.   
 
Another interpretation is that Gyro Gearloose has a more ‘entrepreneurial’ spirit than 
Curious George. Henry talks about himself and the other scientists at the lab as being 
‘inventors’, and this is perhaps an identity that is different than being a ‘scientist’. As 
inventors they are perhaps much more used to the fact that they need others – 
investors – to believe in them in order to raise money for their projects. This is in 
contrast to Gyro Gearloose, where Clark maintains that they are ‘really geeks’ and 
focused on the ‘whole process of doing science’. These differences in how they 
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understand their own jobs may also influence their attitude toward the responsibility 
for the business. Where the scientists at Curious George do not think of themselves as 
an entity that has a ‘business’ to run (the fact that they do is a result of external 
conditions), the scientists at Gyro Gearloose consider the ‘business’ a much more 
integrated part of the lab. 
 
 
8.6 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, I have examined a mode of responsibility that I have chosen to call 
‘Oikos’. Oikos generates some specific forms of conduct, namely, that of investing, 
saving and maintaining. The scientists justify these forms of behaviour with the 
responsibility they have for the survival of ‘the business’ – the organisation they are a 
part of. The organisational traits Oikos generates are very different than the ones 
described in the chapter of Vocation. Oikos generates a concern for time as a scarce 
resource, which I have called ‘Fast Science’. It also generates a strong belief in the 
labs’ own abilities and assumptions. And it creates an understanding of science role 
in society as that of a business in competition with other businesses – an 
understanding that makes the united professional community fade into the 
background.  
 
As part of the concluding remarks, I will now relate the findings from this chapter 
with the governance rationalities from chapter 6. Interestingly, this mode is perhaps 
the farthest away from any of the four rationalities, and perhaps it is because not that 
many scientists writing about ‘responsibility’ consider this particular responsibility a 
desired one. But the rationality that comes closest is in my view the ‘Contribution 
Rationality’. While the focus in chapter 6 is on how the Contribution Rationality 
demands the external control of scientists and underlines the importance of ‘usable’ 
results, some of the elements are still similar, not least the focus on how to govern 
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science in order to make it ‘contribute’. While external governance is certainly in 
focus, some of the texts also articulate the need to make laboratories and universities 
look more like ‘businesses’ and make them compete on a market. The logic of the 
rationality being that this will drive the scientists away from doing work that is not 
relevant or usable and toward making a valuable contribution to society. The mode of 
responsibility that I have described here can be viewed as a result of that way of 
thinking. While the scientists from Curious George claim that these conditions do not 
affect the core of their research, they also admit that they have to shape their 
applications in ways that ‘overlap’ with their funders’ interests. Gyro Gearloose is 
even more radical in so far as they consciously take their point of departure in a 
specific tangible ‘need’ or ‘problem’ that they identify in society and try to solve. In 
that way, they do not feel they have to bend their applications too much in 
comparison with what they want to research; they simply apply to those funding 
agencies that have similar interests.  
 
At the beginning of this chapter, I stated that Oikos shared some similarities with the 
‘entrepreneurial scientist’ as, for instance, described by Etzkowitz (1983, 1998). 
While it is true that the scientists at times see the potential for taking commercial 
advantage of their findings and do frequently take patents, Oikos demonstrates some 
differences compared to Etzkowitz’s descriptions. Where the ‘entrepreneurial 
scientist’ in his view has many opportunities in the double role of scientist and 
businessman or -woman, Oikos in the scientists’ view seems to be mainly generated 
by external pressures for competition and the market-like structures of the 
universities – it is a necessity rather than an opportunity. That this perhaps also 
increases their possibilities for personal economic gain seems to be a smaller part of 
the scientists’ attitude. They are more concerned with how they can keep their jobs 
after the current funding runs out and what the lab’s future may look like under the 
current conditions.   
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9. CITIZENSHIP 
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n this chapter, I will describe the third and last ‘mode of responsibility’: the mode 
of Citizenship. In the previous chapters, I have already discussed how concerns 
about contributing to the surrounding society at times made it difficult for 
scientists to live up to what they consider to be responsibility for the truth and to the 
organisation. But in this chapter, I will illustrate that this concern is indeed a mode in 
itself. In several ways, this chapter directly addresses the science governance 
literature on ‘Responsible Science’ (e.g. Owen et al. 2014). First, because this chapter 
demonstrates that the government rationality does indeed work in the organisations – 
and I illustrate in detail how. But I also examine how Citizenship differs from 
‘Responsible Science’, as it also draws on other contemporary ideals about science 
and society. Second, because it deals with how concerns for the surrounding society 
are at once embraced, negotiated and rejected. In that way, it engages with some of 
the practicable obstacles in realising an ideal about a science ‘for the people’ (Owen, 
Macnaghten, and Stilgoe 2012). Finally, this chapter describes how the 
abovementioned rationality works in relation to different scientific pursuits and 
disciplines, thereby questioning whether elements in this rationality should be used as 
general guidelines in science governance, as has recently been the case in the 
European Union’s new framework for research, Horizon 2020 (Von Schomberg 
2013).  
 
Like the previous two chapters, this chapter begins by exploring a range of conducts 
in this mode, before moving on to justifications and the organisational consequences. 
It finishes by relating Citizenship to the two previous modes and the ideals about 
responsible conduct as we saw them in chapter x.  
 
 
  
I 
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9.1 CONDUCT 
In this section, I will examine three different forms of conduct that are pervasive in 
Citizenship, namely ‘speaking about science’, ‘listening to the public’ and ‘doing 
research’. All of the conducts are ways of behaving that are supposed to fulfil the 
responsibility of contributing something to the public, and all of them are acquired 
abilities. I observed how they are taught to newcomers in the lab and sustained 
through different, repeated situations and events. They are also encouraged by 
management and discussed as part of the daily work of the organization. As in the 
previous chapters, I want to make it clear that the scientists under discussion here 
would not necessarily deploy the same distinctions as I have: For instance the 
distinctions, between the conduct ‘speaking about science’ and that of ‘listening to 
the public’. But these distinctions bring out some details about the differences 
between the two labs and their views of the public. While ‘listening to the public’ and 
‘speaking about science’ may well take place at the same time and in the same space, 
I also see them as two different ways of performing the mode of Citizenship.  
‘Speaking about science’ does not imply that the scientists intend to listen to their 
audience, but merely that they consider it their duty to inform a wider public about 
what they are doing. ‘Listening to the public’ on the other hand implies the 
expectation that the public has a legitimate say in science, which the scientists 
actively take their time to listen to. What connect all forms of conduct are the 
justifications deployed by the scientists, which we will return to after the section on 
conduct.  
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9.1.1 SPEAKING ABOUT SCIENCE 
The first form of conduct that I want to describe is that of ‘speaking about science’. I 
have chosen to include it because I discovered that this takes up a considerable part of 
the scientists’ work (and spare) time. At the same time, I also believe that both the 
way they speak about science and the places they do so share some distinctive 
similarities, which I find interesting to draw out in order to show what the mode of 
Citizenship is about. First, I will describe what it means to ‘speak about science’ in 
the two laboratories.  
 
It turned out, to my surprise, that most of the scientists in the two labs are quite 
engaged in speaking about their research in various arenas. One of the seniors at 
Curious George claims that being able to communicate about one’s own research is a 
vital part of the scientists’ upbringing: 
 
‘What we [the supervisors] really, really want is that our students understand their 
project and that they are able to tell about it. I mean all of us have to be able to sit 
next to our grandmother and explain our project to her, before she falls asleep over 
dinner. No one has a project that is so difficult that you cannot explain it in three 
minutes.’  
 
The conduct of ‘speaking about science’ is very straightforward. It is about the 
scientists going around and describing their work to people outside their own field. 
Some, but not all, of this is formally organised and takes place directly in the work 
context, as in this instance: 
 
Tonight is ‘Public Lab Night’, a bi-annual event, where the whole university, 
including Gyro Gearloose, invites the public inside. On a ‘normal’ weekday, it is 
actually quite difficult to get into the lab. Guards are barring the entrance and 
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everyone needs a special invitation to get in if you are not employed here. To open 
the doors you either use the iris-recognition device or a personal key-card. At first, I 
believed that all these precautions were in place to prevent industrial espionage. But 
it turns out – one of the scientists tells me – that it is supposed to hinder animal 
activists from getting in: ‘you know, they have the whole basement full of laboratory 
animals, right?’  
 
But tonight the doors are going to be wide open and people may come from far and 
wide.  The lab is buzzing with the preparations of different exercises and exhibitions, 
which are on show for the guests. Annie, whom I’m following, fetches a big box from 
under one of the desks. It contains a vast amount of nuts and bolts and some 
homemade strips of cardboard and paper, which shine in bright blue, yellow, orange 
and red colours. They are identical to the multi-coloured diagrams that I have seen 
her work on when she is preparing presentations of her dissertation, but the diagram 
has been torn apart into strips.  ‘This is the kit I use when I’m telling people about 
the diagnostic device that I’m working on’, she says. ‘The colour blue in a signature 
indicates that the individual is healthy, whereas orange, yellow and red indicate the 
presence of disease. I have made my work into a puzzle, so kids can try to assemble 
the diagram – it’s amazing, even kids, who are five or six years old, can tell a sick 
person from a healthy person using their color coded signature responses.’ 
 
All the other volunteers, who are going to present their research tonight, have tried to 
come up with similar creative ways of speaking about their projects. There are pieces 
of cardboard, scissors and post-its lying around the lab. The devices are quite 
different from the grand machines and small flasks usually in action. So, on the one 
hand, the lab feels a little unusual. This is not a typical day: All the volunteers for the 
evening wear the same T-shirt with a big ‘ASK ME’ sign on the back, the front-doors 
are unexpectedly open, the guards joke around, and the instruments have shifted from 
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being so alien to me that they elude description to being items I recognise from theme 
days at primary school. On the other hand, perhaps it is just me who thinks about the 
difference; the scientists seem to feel at ease with this change of environment. While 
this day may be a little different than a normal workday, the scientists do not seem 
confused or in doubt about their task. They have clearly done all of this before. Annie 
has experimented with the puzzles several times, and she has found a way to tell 
children about the project in an engaging way. She tells me that she likes the ‘Public 
Lab Nights’ because  
 
‘You never know if somebody is going to give you some kind of clue to the research. 
And the kids are funny. They are so eager and not afraid to ask at all.’ 
 
Sandra, a newly employed scientist from Gyro Gearloose, comments that South-West 
University in general seems quite good at ‘outreach’:  
 
‘In my old job, there weren’t that many outreach activities or anything, you know, of 
that stuff. I really think that the president here has done a great job in promoting that 
kind of thing. I mean, I see all these adverts for science-cafés and stuff and everybody 
seems involved.’ 
 
Interestingly, despite being at a university known for its many outreach activities, 
several scientists commented that they ‘seldom have the opportunity’ to discuss their 
research. This is a little surprising to me. I have almost been overwhelmed by the 
number of engagement projects of various sorts they are part of at Gyro Gearloose. 
Some of it, such as the ‘Public Night Lab’, is part of the university’s overall outreach 
strategy, and some of it is initiated by the lab itself. There are a lot of activities by 
which they attempt to tell people about the research they are doing. They frequently 
give talks at the local Exploratorium, they participate in ‘Public Lab Nights’, and I 
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have seen their PIs appear at other public engagement events. Nevertheless, they still 
seem as if they could somehow do more, and they talk about themselves as isolated 
from other people. I frequently heard scientists express the sentiment that they are 
outside the rest of society and not engaged enough. This is not only the case at Gyro 
Gearloose, but also at Curious George. The scientists feel guilty about their lack of 
engagement and feel they should somehow do more to reach out. My interpretation is 
that their idea of isolation comes from the image of the lonely scientist in the ‘Ivory 
Tower’. This popular image of the scientist as a lonely, geeky person high up in a 
shiny, impenetrable tower seemed at times rather strong among the scientists – 
despite the fact that they should be the first to know that things far from conform to 
this stereotype Barry, Chandler and Clarke 2001). I believe that the mode of 
Citizenship is far away from the image of the scientist, alone in his ivory tower. 
However, it is very telling about the mode that the scientists both reproduce the 
image of themselves in an ivory tower while not liking this role. It is important for 
them to get out of that tower, not to be isolated, but to be, rather, engaging and 
responsive. But I do not think that any number of science cafés and public lab nights 
would change their views of their profession as being decoupled from the rest of 
society. The scientists speak a lot about their work in various formalised settings, but 
they still believe it to be too little compared to how much they feel they should 
engage.  
 
I will return to this matter in greater detail in the section called ‘Basic Science Guilt’ 
(9.3.3). For the purposes here, it is enough to underline the constant insecurity about 
communication, because it highlights the conduct of ‘speaking about science’. 
Having a bad conscience about not telling the public enough about their research 
projects indicates that the scientists acknowledge there being expectations to their 
role, which they then do not believe they fulfil; partly because it clashes with another 
ideal, namely, that of being distant from society.  
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At both Gyro Gearloose and Curious George, the act of speaking about their research 
to wider audiences beyond their scientific community is something one does and 
something that is considered important. All the scientists I engaged with have told 
‘laypeople’ about their research in various places. They have been at science 
festivals, they have told school children about science, they have been at libraries and 
cafés and talked to interested citizens, they have invited people into their labs on 
special nights and showed them what they worked with, some have written debate 
pieces for the national newspapers, and some have appeared on television news once 
in a while. In my view, these places for ‘speaking about science’ are interesting in 
regard to the current focus on public legitimacy. Most of these events occur in places 
that are recognised as being at the core of public life and general education, or as 
Nowotny (1993) would put it, the ‘agora’. Schools, newspapers, libraries, TV news 
and academia: All places that have historically been recognised as locations with 
public access that encourage debate, enlightenment and development (although ideas 
of who exactly has been considered a member of this ‘public’ has shifted over time). 
The performance of this mode in classic public spaces adds to my impression that the 
scientists consider public legitimacy important. The scientists are obliged to show up 
in spaces that are made for the public and report about their work – not only so that 
the public can be enlightened and science debated, but also so that fellow citizens in 
their community can value and evaluate the scientists’ work. This issue will be 
further discussed in the Justification section.  
 
This formally organised and, by its nature, ‘public’ way of speaking about science is 
just one of the ways that they engage, with another way being more private and 
informally organised and which often happens in everyday-like situations with only a 
few people involved. In the following quote, it is one of the seniors, Sandra, at Gyro 
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Gearloose who describes science communication at the bus stop; she finds it a bit 
difficult, but tries to make an effort anyway: 
 
‘I cannot discuss in a way, you know, where anyone would understand what I’m 
saying, because it’s all about crystallography and in-vitro translations. I just have to 
put it in different terms, and we don’t always have a lot of interaction with society in 
general, so it’s just like neighbours or people I see at the bus – my daughter’s bus 
stop – so I try to explain what I’m doing, the best that I can…’ 
 
Many of the scientists talk about communication in the same way: it’s all a bit 
difficult, as they need to translate between their specialised work-language and a 
different everyday language (and again there is the idea that they ‘do not often have a 
lot of interaction with society’), but they claim that they make an effort anyway. They 
speak about all sorts of places where they meet people and discuss their research. 
Family gatherings, visits to their grandmother, parties at clubs and bars – or at their 
daughter’s bus stop on the way to school. Many of them talk about discussions that 
are taken up by individuals who are critical of the technologies they work with, be it 
vaccines, diagnostic devises or GMO. Sandra continues: 
 
‘But it’s difficult, you know. People have their own ideas about what you are doing or 
they are very anti-vaccine or whatever […]. I think that is so weird...[…] I have just 
met them at the bus stop or where-ever, and then you try to say “well, we do 
vaccines, not only to protect our own health but to our… the help for the elderly 
people we know or the six-month-old babies we know”, or whatever, you know, we 
are trying to protect society, and it isn’t just the drug companies that are trying to rip 
you off, you know, as I hear a lot.’ 
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From the quote, it seems that she becomes a little offended that people are against 
vaccines, as it is her work and she believes that she is doing a good thing. She says 
that ‘we are trying to protect society’ and then people just answer that they are ‘anti-
vaccine’ or complain to her that it is the drug companies that are trying to ‘rip you 
off’. Interestingly, she has at other sessions been very understanding about (her own 
imagination of) the general public’s scepticism about science. She finds it reasonable 
that people are anxious about all the money that gets poured into science compared to 
how few results they get back (see also 9.2.1). But when it’s about her personal work, 
she becomes more passionate and defensive. This is a reaction I often got from the 
scientists who discuss their research areas in their spare time. They frequently get the 
impression that science communication is about defending their own work and 
position. As Angela from Curious George says: 
 
‘I have friends and acquaintances who are really into that eco-wave and who believe 
that being part of that equals being against everything that could be named mingling 
with nature in any kind of way. They think [my work] is a little… But, when I start to 
actually talk with these people, they are quite easily convinced that what we do here 
is pretty ok and orderly.’   
 
Usually, they find their own work ‘ok’, and they can explain why it is so important 
and potentially useful, and they therefore want to defend it. At the same time, the 
discussions become an opportunity to actually discuss and perhaps convince people 
about their position. Miriam, for instance, says: 
 
‘One of my good friends, for instance, he has begun to send me all these papers about 
how dangerous GMO can be, because he knows that I’m working with it.’ 
 
Me: ‘What’s your reaction to that?’ 
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Miriam: ‘It’s a little “oh bummer, now do I really have to familiarise myself with all 
that stuff?” But I’m becoming more and more aware of how important it is to discuss 
these things, because in the last instance, we can see how we make obstacles for 
ourselves in the future, if we don’t do it.’ 
 
I had conducted several interviews with Miriam at this point and had also followed 
her around for quite some time. Thus, I am not sure whether it has been my own 
influence that has played a part here, or whether it is the almost two year period she 
has spent at Curious George, but she has definitely changed her mind about the 
importance of non-scientists’ opinions. In the beginning, she was quite convinced that 
people who could not see the advantages of GMO were either just not enlightened 
yet, or stubborn, radical activists. But this attitude has gradually changed. She still 
believes that GMO is a good solution to a range of different problems, but she has 
also started to consider her own role as a scientist differently. She has started to think 
it important to participate in dialogues about emerging GMO technologies, because 
without it she risks her area disappearing due to lack of public support. What is left is 
the annoyance that she has to get acquainted with a lot of new material, as this is 
tiresome and requires extra work. This very practical and indeed onerous aspect of 
communication is something many of the scientists pointed to. 
 
In many ways, Miriam, Angela and Sandra’s stories reflect an attitude that I often 
encountered: They are a little tired of talking about their research in their spare time, 
because it is hard to spend a lot of time defending one’s job and choice of living – 
and sometimes people can be downright unpleasant. On the other hand, they keep 
doing so, and they clearly feel they are obliged to. In Miriam’s case, her (new) 
position is almost an exact replica of the recommendations from recent Science 
Communication Literature. Several authors (e.g. Kearnes and Rip 2009) have 
reported that nanotechnology is seen as an opportunity to ‘get it right this time’ – in 
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opposition to the controversies following the advancements of GM-technologies. My 
impression from Miriam and others is that the scientists hope to curb resistance to 
their field by making the right kind of communication ‘in advance’. However, there is 
more to it than that. Miriam, at least, has changed her impression of her work and the 
role of science in society. When I, in the same interview, ask her if she thinks it is 
okay that public attitudes influence, which areas get funding, she replies: 
 
‘Yes, I’m convinced it is, and perhaps I wasn’t the last time you interviewed me, but 
I’m increasingly convinced about that. I mean, yes, it’s their [the public’s] money and 
if we can’t convince them that we are doing something good, then perhaps it’s not the 
right thing that we are doing. But we also have to convince them that there really can 
come something good [out of science] if they dare take the risk…’ 
 
Miriam’s impression of the science policy world has changed. In earlier interviews, 
she shared the view that the public, in contrast to the scientists, is irrational and 
therefore should be kept out of decision-making about the direction of science. Now 
she more considers science policy as an arena where the public has a legitimate say 
and where everyone, including the scientists, should try to ‘convince’ each other 
about the best direction for science and society and negotiate a solution. She therefore 
pulls herself together and reads her friend’s anti-GMO literature, even though it 
means extra work. I find Miriam’s shifting attitude about the public’s legitimate right 
to participate in science policy decisions interesting, as it reflects the contemporary 
idea about science’s (and in general public institutions’) role in society; namely, that 
scientists continuously have to address the public’s concerns, because the public has a 
legitimate voice and right to change the direction of science. In that regard, the public 
sphere is considered a place where several heterogeneous, but equal, actors negotiate 
opinions and try to convince each other of their merits (Horst 2012b: 128). It 
therefore becomes the scientists’ duty to speak about their research in order to 
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‘convince’ their peers, the public, that they are working for them. In this also lies a 
shift in the scientists’ view of the connection between ‘the citizen’ and ‘the state’. 
The citizen is, in this view, seen as having the right to – through choices and actions – 
deliver policy objectives (Barnes and Prior 2009: 6). This in turn has consequences 
for the way the scientists do their job: From the observations so far, it seems that they 
have to partake in speaking about their science more ‘publically’ in order to obtain 
and/or deserve public support for public science’s future.  
 
I do not believe in any way that all the scientists whom I met during my fieldwork 
spoke about research in the same way and with the same expectations. But all the 
scientists seem to agree that they should be able to – and do frequently – explain their 
research to laypeople. This does not necessarily mean that they agree that the public 
should interfere with decision-making on funding. Nor does it mean that they all 
agree that the public should have legitimate opinions about, say, ethical or safety 
issues. But as a minimum they agree that it is a part of their job to speak publically 
about science. 
 
9.1.2 LISTENING TO THE PUBLIC 
In this section, I will describe conduct that is closely linked to that of ‘speaking about 
science’, namely, that of ‘listening to the public’. As I already hinted in the last 
section, it is important for the scientists to engage with the public, and I further 
described how this is necessary, as they need to negotiate science policy; it is only by 
speaking about their research that they can move the public. In this section, however, 
I will go a step further and argue that the scientists also take particular care to listen 
to the public and incorporate what they hear into their daily work.  
 
A while before I started my fieldwork at Gyro Gearloose, they tested one of their 
inventions, a diagnostic device, on a group of citizens from the nearby city. The 
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diagnostic device could monitor the general health of a person from day to day and 
also ‘predict’ certain diseases (such as certain forms of Alzheimer’s and cancer), 
even if there would not be an outbreak for years to come. The scientists held meetings 
with the participants and informed them about the functions of the device, what it 
could do and the prospects of getting a technology like that on the market. If people 
were positive or curious, they could become part of the experiments and get a chance 
to monitor their own health for a period of time. A lot of people volunteered – and 
many even wanted to continue after the experiment had ended. Some of them came up 
with the idea of a website, so they could check their health condition online. The 
scientists were quite surprised by this development; they had not expected people to 
get so engaged, and they got very busy setting up the webpage. One of the ideas with 
this experiment was to get new test persons for the technology, which was often 
difficult. Another one was to get input from people about the problems and prospects 
of the device, so they could alter the designs and functions of the technology before 
they tried to commercialise it.  
 
During my visit, the scientists at Gyro Gearloose often referred to this test as a 
tremendous success. Not only did they recruit a lot of test persons, they also got 
valuable input about their diagnostic device, which changed some of the basic 
features of the technology. In its original form, the diagnostic device measured the 
amount of antibodies in the blood and, based on that information, estimated the health 
condition of the person in question. Therefore, everyone who used the device needed 
to prick him or herself with a needle. In an interview with Charles, who had been part 
of organising the project, he told me about one of the attendees, who had asked if 
they could come up with another method because she hated needles. He comments 
that ‘after we got that input from that lady about not wanting to hurt herself, I really 
believe things got going’. Due to her comment, the scientists went back to the lab and 
started thinking about alternative ways of measuring antibodies:   
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‘And that [after the woman questioned the use of needles] was when we started 
thinking about doing saliva tests, because it turns out that saliva and blood actually 
have a lot of the same antibodies. A couple of very specific ones are missing, but most 
of them are the same.’  
 
They ended up redesigning the entire device, so it is now based on a saliva test 
instead of a blood test. They had to sacrifice the identification of ‘a couple of very 
specific’ antibodies in the redesign process, but it seems that they think it was worth 
it. The scientists often refer to this story when they argue for the value of including 
laypeople in their research projects. I heard references to ‘that woman’ at several 
meetings and the story was retold to me in several interviews. While she seems to be 
one of the few individuals (to my knowledge) who has had that great an influence on 
their work, they use the example to underline that one can never know whether 
ordinary people may possess knowledge that can change the direction of research and 
that listening to people is therefore of the utmost importance. As one of the scientists 
said in an interview:  
 
‘I think almost everybody here has given a talk at the Science Café at some point, and 
those attending are people, you know, off the street, and they ask some of the weirdest 
questions, but they are always pretty good, and it’s usually full, so apparently there is 
a group of people – and it’s always different people – that have enough interest to go 
find out what scientists are doing. And they make suggestions that we have brought 
back here.’ 
 
Talking to the scientists at Gyro Gearloose, they seem to think that it is valuable to 
listen to people ‘off the street’ because at some point somebody with valuable input – 
as the woman with the needle-phobia – will show up. They are (almost literally in 
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this story) looking for the needle in the haystack. They are looking for that one 
individual who can pose the right question or propose the right solution, and thereby 
bring the research forward. According to my observations, this individual rarely 
shows up, but the expectation that she or he will is so embedded among the scientists 
that they keep on looking.  
 
Here is another example of this way of interacting. It is the day after the ‘Public Lab 
Night’, and Annie tells me all about her success with the cardboard puzzles. More 
than a thousand visitors had been present at the university and she had had many 
interesting discussions, especially with one of the attendees:   
 
‘It [doing science] is like finding clues to the mystery, and you never know where you 
will find them, for instance, … So, I was talking to this layperson [one of the visitors] 
about the research that we do here on valley fever, and she said: “Oh, did this 
fungus37 develop from tuberculosis?” And I asked her why she said that, and she told 
me that she was a native and had lived here all her life. And in the early 1800s, this 
place, was a tuberculosis sanatorium, which meant that patients from all over the 
USA basically travelled here because of the weather, and it helped in treating the 
tuberculosis, because at that time they did not have the antibacterial for it. So, some 
people got better and went home, but a good majority of them did not survive and 
died here. […]. Inspired by her, I went into looking at the genomic level – the actual 
individual genes of the two different pathogens [tuberculosis and valley fever], where 
one is a bacterium and the other is a fungus… In my head they were not related in 
any way, but it turned out that a good majority of them [the genes] were identical. 
[…] So it was talking to a complete layperson about valley fever and her asking me 
                                                
37 Valley fever is caused by spores from a specific fungus, which people inhale. The fungus is found in the South-western region of the USA and 
Northern Mexico. 
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this question that sparked this whole area […]. It’s scary because it also confirms 
that what we do as humans to the environment is actually coming back to you…’  
 
Annie is trying to understand valley fever and develop a diagnostic device that can 
detect the disease quickly and all of a sudden ‘a layperson’ is giving her clues as to 
the origin and appearance of the disease because she has local knowledge and can 
provide ‘new clues to the mystery’. Annie also points to the advantage the woman had 
in not being trained as a scientist. The woman did not consider the fact that 
tuberculosis is caused by a bacterium, whereas a fungus causes valley fever. She is 
therefore able to suggest a connection that the scientist finds implausible, but which 
turns out to be true. The woman, in fact, adds a further dimension to Annie’s study, 
as valley fever can now also be seen as an unintended side effect of human decisions 
made a hundred years ago. These kinds of engagements, where individuals are 
helping the scientists move forward, are told and cherished at Gyro Gearloose as 
something valuable, albeit specific examples of helpful insights are actually quite 
few. I only ever heard about this example and the experience with the woman who 
hated needles. But on the other hand, neither did Charlie nor Annie ever think that 
they knew better or did not need the help and opinions of the public in their work. 
And I think the fact that the scientists keep participating and sharing stories about the 
worth of laypeople’s input testifies to the significance they ascribe to it as part of 
their daily work. As Annie commented on another occasion:   
 
‘What we do here […] is  “translational research”. And because it is translational, 
because it has repercussions on the public, it is in our interest to truly understand 
what the real question in their mind is, or what it is that they need a solution for – 
because if we don’t, we will just give them a solution that will not even be able to 
help them.’ 
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Even though this might sound too noble to actually be true, it was an argument that I 
often encountered at Gyro Gearloose. They need to ‘understand’ what the public 
wants, because otherwise they will not be able to provide ‘a solution’ nor ‘be able to 
help them’; they therefore find it important to listen. They do not claim that every 
input is valuable. As Charlie said ‘some of them ask the weirdest questions’, but 
sometimes there is one individual who helps them progress and changes their 
perception of what they are doing – and this one individual is the reason that it is 
worth the trouble. They connect this importance to listening to the specific kind of 
research they do, namely, what they call ‘translational’: research that aims at finding 
practical uses in basic science. Furthermore, I see this way of listening to the public 
as reflecting classic American values about the public. It reflects the idea of the 
seemingly ordinary individual who carries a great idea or potential within that ends 
up changing the world – or perhaps a research question.  This view is also reflected in 
the way that the lab sees itself (which I also described in Oikos). They are an ordinary 
lab that has extraordinary ideas, and they go through much hardship in order to 
realise their great potential.  
 
The way that scientists at Curious George listen to the public is different. It is not 
focused on individual input from specific laypersons; it is more based on general 
impressions that they receive from the media, from contacts in the plant and tree 
industries, from NGOs, and so on. The following quote is from an interview where 
Clark tells me about his new research idea, based on public demand for organic 
Christmas trees:  
 
‘Well, Christmas trees are quite fragile [due to aphids, a parasite that eats the trees].  
So there is a turnover every year of about 1,5 billion Danish kroner. And the little 
aphid is the worst pest, and the reason for that is… well, the implication is that a lot 
of pesticide is used. And the Danish people have started to say: “We would like to get 
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organic Christmas trees.” But there’s a problem: The organic Christmas trees are 
being eaten up. So there is one very important part of research where I think we 
could make cross-faculty or cross-departmental collaborations.’  
 
Clark believes that he could modify Christmas trees genetically and thereby create an 
organic Christmas tree that would be better for the environment, the Danish 
consumers and for the lab itself. While I personally believe that he is overestimating 
the Danish consumers’ willingness to buy genetically modified Christmas trees, he 
tries to pick up on a current public issue that he and his team have the expertise to 
solve. But compared to Gyro Gearloose, he has received this knowledge differently; 
that is, an individual citizen has not delivered it personally. It is an issue that he has 
probably picked up on by looking at sale statistics, talked to plant breeders about, or 
perhaps read about in an article in the morning paper. This is the quite typical way in 
which scientists at Curious George listen to the public.  
 
They do not talk about single individuals as ‘that woman with the needle’ as they do 
at Gyro Gearloose. They talk about ‘the public’ or ‘people’ as an abstract entity, and 
they try to pick up on this shared group’s sentiments about the lab’s research field, 
GM plants, or whatever the case may be. They have, for instance, decided that they 
will never plant any GM plants outside securely closed tanks, because they know that 
‘the public’ does not like it – not even if it is allowed legally. Internally, the scientists 
actually believe that this precaution is slightly silly, as they do not consider all GM 
plants in open fields a great threat to the surrounding eco-systems. But they have 
accepted that ‘the public’ does not accept GM plants in open fields, and thus they 
obey.  
 
It is quite common that scientists from Curious George express these general ideas 
about certain things that ‘the public’ does or does not accept or has recently changed 
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its mind about. For instance, they share the perception that the public has become 
more positive toward GM plants over the years. From time to time, they articulate 
this perception of a public discourse in relation to specific research themes, because 
they want to emphasise that there is an issue where ‘the public’ is concerned.  It is not 
really clear how the scientists know about ‘the public’s’ perceptions of science, but it 
is clear that they have an idea about common public discourses on certain subjects; 
for instance, Catherine comments on the problem of antibiotic-resistant bacteria in 
science: 
 
‘Of course, it’s okay that people have an opinion about science. If you, for instance, 
think about antibiotic resistance: If the public should decide, then we should not use 
it [antibiotics], and that is okay, but I’m just not sure what they think we should use 
instead?’ 
 
As such, Catherine is okay with ‘people’ having a say in the direction in which 
science might go and how they should work. But she also finds these situations 
difficult because she cannot rely on a similar idea of a common public opinion about 
what to do instead. In general, my impression is that the scientists rely quite a lot on 
their own perception about public opinion and try to react to it as they see fit. At the 
same time, they find it frustrating because they feel they do not have enough 
knowledge about what exactly the public opinion is or how it should be engaged with 
specifically.   
 
It seems that Curious George is unusual in its insistence on the importance of the 
public. This impression relies on the observation that this attention is something that 
the scientists have learned over their first period of time at the lab. This can, for 
instance, be observed from the courses and activities that the juniors are encouraged 
to partake in when they begin their PhDs. Their manager, Canute, works hard to get 
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approval for as many kinds of courses as possible, including courses on start-ups and 
how the medical industry works, etc. He has also initiated group meetings for juniors 
with a philosopher, who works with synthetic biology, so the juniors can discuss 
ethical aspects of their job with him. However, not all the groups established have 
turned out to as successes, because the students do not feel they have adequate time 
to attend them with all their other responsibilities in mind. The students are given the 
opportunity to attend ‘synbio-lunches’, where prominent guests (scientists and non-
scientists) from all over the world are invited to discuss the future of both synthetic 
biology and synthetic biologists. One of Canute’s students, Catherine, is particularly 
interested in communication activities. Canute and her arrange for her sabbatical at 
another science institution, which is mandatory for PhD students, to be held at the 
Department for Agriculture and Food, where she learned about policy processes and 
political communication.  
 
So the lab does a lot to teach its juniors about the world outside and the legitimacy of 
other perspectives on their field. However, my impression is that this way of bringing 
up other perspectives is relatively new. I get this impression partly from the fact that 
some of the ‘old’ seniors do not seem as preoccupied with this aspect of the scientific 
vocation as the younger ones. Furthermore, the PI, Canute, says himself that ‘things 
have changed the last twenty years and we have got to keep up’. The department has 
worked with the gene modification of plants for a many years and they went through 
the so-called ‘GMO crisis’ around the turn of the millennium (see also Theory 2.1.1).  
Genetically modified crops and products became extremely unpopular among the 
European publics. As a consequence of this public resistance, research funding for 
GMO dropped dramatically, and none of the scientists at Curious George foresaw this 
development, which was a financial catastrophe for the field and for the lab. So it is 
no wonder that listening to the public has become part of their job. They have 
experienced first-hand how opportunities for research funding have suddenly 
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disappeared due to public unpopularity, and they are now adapting to a situation 
where the public’s opinions can have a great impact on their everyday work. They 
have thus acquired the ability to listen and to try to be responsive to what they think 
they hear.  
  
Summing up, both Gyro Gearloose and Curious George consider it their 
responsibility to listen to the public and they do so, albeit in different ways. At Gyro 
Gearloose, they are preoccupied with the idea of the single individual, who – in 
unexpected ways – brings the development of their technologies forward. At Curious 
George, they view the public as a large, but rather abstract entity which has a 
legitimate say in debates about the direction of research, despite the fact that they do 
not always agree with its opinions.  
 
In my interpretation, there is a connection between the kinds of science that the two 
labs are doing and their ways of listening. At Gyro Gearloose, they try to invent 
specific products that people can use in their everyday lives and thus potential users’ 
inputs are considered quite valid in that development. At Curious George, they work 
with a broad range of issues, including what they label ‘basic research’, the specific 
development of crops for developing countries and new forms of medical treatment. 
None of these are considered to be about individual use; they are more about the 
general development of science itself, whether it be agriculture, the environment or 
medical therapy. The individual is not considered a target for any of these 
technologies. Instead, the technologies are pathways to different emergent, shared 
futures – for instance, a future where pesticide use is replaced with GM plants. These 
shifts indicate new visions of the way society should be organised in these areas, and 
my impression is therefore that the scientists are perceptive of the discourses focusing 
on more general changes. Of course, one could argue that the diagnostic device’s 
potential could initiate large transformations of society as well; for instance, in 
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relation to the information that health insurance companies demand or in relation to 
how we plan our lives if we know we are going to die from a fatal disease in ten years 
time. But this does not seem to be an important issue in relation to how Gyro 
Gearloose uses input from citizens.  
 
9.1.3 DOING RESEARCH  
The last type of conduct that I want to describe, as part of the mode of Citizenship, is 
quite simple: doing research. Doing research has also been part of the other modes I 
have described, so the challenge here is to demonstrate how this way of doing 
research can be viewed as different from the other two.  
 
In the following excerpt from an interview with Annie from Gyro Gearloose, she 
talks about what she considers her main responsibility as a scientist to be: 
 
Annie: ‘I think, quite simply, it is two things: One is of course to understand the 
problems that surround us, without involving any possible prejudice or personal 
judgment in making their [the public’s] assessment of what is the problem. And 
secondly, solving the problem.’  
Me: ‘For whom are you solving it?’ 
Annie: ‘For people, which is the reason why I mentioned the importance of 
understanding the problem appropriately without having your own personal 
judgment in the process. Truly just understanding what the question is, and what the 
problem is that these people face. How can I best solve it?’ 
 
As I am doing a project about something as principled as ‘social responsibility’ in 
science, I am often faced with the question of whether the scientists have told me 
stories where they appear nobler and more concerned than they are in practice. This 
consideration often came up when people offered me very general descriptions of 
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their jobs or offered explanations of what they were doing which closely resembled 
the CUDOS norms as described by Merton (Merton 1973). I do think Annie does that 
in the excerpt above, and I have two comments to that: First, this study is a 
combination of interviews and observation studies, and I have attempted to look at a 
combination of what people have told me and what they have done. Not in order to 
make a comparison, but in order to see the combined practices of ‘imagining’ and 
‘doing’ responsibility. ‘Conduct’ implies a combination of what one does and how 
one responds to certain perceived expectations about one’s role in a specific situation. 
Therefore, overly idealised accounts of the scientific work has helped me gain 
insights into what the scientists consider noble and right and how they connect this 
with their daily work.  
 
The above quote is an instance of such a question: Does Annie truly listen to people 
without prejudices? And if so, how is she able to do that? But despite the suspicion 
that this could prove difficult, I do believe the quote is interesting, as it expresses an 
ideal of how scientists should do their work. In this quotation, Annie, who works on 
one of the diagnostic devices, explains that she considers ‘solving people’s problems’ 
her main responsibility. These problems are the basis of her work and the job is done 
when she has solved it. At another point in the interview, she explains that she also 
sees finishing her doctoral degree as her main responsibility, but that these two 
responsibilities coincide: Her doctoral degree is to develop a diagnostic device that 
can help patients with symptoms of infectious diseases. In that way, she thinks that 
her responsibility and her daily work tasks are identical: By developing this device, 
she is also solving a problem for people. In this quote, it is further interesting to see 
reminiscences of the Vocation mode. Annie wants to understand people’s problems 
‘without involving any possible prejudice or personal judgment’, which is close to the 
ideals found in Vocation about not letting personal judgments interfere with work. 
However, in this instance, they are not used as a way of distancing oneself from 
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society. Quite the contrary, Annie is using her professional values as a way to 
exclude her own opinions in order to be able to hear what ‘people’ are telling her. 
From an outsider’s perspective, this may prove difficult, and, furthermore, it is 
difficult to see how this interaction with ‘people’ has taken place in relation to her 
choice of research subject. But it is certain that she considers her research problem to 
be motivated by a problem in society that she wants to solve.  
 
The scientists at Gyro Gearloose organised their research process according to what 
their final goal – a specific product – is. Henry, the PI at Gyro Gearloose, tells me 
about this way of doing science in an interview: 
 
‘[…] [w]e start at the top – we actually mean what we say. So when [other] people do 
a grant about cancer, […] what they really write is “I am going to study this pathway 
and I am going to study this – and this may have something to do with cancer”. And 
here we say: “let us figure out the new target – what do we need to do to get to the 
new target”, where most people say “this is what I do and I am going to adjust it to 
sound like […] it will have this implication”. And we just work backwards. So we are 
working backwards from everybody else, which allows us to keep focus, because we 
really say, “we want to have a prophylactic cancer vaccine, let us go figure out how 
we have to do it.” And we even decided to do the prophylactic cancer vaccine 
because that was the best solution to the cancer problem – you know it has even gone 
further up from that. In that sense we organise our centre completely differently, and 
then the faculty in here38, which really was unique, we all bought into the big visions, 
and then we said we will organise ourselves to accomplish what we agreed, we are 
going to organise ourselves to accomplish the visions, so that is different than having 
faculty where everybody says “okay, you do this, you do that – we will try to write a 
report that sounds like we have worked together.” You know, it is just pretty typical 
                                                
38 Gyro Gearloose is part of a larger research institute, where several biotech laboratories are assembled under the heading of translational research.  
 320 
in departments – and most centres actually – but we try to do that differently here, we 
are still doing it different here.’  
 
In this quote, Henry ties their way of doing science to the specific place: the centre 
that he and his lab form a part of. And this place is, according to Henry, distinct from 
other places because they organise their research in relation to their target, and their 
target is based on ‘the best solution’, in this case in relation to ‘the cancer problem’. 
In his own words, they work ‘backwards’ compared with other scientists, because 
their goal, a specific medical technology, is set from the start, whereas other 
scientists, in his opinion, start out with research topics that they find interesting. On 
another occasion, he adds that their lab is more ‘closely knitted together’ than other 
labs because they have been united in order to ‘accomplish their visions’.  
 
During my fieldwork, it has been clearly visible that the scientists at Gyro Gearloose 
are organised with the end-goal as the default principle. The first question in the 
STIR interviews is always, ‘What are you doing today?’. At Gyro Gearloose, they 
often replied in the line of ‘I’m working on the cancer vaccine’ or ‘I’m at the 
subproject 2 on the diagnostic device’. As many of them are working on several 
projects, they think it important to identify which project they are working on, rather 
than – as at Curious George – what they are doing more specifically that day, for 
example, ‘sending off a genome to be sequenced’ or ‘preparing for the 24-hour 
experiment’. In that way, it is pertinent how Gyro Gearloose identifies with the end 
product of their research. This is also clear from the many different disciplines that 
are represented in the lab. While all of them have to accomplish something alone, for 
instance, a doctoral dissertation, the individual project always forms part of a bigger 
project, where they each contribute with specialised knowledge in order to realise an 
advanced technology. On the diagnostic device project, they employ, among others, 
immunologists, advanced computer statisticians and molecular biologists to cover the 
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different aspects of the technology production. The general organisation of the work 
is fundamentally based on the output. This output focus also became evident when I 
overheard a conversation between one of the PIs, Emma, and, Sandra, at Gyro 
Gearloose: 
 
Sandra bumps into Emma on her way out of the laboratory. She apologises for not 
attending a meeting in their research group yesterday, but she did not know about it. 
Emma tells her not to worry; if she wants to, she can be added to the group’s email 
list and get the meeting alerts, but not that much happened yesterday that she needs 
to know. ‘Oh, only one thing that is important’, Emma adds, ‘I wanted the meeting to 
go in another direction than last time, where everyone got caught up in this 
knowledge thing. I feel that it’s my role as PI to step in and say, “no, we are doing a 
cancer vaccine, that is the goal, all the knowledge will come as we go along, for 
sure…”, so we talked about that and I think people are back on track.’ 
 
In this story, the specific way of organising the research according to their shared 
responsibility for the end product becomes apparent. Apparently, the group has got 
‘caught up in the knowledge thing’ – the theoretical implications of developing a 
cancer vaccine – but Emma thinks that these considerations are of less importance 
compared to the vaccine itself, and it is important that the whole group follows suit. 
Sandra commented after the encounter that it was nice to know the priorities and 
what her role is. Having worked in other laboratories, she is not used to this way of 
organising things. She has usually done what she considered to be ‘basic research’, 
but she is starting to get an idea about ‘what she is doing here’ and ‘how she 
contributes to the main project’. It seems that Gyro Gearloose’s ways of organising 
the research is one that the scientists have to get used to – that they should not ‘get 
caught up in the knowledge thing’ and should instead focus on how to develop 
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technologies. In comparison, the organisation of research has a different emphasis at 
Curious George.  
 
Here, the research is not organised in relation to a specific end product in the same 
way, even though many of their grants have specific goals. However, these goals are 
not the scientists’ primary concern, as one of the professors puts it: 
 
‘[…] our basic essence is science, and then we have to – in order to attract funding – 
be able to direct it in a direction where it has some kind of relevance for society and 
those who pay the funding and that is fair enough. But we have to realise that we are 
fundamentally interested in basic science.’ 
 
While I am not sure that everyone at Curious George would agree that they are 
‘fundamentally interested in basic science’, the quote does resemble some of the 
opinions that I often met at Curious George: They have some specific interests they 
want to pursue, which they then have to twist a bit in order to get the funding needed 
(see also previous chapter 8). This does not mean that they do not want to give 
something back to society via their science, but rather that they go about contributing 
in other ways than by a specific, tangible technology. In the following sections, I will 
describe some of these other ways of living up to this responsibility.  
 
The scientists at Curious George see themselves as having a big responsibility in 
relation to choosing which research projects to work on and where to apply for 
funding. The PI, Canute, explains that they take great care in choosing some research 
topics and calls for applications over others: 
 
‘We don’t even bother with those [call for applications] that only range from one to 
two years and where it’s all about a fancy, new concept. Because nothing is going to 
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come out of it that anyone can use. It’s the long stretch and the high quality that 
counts. That’s where we can make a contribution that matters.’ 
 
According to Canute, one thing that is important is not to be impressed by new, 
‘fancy concepts’, but rather to be more aware of how you can contribute with solid 
research of a high quality. Therefore, the lab’s strategy is to get their hands on that 
kind of money, and they seldom apply for anything else. In the same interview, I, in 
reply to what he says, mention an instance, where the lab actually has gone for short-
term grants and where the potential for big findings is limited. Canute replies that he 
thinks these grants are sometimes necessary in order to keep the lab going. But he 
believes that this happens very infrequently, max two times the last ten years. With 
this reply he shifts position in his argumentation: Where at first he explains that they 
look for opportunities to do excellent research, which somebody could ‘use’, he then 
also admits that they, at times, have to settle for less in order to maintain the lab as a 
viable economic entity. Thereby, he shifts mode and argues as we have seen in Oikos. 
But he does not like that he has to settle for ‘fancy new concepts’, which are, in his 
opinion, hollow and useless. They want to contribute with something useful and at 
Curious George useful means quality or ‘research excellence’.  
 
For the scientists at Curious George, quality is a key word. Their work is all about 
producing very sound, new science, which has potential applications. They see it as 
their key task to do what Clark, one of the seniors, calls ‘the hard, tedious work’, 
which lays the groundwork for future applications. And they often connect the need 
for high quality work with the responsibility they believe they have to provide sound 
(basis for) technologies to the public.  
 
Besides sorting out short-term projects that they consider lacking in seriousness, 
Curious George also works on a range of projects where they believe they improve 
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the livelihood of people, without giving up the principle of high-quality research. As 
the lab is, in one way or another, working with plants, they have for many years 
sought to improve crops for developing countries by genetically modifying them. In 
several newspaper and Internet articles, Canute explains how his work on improving 
the cassava plant in order to help with hunger problems in Africa is what really 
prompted his getting into plant chemistry research. But this is not only Canute’s 
research project. Several scientists have been involved in the project over the years. 
One of them, Linda, is collaborating with plant breeders in Nigeria and other places 
where cassava is an important basic nutrition. Funding for the cassava project comes, 
for the time being, from the state’s development aid. In the following, Linda speaks 
about what she considers to be her responsibility in relation to that research project: 
 
Me: ‘So what you’re telling me is that you have a responsibility to return the 
knowledge that you develop about a plant to those who are actually harvesting it?’ 
Linda: ‘Yes, or, what I’m saying is that there are some work stations in Africa that we 
deliver knowledge to, because we can’t get further – and that wouldn’t make sense 
anyway – but in some way, we need to return it [the knowledge or technology] to the 
place where it [the plant] is harvested because it is a tropical plant. And we cannot 
escape that responsibility, but it demands two parts: both that we hand over the 
knowledge and that they [the plant breeders] hand over their knowledge. When the 
State Aid […] granted us the money, they also delegated some form of responsibility 
that the knowledge will end up where it is used, and that is not [the government’s] 
responsibility, that is ours, and the government doesn’t have to interfere.’ 
 
What I find interesting in relation to this quote is how they tie their relationship to 
return knowledge to the users with their links to the state. While ‘the government 
does not have to interfere’ with scientists’ work, it is not due to an imagined, 
institutional demarcation of science from society as we saw in Vocation. They do not 
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exclude the government because ‘society’ in general should be kept out of the project 
in order to secure objectivity; rather, society – here represented by farmers in Africa – 
is the reason that the research is going on in the first place. In Linda’s words, it is 
because the responsibility between different (public) actors has been settled and 
‘delegated’ such that the government collects money through taxation and then 
allocates a portion to State Aid, of which State Aid then grants a portion to research 
in crops in developing countries, and those scientists who have been granted the 
money then have the responsibility to co-operate with local plant breeders. And the 
scientists acknowledge this responsibility and work with it without question.  
 
Some might question whether this is ‘doing research’ as the heading indicated. This 
‘research’ also includes co-operation with plant breeders, traveling to different 
countries and knowledge exchanges between scientists and plant breeders. But I 
choose to call all of it ‘research’, because the scientists do not themselves make any 
kind of boundary work between the laboratory work and the knowledge exchanges. 
We have seen them do that in other situations, where only strict laboratory work is 
seen as ‘scientific’ (see 8.3.1) and the rest is ‘politics’. But in relation to the work 
with the cassava plant, these boundaries are not in place and the diverse activities are 
all part of the research process.  
 
This reflection about whether it is ‘research’ is also tied to the choice of ‘conduct’ as 
a way to look at agency. With the use of this concept also follows a focus on the way 
people behave instead of on a single incident (see also theory 3.3.3). So by 
accounting for the co-operation between State Aid, Curious George and African plant 
breeders, I describe the way the scientists do research. I would only separate the 
experimental part from the collaborative part if the scientists actively separated them 
themselves. But in this case – and in the mode of Citizenship – they do not. The same 
is the case with the next example from Curious George.  
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Some of the scientists at Curious George are also working with ‘open source’.39 The 
biotech area is known for its many patents and for the enormous power of the 
agricultural and medical industries in this area.  However, some of the scientists at 
Curious George actively refrain from taking patents because they want knowledge to 
be publicly accessible, and they see open source as a path to fair and more effective 
knowledge building. This is not conduct that everyone follows and it is not official 
(nor in opposition to) lab policy. In the previous chapter, Oikos, I actually describe 
the opposite: how some of the employees value patents and how they take patents for 
the sake of their organisation and hope to receive personal recognition in return. But 
in this mode, patents are frowned upon at Curious George. Other scientists working 
with synthetic biology, where open source and public ‘biobanks’ are popular, have 
inspired some of the younger scientists from Curious George. Over a dinner among 
colleagues, Josh even asserts that synthetic biology is about having a specific 
‘attitude’:  
 
‘I mean, I’ve given it a lot of thought lately, and I talked to Miriam [a colleague] 
about it as well, and I also want to state something about it in the introduction to my 
dissertation: synthetic biology is not a discipline per se, it’s more of an attitude to 
doing research, where you have certain ideas about how you approach it; like you’re 
for “open source” and for “interdisciplinarity” and for “applied research”. But, I 
mean, it’s not specialised enough and the knowledge is not deep enough for it to be a 
discipline.’ (from memory) 
 
                                                
39 The term ‘open source’ refers to something that can be modified because its design is publicly accessible. While it originated in the context of 
computer software development, the term now covers a social movement that tries to promote publicly accessible knowledge and technologies in 
many areas, including synthetic biology. There is much debate about open source approaches and synthetic biology. See for instance: 
http://www.nature.com/news/synthetic-biology-cultural-divide-1.15149 
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In the previous chapter, Oikos, I describe how the fact that the scientists at Curious 
George operate under the heading of ‘Synthetic Biology’ does not seem to matter in 
their daily laboratory work, but it matters a lot when they are outside the laboratory: 
when they attend conferences, when the communication officer is preparing a debate 
piece, or when their PIs go to Brussels to lobby for funding. But when the modes 
shift, synthetic biology becomes important in another way. In Josh’s quote, doing 
synthetic biology becomes a political statement that implies that some ways of 
conducting science are better than others. And some of the scientists seem to have 
embraced these ways of doing their job: They go to open source case competitions, 
they refuse to take patents themselves, they collaborate with scientists with similar 
points of view, they refuse to work with specific companies, e.g. Monsanto40, and so 
on. Along the same line of thought, the lab has initiated co-operation with a local Do 
it Yourself bio-lab.41 They have done this, in the words of Canute,  
 
‘To be inspired by their creative spirit, but also to make sure that they are not 
developing something that could potentially be dangerous.’  
 
Through their choice of collaborators and ways of handling their knowledge, Curious 
George are making statements about what role they believe biotech should have in 
society. They look at ‘Synthetic Biology’ as a driver for more openness in science 
and science as something that is publicly available and not owned by big business. 
But as I mentioned earlier, this is not something that all of the scientists at Curious 
George are aware of. In fact, I would go as far as to say that some of them have little 
idea of the social movements that are bubbling away in their midst. No one seems to 
be against it, on the other hand, but whether they include it in their own research is 
                                                
40 Monsanto is a multinational agricultural company that has been under severe criticism for creating social and environmental damage due to their 
genetically modified crops and aggressive business strategies. 
41 DIYbio is a global social movement where people work from the belief that ‘biotechnology and greater public understanding about it has the 
potential to benefit everyone’ (www.diybio.com). Under that headline, various local public laboratories have been set up, where ordinary citizens can 
experiment with biotech, science’s role in society is discussed and various (more or less rebellious) activist activities are organised.  
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another question. The work with these perspectives is based on the individual 
scientists’ interest and not something that is official ‘lab politic’ or a part of a 
carefully planned ‘organizational culture’. That being said, it seems that those 
juniors, who engage in these matters, are considered as great assets for the lab and 
someone the lab will probably invest in – to use an expression from Oikos. 
 
This description of the ways in which Curious George conducts ‘Responsible 
Science’ in this mode is quite different from the description of Gyro Gearloose. In my 
interpretation, this is due to the different research aims of the two labs. At Curious 
George, there are many different ways of conducting responsible research: not taking 
patents, working with plant breeders, making high quality science, and so on. At 
Gyro Gearloose, they mainly do it in one way: to produce the best medical 
technologies for the people. At Gyro Gearloose, it seems somewhat easier to align the 
research task with the responsibility of contributing to the surrounding society. This 
is, in my view, due to two conditions. First, the knowledge they produce is always 
tied up to a specific, tangible technology where they are able to imagine who will 
benefit, and they are able to include the considerations of this imagined end-user into 
the design of their technology. Second, they work in teams on projects (albeit the 
same person can be involved in more than one project) where they have a specific 
role in taking this specific technology forward, usually due to their disciplinary 
background. In that way, they are better suited to explaining the way they, as 
individuals and as a lab, contribute to society. At Curious George, on the other hand, 
they are not ‘working backwards’ from an ideal solution and to the research problem. 
As they focus on ‘excellent basic research’, they cannot in the same specific way tie 
their research to particular problems in society.  Despite this, they still work under 
broad headlines such as ‘making cheap and sustainable medicine’. They also want to 
take the responsibility for giving something back to society seriously, but they do so 
from other parameters and in other ways. They refuse to spend public money on ‘bad 
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science’, and they refuse to apply for grants that are too unambitious to respond to. 
Furthermore, they have many haphazard principles about whom they should work for 
and in which ways: They would rather work for the government’s development aid 
than for Monsanto and they want their work to be open source.  
 
9.1.4 SUMMING UP 
In this section, I have illustrated different forms of conduct in the two labs that form 
part of the mode Citizenship. I have shown that the scientists engage in a range of 
activities: ‘speaking about science’, ‘listening to the public’ and ‘doing research’ in 
ways which give clear and concrete expression to their desire to live up to the role 
they believe the surrounding society has of them; namely, that they have an 
obligation to share their knowledge and technologies, not do any harm and spend 
public money well. They try to live up to these responsibilities in different ways: 
Both by informing their (fellow) citizens about the science they do; by ‘listening to 
the public’ and incorporating the public’s ideas into their research; and by ‘doing 
research’ in ways where they take their responsibility into account.  
 
While the three forms of conduct are pervasive in the two labs, there are also some 
differences that I mostly attribute to the differences between what kind of science the 
two labs do and what they want to get from doing it. Gyro Gearloose is doing 
‘translational research’ and focuses on developing specific solutions to some of the 
problems they observe in society. Therefore, the ways they conduct themselves are 
closely linked to this identity as being a ‘translational researcher’, and their area of 
research is always coincident with what they want to share with the surrounding 
society. The challenge for them is therefore in how to push their technologies ‘out’ 
into society. Curious George has a more diverse research agenda, where they try to 
develop both high quality basic research as well as organic products to use in 
medicine and agriculture. This research identity that is both about being a ‘basic 
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scientist’ but also about securing the basis for sound (plant) technologies for future 
use makes the ways of engaging with society more diverse and not as shared among 
all the members of the lab, as it was at Gyro Gearloose. Some of the engagements are 
closely tied to their technologies, such as the GM cassava plant. Others are about 
attitudes related to how science should be conducted, that is, in an open source 
environment and always of the highest possible quality.  
 
In these sections, I have shown that the scientists believe they have responsibilities 
they need to live up to, and I have followed their attempts so to do. In the next 
section, ‘Justifications’, I will go one step further and look even more closely at 
‘why’ the scientists believe they have this responsibility. In this way, I will attempt to 
connect their conduct with some specific types of shared worldviews about science’s 
role in society, which I found to be pervasive in this mode.  
 
 
9.2 JUSTIFICATIONS 
In this section, I will account for how the scientists justify the responsibility to share 
knowledge and technologies with the surrounding society. The section about conduct 
has already stated some of the scientists’ reasons for why they had this responsibility. 
They said they need to listen to the public’s recommendations in order to align their 
research with what the public wants; they said the public has a legitimate right to 
intervene in their research; they see the public as a group of individuals of whom 
some may be of assistance in the research process; and so on. However, this section 
about justifications will, as the ones in the two previous chapters, go more in depth 
with the reasoning behind the feeling of responsibility. My argument is that the mode 
of Citizenship performs a specific version of the role of science in society and the 
scientists’ duties follow from this. This worldview is not – as I will also show – very 
unique to the scientists. They draw on known government rationalities on the ideal 
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organisation of the public sector when justifying their conduct. This is an observation 
already made by Law, when he argues that research managers use well-known 
‘grand’ narratives about organisation such as ‘administration’, ‘vocation’ or 
‘enterprise’ in their daily work (Law 2009).  
 
As in the previous sections, I will first show that the scientists have some immediate 
standard comments about why they have this responsibility. In this mode, it is all 
about ‘tax’ and how they are dependent on public investment and therefore have to 
return something to society. However, I will also demonstrate that this neat 
explanation is also perhaps a little too neat and in fact works as a ‘proxy’ for some 
more elaborate ideas about the role of modern science in contemporary democracies.   
 
9.2.1 TAX AND THE ‘DEMOCRATIC RESPONSIBILITY’ 
I’m sitting next to Sandra, who is preparing an experiment for tomorrow. She is in a 
hurry because she is late picking up her kid from kindergarten – ‘I always am’ she 
complains, smiling. She puts some samples in the oven and rapidly adjusts the time 
and heat on the keyboard next to it. Then she hurries on. At some point during her 
tasks, she looks up at me and says, ‘If you have any ideas, you are of course more 
than welcome to contribute’, ‘Nah,’ I reply, ‘I mean… I would like to, but this is not 
really my field.’ Sandra then offers, without irony, ‘Oh, but I mean, if you have any 
great ideas as to how to cure cancer, they are very welcome.’ I think a bit and say, 
‘Well, honestly, not that many, but I guess I can tell you something about why the 
public responds to new ideas about cancer treatments the way they do.’ ‘Oh,’ she 
says, as she takes off her lab coat, ‘I understand why they are sceptical. They pour so 
much money into cancer research and still nothing is happening.’  
 
I often encountered the idea among scientists that the public was sceptical due to so 
much money being spent on science, but with slim returns. Sandra’s example with 
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cancer research is just one of them. This seems to be a general idea among the 
scientists about how the public looks at science. They therefore consider it their 
responsibility to engage and talk about ‘the good things we are doing’, as several of 
them put it. Otherwise, they are afraid that they will loose public support. When I 
inquired about why their relationship to the public mattered, they usually answered 
that with tax funding followed a responsibility to do something that mattered to the 
people, who pay them. As this quote from an interview with Henry from Gyro 
Gearloose illustrates:  
 
‘To ask society to pay taxes to fund your research and then withdrawing from the 
problems that they are facing is not responsible, I don’t think.’  
 
The scientists’ understanding seems to be that their work is based on public money 
and therefore they have a responsibility to show that something valuable is coming 
out of the public’s investments. During an interview, Linda from Curious George 
even called it ‘a failure’ if they do not consider the world outside the university as an 
important stakeholder in their work, as tax funding is the basis for their existence: 
 
‘So, I’m actually saying that, in one way or another – both in education and in 
research – society is an important actor for us. And if we, as a university, say, “we 
have nothing to do with you people on the other side”, then we have failed completely 
[…] because it is tax money that sustains us.’    
 
I heard this argument again and again, irrespective of whether I was in the Danish or 
American lab. Every time I asked directly about why engagement mattered, tax 
funding would be the answer. Here, it is Christian from Curious George who ponders 
the responsibilities in relation to his own PhD project: 
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‘I think it would be totally crazy to distance myself from society. I know that there are 
people here [at the lab] who isolate themselves a lot, but I also believe that the 
taxpayers’ money is wasted on your education if the topic is only interesting to 
yourself.’  
 
I never really encountered those people who were isolated – but perhaps they were 
isolated to such a degree that I did not even notice them in the lab. Those who did not 
isolate themselves and whom I met seemed to share Christian’s opinion. Taxes, tax 
money, tax income, tax funding, the public investments; these expressions came up 
when I asked why they thought it so important to engage with citizens in different 
sorts of ways. It could also be expressed a little differently, as when I asked Simon 
whether it was a sort of obligation for scientists to speak about their research, and he 
answered: 
 
‘We do [have that obligation], as it’s the public who pays for what we are doing, and 
that is the democratic responsibility that we have.’ 
 
In his opinion, they have a ‘democratic responsibility’ to account for their work. Not 
necessarily to produce something useful for the public, but to be able to account for 
their actions as other organisations that are government funded must. So the 
argument, while still pointing to tax as the important factor, is a little different than 
the others. While they underline the importance of the subject being relevant in other 
contexts than the scientific, Simon connects his idea of responsibility with a more 
general socio-political norm that public organisations should be economically 
transparent.  
 
So an obligation to return something to those that fund and to be transparent are the 
immediate answers to the question of why the scientists believe they have a 
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responsibility to return ‘useful’ knowledge and technologies to society. These 
answers make sense seen in the light of several recent university reforms across the 
Western world, which have had as one of their aims to ‘increase accountability to the 
tax-payer’ by encouraging, among other initiatives, ‘better responsiveness to user-
groups’ (Shore and Wright 2000: 69). As I touched upon in the theory section, this 
kind of change in public science governance shares similarities with changes in 
norms and techniques of governance across much of the public sector, where the 
focus on accountability to users (taxpayers included) and direct participation replace 
ideals about professional ethics (DeLeon 1997). In that sense, the answers do make 
sense, as they resonate very well with current policy tendencies.  
 
But as in the other modes of responsibility, I get the impression that this immediate 
explanation is somehow a reduction or simplification of some more complex ideas 
about science’s role in society. Although I am sure that their explicit justifications are 
plausible and well motivated, I also think that it is insufficient to adequately describe 
the reasons that the scientists feel a responsibility to engage with society. I will argue 
that ‘tax’ works as a proxy for more complex and abstract conceptions of science’s 
relationship to society – in the same way as the scientists also used proxies for ‘the 
truth’ in the mode of Vocation.  
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9.2.2 PUBLIC – AS OPPOSED TO CORPORATE 
Taxes aside, one of the most common ways that the public scientists justify their 
responsibility to contribute something to society is by comparing themselves to the 
private sector. They explained to me that they are different (and better) because they 
are part of something that is more than profit optimisation. They believe that they 
somehow have a responsibility to do ‘more’, as I will show in the following.  
 
The idea that ‘society pays, we deliver’ is widespread among the scientists, despite 
the fact that it is far from always public money that funds their work. As we saw in 
Oikos, private foundations and companies also play a role in paying for the research 
projects (8.1.1). Altogether, the connections and boundaries between private and 
public are much more complex than the manner in which they are talked about by the 
scientists, a theme that Gorm-Hansen (2011), among others, has described in depth. 
 
However, I never got the impression that the scientists feel the same responsibility 
toward their private benefactors as they do toward the public. Sure, often the 
scientists want to collaborate with industry and they have strategic reasons for 
aligning themselves with the research themes that are popular among big private 
funders and corporations. If they collaborate, they do feel obliged to deliver what 
they have promised in the mutual contract, but not much more. I never heard them 
say things like ‘It’s the private sector that funds us, so of course we should give 
something back to them’, the way they did when we talked about their relations to 
‘society’ (an entity, which, as a logical consequence must be ‘non-private’). If they 
ever made a remark about how they owed something to their private funders, it was 
strictly tied to the contract or a personal relationship with the funder. My general 
impression is that they consider private foundations and private companies more as 
equals or as business partners. I would go as far as to argue that from my 
observations, their perception of their relationship with the private sector look exactly 
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like the straightforward way they describe their relationship with society: They pay, 
we give something back. In comparison to this, my impression is that the feeling of 
obligation toward the public is far more complex and about more than ‘tax’. When 
the scientists talk about collaborations with industry, they are eager to disassociate 
themselves from connections that are ‘too close’ – and they often compare their own 
labs to the private sector’s labs in ways that favour public laboratories. When I ask 
Henry, one of the PIs at Gyro Gearloose, why he does not work in industry, he 
answers: 
 
‘I could never do what I’m doing here in a private laboratory. This will allow me to 
envision big inventions, you cannot do that when it’s all about the bottom line.’ 
 
In many of the scientists’ opinions, companies are narrow-minded and do not have 
the resources to think in terms of great inventions or big scale problem-solving in the 
way that public laboratories are able to. They have to be more concerned about ‘the 
bottom line’. Many of the PhD students express the same sentiments; they are not that 
eager to move to industry after they have graduated, even though they know that jobs 
are available and the salaries are higher. As Miriam says: 
 
‘I’m sure that I would not be allowed to do the things I do here in a private company. 
I mean, in public laboratories you can spend time exploring and using your 
imagination to come up with solutions that are really creative and great. I don’t 
believe I could do that in, for instance [name of company]. It would all be about the 
bottom line and small improvements of existing products. It would take me years to 
be in a position where I would be allowed to do the things I already do here as a 
student.’ 
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Public laboratories invent great things, are creative and come up with impressive 
‘solutions’, whereas private laboratories focus so much on the bottom line and have 
such limited funds that they cannot do the same. Shapin (2009) actually makes the 
opposite conclusion in his book on the development of the scientific profession. He 
explains that public research has become so exposed to competition that big visions 
and ventures into the unknown have become difficult. On the other hand, private 
science has begun to invest heavily in their basic research and long-term positions, 
and a steady inflow of resources make the scientists more ‘free’ to pursue the goals 
they favour (Shapin 2009: 328). My empirical material is ambivalent in this regard. 
As I also mentioned in Oikos, I followed a couple of the PhD students who took a 
course on ‘biobusiness’, which took place at Copenhagen Business School – my own 
university. Prominent managers from the pharmaceutical industry conducted part of 
the teaching. The students from Curious George were not impressed by the content 
and the prospects of doing ‘biobusiness’. As one of them commented:  
 
‘I mean that guy from [name of company] basically said it: They can’t really make 
money on new products, so they just have to optimise old ones. I mean, he talked 
about making treatment an ‘event’ for the patient as their new strategy. Damn me if I 
ventured into science to make wellness.’ 
 
So on the one hand, the scientists tell me that they have their worst suspicions 
confirmed when they deal with private corporations; they are all about profit and not 
about solving big problems. Pharmaceutical companies, for instance, do not invent 
revolutionary treatments, according to the scientists.  
 
During my fieldwork, one of the PIs got a part-time job as a research director at a 
multinational company. His experience was that public science has become so 
optimised and output-focused due to exposure to competition that public science is 
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much more competitive and efficient than the company’s science department. He 
therefore had to fire many of the employees and renew their strategy. On the other 
hand, I also encountered many more well-functioning collaborations between the 
public and private sectors, where companies are partly funding PhD students or are 
delivering much appreciated data to journal papers from experiments. Shapin’s 
(2009) point about public and private science’s exchange of roles over the last fifty 
years may be relevant to some extent. My observations are mixed. What I do find 
interesting is that a myth about public science persists. Many of the scientists use the 
distinction between public and private to justify a certain special responsibility that 
they have as public scientists: The responsibility to make grand solutions for 
society’s problems – including solutions to problems that society has not even 
experienced yet.  
 
Public science is supposed to change the world; they have that responsibility on their 
shoulders, and that distinguishes them from other kinds of scientists. But while they 
do favour public research over private, they also seem to have a much more 
straightforward perception of their relationship to the private sector compared with 
their relationship to the public. As my main concern is the study of public science, I 
will not go into further detail with that relationship. I will, however, continue my 
description of how the scientists see their role as being a part of an imagined ‘public’ 
sphere. 
 
9.2.3 A JOB WITH MEANING 
The scientists tell me all these things with a certain pride in their voice; they like that 
they work for public laboratories and are part of something they believe actually 
makes a positive difference for society – and they justify their choice of job with this 
positive difference. But the justifications in Citizenship are multi-faceted, and we 
need to look at further reasoning in order to grasp where they root this responsibility 
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to share their knowledge and technologies. Overall, I get the impression that the 
scientists share a sense of belonging to public society in this mode. This is both 
different from Vocation, where they express that society’s interests do not affect 
them, and Oikos, where they mainly belong to an organisation. The first example 
from ‘Not Just a Job’ is from an interview with Simon from Curious George: 
 
‘It [his job satisfaction] is about whether I can imagine that there is a product at 
some point which can be used by someone in a reasonable manner. It doesn’t have to 
be in relation to industrial production, it might as well be… I mean, I did some 
research where we studied how traditional medicine is used, if it is usable or not. And 
that kind of knowledge is not industrial per se, but it is very usable for those people 
who live close by these plants. So it’s a little more about that the knowledge which I 
build up is used by someone else as well.’ 
 
In this quote, Simon establishes a kind of link between his work and the people who 
will potentially benefit from it. It is important for him to do research that has an 
impact on other people’s lives. In many other encounters, Simon was very 
preoccupied with strategic work, potentials for industrial collaboration and personal 
benefits, such as profit and professional acknowledgement from his co-workers. But 
in this quote he disassociates himself from the importance of industrial production 
and strategies. Instead, he just talks about the importance of making useful 
knowledge in general and how that is significant for finding some kind of satisfaction 
with his job. This search for meaning is shared between Curious George and Gyro 
Gearloose. In the following, it is Alan from Gyro Gearloose and I who discuss during 
one of the STIR interviews: 
 
Me: ‘So you tell me that you want to create a successful product; what is a 
“successful product” to you then?’ 
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Alan: ‘Yeah, so in my opinion creating a successful product would be creating a 
product in which it’s probably safer, more efficient and less… ahh more inexpensive 
for the consumer and for the public. So… and I think that ‘s how all research should 
be done, that should be the end goal of how all medical research is happening, or you 
know, people that are designing drugs. It should be safer, more efficient and 
cheaper… Otherwise it’s just a job, you know.’ 
Me: ‘Who cares about you trying to create cheaper, safer and… what was it… more 
efficient treatments?’ 
Alan: ‘Uh... my boss, I guess, and fellow scientists, and in the end the consumer and 
the public, of course.’ 
 
Several points from this exchange are interesting in relation to how the scientists 
consider their role in society. First and foremost, it is interesting that he sees it as his 
goal to ‘create a successful product’ (he is working on a cure against acne). In other 
modes, a paper might have been published or he might have received a postdoc offer. 
His answer is similar to those I presented in the section on conduct, called ‘Simply 
doing research’. The scientists at Gyro Gearloose have a responsibility to deliver 
something they think people need and he tries – and wants to – live up to this 
responsibility. He even believes that ‘that should be the end goal of how all medical 
research is happening…’. So Alan identifies being a medical scientist with creating 
‘safer, more efficient and more inexpensive’ treatments. And then he adds, ‘otherwise 
it’s just a job, you know’. My interpretation of that last addition to Alan’s explanation 
is that the effort to improve something is what makes the job interesting and 
meaningful – and thereby, apparently, more than a job.  
 
Interestingly, this consideration is very different from what I presented in Vocation. 
In that mode, what makes the scientists’ work special – and precisely more than an 
ordinary job – is that the only purpose is the expansion of mankind’s knowledge and 
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a satiating of the scientists’ own curiosity. So once again, it becomes clear how the 
purpose of the scientific profession changes depending on the mode. Where the mode 
of Vocation stressed disinterestedness as part of the condition for doing the job, 
Citizenship turns things around, as clear outcomes are what make the job meaningful.  
 
A second point that is interesting in relation to the exchange is that the ‘consumer’ – 
despite Alan’s wish to help – seems quite abstract for him. The consumer is 
mentioned after the boss and the scientific community. The latter two are more 
immediately thought of as stakeholders. The consumer, on the other hand, though still 
present, is not the figure that Alan is most concerned with at the moment.  I often met 
this kind of reasoning during my fieldwork. The scientists have an idea of some kind 
of public figure out there, someone for whose sake they work, but who is otherwise 
not entirely present for them. I encountered the idea of the ‘consumer’, an end-user, 
who could be helped by, or be critical of, a product; ‘soldier’ – a professional 
working for the government – returning from destinations far away and needing 
medical aid; ‘patient’, who needs a special treatment;  ‘the citizen’ or ‘the public’, 
who either has general needs, such as cheaper medicine, or legitimate worries about 
the outcome of the scientists’ experiments; and ‘children’ or ‘descendants’, who want 
to live in a future better than the present. The figure they refer to seems to be 
dependent on the type of technology or knowledge on which they are working at the 
moment. If they are working on the development of diagnostic devices, they imagine 
that it needs both approval from the public authorities and a contract with a medical 
company, after which it will be sold on the market to the individual ‘consumer’. If 
they work on plant compounds or nano-discs, they imagine a ‘citizen’ or a ‘public’ 
who/which may have legitimate concerns or uses for that knowledge, despite the 
scientists themselves not being sure about its possible future applications. If they 
work on cancer treatments, they imagine how introducing more efficient treatments 
could optimise the healthcare system. So depending on the figure they imagine, they 
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try in many instances to design their knowledge or technology so that it will be useful 
– or at least not harmful – to the imagined figure. That is a goal for Alan from the 
previous story as well.  
 
Strangely, it does not seem that important which of these figures they portray in 
relation to their obligations: ‘Citizens’, ‘patients’ and ‘consumers’ seemed 
interchangeable. They are all legitimate in terms of someone whom it is deemed 
worth going to work for. It is difficult for me to understand how it could be so. I have 
just illustrated how they very clearly distinguish between working for private or 
public science, but then, on the other hand, they do not (to my knowledge) seem to 
distinguish between making treatments for soldiers returning from war elsewhere and 
cancer patients. My best guess is that, when I consider this through the lens of 
‘Citizenship’, all these figures make up well-known archetypes in an everyday 
imagining of society, and that the scientists therefore consider them as legitimate 
benefactors of  the help they provide as ‘public scientists’; in the same way that it is a 
teacher’s duty to help school children and a doctor’s responsibility to treat patients. 
The scientists just have different stakeholders, depending on the project.  
 
But the scientists often have trouble connecting these rather abstract figures with their 
daily, tangible work tasks. And who could blame them? These figures seem quite far 
away from test tubes, enzymes or nano-disks, all of which are their immediate 
concern. They cannot relate every single experiment to the bigger picture. But they 
still have these blurry, abstract figures in mind when they justify what they are doing; 
remember:  ‘all medical research should be done with the goal of creating cheaper, 
more efficient and more inexpensive products.’ This is again different from Vocation, 
where ideas about output and their implications for society are not considered 
important – almost the contrary: Too much focus on the outcome could lead to ethical 
lapses. In one of my interviews at Curious George, Walter reflects on his motives for 
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doing research. Walter is usually very focused on classic scientific virtues, as I 
described them in Vocation, and he tends to find other aspects slightly irrelevant: 
 
Me: ‘So what you are telling me is that you believe it’s fair that, as the taxpayers pay 
for your work, you have to deliver something back to them. But would it be more 
interesting for you if you didn’t have this obligation?’ 
Walter: ‘No, actually I don’t think so. As a matter of fact, I think that it’s very 
interesting for your own motivation, if you can see that your work can be used for 
something besides the pure academic exercise.’ 
 
So even those scientists who are more focused on academic virtues believe that their 
work ‘motivation’ comes from something that is beyond the ‘pure academic exercise’ 
– even if they are afraid, as we saw in Vocation, that it could interfere with their 
professional judgement. In these situations, they often resort to boundary work 
(Gieryn 1983). They do so in order to simultaneously embrace the responsibility for 
being objective with the responsibility for the outcomes of their research. Walter, for 
instance, thinks it is okay that his ‘motivation’ for working on specific projects is 
related to his obligation to the taxpayers, whereas I am sure he would say otherwise 
about the specific experiments. Clark from Curious George constructs a similar 
boundary between what gives you ‘satisfaction’ and what is of ‘interest’: 
 
‘[…] [t]his [to know that you work on developing better treatments for diseases] 
gives you a lot of satisfaction and of course we work towards the high goal of 
producing drugs for humans in […] a cheap and sustainable way. On the way we 
often forget that; because the plants produce these compounds for a very specific 
purpose and if we can address that question it is of course not of any interest for the 
drug production but exclusive for plant biologists.’  
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So there are those aspects of work that give ‘satisfaction’ and can be considered a 
‘high goal’, namely, that of producing cheap and sustainable drugs. This aspect could 
also interest people outside the scientific community. But then there are the 
‘compounds’ and their ‘specific purpose’. These are ‘exclusively’ interesting for the 
scientific community itself, the ‘plant biologists’. In their everyday work lives, the 
scientists sometimes claim that they do not think that much about the ‘purpose’, but 
more about the technicalities, as in how and why plants produce ‘compounds’. In my 
interpretation, this is because they try to separate a part of their work, which they can 
call ‘scientific’, from the rest of their work, which they apparently do not think of as 
‘scientific’. But despite the fact that they do not consider the goals – for instance, 
producing new medicine – as ‘scientific’, they do consider it an important part of 
their work because it gives motivation and meaning. Otherwise, their work would be 
‘just a job’.    
 
In this section I have illustrated other aspects of the justification for why scientists 
need to share their knowledge and technologies with society. I have examined how it 
is important for the scientists to find some kind of meaning in their job. They do this 
by relating what they are doing to abstract figures whom they believe they should 
help, but who are quite far away from their everyday concerns. Interestingly, though, 
this understanding of ‘meaning’ was not seen as significant in either Vocation or 
Oikos. In Vocation, what rendered the job ‘meaningful’ was almost the opposite of 
what gives it meaning in this mode; namely, that there is no purpose in what the 
scientists are doing and that they are precisely not engaged in ‘society’. In Oikos, 
‘meaning’ really signified the will to make the organisation survive, and the fight for 
this gives a sense of purpose (see 8.2.1). So the question remains: What kind of 
worldview is this sense of meaning derived from? My first, tentative answer to this 
question is based on an interpretation of the three previous observations. First, the 
distance the scientists maintain to private science; second, the commitment to the idea 
 345 
of an abstract figure who gives them motivation and meaning in their job; and third, 
how this figure is at the same time very distant in their everyday work.  
 
Based on these observations together, my interpretation is that the scientists see 
themselves as part of an ‘imagined community’, which possesses specific 
characteristics (Anderson 2006)42. An ‘imagined community’ is a shared conception 
of a large group (so large that you do not have everyday contact with them), who 
share a sense of belonging, based on adherence to both the same limits of the 
community and a feeling of fraternity, despite differences in class, gender and social 
standing (Anderson 2006: 7).  
 
In Citizenship, the scientists imagine a community in which there are different 
professional roles working for a public (as opposed to the private sector and the 
market) society. These roles have specialised duties. The scientists’ roles in this 
imagined society are to somehow help with the solving of society’s big problems, 
such as cancer or hunger. But they are still relatively free to decide which problems 
to solve and how – they therefore do not care that much whether they are working for 
soldiers or patients. As long as they are recognised by the scientists as fellow 
members of this imagined community, these figures create a sense of meaning. In the 
next section, I will further elaborate on the scientists’ conceptions of being part of an 
imagined, public community.  
 
9.2.4 AN ORDINARY SPECIALISED PUBLIC INSTITUTION 
                                                
42 In the first edition of his book ‘Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism’ from 1983, Anderson developed the 
concept to describe national states and feelings of nationality. The term has later been used in many different contexts, for instance ‘Facebook’, or the 
local football team and its fans (and indeed opponents) can be described as imagined communities. My use of the term similarly twists the concept, as 
I describe how a very small population (one lab, two labs) share an idea about how society in general is composed, how they belong to that society, 
and, thereby, what their role in that society is.  
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I’m interviewing Annie from Gyro Gearloose. We are talking about her 
responsibilities as a PhD student and as a scientist and how they differ from other 
professions’ responsibilities.  
I ask her how her responsibilities differ from those of, for instance, lab technicians or 
security professionals:  
 
Annie: ‘They don’t, actually.’ 
Me: ‘Ok, why not?’ 
Annie: ‘Because we all contribute in the same way […].’ 
Me: ‘Could you give an example of that?’ 
Annie: ‘So, as I mentioned for my thesis, we have a certain number of goals that have 
been approved, and I have to work towards meeting those. So I mainly just contribute 
towards those. But maybe security personnel have the same sort of goals outlined for 
their job, you know, and they contribute towards completing those. So it isn’t very 
different, except maybe the impact of what we do is different.’  
Me: ‘Ok, how so?’ 
Annie: ‘For example, again in that same example that I gave about the security 
personnel: What they do is in real time. So their job requires that what they do in that 
moment is important, and affects maybe the eight hours that they spend. But through 
this program and through doing this work, the opportunity that we get is to make or 
create something that is better at diagnosing […]. My work is done, you know, as 
long as I meet my goals […]. And I leave here. But then it gets taken and applied in 
the industry, and it goes into practice, and it actually affects people’s diagnoses.’  
 
This exchange with Annie is a very fine example of the imagined community I 
described in the previous section. She is part of a community where she has a special 
role in developing ‘something that is better at diagnosing’ in the same way that the 
security professionals probably also have some special ‘goals’ which they work to 
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accomplish. Both professions are united in having duties for the community, but they 
are specialised in different areas and therefore their duties are different. This focus on 
being together in having duties, but specialised in specific duties – and how they 
should be conducted – are very typical for how the scientists justify their 
responsibility in Citizenship. Annie repeats that worldview at the end of the quote, 
where she describes an innovation process that ends with the sharing of diagnostic 
methods with ‘people’, and where all the steps in that process are taken care of by 
specialised parts of society: her as a scientist, industry, and the medical sector.  
 
I’m following Simon from Curious George around for the day. He is visiting one of 
the local high schools to talk about his research. We arrive and are directed to a 
large, semi-dark auditorium, where more than 150 students are assembled. It’s all 
the students who specialise in science, we are told by one of their teachers. It’s 
Friday morning and most of them look tired and not particularly interested. Some of 
them have fallen asleep and are slumped over the tables. During Simon’s 
presentation, I can see the door open and close constantly as more students enter. 
Simon explains that enzymes from the plant “poisonous carrot” can be used for 
cancer treatment if they are transplanted to moss. And he spices up the talk by 
explaining that the same technique can also be used for developing pheromones for 
perfumes. The high school teachers ask polite questions and try to engage their 
students in the discussions as well but without much success.  
 
Back at the department, Simon comments: ‘It’s impossible when they are that many, 
it’s early in the day and they are seated in a dark auditorium. It would be strange if 
they were engaged! And there were a lot of things I did not do because of the 
conditions. I had brought the moss that smells of perfume, for instance, but I could 
just feel that it would be in vain to send it around. But when I’m visiting a small 
amount of students, and I […] bring that moss… Perhaps they return to their mom 
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and dad and they tell them about it and, “God, where did that come from” and, you 
know, “What!” and “Wow, do they do things like that as well?” You know, to make 
the public aware of what we are actually running around doing, that’s perhaps the 
most important aspect of participating in the Science Festival.’   
 
The visit is part of the nationwide annual ‘Science Festival’, where science is 
celebrated at primary and high schools across the nation. There are many different 
activities for children throughout the week. One of the events is a visit from a 
scientist who talks about his or her research. Simon participates every year; he thinks 
it is important that the scientists are visible at all stages of education in order to 
attract new students to plant chemistry. But he also hopes that the stories about what 
he and his colleagues do will reach a broader public through the younger members of 
society. As the above story indicates, he believes it is important that the public know 
about what scientists are doing. In another encounter, he explains that he finds this 
aspect important, as he and the other scientists are part of a public sector along with 
other institutions that also have an obligation to serve the public in the best and 
cheapest way possible.   
 
This is an argument I often hear among the scientists: They say that they are obliged 
to tell the public about their research because they belong to public institutions, and 
the public has a legitimate right to know how tax money is spent and what the 
scientists are working on. In that way, it becomes the act of accounting for their 
activities that is central for their conception of sharing their knowledge and 
technologies. In a Danish context, I believe that this feeling of responsibility is 
perhaps reinforced by the recent so-called Penkowa-case (‘Penkowa-sagen’ in 
Danish). Milena Penkowa, a renowned brain scientist, was accused and found guilty 
of serious scientific fraud and the misuse of public funds in 2011 and 2012. The story 
received huge media attention both in Denmark and internationally. While this recent 
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incident might have provoked the obligation to account for one’s work even more in 
Denmark, I believe that it has deeper roots. Shore and Wright (2004) describe how a 
series of university reforms have made ‘forced accountability’ a part of everyday life 
for scientists, in that they now spend more time accounting for what they are doing to 
diverse stakeholders, such as politicians and the public, than actually doing research 
(Shore and Wright 2000: 71). The focus of their paper is audit technologies, which is 
not an explicit part of this dissertation. Therefore, I cannot relate specific audit 
technologies to the obligation to account for daily work life among the scientists, but 
I can assert that this feeling of obligation to be accountable is indeed present. The 
scientists connect it with the idea of being part of a public sector together with other 
institutions, and all the latter should account for their operations and work because, 
the scientists reason, they owe their existence to the taxpayers. While this idea and 
the fairness of it are sometimes questioned, as I will show in the section on 
negotiations it is far from always being the case. In many instances, it is taken for 
granted and perhaps even celebrated. As Simon remarks:  
 
‘In reality, I think the public knows more about the intelligence agencies than they do 
about us. […]. And other public organisations, such as the elementary schools, are 
discussed a lot.’ 
 
Public research organisations are just one kind of institution among many, and public 
institutions are obliged to discuss their work with the public. That is just the way it is. 
This view is also expressed during the seminar I give for the scientists at Curious 
George as a conclusion to my stay. We discuss the freedom and obligations that come 
with the job as a scientist: 
  
I try to provoke the scientists by saying that I have observed them becoming really 
annoyed when ‘ignorant’ citizens want to tell them what kind of research they should 
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do and why. One of the scientists raises her hand and says, ‘Well, but school teachers 
get annoyed too if others tell them how to teach.’  
 
My interpretation of this exchange is that the scientists want to express that in general 
scientists are quite ordinary when it comes to discussions about professional 
autonomy. Other workers in public service, such as schoolteachers, feel the same 
way, but they do not attribute their frustration at loosing professional freedom to an 
antiquated idea of a lonesome individual in an Ivory Tower. Instead, they continually 
negotiate how much and in which ways the rest of society can interfere with their 
work (though, lately, not with great success). My interpretation is that the woman 
with the raised hand argues that when scientists get annoyed with the public 
interfering, it is no different to other public professions having to defend themselves 
against public critique. It is a way of negotiating freedom and duties in public service. 
In that way, the habit of referring to ‘ignorant publics’ and ‘facts’ in this battle may 
be used because it has historically been a legitimate way of setting boundaries for 
how much the public has a right to interfere with the scientists’ professional opinions.   
 
The last two stories above may seem contradictory at first glance. The first quote 
promotes the idea of public dialogue and the next defends professional autonomy. 
But in my view, the two stories express the same kind of worldview. Namely, that the 
lab and public scientists are ordinary members of public service among many other 
professions. And they all have specialised duties and freedoms. But the scientists’ 
specialised duties and freedoms go hand in hand with the view that the way science 
and its responsibilities are governed should be compared with the way other public 
institutions and their responsibilities are governed – for better or for worse. I will 
discuss this worldview more thoroughly in the section Negotiations. First, I will draw 
some conclusions on the justifications that I have presented in the previous sections. 
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9.2.5 SUMMING UP 
In the above stories, the scientists look at their work in a completely different way 
than they do in both Vocation and Oikos. They consider their job as one among many 
in an imagined public community. They find it reasonable that their work should be 
subject to public discussion, and they want to join this debate as well – not least to 
ensure that they do not lose all their professional autonomy. Seen in that way, 
‘science communication’ becomes something very different from the ‘deficit model 
of science communication’ (Irwin and Wynne 1996), which is described in Vocation. 
Here, scientists feel obligated to inform the public about their work and findings; 
however, they follow that obligation because they want the public to learn and 
respect scientific facts. These examples show a different case: The communication is 
imagined as a vital part of negotiations between the scientists, the public and 
government. By the means of doing science communication a compromise between 
the public’s wishes and the scientists’ freedoms can be reached. 
 
 
9.3 ORGANISATIONAL CONSEQUENCES 
The sense of belonging to society also frames the meaning of the scientists’ jobs in a 
way that is different from how it is rendered in Vocation and Oikos. In Vocation, it is 
the isolation, absorption and curiosity that make the scientists content. In Oikos, most 
of them seem to struggle to find positive meaning, but they do find a certain 
satisfaction in actually having done a job that positively advances their own career or 
the organisation as a whole. In the Citizenship mode, they find ‘motivation’ in 
helping members of a shared society. In that way, all the straightforward 
justifications based on ‘tax’ function as proxies for a more abstract sense of being 
part of an imagined public community along with other public institutions. In their 
view, the way of governing their duties and responsibilities should be comparable to 
these other public institutions. That does not mean that ‘tax’ is irrelevant at all. Tax is 
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a significant part of the scientists’ ways of justifying how they do their work, as they 
consider tax funding the legitimation of the public’s right to interfere in decision-
making about science. But even if tax is important, there is more to the justification. 
The scientists believe they can be compared to other public professions in so far as 
they have a specialised duty to help the public, as well as the freedom of how to help, 
which comes from the specialisation and expertise they represent. Therefore, they 
find it legitimate to fight for their autonomy as other public professions do.  
 
The scientists’ conception of being part of a public community is very abstract and 
does not (necessarily) refer to a particular system in a particular. They are, as public 
scientists, employed by government and with that comes a set of obligations, but their 
work does not necessarily have to benefit the citizens of their own country. 
Depending on the task at hand, their idea of the public they work for changes. As 
scientists, they do not necessarily work for a specific local or national government. 
Their work does not necessarily have to benefit citizens with whom they share 
national or regional borders. As we saw in earlier sections, the abstract figures they 
feel an obligation to share their knowledge with come in many forms. They can be 
from anywhere in the world: it can be citizens in general, citizens with special needs 
or special kinds of citizens. But no matter that these figures are quite abstract, sharing 
their knowledge and technologies with them is a presumed or imagined responsibility 
in this mode. Despite the fact that their responsibility to share is not tied to a specific 
state or a specific citizen, their justification for the responsibility shares similarities 
with some very specific contemporary ideas about how the public sector should be 
governed. 
 
These ways of considering the job are interesting seen in the light of the demands for 
‘Responsive Government’, as I described in the theory section (2.1.2). In some ways, 
the scientists do seem to find it legitimate that they are supposed to deliver on 
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research goals decided externally and, furthermore, are held accountable for how they 
spend their time and money. In addition, the acceptance of the idea that the public 
does not only have the right to express their opinions about scientific developments, 
but also has the right to, more or less directly, influence the prioritising of research 
and how it should be conducted further resonates with that rationality.  
 
We saw this, for instance, when they describe how an important part of the public 
engagement exercises is to report on reasonably well-spent money and tangible 
results. And it is certainly clear from the way that Henry from Curious George 
considers it irresponsible to ‘ask for money’ and then not deliver, i.e. not living up to 
conducting the scientific job responsively. On the other hand, the scientists are 
frustrated by some of the specific manifestations of this demand, for instance: That 
they have to justify doing science with no immediate application; that they have to 
make very strategic considerations about the grant applications rhetoric; that they 
have to spend a considerable amount of time substantiating their whereabouts instead 
of conducting research; and how very confusing it can be to adapt to the different 
demands for accountability in specific situations. The responsibility for the public 
comes with a range of frustrations that are not just a simple wish for general 
autonomy, but rather points to specific situations where it is difficult and frustrating 
to live up to being ‘responsible’ in this way.  
 
I argue that one of the consequences of the responsibility for the public, as the 
scientists imagine it, is that the scientists’ professional role is recast as, in du Gays 
words ‘entrepreneurs’ of publicly decided projects; that is, managing and conducting 
government-financed projects (2008). But in some specific situations, this is seriously 
at odds with the responsibility the scientists feel they have for ‘the truth’ and the view 
of the scientific community as reasonably trustworthy in governing themselves 
responsively. Du Gay (2009) explains that bureaucracy’s historically-built experience 
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in, and responsibility for, running a state has been eroded in favour of the 
responsibility for realising the current government’s decisions. This has in turn led to 
an unstable and contradictory range of public reforms in various areas and resulted in 
a poorly managed public sector. The question is whether we will see similar 
developments in the domain of science in the coming years. Given that the internal 
government of science is now heavily supplemented with demands of being 
accountable to various shifting governments and public opinions, what will happen to 
the academic system itself, the quality of science and, not least, the well-being of 
those working under these conditions? Some of the effects that will be described in 
this chapter such as ‘basic science guilt’, the shifts from one fashionable theme to 
another and the tedious strategic work that goes into keeping research meaningful do 
perhaps point to some of the problems in excessive responsiveness.  
 
9.3.1 FEEL GOOD SCIENCE? 
In the previous two chapters, I have demonstrated how time and truth-making shifts 
depending on the mode. In Vocation, spending a lot of time on experiments and being 
almost painstakingly patient is of importance because true science takes time to 
produce. It is all about ‘Slow Science’. In Oikos, it is vital to be quick on your feet, 
trust one’s own ability to produce a needed result and publish before others. Fast 
Science is appreciated.  
 
It is more difficult to see whether Citizenship generates specific understandings of 
time and facts. The empirical data is less coherent here, and there is simply less talk 
about it compared with the other modes. Starting with time, I am not able to describe 
the generation of a specific all-encompassing idea about the nature of time as I have 
done with the other modes. I cannot see whether the organisation’s shared idea of 
time generally shifts. It is more as if both the conception of infinite time (to do proper 
research) and time as a scarce resource are still present, and therefore the central 
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conducts of Citizenship are pressed out to the fringes of the scientists’ work time, for 
instance, to the weekends, to the evenings, or as something the scientists have to do 
on top of other things. In any case, the time spent on these activities still ends up 
taking more time than expected. As Catherine comments on the responsibility to 
participate in one of their annual public engagement events: 
 
‘Everybody needs to lend a hand at public lab nights, even though you have to leave 
your other projects, spend a lot of time on it, and half the weekend cleaning up 
afterwards and you only get two bottles of wine for it.’  
 
This is an understanding of the relation between engagement activities and time that I 
come across frequently. The scientists feel obliged to participate, they also want to do 
it in the way I described in the sections on conduct, and it nearly always ends up 
taking much more of their time than they had expected. The story about Mike – from 
Vocation – teaching his students that doing proper science communication takes as 
much time as writing a scientific paper comes to mind. The juniors are not 
necessarily aware of how much time these activities take and tend to take them upon 
themselves as yet another task they can do in the evening or at the weekend. But they 
end up spending much more time on it. The seniors seem more used to it; for 
instance, when Henry from Gyro Gearloose comments that he has eventually learned 
to say no – also to things that matter to him. He has, in line with many of the other 
seniors, learned that public engagement activities take up much of their time if they 
agree to too much. It stops being something they do at weekends and during evenings 
and takes time away from the responsibility for the business and for the truth.  
 
On the other hand, the scientists also tell me that they enjoy doing science 
communication because it ‘feels good’ to communicate about what one does and to 
discuss it with others besides their colleagues. As one of the scientists from Gyro 
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Gearloose says: ‘I think scientists really want to speak about their work, they just 
need the opportunity’. Walter from Gyro Gearloose explains that he has participated 
in courses about plant chemistry for high school teachers and that the process of 
making them understand and reflect had been ‘very rewarding’. In section 9.1.1, I 
also showed that the scientists at times complained or excused themselves for not 
communicating enough. So there is a curious paradox about time and Citizenship: On 
the one hand, the scientists are surprised that it takes up as much time (from other 
responsibilities) as it does, and they learn to say no to some of the activities over 
time; on the other hand, they like science communication because it gives them an 
opportunity to talk about their research and they feel guilty for not doing it enough. I 
am not sure how to interpret these contradictions. I have called this section ‘Feel 
Good Science’, in an attempt to mirror ‘Slow Science’ and ‘Fast Science’. I use the 
analogy of food but I am, at the same time, cautious about using it, as I would like 
more data to support the story. ‘Feel good food’ is a recent phenomenon: it is healthy 
food that is also supposed to be tasty and prepared with care. In addition, it should be 
made exclusively with fair-trade products, exclusively using organic ingredients or be 
strictly vegan – or all of the above. It is supposed to make your body, your taste buds 
as well as your conscience feel good.  The analogy works in so far as science 
communication is something that can put the scientists at ease (although I also 
showed examples of the opposite in 9.1.1). Furthermore, it is something they need to 
do: ‘everybody needs to lend a hand’, a bit like all of us need to adapt to a healthy 
diet and are glad when we manage to do so. At the same time, it turns out that it takes 
a long time to cook and eat in that way, time that could have been spent otherwise. 
Public engagement is in every way something that is considered to be an inherently 
good and healthy thing to do but, at the same time, a time-consuming task that they 
do not consider their main priority.  
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A similar ambivalence seems to be present in relation to fact-making. As with time, it 
is difficult to establish whether and how Citizenship generates a certain attitude 
toward facts. So the comparisons with the previous modes are again tentative. At 
Curious George, Clark tells me that it gives him ‘good satisfaction’ that his research 
is interesting in the field of medicine. But at the same time, he explains that this 
satisfaction is something that comes on top of the satisfaction of making something 
that is interesting. At other times, as I have described throughout the section on 
justification, the scientists see it as their foremost responsibility to help other people, 
but how this exactly affects their stance vis-à-vis fact-making is more difficult to say. 
It often means that they prioritise certain research projects over others. At Gyro 
Gearloose, they do perhaps also tend to have a certain trust in their hypotheses 
because they always choose the research areas and methods based on what they 
consider to be ‘the best solution to society’s problems’, as Henry puts it when 
explaining their cancer vaccine project. With this, he also indicates that Gyro 
Gearloose, via their science, actually has access to knowledge about the most optimal 
solutions to society’s problems – in contrast to many other places. At Gyro 
Gearloose, they strongly identify with being ‘translational scientists’, meaning that 
they see it as their job to translate their knowledge into tangible technologies; without 
that responsibility, they would not really be there. At Curious George, most of the 
scientists are similarly convinced that many problems, for instance, hunger, will be 
difficult to solve without GMO technologies. So there are some connections between 
the general directions that their research takes and their opinions about solutions to 
society’s problems. But while it is possible to establish links between problems they 
want to solve and their research area, it is more difficult to make a detailed account of 
how this specifically influences the establishment of every single fact they develop. 
This will demand a more thorough focus on that exact aspect.  
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When they do produce science whereby the prospects for applicability and use are 
very apparent, some of the feelings of frustration that I have described disappear. It is 
as if the scientists find their tasks 100% legitimate and the impression I got of them 
trying to defend themselves disappears. In that respect, it also becomes ‘Feel Good 
Science’ because, by living up to some contemporary demands, they do not have to 
go around with a bad conscience about public money being badly spent.  
 
It is difficult to say why Citizenship does not generate specific attitudes to time and 
fact-making as Vocation and Oikos do; or at least none that I observed. Perhaps it is 
because the responsibility for the public is not considered as central as the one for the 
truth and the one for the business, and the mode is thereby weaker in its ability to 
generate different organisational effects. Or perhaps it is because this concern for 
public opinion is new and shared ideas about time and fact-making have not been 
established. Perhaps they never will. I am not sure about this particular aspect and 
can conclude that further empirical studies are necessary in order to conclude 
securely on this subject.  
 
9.3.2 THE SCIENTISTS AS ACTIVISTS 
An interpretation of the scientists’ ways of doing their work as a result of this mode, 
could be labelled as ‘activist’. By ‘activist’, I mean active political, non-party 
engagement with the aim of changing science’s current role in society – or at least the 
field’s role in society. The scientists find it important to take part in debates about the 
direction in which society is moving, especially if this debate involves their own area 
of work. Catherine from Curious George feels very strongly about this and 
comments: 
 
‘[…] you have an obligation to speak up if you can see that somebody tries to 
manipulate things, because there are many organisations that use [scientific] data in 
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their work. And now there has been that GMO experiment in France, which was a 
completely crazy experiment with a completely ridiculous population size. I mean, 
there were 10 mice and then two of them died and then they continued to work with 
the remaining eight. And, damn me, you cannot take the liberty to call that a 
population. And then they publish it in that way they did, I mean, they only gave the 
data to specially chosen journalists – who only got specially selected data before the 
article was printed and who knows what. And in an instance like that, I believe that 
you have a great obligation to help people navigate a bit. The statistics made from 
those experiments were plain crazy…’ 
 
At the time of the interview, the news reported a recent French experiment where rats 
were fed GM maize and most of them apparently got severe forms of cancer. 
Catherine is – as the quote suggests – quite angry about the experiment and the 
press’s handling of the case. She is so angry that he does not even care about getting 
the facts right. It was experimental rats not mice, and there were actually 200 of them 
not ten. But the facts are not that important here, as the exaggerations are made 
because Catherine is angry and, because the whole experiment is completely invalid 
to her, it does not matter if it were based on 200 rats or ten mice, the quality was so 
low anyway. She believes that it is ‘a completely crazy experiment’ and therefore he 
has a duty as a scientist to speak up to help laypeople ‘navigate a bit’.  
 
In the examples I have described in the conduct sections (9.1.1 and 9.1.2), most of the 
scientists’ engagements with the public have been planned, carefully prepared and are 
very much about explaining their own research and its potential implications for 
society to a lay public. This is different. Here, Catherine reacts to an issue that she 
considers highly politically potent. The debate about GMO and its unintended side 
effects has been quite contentious.  In the other examples, I have argued that the way 
the ‘speaking about science’ is performed could be understood as a specific 
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commitment to democratic society through its practising in society’s institutions 
(libraries, schools, etc.) and by the institution’s methods, that is, enlightening 
dialogue. This example is different. Here, Catherine raises her voice with a specific 
standpoint, a conscious, political statement. Her political statement is still based on 
his professional expertise, and she still wants to help non-scientists ‘navigate’ the 
debate. In that way, there is still an element of enlightenment in her activism, but that 
is not all. She is also just angry and wants to show an ‘alternative truth’ (Barry 1999: 
75) about GMO: a truth that he thinks she has a special access to based on her 
professional knowledge; namely, that the experiment was of no use and that GMO 
has not been proven harmful. In this way, her engagement becomes an engagement 
on equal footing with other interested parties.  
 
Several scientists have complained that their colleagues, both within the lab and in 
general, could participate more in debates about the direction of science. For instance, 
Miriam comments that: 
 
‘Where I believe that scientists are failing are that they do not dare say “this is 
perhaps not the right way forward.” We tend to lock ourselves up and say that “they 
have decided that, so we might follow it as long as I can still do research,” instead of 
speaking up and saying: “Well, is this what we want as a society? Isn’t it better that 
we do some basic science, where we can make really big leaps forward, instead of 
doing science that is pretty applied in the foreseeable future? Instead, do something 
that is more far-sighted.” But you don’t hear that much and interest in those kinds of 
opinions is also really small.’ 
 
Miriam believes that scientists should be far more daring in stating their opinion 
about what role science should have in society.  She is a warm proponent of the view 
that academia should conduct basic science and leave the applications to industry, but 
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while most scientists may feel the same, she believes that they are too scared of 
losing their money and work to speak up. And while I did observe scientists being 
critical about other scientific results, as in the example with Catherine above, I 
seldom observed the scientists actually criticising science policy in the public media. 
And this is despite the impressive amount of lobbying and negotiating about 
research-funding allocations they do in their daily work life (as we saw in the Oikos 
mode, 8.1.1). One of the only exceptions was actually Catherine As mentioned above, 
she spent half a year in the Department for Agriculture and Food. After her stay, she 
created a blog where she commented on current science governance themes – 
including a very critical debate piece that sharply argued against the statements on 
GMO made by the Department she had worked for only months before.  
 
‘They haven’t really been in contact since then’. And of course I’m a little, “oh 
bummer, did I burn all my bridges?” Because I really liked working there […]. But 
then, I mean, I couldn’t sit there and watch the minister just turn on a dime and 
follow all the ecological types…’  
 
While the scientists at Curious George perhaps seldom speak up in public debates 
about science governance, many of the scientists do other things that I would 
characterise as ‘activism’. As I also mentioned in an earlier section, they have 
initiated collaboration with the local Hacker Space on certain projects. They are very 
much in favour of the Hacker Space’s open-source policy and their philosophy about 
science being to and for the people rather than big business. At the same time, as 
Canute commented, they are also glad to be able to help and keep an eye on the 
inventions from the Hacker Space so they do not do anything too risky or dangerous. 
The stance on patenting is a huge issue in biotech, an area where patents are taken out 
very frequently and a lot of secrecy prevails. While some of the scientists at Curious 
George do take patents out (also described in Oikos), Canute has, for instance, 
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decided that he will not take patents on production platforms in order to engage other 
researchers and industries in improving the platform, which could then be rapidly 
improved used to e.g. produce numerous drugs each of which could be patented 
separately. This will speed up the process of generating products using synthetic 
biology approaches. The international research partners with whom they collaborate 
have the same sceptical attitude toward broad patents that may serve to hamper 
development within the patent protected domain. It does not mean that they have 
totally abandoned them: ‘it can be necessary at times’, as Canute comments in a 
national newspaper. And there is no general policy in the lab on patents, but some of 
the scientists are quite sceptical.   
 
Where many individuals, in one way or another, are involved in their own ‘activist’ 
case at Curious George, this is not the case at Gyro Gearloose. Here, they mainly 
work on their core tasks, namely, developing their technologies. While I am sure that 
they have opinions on many different subjects, it seems that direct activism and 
political involvement are reserved for the PIs. And usually the rest of the staff share 
the political views held by management. The picture is much more homogeneous. 
But the PIs do engage in ‘activism’ of sorts – and in a way that is closely related to 
their inventions. First and foremost, they are concerned that their medical inventions 
will never end up benefitting the patients because both the FDA43 and big medical 
companies may stall the commercialisation of the inventions. While getting the 
FDA’s approval is mostly about making very rigorous work and proving the safety of 
a technology, dealing with the pharmaceutical companies is not as easy. Henry, the 
PI, is really keen on getting the products out where they can actually benefit people; 
he has given the subject a lot of consideration and has also asked external consultants 
for help. Based on this, he now tries to avoid big companies when he sells the lab’s 
                                                
43 In the USA., the FDA is the government agency responsible for protecting public health through the regulation of pharmaceutical drugs and 
medical devices as well as food safety, tobacco products and dietary supplements.  
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methods and ideas. He is afraid that big companies are too bureaucratic and will not 
work hard enough in promoting his technologies, but will rather put them in a drawer 
somewhere. For the next ‘big thing’, he has even decided that he, together with the 
other co-director of the lab, will make a start-up company to avoid all the traps of 
working with other companies. While this is going to be a lot of work, he really 
hopes that it will make a difference for when the products reach the end-user. So 
participation in debates strategies for making findings publically available and 
criticism of big companies form part of the scientists’ way of going about their work 
in this mode. It differs whether they act as concerned individuals, as an organisation 
or as part of a bigger movement.  
 
So the responsibility for the public also prompts the scientists to engage in various 
activist activities and engage in movements such as the DYI-bio and open-source. 
Furthermore they also take an active stance against big business. In that way the 
scientists do seem very ‘engaged’ in society’s problems, where they consider them to 
be relevant and take an active role in the engagement. But as I will show in the 
section called ‘basic science guilt’, they do at times, despite these engagements, feel 
‘guilty’ about the science they actually do and their lack of engagement.  
 
9.3.3 BASIC SCIENCE GUILT 
The last organisational consequence that I want to touch describe is one that I have 
chosen to call ‘basic science guilt’. It addresses the feeling, I often met at Curious 
George that they felt guilty about doing ‘basic science’ and thus needed to defend the 
value of it. I consider this feeling of guilt as an effect of demands to be ‘responsible’ 
and demands to produce science ‘for the people’ (Owen, Macnaghten, and Stilgoe 
2012). In that way, this section also addresses the effects on the general wellbeing of 
scientists as an effect of Citizenship.  
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In an interview with Karen, I ask her to make a drawing of her project and how it 
relates to her surrounding world. Karen draws a circle in the middle of a piece of 
paper and names it ‘project’. 
‘It’s the middle of the universe, ha ha,’ she comments as she draws. 
She then draws another circle around the project circle, which she calls ‘work’ and 
then half a circle further out, which she names ‘friends at work and outside work’. 
After some thought, she draws a bunch of small bubbles that partly cover the project 
circle.  
 
‘They are my ambitions,’ she says, ‘you know, career opportunities and self-
realisation and all that stuff.’  
 
Karen draws a lot of things on the piece of paper; thereby, the picture becomes more 
and more elaborated. ‘This is fun’, she comments. Other research fields are added as 
well as ‘learning computer programming’, ‘visits to other countries’ and 
‘collaborations with other universities’.  She comments that she should perhaps draw 
some of the things the project should ideally relate to, but doesn’t; ‘Like family,’ she 
says ‘and some friends that I don’t see much due to work.’ She draws two rectangles 
in the corners of the piece of paper, far away from the middle of the universe.  At last, 
she seems done. We are silent for a bit, and then I ask: 
‘Are there other things it should relate to, but doesn’t?’  
‘Reality!’ Karen promptly answers.  
Me: ‘But you just said that… But of course, by “reality”, do you mean “usable”?’ 
Karen: ‘That was what I meant, you know, applicable.’  
 
This is a very telling story of the way that some of the scientists at Curious George 
look at their projects. On the one hand, Karen is proud that she is doing what she at 
another point calls ‘an advanced basic science project’, but on the other hand, she 
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believes that ‘reality’ is missing from her project and indicates that it should 
somehow be included. From the drawing though, it seems that there is a lot of 
‘reality’ at play. Her project is connected to all sorts of things; a rather big network 
has been visualised through the drawing. A network that connects the work she does 
in the laboratory with various other labs, her current life situation and dreams, 
colleagues and trips to foreign countries, as well as learning new skills, developing 
new knowledge and getting a doctorate degree. But besides all that ‘reality’, Karen 
still thinks something is missing; namely, that the project does not lead to anything 
immediately applicable for society. At other times, she defends the right to basic 
science and says it is important to satisfy human curiosity about how the world 
functions and that basic science could lead to big leaps in technology someday. But 
these arguments only underline the impression that something needs to be defended. 
The idea of doing a science project that does not relate to ‘reality’ – or is not 
‘applicable’ – is not something the scientists feel they can do without justifying it to 
themselves – and others. They are ready to defend their position.  
 
This sentiment is expressed quite often at Curious George, but very rarely at Gyro 
Gearloose. ‘Basic science’ is an integrated part of Curious George’s research 
ambitions. In contrast, Gyro Gearloose does so little of what they believe to be ‘basic 
research’ that they never talk about the lack of potential applications. An exception is 
Sandra, who just arrived at Gyro Gearloose from another job. She describes needing 
time to get used to Gyro Gearloose’s scientific culture. She liked doing research 
without thinking about the wider potentials for application: ‘I need something to 
preoccupy my mind with, you know, I just like to solve puzzles,’ she commented once, 
laughing. She thinks it is important that research is ‘exciting’ and ‘mind-blowing’ in 
itself without thinking about potential ways to use it. However, I also get the 
impression that she thinks it is important to defend this position, as if it were 
threatened. During the period that I followed her, it seemed that she came to 
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appreciate Gyro Gearloose’s way of doing things. In the following excerpt, she 
includes a lot of other thoughts on what science’s main task should be: 
 
‘So, I think, you know, if you are asking for grant money, and you get that grant, your 
role is to fulfil that grant, or at least do something as exciting as that. I mean, you 
might have an idea for a grant, and when you are working on it, you realise that “this 
is not going to work out, but I think there is something else that is going to work that 
is even better or more exciting.” And it’s just – as long as you are producing 
something useful, interesting, helpful – whatever.’ 
 
Here, she includes ‘useful’ and ‘helpful’ in her definition of what scientists should try 
to do, but also adds a ‘whatever’; it should not be a definite condition that it must be 
‘useful’ or ‘interesting’. In the same interview, she tells me that she has come to like 
the way things are done at Gyro Gearloose and that it is nice to be organised in such a 
way that she knows what to do everyday, what her role is and what she can expect 
from others. On other occasions, she maintains – not in relation to her work but more 
in general – the position that basic science needs to be defended. She was also one of 
the few who expressed that opinion at a seminar that I hosted toward the end of my 
stay at Gyro Gearloose, at which the scientists and I discussed social responsibility 
and scientists’ relation to society. But that does not necessarily mean that she was the 
only one with that opinion: The director of the lab was present during the seminar and 
I am not sure that many of the attendees dared express too many sentiments that were 
against his opinions – at least not in times of crisis, as described in Oikos. And 
Henry, the lab director, is certainly not a fan of research without any other purpose 
than satisfying human curiosity. As he comments once, when he tells about his 
research career to some of the juniors: 
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‘Basic scientists hate me when I say this, but I think it’s increasingly wrong to let 
society fund you and then not deliver something back.’ 
 
Henry often talks out against basic research. And in contrast to some of the scientists 
from Curious George, he is not directly defensive about his way of doing research. 
But again, his vision of doing things ‘backwards’ – from the best possible solution to 
the required research – also fits very much with current science policy ideas. Gyro 
Gearloose’s way of organising their research backward responds very directly to calls 
for science ‘for the people’, as the specific end product always determines what kind 
of experiments they do.  
 
At Curious George, the end product is far from always determined from the outset of 
a research project. But neither do they directly oppose the idea of their research 
ending in applicable technologies. One of the professors, Clark, at Curious George 
asks me about the difference between their lab and the one I visited in the US. I tell 
him that I find it interesting that they always focus on their end product, something I 
definitely find different from Curious George. He considers this a bit and replies: 
 
‘It gives me a lot of satisfaction to know that there’s a product on the horizon, but I 
think it’s important that it’s sound basic research that lays the path … We do basic 
science, we are lucky that the stuff that we are interested in happens to be of 
commercial interest as well. I found out only later. I was interested in the more 
scientific part of the project, and then I found out: Wow, there’s a company and they 
are really keen on collaborating…’  
 
While Clark does perhaps not feel as guilty about doing basic science as Karen in the 
story above, he does acknowledge that ‘a product on the horizon’ is a good 
motivator. He also acknowledges that it has been significant for his field that their 
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area of research – plant terpenoids – is becoming increasingly ‘of commercial 
interest’ because of its potential usage. The scientists at Gyro Gearloose feel that it 
gets easier to justify their jobs to people outside the scientific community if some 
kind of product – even if it is only ‘on the horizon’ – is part of their research. This 
way of going about their research – with a ‘product on the horizon’ – is very telling 
of the way they do science at Curious George. They have broad ideas about how their 
science may change different areas of society, such as the production methods of 
medicine, energy or new crops. They have a vision of a better society, where their 
methods or technologies fit in, but do not necessarily create specific products. On 
their webpage, you can, for instance, read a presentation by one of the research 
groups in the lab: 
 
‘By combining highly sensitive Nano devices with biological samples (e.g. proteins 
and cells), we are attempting to develop novel biosensors applicable in e.g. the 
medical and environmental safety sectors. The unique features of nanomaterials are 
expected to provide novel types of biological information that can revolutionize 
diagnostics and pharmacological investigations of diseases such as cancer, diabetes 
and heart disease.’ (From Curious George’s webpage 28.06.14) 
 
From what I discerned in the field, it takes quite a lot of what the scientists at Curious 
George call ‘basic science’ to come closer to fulfilling the expectation to 
‘revolutionize diagnostics’. For instance, they need to study the ‘unique features of 
nanomaterials’ in great detail, which may take years, and perhaps it turns out not to 
be the right way to go. Nevertheless, the visions are there and they work toward 
them. However, they do not seem to think that working toward specific visions for 
new ways of making medicine is relevant enough. The scientists at Curious George 
seem to be constantly on the lookout for relevance; they do not necessarily plan for 
their projects to be relevant, but they savour relevance when their research turns out 
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to be so. The scientists at Curious George are good at listing all the potential uses of 
their knowledge and all their close stakeholders and collaborators. But in contrast to 
Gyro Gearloose, they never seem to be satisfied with their lists. On the one hand, 
they at times sound guilty about not being relevant enough, as Catherine comments: 
 
‘Sometimes I get a bit frustrated with this job. And this is why I also liked being in the 
Department (of Agriculture), because sometimes, you just sit in here [in the lab], and 
besides your supervisor, only two or three people in the whole world are going to 
read what you have done… tops! And it just seems so useless…’ 
 
On the other hand, they also furiously defend the importance of their right to do basic 
science – usually with the argument that no one can ever know when an application 
will come from great a discovery. As Clark, who seemed almost angry with me when 
I asked him why he thought the public needed education in science, says: 
 
‘What do people that do basic research say? People that do true basic research have 
very severe limitations when it comes to selling stuff and really making an 
application. Should they not be allowed to do that research? Just because the public 
does not immediately see the value? But it [the research] clearly has value, because it 
could be the foundation on which 20 years later positive, additional research will 
happen. So that would be more of a question for you: “Do you think we should do 
more basic research?”’ 
 
Suddenly faced with my own question, I stammered an answer that did not make 
much sense. I was more concerned about how agitated Clark suddenly became. But 
this was often the case when the topic was ‘basic science’. My impression is that the 
scientists at Curious George feel pressured because they are not sure whether they are 
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‘allowed’ to do basic research. They feel that it is illegitimate – and they sometimes 
associate these limited possibilities with increased public participation in science. 
 
And yet at other times, they assert that their own research is indeed very relevant, 
because they work with a plant from which it is easy to generalise to other plants – 
what they call ‘a good model plant’; or because they work with something that results 
in findings that are of interest to industry or others; or because they work with an 
important crop. For instance, I overheard this conversation over lunch: 
 
Miriam: (teasing a little) ‘So, why are you really working with that plant, Catherine? 
Why is it sooo interesting?’ 
Catherine: ‘You know, it’s actually a really important crop. It’s it forms the basic 
nutrition for a lot of people and it contains several highly important vita… 
Miriam: ‘Wow, wow, wow, calm down, you got me – and you certainly got your intro 
for the PhD dissertation!’ 
 
A certain schizophrenia in relation to the topic of application is discernable at 
Curious George. But the almost aggressive defence of basic science, combined with 
the sudden expressions of doubt about the legitimacy of doing it, gives me the 
impression that a sort of shared guilt about doing basic science hangs over the lab at 
times. Not all the time, of course. Perhaps, it is noticeable that Vocations do not 
generate feelings of guilt, whereas Citizenship provokes it.  
 
These stories have been included because I find it interesting that the stories of 
responsibility in the mode of Citizenship closely resemble the idea that science needs 
to be of ‘relevance’. Hessels and van Lente (2009) have looked at the demand for 
‘relevance’ in science and analysed what it has come to mean in science politics over 
the years. They show that ‘relevance’ has been a key term in public science at least 
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since World War II, but the meaning of the word has changed. As funding is 
increasingly framed as a helping hand for national innovation, the meaning of 
‘relevance’ also changes:  
 
‘Around the turn of the century [the 20th century], the funding of university research 
is increasingly framed as support for the national innovation system. Maintaining a 
‘healthy innovation system’ becomes a central goal of economic policy, which 
implies that universities deserve support thanks to their central position in this 
system. In this perspective, however, support for university researchers is 
accompanied by the expectation that they actively interact with other actors in the 
innovation system, and contribute to the process of ‘valorization’, by writing patents 
or by founding spin-off companies.’  (Hessels, Van Lente, and Smits 2009: 395)  
 
In the chapter ‘Vocation’ the scientists worried about the validity of their studies. 
Now they worry if their work is relevant, that is, applicable. In that way, 
responsibility and relevance become connected. The way ‘relevance’ is articulated in 
policy discourse is about how science can put forward knowledge, which can drive 
national and regional innovation. And when the scientists at Curious George talk 
about their own projects, they are uncertain about whether their work can really do 
that. In comparison, the scientists at Gyro Gearloose do not feel guilty (about that, 
anyway), as they always know exactly how their work is going to feed into the 
development of a new product.  
 
The chapter on Citizenship has so far shown that the scientists feel a responsibility to 
account for the public money they spend. The scientists are eager to show the public 
that they are worth the money spent; that they do actually work hard and that they 
work to improve our shared living conditions. But one of the ways to prove that is to 
show that what they do has an innovative potential and can be taken up by industry 
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and start-ups. Some of the science that they do at Curious George does not have these 
immediate potentials. This does not sit well with the scientists.  
 
I will argue that many of the scientists develop what I call ‘basic science guilt’ – 
which the scientists in the above stories suffer from. I understand and use ‘basic 
science guilt’ as the feeling of inadequacy that the scientists get when they do not 
believe that the work they do is legitimate in the eyes of others. And even though 
they disagree with that perceived judgment, they still find it difficult to maintain, for 
themselves, the idea that what they work on everyday is of value. And they feel the 
need to defend their job. To do ‘relevant’ research seems to be a way of returning 
something, where they can prove that tax-money has been well-spent and in that way 
somehow give something back. But as both ‘relevance’ and ‘Responsible Science’ 
are quite broad and fragmented phenomena, it is quite difficult to estimate when they 
are ‘relevant’ or ‘responsible’ enough and this leaves room for feelings of guilt and 
inadequacy. At Gyro Gearloose, where they innovate specific products and can see a 
clear connection between research and application, this guilt is not apparent. In their 
case, ‘relevance’ and the responsibility to give something back to society converge. 
But at Curious George the tasks are decentralised, people have different projects and 
some of it is basic science, and that is why ‘basic science guilt’ prevails.  
 
Observing how the two labs relate to relevance does engender some questions in 
relation to my choice of the two laboratories as case sites. At a glance, it might seem 
as if Gyro Gearloose is just more ‘responsible’ than Curious George. One may argue 
that Gyro Gearloose lives up to the standards of ‘Responsible Science’, as presented 
in the theory section (2.1). They reflect upon their science and the outcomes; they 
organise and participate in deliberative exercises with the public; and they are 
focused on innovation and deliver something very tangible, useful and even ‘good’ to 
the public, namely, new diagnostic devices and vaccines. They even develop 
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strategies to avoid the much-criticised pharmaceutical industry (e.g. Sismondo 2008) 
in order to create a better alternative for the ‘customers’. At the same time, they also 
cherish classic academic virtues and strive to live up to academic standards. Are they 
more ‘responsible’ than Curious George? The answer depends on the perspective. If 
one looks at the two labs in comparison with the ideals put forward as ‘Responsible 
Science’ (see 2.1), then Gyro Gearloose is perhaps actually the most responsible one. 
In many ways, they do live up to the ideals. And I do not believe that Curious George 
does to the same extent. First, the ideals do not seem to penetrate the organisation to 
the extent they do at Gyro Gearloose. At Curious George, the scientists do a lot of 
outreach, but it is not centrally coordinated and the reasons for doing it are not 
centrally controlled, but rather based on individual interests. Second, the scientists at 
Curious George seem more critical about public opinion than the scientists at Gyro 
Gearloose. They are not necessarily convinced that the public should always have a 
say in deciding which direction science should take, and they do not always consider 
them helpful partners. They do a lot of work with plants for developing countries and 
advanced medicine, but on the other hand, they also insist on the right to do basic 
research without interference from other stakeholders. And sometimes, they even 
refuse to reflect upon their work. They already did that when they chose their area of 
research, they claim; or they think that it is only necessary if one works with animals. 
Seen from that perspective, Gyro Gearloose does seem more responsible. But the 
question is whether we are looking at responsibility in the correct way? 
 
From another point of view, Curious George is perhaps just as responsible as Gyro 
Gearloose. Yes, Gyro Gearloose has in many ways included in their work elements 
that resemble those from ‘Responsible Science’. Curious George has done this as 
well, but perhaps not as much. However, given that we consider ‘Responsible 
Science’ to be a specific government rationality (2.1) with specific aims, it should be 
noted that it therefore encourages certain forms of behaviour and discourages others. 
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In this case, it is my interpretation that ideals about ‘Responsible Science’ do 
contribute to the scientists’ feelings of ‘basic science guilt’ because of the 
encouragement to reflect upon outcomes of science and how these interact with 
society. The demand to reflect is burdensome in the instances where the scientists 
honestly think that reflections upon their interactions with society are of little 
importance. I imagine that this demand must leave the nagging thought that they just 
have not been able to reflect hard enough or they have overlooked something 
extremely important.  
 
Furthermore, the rationality also implies that a certain amount of legitimacy in the 
eyes of the public is necessary. This is not a substantial claim; the rationality does not 
positively articulate what makes an outcome legitimate, as this is supposed to be a 
result of deliberative processes (Owen et al. 2013: 38). But the positive inclusion of 
different visions for society in the material construction of new knowledge and 
technologies is articulated as a goal. However, this may prove difficult to fulfil if the 
knowledge the scientists are making is not applicable. Owen et al. (2013) do assert 
that ‘Responsible Science’ cannot and should not be a standard for all research; they 
state that the most ‘pure’ forms of science could be excluded from this framework. 
But perhaps it is worthwhile to look at the unintended side effects of the ideals of 
‘Responsible Science’; namely, that they form part of a movement advancing away 
from the value of basic science and toward an ideal of usable results that are possible 
to discuss and reflect upon. Guilt about not making applied science is in my view one 
such unintended side effect.  
 
Curious George certainly do consider which kinds of science they conduct and why. 
They are very committed to – and often articulate the importance of – making science 
of the highest, long-term quality; something they can leave behind and which can be 
of use for future generations. While this may not feed into the national innovation 
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system here and now, nor be functional in any kind of way, it does spring from a 
responsibility to return something of value to the surrounding society. However, they 
do not understand responsibility as a demand to be ‘responsive’. 
 
 
NEGOTIATING CITIZENSHIP 
In the previous sections, I have described the mode of responsibility called 
‘Citizenship’ as if it were a ‘pure’ mode; that is, an ideal, which is fully realised in 
the way that the scientists work (Law 1994: 6). But in reality, it is of course not. In 
the two previous chapters, we have already seen how the scientists also organise their 
work according to the two other modes, namely, that of Vocation and Oikos. In this 
section, we will take a closer look at how the scientists negotiate which justifications 
should form the basis of their decisions and how they, furthermore, refuse to take the 
responsibilities associated with Citizenship due to other concerns.  
 
One of the most common denials of any kind of responsibility to ‘listen to the public’ 
(9.1.2) was made with reference to the idea that if the public received education about 
science, then they would not oppose scientific advancements. This refusal is clear in 
an interview with Clark, in which he told me about a seminar held by Curious 
George’s ‘in-house’ philosopher, who worked with ethics in synthetic biology: 
 
Clark: ‘Well, we lost a lot of opportunities [due to the GMO crisis]. Absolutely. Stem 
cell research is going in a similar direction right now. And for very similar reasons, 
and this is very annoying, because I think that scientists can stop that before it 
happens. And this is why the synthetic biology programme has initiated a public 
exchange and communication. And we have a philosopher on board…’ 
Me: ‘Yeah, Andrew?’ 
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Clark: ‘Yes, Andrew. It was really cool, because he has talked about exactly those 
things: Public perception of synthetic biology – threats and opportunities seen by the 
public. And then he explained that when the public is educated about a certain topic, 
and he asked again about their opinions, they are much more positive. And I was 
like: “Wow, this is a big change.” So it clearly shows that we have some homework 
to do.’ 
 
I have met Andrew and heard him give talks on other occasions, and I actually cannot 
imagine that he would ever advocate the viewpoint that scientists should engage with 
the public in order to avoid public controversies. But that aside, it is interesting how 
Clark here proposes what looks like a classic ‘deficit model for science 
communication’: One where resistance is seen as an expression of ignorance and 
communication as a way to remediate this ignorance and eradicate scepticism 
(Trench 2008: 134). Even though Clark acknowledges the responsibility to 
communicate with the general public, it is only as a strategy to make people more 
positive toward a ‘certain topic’ and to curb public resistance. From time to time, I 
met this idea in one way or another. Engagement with the public is done in order to 
open the way for the type of science the researcher wants to do. In the following, it is 
Walter who talks about his current research project: 
 
Walter: ‘Well, what we try to do now is what we call bio-pesticides, that is: How we 
use naturally occurring substances from the plants as insecticide or fungicide – or as 
an alternative to the chemically synthesised pesticides, which we use today.’ 
Me: ‘Precisely. What you do is, as I understand it, develop something that is 
supposed to replace something which polluted quite a lot?’ 
Walter: ‘Yes, and hopefully it also generates a bigger understanding among the 
public that you can do things in alternative ways by learning from nature.’ 
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Walter hopes that his work can teach people that we can ‘learn from nature’. But at 
the same time, he refuses to acknowledge that his research could be seen as 
controversial in any kind of way or that people could see any kind of ethical problems 
in their new ‘insecticide’ or ‘fungicide’.  
 
‘I don’t really consider ethical problems because I don’t work with animals,’ he tells 
me in the same interview; ‘I actually changed research area back in the day because 
I couldn’t handle working with laboratory animals.’  
 
So Walter does think about ethical problems, but not as something that affects his 
current area of research. He has a classic medical view on research ethics, where it is 
about not consciously hurting others in the research process – in his case, not even 
animals. In that way, working with GM plants is simply excluded from ethical 
concerns and he does not give it much thought – although he does mention that plants 
actually ‘scream’ in pain when you cut them, albeit we cannot hear them. When he 
talks about communication with the public, it is about teaching them that nature can 
be used in intelligent ways, not about ‘listening’ or accounting for the work they do.  
 
Another way that the scientists try to moderate the demand for engagement is by 
referring to mutual ‘trust’ – that all that engagement and dialogue is not really that 
necessary because they are, as one of the scientists says, ‘basically very reasonable 
people who do very reasonable things.’ This is an argument that I hear quite often: 
That the different institutions should trust each other and that they (the scientists) 
trust other parts of society to do their work, so perhaps people should do the same 
with their work, as Catherine comments: 
 
‘I also think that people have to trust that reasonable things are going on here and at 
the other science departments… I think so… or I actually don’t really know what I 
 378 
think about it. But I think that you have to trust it. I trust it myself: That they do 
something reasonable at that faculty they have out there on that island [the 
Humanistic Faculty in Copenhagen]. In reality I have no clue about it, but they 
probably know what they are doing… at least that is what I assume.’ 
 
This is another way of questioning public engagement and the inclusion of citizens in 
the governing of science; that is, by saying that it is unnecessary, because society 
needs some kind of basic trust in and between its institutions – not suspicion. I often 
met this kind of resistance during my fieldwork. I interpret it as another view of 
democracy than the one expressed in the mode of Citizenship. This one is closer to an 
idea about a representative democracy with stable basic institutions and a distinct 
division of labour between them. Here, trust that others are doing their work to the 
best of their ability is a prerequisite for making society work. Too much interference 
from other professions or groups is seen as a sign of suspicion, not one of mutual 
trust and collaboration. In contrast, Citizenship performs a much more deliberative 
democratic ideal: Through dialogue and co-operation with heterogeneous actors, the 
scientists and others can together move science and society forward.  
 
The final observation of resistance that I will touch upon is tied to the scientists’ 
actual amount of work. The scientists often seem sceptical about engagement projects 
because they are afraid it will take time away from doing research. They often 
experience it as yet another chore they have to do, which they do not consider 
‘research’. They coined it ‘paperwork’, ‘administration’, ‘bureaucracy’, ‘surveys’, 
‘all that stuff’, ‘outreach’, among many other terms, and they often sound tired 
saying it. Simon, who actually does a lot of research projects, says: 
 
‘I mean sometimes I just get so tired… Then this secretary comes and asks me if I had 
done this or that survey, and I say “no”, because I didn’t think it was mandatory, but 
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there are just all these things and it sometimes just gets too much. I have this cartoon 
in my office: it’s this guy walking out into the hallway, saying “I’ve solved the riddle 
of cancer”, but people ignore that and tell him that he should sign a lot of papers and 
register his teaching… and I sometimes just get so ARRRGH, because we have to do 
all these things and it takes so much time… But I shouldn’t say too much, I do a lot of 
outreach myself…’ 
 
This feeling of ‘ARRGH’ is one I have met frequently. It is not that the scientists are 
not sympathetic to the cause of outreach or do not want to participate in all sorts of 
public engagement projects, but rather that they have a lot of work already and they 
find it really exhausting to fit more into their work schedule. At the same time, they 
do not get any formal acknowledgement, salary or promotions by engaging with 
society. Therefore, it often ends at the bottom of the priority list. This is quite 
interesting because it reveals some of the very tangible obstacles of making 
‘Responsible Science’ an integrated part of scientific conduct. In their daily work, the 
scientists find it hard to fit in more responsibilities than they already have. They are 
in many ways, as I have shown in the previous sections, not even against 
‘Responsible Science’ they perform it themselves. But at the same time, stress and 
feelings of powerlessness frequently arise in the face of the many responsibilities that 
the scientists are faced with. For instance, this became apparent in an exchange with 
one of the scientists from Gyro Gearloose on my first day at the lab, when I 
introduced myself: 
 
Calvin: ‘Well, welcome. So you’re a bit like the other [another ethnographer] who 
was here last year. So what’s your project about again?’ 
Me: ‘Uhm, I look at ‘Social Responsibility’ in science and how you guys work with 
demands to engage with the public.’ 
Calvin: ‘Oh, so you’re here to look at that publish-or-perish phenomenon.’  
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(From memory) 
 
In the beginning, I was not really there to look at ‘that publish-or-perish 
phenomenon’. I saw that as something very different from ideas about ‘Responsible 
Science’. But during the fieldwork, it became apparent that the scientists do not really 
distinguish between the many different demands they are subject to – Publish! 
Engage! Innovate! – and have to deal with in order not to ‘perish’. All of the 
demands are seen as troublesome and often they are seen as obstacles to doing 
science, which is still their primary responsibility and without which their job would 
not exist. These conflicting demands are especially troublesome for the junior 
scientists: first, because they do not have a permanent position (of which there are 
fewer and fewer in general) and they therefore try to perform all three responsibilities 
at once in order to prove their worth; second, because these three different 
responsibilities are actually difficult to navigate (as we also saw in chapter 7 and 8), 
and it is difficult to discern which responsibility is actually their main responsibility. 
This is, for instance, the case with Catherine, whom I have mentioned before.  
 
As part of her PhD, Catherine has worked for the Ministry of Agriculture and Foods 
and has her own blog in one of the national newspapers. But all these activities also 
mean that she is not as far advanced with her research project as she could be. In an 
interview she told me how her supervisor, has demanded that she start to ‘focus’. She 
needs to concentrate on research. ‘Sometimes he even says it, when he just passes me 
in the hallways “focus, Catherine, foooooooocus”.’  
 
On another occasion, the supervisor comments on Catherine’s virtues: ‘Catherine is 
an excellent science communicator as well as an excellent scientist, but she really 
needs to re-focus on the research. I mean, that is our core job here, and you cannot 
get a PhD without it.’ 
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The scientists find that balancing between the different responsibilities is difficult. 
While this is something the juniors find especially tough, as they are new to the job, it 
is something that everyone recognises and is discouraged by. Not because they do not 
consider engagement with society important, but because it is simply hard and 
exhausting to fit all their responsibilities into an ordinary workday.  
 
 
9.5 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO LABS 
Of the three modes that I have described, Citizenship is that which exposes the 
greatest differences between Gyro Gearloose and Curious George. In Curious 
George, Citizenship is performed as a range of different activities and political 
stances vis-à-vis the best way to do science. They co-operate with DIY labs; they host 
public lab nights, where the public can experiment with the gene modifications of 
plants; they try to pick up on the public’s perceptions of GMO and problems where 
they can help and direct their research; they prepare their juniors to reflect about their 
research by promoting courses in industry partnerships and ethics; and they 
participate in public debates about synthetic biology and a range of other relevant 
topics. At Gyro Gearloose, the picture is much more homogeneous. They also 
participate in public debates, invite the public into their lab, try to circumvent the 
pharmaceutical industry and are very conscious about which technologies they want 
to invent. But their lab is much more tightly united in the common goal of inventing 
tangible, medical technologies that can help future patients. Therefore, all their ways 
of engaging with the public are underpinning that common goal.  
 
This is the biggest difference between Gyro Gearloose and Curious George: Curious 
George is not united in one, unique quest; they have a range of different research 
activities, many of which they label ‘basic science’. In my interpretation, that is also 
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why their engagement activities are much more diverse – they are connected to many 
different research projects, which are confronted with different problems and 
challenges. Even though the justifications for why the scientists have a responsibility 
to share knowledge and technologies with the public are strikingly similar across the 
two labs, the performance of this responsibility looks very different depending on 
which kind of science they do. Many studies indicate that the boundaries between 
‘basic’ and ‘applied’ science are blurry at best and perhaps even non-existent in 
reality (e.g. Gibbons and others 1994). While this may be so, this study describes 
how the perception of what kind of science is being done has a big influence on the 
way that ‘Responsible Science’ is conducted – even if the general principles for why 
engagement with society is necessary are similar.  
 
This difference makes it relevant to ask whether it is realistic or plausible to work 
with one idea about ‘Responsible Science’. In Owen et al. (2013), the authors suggest 
that their framework for Responsible Innovation should be applicable in regard to 
most forms of science – except perhaps the most theoretical kinds of ‘purely 
descriptive science’ (: 45). But perhaps the concept needs more flexibility in order to 
work and should be developed in closer co-operation with the scientists working in 
the field, as they seem to have some very elaborate ideas about which kinds of 
problems and challenges the exact disciplines and technologies may embody.  
 
Another reason that may account for the difference between the two labs is that 
‘Responsible Science’ – especially the idea that the public has a legitimate right to 
change the direction of science – is a rather new development. Of course, the idea of 
the scientists having responsibilities toward society is not new, as I indicated in the 
Theory Section. But the exact composition of that rationality, where participation and 
responsiveness in some suitably recondite sense has replaced professional ethics as an 
ideal in the public sector, is quite new and perhaps not that institutionalised yet. The 
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scientists (and policy makers) are still trying to figure out what ‘Responsible Science’ 
is, what it looks like and how to do it. It is, in other words, still at an experimental 
stage. In comparison, the two other modes, and especially that of Vocation, have 
longer histories.  The rules of conduct in Vocation have become institutionalised 
through many decades (centuries, almost) of careful teaching, writing and 
dissemination of ideals related to science and how to reach them. They are – at a 
glance at least – much more coherent and internalised than those of Citizenship. 
Those ideals found in Oikos are newer. The marketization of universities has been 
part of New Public Management reforms, which have gradually gained momentum 
since the eighties (Boden and Nedeva). These reforms have also heavily targeted the 
universities’ finances, forcing them to undertake frequent structural changes in many 
of the public science’s core duties such as teaching, research, and the education of 
young scholars (Shore and Wright 2000: 71f). While research areas such as plant 
chemistry and stem cell research have experienced cuts due to public scepticism, the 
scientists still seem to be in a phase of getting used to that shift in public policy. They 
seem more experienced in adapting to the demands for competition for funding. 
Therefore, the local differences in how to handle the demands of public engagement 
may be more pronounced than they are in Oikos.  
 
 
9.6 CITIZENSHIP AND POLITICAL RATIONALITIES 
As the last point before the conclusion, I will compare the four political rationalities 
from chapter 5 with the responsibilities that I have outlined in this chapter.  As this is 
the last chapter, I will also make some considerations about the theoretical 
connections between the political rationalities and the ‘modes of responsibility’. 
 
As I have already shown in the two previous chapters, these purified visions of what 
responsible conduct looks like and the everyday work life of scientists differs quite a 
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lot. But that does not mean that there are not links and similarities between the two. 
Interestingly, the mode of Citizenship performs elements of all the different political 
rationalities, albeit mostly from the ‘Contribution’ and the ‘Integration’ rationalities. 
But elements from both ‘Demarcation’ and ‘Reflexivity’ are also present.  
 
While one of the virtues of the Demarcation Rationality is to withdraw from society 
in order not to become entangled in society’s interests, another point in the 
Demarcation Rationality is that it is science’s duty to help ‘mankind’. In that respect, 
the insistence of Citizenship that science and technologies need to be shared with the 
public can be seen as a reflection of that virtue. This does not mean that they are 
identical. There are, for instance, great differences in the ways scientists are supposed 
to share their knowledge and technologies in the Demarcation Rationality than in 
Citizenship. The Demarcation Rationality does not encourage any form of dialogue 
or mutual understanding. Here, facts are supposed to be delivered in a neutral and 
objective fashion, with citizens then doing with these facts what they please (but 
hopefully they follow scientific advice). Another example is the great difference 
between articulating a wish to help ‘mankind’, as it is articulated in the Demarcation 
Rationality, and Citizenship’s concern for ‘the public’. Whereas ‘mankind’ refers to 
the basic trait of being human without any other defining characteristics, ‘the public’ 
is already much more delimited and specific. Compared to mankind, ‘public’ refers to 
a much more well-ordered mass of people who are somehow not just human, but also 
part of a population that is within the limits of governmental regulation, which is very 
different from mankind. As I indicated earlier in the dissertation, it is not of the 
utmost importance for the scientists whether the ‘public’ they seek to help is part and 
parcel of the same regional, national or supranational area as themselves. In that way, 
the ideals from Demarcation are mirrored in Citizenship in so far as science is still 
considered an international profession with universal rules of conduct.  
 
 385 
While the kind of public they help is of no great importance to the scientists, it is 
important for them that they do help, as this is a motivating factor in their work. They 
want to solve big problems and challenges and, in that regard, their conduct mirrors 
ideas from the Reflexivity Rationality. This is further underlined by their not caring 
who it is exactly they help, as long as they are in need. I consider this a sort of 
professional freedom, which was also expressed in the Reflexivity Rationality: 
Scientists are indeed problem solvers, but they have the power to decide which kinds 
of problems they would like to solve.  
 
Another aspect that is telling for the Demarcation Rationality is its focus on 
responsibility as part of the scientific process, rather than responsibility as a quality 
that the outcome produces or possesses. This focus on the process of doing science as 
a target for steering is also apparent in Citizenship. This is, for instance, apparent in 
many public engagement activities that take place before the fact in both laboratories 
– where prospects and disadvantages about emergent technologies are discussed. This 
is not least the case at Gyro Gearloose, where very specific properties of their 
technologies are up for debate. But the huge difference is that the Demarcation 
Rationality does not express any wish to include the ‘mankind’ it tries to help in the 
discussion about the research. Instead, strong internal ethics are considered the safety 
net that ensures responsibility.  
 
In that regard, Citizenship shares more features with the Integration Rationality. The 
rationality articulates a need for external regulation of science and it also considers 
the process of doing science as the object of steering. This regulation is typically 
imagined as happening in deliberative dialogues between interested groups. It makes 
sense that this political rationality is being performed in Citizenship, as a good part of 
those academic articles, which formed the basis for the construction of that political 
rationality, were from the newer body of science governance literature that 
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encourages ideas about Responsible Innovation (Schuurbiers, Osseweijer, and 
Kinderlerer 2009; Roco et al. 2011) 
 
But one of the surprising aspects of the mode of Citizenship is the huge focus on 
accountability to the public. The accountability is not tied to the production of new 
knowledge and technologies per se. Rather, the scientists are eager to make sure that 
the public know that they indeed work hard for the funding they receive. This way of 
performing comes in fact much closer to aspects of the Contribution Rationality. In 
that rationality, the firm external control is seen as a way to make the scientists 
contribute to society. This focus on controlling is not explicitly talked about in 
Citizenship, but it is striking how they see public engagement events as opportunities 
to ensure that their reputation as honest, hardworking people is maintained. All in all, 
the mode of Citizenship embodies elements from all four rationalities, which are 
mixed and matched in different daily situations. Compared to the other two modes, 
this is definitely the one in which the most varied elements from the political 
rationalities are assembled. There could be several reasons for that. One is that 
Citizenship is the youngest mode, and ‘the best’ elements from all historically 
legitimate rationalities on ‘Responsible Science’ are patched together – creating huge 
responsibilities: both making ‘true’ statements, ‘relevant’ science and incorporate 
reflections on ‘outcomes’ in their work.  
 
Another reason may have to do with the nature of the social. I have constructed four 
rationalities about the responsible conduct of science based on writings in academic 
journals. While I can see that there clearly are connections between these rationalities 
and the scientists’ daily work, it would be rather surprising to find a 1:1 relationship 
between ideal and conduct. As Law comments (paraphrasing Foucault), ‘the 
networks of the social carry and instantiate a series of intentional but non-
subjective reflexive strategies of social ordering’ (Law 1994: 96, original emphasis). 
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Law does not thoroughly account for how these ‘strategies of social ordering’ 
become connected with daily work, for instance, how one ‘chooses’ different 
strategies or why the shifts between different modes happen. But he does assert that 
‘they come and they go. They are certainly not exhaustive. And they are, of course, 
defeasible imputations. On the other hand, they are contingent, but coherent 
reflexive…’ (Law 1994: 96). This is the same kind of observation that I can make 
about the connections between the political rationalities and the modes of ordering. I 
can argue that there are indeed similarities, and that there are patterns in the way the 
scientists do and think about responsibility. And I can see how different resources 
from the different rationalities are drawn upon in each mode and disappear again. But 
I cannot account for the exact connections.  
 
What I can say is that there are indeed some huge differences between the 
descriptions of ideal responsible conduct from the document study and how the 
scientists handle the responsibilities they face in their everyday work life. The 
scientists seem to use the different ideals about responsible conduct when they have 
to make specific decisions in difficult situations. Different types of worldview inform 
them about different ways of ‘taking responsibility’ for the situation; how they 
choose and why they do it creates some very specific ways of going about the 
scientific job.    
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9.7 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, I have outlined the mode of Citizenship. I have described the way the 
scientists talk about their research, listen to the public and do research for the public. 
I have also indicated how they justify this form of behaviour with the idea that public 
science is a public institution among other public institutions and should – like the 
others – contribute to  ‘society’; in doing so, they accept that the public has a 
legitimate say in the direction of science, even though they at times find this tiresome 
and frustrating. This view of science’s role in society is different than how the role 
was articulated in the two previous modes. In Oikos ‘society’ was constructed as a 
market, where research organisations competed for scarce resources. Vocation 
generated a view of society as a range of stable institutions with distinct 
responsibilities. Citizenship also generates the idea of society with different 
institutions, notably a large public sector where public professionals of various kinds 
work on improving society. But the lines between the different institutions and the 
different responsibilities have been blurred compared to Vocation’s ideas. Both ‘the 
public’, and ‘science’ has responsibilities for the outcomes of science – a 
responsibility that can be fulfilled through deliberative dialogue and ‘engagement’. In 
that way, Citizenship shares many similarities with the broader demands for 
‘Responsive Government’. Science also has a responsibility to produce ‘relevant’ 
research for the people – something the scientists translate into making ‘innovation’. 
Thereby they also have a responsibility that Vocation allocated to industry. These 
dissolving lines between different institutions and their responsibilities make the 
scientists’ confused about what their responsibilities are and how to handle the 
different forms of demands. Notably they develop resistance and ‘basic science guilt’ 
if they do not feel they live up to the demand of being ‘relevant’.  
 
I have explained how the scientists justify their conduct in similar ways across the 
Atlantic, but that they speak, listen and do research rather differently in Citizenship. I 
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attribute these differences to the specifics of the science they do, and I suggest that it 
would be useful take a closer look at the ideals about ‘Responsible Science’ as these 
are currently presented in the science governance literature. Increased flexibility and 
different approaches to what counts as ‘Responsible Science’ may be in order. 
 
Finally, I compared Citizenship with the political rationalities identified in the 
document study. Curiously it seems as elements from Citizenship can be mirrored in 
the four different rationalities. It is difficult to assert, why it is so, but one explanation 
is that Citizenship is a mode that generate several layers of responsibility and thereby 
many tasks that the scientists have to do: both making ‘true’ statements, ‘relevant’ 
science and incorporate reflections on ‘outcomes’ in their work. In the next, and 
concluding, chapter I will follow up on the findings from all the analytical chapters 
and suggest ideas for further studies.  
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10. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION  
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hroughout the previous chapters, I have analysed how ‘Responsible Science’ 
is conducted and justified in scientific work, taking my analytical point of 
departure in the practitioners’ own perspectives and experiences. In this 
concluding discussion, I will sum up this dissertation’s stance and findings and 
discuss these in relation to further theoretical, empirical and practical work, looking 
particularly at the bearing that the notion of ‘responsibility’ has on scientific conduct.  
 
In the first analytical chapter, I presented an analysis of four political rationalities in 
relation to the subject of ‘Responsible Science’. The analysis is based on the 
(Foucauldian-inspired) concept of ‘political rationalities’ (Rose and Miller 1992), and 
it showed that four political rationalities related to the responsible conduct of science 
emerge from the study of scientific journal papers. The ‘Demarcation Rationality’, 
which sees an institutional and practical separation of science and society as a 
prerequisite for responsible scientific conduct; the ‘Reflexivity Rationality’, which 
argues for an enhancement of reflexivity among scientists, implying that they should 
use society’s problems (also the ones created by science itself) as a point of departure 
for their inquiries; the ‘Contribution Rationality’, which insists on science’s duty to 
live up to the public’s expectations; and, finally, the ‘Integration Rationality’, which 
advocates for the integration of different actors’ perspectives in the process of doing 
science in order to enhance its responsibility. While all four are distinct, they also 
share similarities. Both the Demarcation and Integration Rationalities consider the 
actual scientific process as the object of steering, whereas the Reflexivity and 
Usability Rationalities point to the outcome as the object of steering. But the 
Demarcation and Reflexivity Rationalities both insist on internal steering by the 
profession itself, while both the Usability and the Integration Rationalities underline 
the importance of external governance if science is to become responsible. 
Furthermore, the analysis revealed the wide variety of ideas about ‘Responsible 
T 
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Science’ in the scientific field. It thereby underlines that ‘Responsible Science’ is a 
conflicted and multifaceted phenomenon.  
 
In the three analytical chapters that followed, I moved the analysis from text to 
ethnography, that is, I did ethnographic fieldwork of two laboratories, which I named 
Curious George and Gyro Gearloose. In the first of these chapters, I described 
(inspired by Law’s ‘modes of orderings’ [1994]) a ‘mode of responsibility’, which I 
called Vocation. Vocation justifies its actions with the responsibility that the scientists 
have for taking care of the ‘truth’. This is done through their meticulous and rigorous 
work with materials. The three forms of conduct, ‘checking’, ‘repeating’ and 
‘criticising’ are characteristic of this mode. The responsibility for the truth also has 
consequences for the organisation in terms of how they consider themselves as 
professionals. In the mode of Vocation, they consider themselves members of a global 
profession with noble intentions. It also influences their perception of time, whereby 
the mode generates an idea of time, as something there should be plenty of, so they can 
keep perfecting their observations. It also means that the faith they have in their own 
abilities to produce a fact are quite limited; they look at their work with many 
reservations and a large dose of scepticism. Finally, it also means that they consider 
themselves members of a society that consists of several stable and demarcated 
institutions such as the state, the public and the scientific, where each institution is 
endowed with specific obligations.   
 
In the second ethnographic chapter, I moved from the mode of Vocation to the mode 
of Oikos. Oikos justifies its actions with the responsibility for the ‘business’; that is, 
to enable and ensure the survival and prosperity of the group they are members of.  
This is mainly done by ‘investing’, ‘saving’ and ‘maintaining’.  The responsibility for 
the business also has some specific consequences for the organisation. The scientists 
regard themselves as part of a group that is in competition with other laboratories and 
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not part of a global community. Their time has become acutely finite; they have to 
produce to compete. Their scepticism regarding new potential facts has transformed 
into a firm belief in their own abilities to prove their hypotheses. They look at society 
as a variety of organisations – both public and private – that are all competing for 
funding and struggling for survival on a market of innovation and services.  
 
In the third chapter, I turned from Oikos to Citizenship and, again, the two labs 
transformed. Citizenship justifies its actions with the responsibility for the ‘public’. 
By that they mean they have a responsibility to produce a form of science that is 
legitimate in the eyes of the (taxpaying) public. They do this by ‘speaking about 
science’, ‘listening’, and by ‘doing research’. The mode of Citizenship is less 
coherent than the other two, as the connections between their ideas, their ways of 
conducting themselves and the organisational consequences do not appear as stable as 
in the modes of Vocation and Oikos. These modes were easier to compare because 
many of their organisational consequences appeared to be the opposite of the other. It 
is not as easy to compare Citizenship with the other two modes, as the organisational 
consequences do not address themes such as ‘fact making’ or ‘time’ as coherently as 
they do. However, one consequence is that they see themselves as ‘activists’; as 
people who have a political cause that they need to convince others about. They also 
regard themselves as being part of a public sector consisting of a range of different 
organisations that all have a responsibility to be transparent and do reasonable work 
for the money they are allocated. This mode also engenders a sense of guilt about 
doing ‘basic science’ among the scientists at one of the laboratories, as they have a 
hard time legitimating for themselves the reasons why they are producing something 
that cannot immediately be applied outside the lab. At the other laboratory, they seem 
to live up to the demands of making both commercial technologies and integrating 
the public’s views into their work. On the other hand, the employees seem rather 
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anxious about being dependent on temporary grants and not really having the 
prospects of job security and a stable income.  
 
The three modes are negotiated in the everyday work. The scientists evaluate whether 
it is the responsibility for the ‘truth’, the ‘business’ or the ‘public’ that should guide 
their choice of action in specific situations. A general feeling of frustration about the 
variety of evaluation criteria, as well as the work needed to live up to these criteria, is 
registered in both labs, albeit in different ways. The scientists in one lab are eager to 
do the science they find most interesting and relevant without too much interference, 
especially from politicians. The scientists at the other lab want to solve big societal 
challenges but feel inhibited by the resistance from both funders and the scientific 
community.  
 
In what follows, I will conclude with some more general reflections about the 
findings and discuss them in relation to the themes of ‘science governance’. The rest 
of the chapter is structured in three parts, drawing conclusions on the theoretical, 
empirical and practical aspects of the knowledge produced in this dissertation. In the 
theoretical discussion, I consider this dissertation’s contribution to the field of science 
governance. The focus is primarily on the construction of ‘Responsible Science’ as an 
object of study rather than a normative concept. In the empirical discussion, I 
consider the findings in relation to their generalisability and in relation to my role as 
observer and investigator. In the practical discussion, I consider the implications of 
the findings in relation to further work with ‘Responsible Science’ and similar 
concepts at both the political and organisational levels.  
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10.1 ESTABLISHING RESPONSIBLE SCIENCE AS AN OBJECT OF 
STUDY 
This study contributes theoretically to the small, but growing, field of studies that 
establish ‘Responsible Science’ as an object of study rather than a normative concept 
(e.g. Mccarthy and Kelty 2010; Fortun & Fortun 2005). Contributing to this field is 
important for several reasons: First, because further descriptions of the current 
conditions for conducting the scientific job are needed as a basis for justifying the 
calls for more ‘responsibility’ in science; second, because it is important that the 
content of these calls actually addresses the most pressing problems in current 
scientific conduct. My impression of the current ‘Responsible Science’ literature (e.g. 
Scott 2003; Brown and Guston 2009) is that much of it takes its point of departure in 
the idea of the scientists as actively resisting engagement due to their professional 
heritage. As a result of this, they resist reflecting further upon legitimacy and 
outcomes. Through the study of responsibility in practice, this dissertation contributes 
with some alternatives to this view. 
 
Whereas many studies are focused on evaluating the outcomes of projects that work 
with ‘Responsible Science’ (Fisher 2007; Schuurbiers 2011), this study contributes 
with multiple understandings of ‘responsibility’ as they appear among scientists in 
their everyday work, something that has been called for on several occasions (e.g. 
Taebi et al. 2014; McCarthy and Kelty 2010). It answers this call in two ways. First, 
by establishing a typology of ideals of responsible scientific conduct based on the 
reading of scientific journals. This typology can be used as a starting point and guide 
for further empirical studies of the phenomenon. Furthermore, the four political 
rationalities testify to the heterogeneity and conflicts in the understandings of 
responsibility in science and assert the fact that no point of view on this subject is 
innocent; the question of ‘Responsible Science’ is inherently political.  
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Second, the ethnographic part of this study examines which responsibilities the 
scientists perceive as important to live up to in their everyday work and how they 
attempt to do so. An important contribution to the development of ‘Responsible 
Science’ as an object of study is the demonstration of the connections between 
‘responsibility’ in practice and different historically situated institutions in society. 
The scientists’ understanding of their responsibility for ‘the truth’ share similarities 
with the way Weber describes the scientific profession as a disciplined pursuit of 
knowledge (Weber, Owen, and Strong 2004). As a way of describing science’s role 
in society, Vocation also reflects aspects of the ‘science-military’ complex (Shapin 
2009) that combined public funding for basic science with a strong, centralised state, 
and with national industry as users of the knowledge and the workforce. Oikos 
mirrors the development of an entrepreneurial science (Etzkowitz 1998) that also 
developed in step with the reforms of the public sector, which emphasised 
competition between public service providers and a blurring of the boundaries 
between the public and private sectors (Boden and Nedeva 2004). But where ‘the 
entrepreneurial scientist’ is described as an individual who has the personal skills and 
mindset to seize opportunities (e.g. Etzkowitz 1998), this study points to the need to 
be good at seizing opportunities, otherwise the scientists’ ‘business’ may not survive. 
The scientists do not necessarily find this aspect of their work fruitful for the 
scientific outcomes or their professional satisfaction.  And finally, Citizenship shares 
similarities with the calls for the ‘Responsive State’ (deLeon 1997), which developed 
during the nineties. While the demands for more competition and the privatisation of 
the public sector did not disappear with this call, they were supplemented by calls for 
direct accountability by users (‘customers’) and ‘the public’ (OECD 1996). Elements 
from these ways of governing the public sector are seen in many areas of the public 
sector, where ‘user involvement’ is considered as a solution to the public sector’s 
apparent lack of democratic accountability. The scientists have difficulties in 
distinguishing this demand from the responsibility for the business. Both are 
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considered extra elements of their work that draw their attention away from the core 
task of producing sound research. I have made an overview of the most important 
elements of the three modes and the inherent ideas about science’s role in society, the 
affect on the perception of the scientific profession and what makes the job 
meaningful: 
 
 Conduct Justification Idea about society Professional 
Role 
Meaningful 
work 
Vocation -­‐ Checking	  -­‐ Repeating	  -­‐ Being	  Critical	   Responsibility for the truth Stable,  autonomous institutions Specialists Pursuing knowledge 
Oikos -­‐ Investing	  -­‐ Saving	  -­‐ Maintaining	   Responsibility for the Business A highly competitive market Knowledge-sellers Creating successful organisatio
ns 
Citizenship -­‐ Speaking	  about	  Science	  -­‐ Listening	   to	  the	  Public	  -­‐ Doing	  Research	  
Responsibility for the Public Institutions with dissolving 
boundaries and overlapping 
responsibilities 
Activists and 
specialised 
public 
professionals 
Helping 
society and 
taking 
active 
political 
stances 
relating to 
their area of 
research 
 
 
 
I have described the three modes as if they were pure  – as if they were performed 
without resistance or were never negotiated or changed. In daily work life, the three 
responsibilities are continuously weighted against each other in relation to specific, 
tangible decisions. The responsibility for the business and for the public are not easily 
integrated into the daily work. Both are at times considered at odds with the 
responsibility for the truth. Furthermore, the scientists consider it quite hard work to 
maintain all three responsibilities at once, even if they consider them meaningful. 
From a current point of view, it seems as if Vocation and Oikos are the most stable 
modes. They appear similar across the two labs and address some of the same 
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organisational themes such as time and fact-making. The scientists believe that the 
responsibility for the business is burdensome, as it takes time and their own jobs are 
continuously at stake. But without a laboratory, there is no way they can engage in 
their vocation. So it is a responsibility that is hard to avoid. The question is whether 
the stability of each mode and their interrelationship will change over time and give 
rise to new responsibilities.  
 
This study also draws attention to the fact that the scientists’ understanding of their 
responsibilities depends on the kind of science they consider themselves doing. In 
this respect, two distinctions that mattered for the scientists’ understanding of 
responsibility emerged from the ethnographic studies. First, that the scientists in both 
labs considered themselves ‘public scientists’ (as opposed to corporate) and that this 
professional identity, in being part of public service, meant that their responsibilities 
were regarded as being both larger and more diffuse than the way they perceived the 
duties of a corporate scientist. The second distinction appeared when the two labs 
were compared. Here, it became apparent that Curious George values ‘basic science’, 
while Gyro Gearloose takes pride in doing ‘translational research’, with immediate 
application in the medical sector. Some studies question the actual difference 
between basic and applied research, arguing that the lines between them are 
becoming increasingly blurred as much research, even in its ‘basic’ stage, is 
undertaken in the context of application (Nowotny 1999: 250). While this may be 
true, this study suggests that the idea of a distinction between ‘basic science’ and 
‘applied science’ still has an effect associated with the kind of responsibility the 
scientists conceive of as meaningful in relation to their daily work. A tentative 
suggestion stemming from this is that science and technology studies should not 
necessarily abandon this way of typologising science. While it in many cases may be 
difficult to distinguish ‘basic science’ from ‘applied science’, the two terms carry a 
significant cultural meaning for scientists. They are used as a way to underline their 
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special professional identity within the scientific field and give meaning to the work 
they do and their idea about science’s role in society.   
 
10.1.1 THE UNINTENDED SIDE EFFECTS OF RESPONSIBLE SCIENCE 
Another discussion pertaining to the theoretical contribution of this project is the 
fruitfulness of including broader studies regarding the development of public service 
in Western societies. This study argues that the demands for accountability, 
responsiveness and public engagement are a specific idea of good government that 
has affected the entire public sector and many public sector professionals. This 
argument is not made in order to situate ‘science governance’ within the general 
public administration literature. It is made in order to underline the importance for 
science governance of using insights from literature on the development of public 
administration. Many of the developments within science governance can be 
compared to similar developments in other areas of public service such as the school 
system, the healthcare system and government bureaucracy. In the following 
paragraphs, I will make some final reflections about the perspectives of ‘Responsible 
Science’ considered in relation to the more general tendencies of government.  
 
This study has taken its point of departure in the scientists’ own ideas about their 
responsibilities. But as science is by no means a closed system, their ideas also reflect 
broader trends within both science governance and the general development of the 
steering philosophy within public administration. In chapter 5, I identified four 
government rationalities about ‘Responsible Science’. One of the main differences 
between the rationalities is whether they rely on internal or external governance of 
science.  
 
The Demarcation and the Reflexivity Rationalities rely on internal governance via 
professional ethics as a way of steering science. I will argue that the Contribution 
 401 
and Integration Rationalities instead introduce ‘accountability’ (see 2.1.2) to 
various external actors as a means of government. With the Contribution 
Rationality, this accountability should mainly be derived from formal audits 
conducted by government (and more informally by industry), where the 
inventions’ abilities to contribute to industrial development are measured. In the 
Integration Rationality, accountability is secured through public dialogue with 
heterogeneous actors (mainly articulated as ‘ordinary citizens’, ‘industry’ and 
‘NGOs’). The main argument here is that the outcome will be ‘responsible’ as a 
consequence of a process of involving various actors in the process. The 
accountability is thus achieved through the process of dialogue. Looked upon from 
the perspective of the everyday work in the laboratories, these different ways of 
governing science are both recognised and acknowledged but, at the same time, 
found to be rather confusing and time-consuming. The practical work of 
responding to these demands takes a great effort. Time and energy that would have 
otherwise been used on what the scientists consider their core task, namely, that of 
doing research, is spent on addressing these demands. Some of the juniors become 
confused by the different demands and how to prioritise between responsibilities. 
The seniors must, to a greater extent, adapt to the circumstances but are frustrated 
with the amount of time they spend strategically considering the relevant 
evaluation criteria in specific situations.  
 
Considered in the light of broader tendencies within public administration, this move 
from professional ethics to external accountability shares many similarities with 
developments in the rest of the public service, not least in relation to the development 
in the central bureaucracies. Du Gay (2009) demonstrates how a range of positions 
within government bureaucracy have changed due to reforms of the public sector 
within the last four decades in the UK – and similar trends can be observed 
throughout the Western democracies. These reforms have changed the ‘bureaucrat’ 
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from being accountable to the state administration to being either loyal to the party in 
government or directly to the public through diverse governance technologies such as 
phone surveys or apps. Du Gay problematises this shift by pointing to the lack of 
focus on history and stability in public service decision-making that this shift entails, 
because no one is loyal to the public administration itself, but more to the opinions of 
shifting governments and governing trends (Du Gay 2009: 381). The same worry can 
be applied to science: What happens if internal ethics are rejected in favour of 
accountability to external auditing from various actors? What will happen to 
scientific outcomes and scientific jobs if the responsibility for the ‘truth’ and ‘the 
scientific community’ are diminished and with it the careful work that sustains it? 
The struggles to live up to the demands of doing ‘high quality’ research and the 
‘basic science guilt’ at Curious George and the insecurity about the future at Gyro 
Gearloose are perhaps indicative of what could be seen as (with thanks to Ulrich 
Beck [1992]) the ‘unintended side-effects’ of this way of governing science.  
 
As such, this is not an argument in favour of the scientists retreating to their ‘Ivory 
Tower’ – many studies suggest that such a tower has indeed never existed (Strathern 
2003). Gorm-Hansen (2011) even suggests that politicians chased the scientists up 
into the Ivory Tower, so they could make public reforms with the intent of getting 
them out. But my argument is that studies of how ‘the new governance of science’ 
actually operates on an everyday basis are an important basis for assessing the 
qualities of ‘Responsible Science’. Especially regarding the big question of whether 
this form of governing solves the problems in science that it was developed as a 
response to. Further studies that compare the consequences of demands for ‘public 
accountability’ in other public service areas with those of public science could prove 
fruitful in relation to the development of ‘Responsible Science’. The question that 
needs further attention is, What happens to both the quality of the scientific findings 
and the quality of the scientific job in light of the new forms of government?  
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10.2 GENERALISATIONS AND ROLES 
 
10.2.1 GENERALISATIONS 
As I described in the method section (4.1), the two labs that I chose had worked with 
a range of public engagement projects and were as such not foreign to ideas about 
‘Responsible Science’. Their specific lines of research have also caused controversy, 
which makes them even more aware of the importance of public accountability. The 
question is how and to what extent the findings from this study can be used in 
relation to more general reflections. In this section, I will argue in which ways I 
believe they can.  
 
First, the four government rationalities from chapter 5 and the three modes of 
responsibility echo well-known historically situated ideas about science’s role in 
society, as discussed in 7.3.4, 8.3.4 and 9.3.3. The ideas about responsibility as they 
are articulated in this study are, as such, not very original. They are well known from 
both the history of science and the history of public administration. Thus, the contents 
of the government rationalities and the daily responsibilities for the truth, the business 
and the public may be recognised in many laboratories, even though the way in which 
the scientists relate to them probably varies – just as it varied between Gyro 
Gearloose and Curious George.  
 
Second, the study showed that the differences between the three different modes of 
responsibility are perhaps bigger than the differences between the two labs, especially 
the mode of Vocation, which is performed in very similar ways across the two labs. 
That it enables such stable conducts and justifications across both disciplines and 
national borders testifies to the pervasiveness of this mode. There are greater 
differences in the ways that Oikos and Citizenship are performed in the two labs. In 
both modes, this seemed to be connected to the different scientific goals each lab 
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pursues and whom they perceive the user of their knowledge to be. In contrast, the 
difference in national political cultures is difficult to ascertain from the perspective of 
the working scientists and PIs. In my view, this is not necessarily because the cultures 
do not have an influence. Rather, it shows some of the limits of my methodological 
framework. Enabling these differences to stand out would have demanded a 
framework that was less explorative and more focused on the specific relations 
between political culture and responsible science. This is another area where more 
empirical studies could be fruitful.  
 
A third question pertinent to the general conclusions of this study pertains to the 
observed scientific disciplines. Both laboratories work in the field of biotech and 
more or less explicitly with synthetic biology. Curious George has moved from 
working with biochemistry to working with synthetic biology. Gyro Gearloose does 
not seem to pay much attention to disciplinary boundaries and has a highly 
interdisciplinary staff working according to the dictum of producing medical 
technologies based on immunosignaturing. Nevertheless, the focus is still mainly on 
advanced bio-science. Since the seventies, the field of biotech has been very active in 
establishing connections with industry and has fostered some of the best-known 
entrepreneurial scientists, such as Craig Venter. There have also been high political 
expectations for the field’s ability to develop scientific findings into applicable 
technologies (Jasanoff 2005: 17). At the same time, some of the biotech technologies 
have been found highly controversial and public support has therefore been 
fluctuating. On that basis, I consider many of the ways that the labs engage with their 
external environments as much more active and proactive than, say, many geology or 
astronomy departments. That being said, I still consider the three modes of 
responsibility for the truth, the business and the public as rather pervasive within the 
institutions of science, while the specific ways of relating to these may differ. This 
consideration is based partly on the finding that public sector developments seem to 
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matter greatly for the scientists’ understandings of their responsibility and partly on 
the journal papers that were the basis for the analysis of the political rationalities on 
responsibility in science. Scientists from various disciplines covering the natural 
sciences, the humanities and social sciences authored these articles and the different 
viewpoints crisscrossed disciplinary affiliations.  
 
10.2.2 IT MATTERS WHO ENTERS 
In the method section, I argued that whoever enters the laboratory matters for the 
final product. In this section, I will make some final reflections about how my 
position vis-à-vis the informants has had implications for the final product, that is, the 
knowledge presented in this dissertation.  
 
I had expected the scientists to be quite alienated by ‘social responsibility’ and 
perhaps even hold negative views toward such developments. But I gradually 
discovered that while they did have their reservations, these were usually grounded in 
the practical problems associated with how to apply these thoughts in their everyday 
work life. This initial finding led me to reconsider my position in relation to the 
literature on laboratory engagements. Some of these tend to present the scientists as 
being rather sceptical about including social concerns in their daily work due to their 
professional heritage – a position that I also observed and presented in the mode of 
Vocation. Mike Fortun sums up this attitude in science studies: 
 
‘So much of what I read in our disciplines of science studies is marked, or at least 
tinged, with a resentment […] toward both scientists and the sciences, as though if 
they had only been more humanistic, more ethical, more responsible, or had better 
values to begin with, we wouldn’t be faced with the ‘implications’ that justly 
preoccupy our attention.’ (Fortun 2005: 164) 
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So the results that I have presented in this dissertation are also motivated by a 
conscious decision to present a different story about scientists’ everyday work than 
the one Fortun (2005) describes. A story that is not about the scientists’ inability to be 
‘more humanistic’, ‘more ethical’ or ‘more responsible’. Instead, the intention has 
been to tell a story that is partly focused on the multiplicity and political character of 
‘Responsible Science’ and partly focused on describing the very practical aspects of 
being a ‘responsible’ professional. It was also a conscious decision to abandon the 
explanations of resistance and ways of interacting with society, which I already 
knew. I therefore decided to look at the empirical material from other angles instead. 
In that way, the results here are, of course, the result of the many interactions 
between the scientists and me. It is the scientists who have taught me so much about 
being responsible. But it is also the wilful decision of the ethnographer to search for 
and present different stories about scientific work. I could have also written a story 
that emphasised the more negative aspects of the interactions and given examples of 
hopeless misunderstandings and even insults between the informants and me. But I 
chose another approach. In that way, it does matter who enters. As ‘Responsible 
Science’ develops as an empirical object, more diverse studies of the phenomenon 
will hopefully appear, so that the inherent conflicts and facets of the phenomenon 
become visible.   
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10.3 FURTHER WORK WITH ‘RESPONSIBLE SCIENCE’ 
The last theme I want to touch upon relates to the practical implications of this study. 
The empirical findings also establish momentum for considering how to move 
forward with the framework for ‘Responsible Science’ at the political level.  
 
First, one of the main points from this study is that scientists reflect quite a bit upon 
their responsibilities toward society, but it takes a large amount of work to both 
navigate the complex set of expectations they face and to actually live up to them. 
The scientists will at times reject their responsibility to, for instance, work on 
obtaining public accountability for their plans. This is not necessarily because they 
are oblivious to the importance of doing so, both from a professional and a 
democratic perspective. In many instances, it is because they simply do not consider 
it their main responsibility and do not have time for it. If the work with ‘Responsible 
Science’ is to be a success in practice in the actual laboratories, it seems important 
that the theme be very closely interwoven with the scientists’ daily work and very 
closely related to their theme of research, so they can conceive of it as a meaningful 
endeavour in relation to their other work obligations.  
 
A second point stems from the observation that the kind of science the scientists do 
matters for the way they perceive of their responsibility. Science is a complex 
institution with a multitude of different goals and disciplines. Therefore, it seems 
pertinent that a certain amount of flexibility is introduced into the work with 
‘Responsible Science’. I showed how some scientists even experience guilt about 
conducting ‘basic science’ because they consider it illegitimate not to develop 
something that can be applied outside the lab. Feeling guilty about one’s work is not 
very productive, neither for the hardworking scientists nor for the scientific work 
itself. While recent demands for ‘Responsible Science’ are not solely responsible for 
this development, it does perhaps enforce the guilt because demands for both 
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legitimacy and commercialisation seem to be inherent in the calls for responsible 
science (Kearnes & Rip 2009). To counteract these developments, it seems to be a 
good idea to introduce flexibility into the concept. By that I do not mean a scale 
going from ‘less’ to ‘more’ responsible, which the scientists can choose from. Rather, 
it seems that they should be able to argue for the responsibility of their actions from a 
range of different perspectives that make sense in relation their exact niche and 
eventual end-users.  
 
This leads me to the third point, namely, that it is important that the ideas of 
‘Responsible Science’ make sense in relation to the scientists’ daily work. This 
means that it is acknowledged that work with public engagement takes time and 
energy from other responsibilities; that the demands to be more ‘responsible’ are 
recognisable in relation to the actual work done in the laboratories and – perhaps 
most significantly – it is important to help with the confusion the scientists feel in 
relation to the very different evaluation criteria of their work. In that way, the role of 
the social sciences is perhaps not so much to underline the importance of ethical and 
social aspects of science, but more to help the scientists navigate and make sense of 
their many work tasks.  
 
The very last point that I want to make is that it is also important to notice the shift 
from internal ethics to the external demands for accountability, which is part of the 
demands for ‘Responsible Science’. While the intentions of this shift are very noble, 
it is still an open question as to whether more participation and inclusion in the 
government of science will lead to a more responsible, or perhaps even sustainable, 
science. Only further empirical work with ‘Responsible Science’ can answer that 
question.   
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